A Theory of Knowledge
GA 2
I. The Point of Departure
[ 1 ] When we trace any one of the intellectual currents of the present time back to its source, we invariably arrive at one of the great spirits of our “classical age.” Goethe or Schiller, Herder or Lessing gave an impulse; and from this impulse has issued this or that intellectual movement which continues even to-day. Our whole German culture is based so squarely upon the great writers of that epoch that many who consider themselves entirely original achieve nothing more than the expression of what was long ago intimated by Goethe or Schiller. We have entered into such a living union with the world created by them that any one who would turn aside from the track already pointed out by them can scarcely count upon being understood by us. Our way of looking upon life and the world is determined by them to such an extent that no one can arouse our sympathetic interest who does not seek for points of contact with our world as thus determined.
[ 2 ] Only as regards one branch of our intellectual life must we admit that it has not yet found such a point of contact. It is that branch of knowledge which proceeds beyond the mere assemblage of observed data, beyond the cognizance of single experiences, and seeks to provide a satisfying total view of the world and of life. It is that which is generally called philosophy. For this, our classical period actually seems to be non-existent. It seeks its salvation in an artificial seclusion and aristocratic isolation from all the rest of our intellectual life. This statement cannot be disproved by reference to the fact that a number of older and younger philosophers and scientists have undertaken to interpret Goethe and Schiller. For these have not attained to their scientific standpoints by developing the germs existing in the scientific works of these heroes of the mind. They have arrived at their scientific standpoints apart from the world-conception represented by Goethe and Schiller, and have afterwards compared them with this. And this they have done, not for the purpose of gaining from the scientific opinions of the great thinkers something to serve as a means of guidance for themselves, but rather to test these opinions and see whether they could be maintained in the face of their own course of reasoning. This point we shall later treat more thoroughly. First, however, we should like to point out the effects which this attitude toward the highest stage of evolution in contemporary culture produces in that field of knowledge with which we are concerned.
[ 3 ] A large part of the educated reading public of the present time will at once lay aside unread any literary-scientific work which lays claim to being philosophical. Seldom, if ever, has philosophy enjoyed so little favor as at present. Except for the writings of Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann, who have dealt with problems of life and the world of the most widespread interest and have, therefore, gained a wide circulation, it is not too much to say that philosophical works are at present read only by professional philosophers. Nobody except these persons concerns himself with such writings. The educated man who is not a specialist has the vague feeling: “These writings contain nothing suited to a person of my intellectual needs. What is there discussed does not concern me; it is in no way related to what I require for my mental satisfaction.” This lack of interest in philosophy cannot be due to anything other than the circumstance to which I have referred; for there exists, face to face with this indifference, an ever increasing need for a satisfying conception of the world and of life. The dogmas of religion, which were for a long time an adequate substitute, are more and more losing their convincing power. The need is steadily growing to attain through thought to that which man once owed to faith in revelation—the satisfaction of his spirit. The interest of cultured persons could not, therefore, be lacking if this particular branch of knowledge marched in step with the whole evolution of culture, if its representatives would take up a position with reference to the great questions that move humanity.
[ 4 ] In this matter we must always keep before our minds the truth that the proper procedure is never that of creating a spiritual need artificially, but quite the contrary: that of discovering the need which exists and satisfying this need. The task of science is not that of propounding questions but that of giving careful attention to these when they are put forth by human nature and by the contemporary stage of evolution, and of answering them. Our modern philosophers set tasks for themselves that are not at all the outflow of that stage of culture whereon we now stand—questions for which no one is seeking answers. Those questions which must be propounded by our culture, because of the position to which our great thinkers have elevated it, are passed over by science. Thus we possess a philosophical knowledge which no one is seeking and suffer from a philosophical need which no one satisfies.
[ 5 ] Our central branch of knowledge, that which ought to solve for us the real world-riddle, must not be an exception in comparison with all other branches of the intellectual life. It must seek for its sources where these have been found by the others. It must not only take cognizance of the great classic thinkers, but also seek in them the germs for its own evolution. The same wind must blow through this as through the rest of our culture. This is a necessity inhering in the very nature of things. To this necessity must we ascribe the fact that modern researchers have undertaken to interpret our classic writers as we have explained above. These interpretations reveal nothing more than a vague feeling that it will not suffice simply to pass over the convictions of those thinkers and proceed with the order of the day. But they prove only that no one has arrived at the point of a further developing of their opinions. This is evidenced by the manner in which the approach is made to Lessing, Herder, Goethe, and Schiller. In spite of all the excellence of many productions of this class, it must be said of almost everything that has been written in regard to the scientific works of Schiller and Goethe that it is not developed organically from Schiller's or Goethe's own views but takes a retrospective relationship to them. Nothing can more strongly substantiate this than the fact that representatives of the most diverse tendencies in science have seen in Goethe the genius who experienced beforehand premonitions of their points of view. Representatives of world-conceptions which possess absolutely nothing in common refer with seemingly equal justification to Goethe, when they feel the need to see their respective points of view recognized at a high point in human history. One can scarcely imagine a sharper contrast than that between the teachings of Hegel and Schopenhauer. The latter calls Hegel a charlatan and his philosophy a meaningless rubbish of words, mere nonsense, barbaric word-combinations. The two men actually have nothing whatever in common except their unlimited admiration for Goethe, and their belief that he acknowledged himself as adhering to their respective views of the world.
[ 6 ] Nor is the case different as regards more recent scientific tendencies. Haeckel, who has elaborated Darwinism with the gift of genius and with a logic as inflexible as iron, and whom we must consider by far the most significant follower of the English investigator, sees in Goethe's point of view the anticipation of his own. Another contemporary scientific investigator, A. F. W. Jessen, writes in regard to the theory of Darwin: “The stir which has been created among many specialists in research and many laymen by this theory—often before brought forward and as often disproved by thorough investigation, but now supported by many apparently sound arguments—shows how little, unfortunately, the results of scientific research are known and understood by people.”1Cf. Jessen: Botanik, der Gegenwart und Vorzeit, p. 459. In regard to Goethe, the same investigator says that he rose “to comprehensive researches in both inanimate and animate Nature,”2Ibid., p. 343. in that he found through a “thoughtful, deeply penetrating observation of Nature the fundamental law of all plant-formation.”3Ibid., p. 332. Each of these two investigators is able to cite a wearisome number of illustrations to show the harmony existing between his own scientific tendency and the “thoughtful observations of Goethe.” But, if each of these standpoints could justly refer to Goethe's thought, this must cast a dubious light upon the unity of that thinking. The basis of this phenomenon, however, lies in the very fact that neither of these points of view really grows out of Goethe's world-conception, but each has its roots quite outside that conception. The phenomenon arises from the fact that men seek out external agreement as to details, torn out of the totality of Goethe's thought and thus deprived of their meaning, but are not willing to attribute to this totality the inner fitness to serve as the basis for a scientific trend of thought. Goethe's opinions have never been made points of departure for scientific researches but always only material for instituting comparisons. Those who have busied themselves with these opinions have seldom been students surrendering themselves with unprejudiced minds to his ideas, but usually critics sitting in judgment upon him.
[ 7 ] It is even said that Goethe had far too little scientific sense; that he was all the worse philosopher for being so excellent a poet; that for this reason it would be impossible to find in him the basis for a scientific point of view. This is an utter misconception of Goethe's nature. Goethe was, to be sure, no philosopher in the ordinary sense of the term, but it must not be forgotten that the wonderful harmony of his personality led Schiller to declare: “The poet is the only true human being.” What Schiller here intended by the expression “true human being,”—this Goethe was. No element belonging to the very highest form of the universally human was lacking in his personality. But all these elements united in him to form a totality which is, as such, effectual. Thus it comes about that his opinions regarding Nature rest upon a profound philosophical sense even though this philosophical sense does not enter his consciousness in the form of definite scientific statements. Whoever immerses himself in that totality will be able—provided he brings with him philosophic capacities—to release this philosophic sense and set it forth as Goethe's form of knowledge. But he must take his point of departure from Goethe and not approach him with a ready-made opinion. Goethe's intellectual powers are always effective in the manner requisite to the most rigid philosophy, even though he has not left such a philosophy as a complete system.
[ 8 ] Goethe's view of the world is the most many-sided imaginable. It proceeds from a central point which rests in the unified nature of the poet, and it always brings to the fore that side which corresponds to the nature of the object. The unity of the activity of intellectual forces lies in the nature of Goethe; the temporary form of that activity is determined by the object concerned. Goethe borrowed his manner of observation from the external world instead of obtruding his own upon the world. Now, the thinking of many men is effectual only in one definite way; it serves only for a certain type of objects; it is not unified, as was Goethe's, but only uniform. Let us endeavor to express this more thoroughly:—There are men whose intellects are especially adapted to think out merely mechanical interdependencies and effects; they conceive the entire universe as a mechanism. Others have the impulse to take into consciousness everywhere the secret mystical element of the external world; they become adherents of mysticism. All sorts of errors arise from the fact that such a way of thinking, entirely appropriate to one type of objects, is declared to be universal. This explains the conflict between various world-conceptions. If a thinker holding such a one-sided conception confronts Goethe's view, which is unlimited—because it always takes its manner of observation, not from the mind of the observer, but from the nature of the thing observed—then it may easily be understood that this one-sided thinker lays hold upon that element in Goethe's thought which harmonizes with his own. Goethe's view of the world includes within itself, in just the sense indicated, many tendencies of thought, whereas it cannot in turn be penetrated by any one-sided conception.
[ 9 ] The philosophical sense, which is an essential element in the organism of the genius of Goethe, is also significant from the point of view of his poetry. Though it was alien to Goethe's mind to set forth in clear conceptual form what was mediated to him by this sense, as was done by Schiller, yet the philosophical sense was an active factor in his artistic creative work as in that of Schiller. Goethe's and Schiller's poetic productions are unthinkable apart from their world-conception, which was the background. In this matter we are concerned more with the actually formulated basic principles in Schiller, but in Goethe rather with the manner in which he looked at things. But the fact that the greatest poets of our nation at the climax of their creative work could not do without that philosophical element proves more than all else that this is a necessary constituent in the history of human evolution. Resting upon Goethe and Schiller will enable us to tear our central science away from its academic isolation and incorporate it into the rest of our cultural evolution. The scientific convictions of our great thinkers of the classic age are bound by a thousand ties to their other endeavors; they are such as were demanded by the cultural epoch which created them.
1. Ausgangspunkt
[ 1 ] Wenn wir irgendeine der Hauptströmungen des geistigen Lebens der Gegenwart nach rückwärts bis zu ihren Quellen verfolgen, so treffen wir wohl stets auf einen der Geister unserer klassischen Epoche. Goethe oder Schiller, Herder oder Lessing haben einen Impuls gegeben; und davon ist diese oder jene geistige Bewegung ausgegangen, die heute noch fortdauert. Unsere ganze deutsche Bildung fußt so sehr auf unseren Klassikern, daß wohl mancher, der sich vollkommen originell zu sein dünkt, nichts weiter vollbringt, als daß er ausspricht, was Goethe oder Schiller längst angedeutet haben. Wir haben uns in die durch sie geschaffene Welt so hineingelebt, daß kaum irgend jemand auf unser Verständnis rechnen darf, der sich außerhalb der von ihnen vorgezeichneten Bahn bewegen wollte. Unsere Art, die Welt und das Leben anzusehen, ist so sehr durch sie bestimmt, daß niemand unsere Teilnahme erregen kann, der nicht Berührungspunkte mit dieser Welt sucht.
[ 2 ] Nur von einem Zweig unserer geistigen Kultur müssen wir gestehen, daß er einen solchen Berührungspunkt noch nicht gefunden hat. Es ist jener Zweig der Wissenschaft, der über das bloße Sammeln von Beobachtungen, über die Kenntnisnahme einzelner Erfahrungen hinausgeht, um eine befriedigende Gesamtanschauung von Welt und Leben zu liefern. Es ist das, was man gewöhnlich Philosophie nennt. Für sie scheint unsere klassische Zeit geradezu nicht vorhanden zu sein. Sie sucht ihr Heil in einer künstlichen Abgeschlossenheit und vornehmen Isolierung von allem übrigen Geistesleben. Dieser Satz wird dadurch nicht widerlegt, daß sich eine stattliche Anzahl älterer und neuerer Philosophen und Naturforscher mit Goethe und Schiller auseinandergesetzt hat. Denn diese haben ihren wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt nicht dadurch gewonnen, daß sie die Keime in den wissenschaftlichen Leistungen jener Geistesheroen zur Entwicklung gebracht haben. Sie haben ihren wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt außerhalb jener Weltanschauung, die Schiller und Goethe vertreten haben, gewonnen und ihn nachträglich mit derselben verglichen. Sie haben das auch nicht in der Absicht getan, um aus den wissenschaftlichen Ansichten der Klassiker etwas für ihre Richtung zu gewinnen, sondern um dieselben zu prüfen, ob sie vor dieser ihrer eigenen Richtung bestehen können. Wir werden darauf noch näher zurückkommen. Vorerst möchten wir nur auf die Folgen verweisen, die sich aus dieser Haltung gegenüber der höchsten Entwickelungsstufe der Kultur der Neuzeit für das in Betracht kommende Wissenschaftsgebiet ergeben.
[ 3 ] Ein großer Teil des gebildeten Lesepublikums wird heute eine literarischwissenschaftliche Arbeit sogleich ungelesen von sich weisen, wenn sie mit dem Anspruche auftritt, eine philosophische zu sein. Kaum in irgendeiner Zeit hat sich die Philosophie eines geringeren Maßes von Beliebtheit erfreut als gegenwärtig. Sieht man von den Schriften Schopenhauers und Eduard von Hartmanns ab, die Lebens- und Weltprobleme von allgemeinstem Interesse behandeln und deshalb weite Verbreitung gefunden haben, so wird man nicht zu weit gehen, wenn man sagt: philosophische Arbeiten werden heute nur von Fachphilosophen gelesen. Niemand außer diesen kümmert sich darum. Der Gebildete, der nicht Fachmann ist, hat das unbestimmte Gefühl: «Diese Literatur a1Die Stimmung, die hinter diesem Urteil über die Art des philosophischen Schrifttums und das Interesse, das diesem entgegengebracht wird, liegt, ist aus der Geistesverfassung des wissenschaftlichen Strebens um die Mitte der achtziger Jahre des vorigen Jahrhunderts entstanden. Seit dieser Zeit sind Erscheinungen zutage getreten, denen gegenüber dieses Urteil nicht mehr berechtigt erscheint. Man braucht nur an die blendenden Beleuchtungen zu denken, welche weite Lebensgebiete durch Nietzsches Gedanken und Empfindungen erfahren haben. Und in den Kämpfen, die sich zwischen den materialistisch denkenden Monisten und den Verteidigern einer geistgemäßen Weltanschauung abspielten und bis heute abspielen, lebt sowohl das Streben des philosophischen Denkens nach lebenerfülltem Gehalt wie auch ein weitgehendes allgemeines Interesse an den Rätselfragen des Daseins. Gedankenwege wie die aus der physikalischen Weltanschauung entsprungenen Einsteins sind fast zum Gegenstande allgemeiner Gespräche und literarischer Auslassungen geworden.
Und dennoch haben die Motive, aus denen damals dieses Urteil gefällt worden ist, auch heute noch Geltung. Schriebe man es heute nieder, man müßte es anders formulieren. Da es als ein nahezu altes heute wieder erscheint, ist es wohl angemessener, zu sagen, inwiefern es noch immer Geltung hat. - Goethes Weltanschauung, deren Erkenntnistheorie in der vorliegenden Schrift gezeichnet werden sollte, geht von dem Erleben des ganzen Menschen aus. Diesem Erleben gegenüber ist die denkende Weltbetrachtung nur eine Seite. Aus der Fülle des menschlichen Seins steigen gewissermaßen Gedankengestaltungen an die Oberfläche des Seelenlebens. Ein Teil dieser Gedankenbilder umfaßt eine Antwort auf die Frage: Was ist das menschliche Erkennen? Und es fällt diese Antwort so aus, daß man siebt: das menschliche Sein wird erst zu dem, worauf es veranlagt ist, wenn es sieh erkennend betätigt. Seelenleben ohne Erkenntnis wäre wie Menschenorganismus ohne Kopf; das heißt, es wäre gar nicht. Im Innenleben der Seele erwächst ein Inhalt, der wie der hungernde Organismus nach Nahrung, so nach Wahrnehmung von außen verlangt; und in der Außenwelt ist Wahrnehmungsinhalt, der sein Wesen nicht in sieh trägt, sondern es erst zeigt, wenn er mit dem Seeleninhalt vereinigt wird durch den Erkenntnisvorgang. So wird der Erkenntnisvorgang ein Glied in der Gestaltung der Welt-Wirklichkeit. Der Mensch schafft an dieser Welt-Wirklichkeit mit, indem er erkennt. Und wenn eine Pflanzenwurzel nicht denkbar ist ohne die Vollendung ihrer Anlagen in der Frucht, so ist nicht etwa nur der Mensch, sondern die Welt nicht abgeschlossen, ohne daß erkannt wird. Im Erkennen schafft der Mensch nicht für sich allein etwas, sondern er schafft mit der Welt zusammen an der Offenbarung des wirklichen Seins. Was im Menschen ist, ist ideeller Schein; was in der wahrzunehmenden Welt ist, ist Sinnenschein; das erkennende Ineinanderarbeiten der beiden ist erst Wirklichkeit.
So angesehen wird Erkenntnistheorie ein Teil des Lebens. Und so muß sie angesehen werden, wenn sie an die Lebens-Weiten des Goethesehen Seelen-Erlebens angeschlossen wird. Aber an solche Lebens-Weiten knüpft auch Nietzsches Denken und Empfinden nicht an. Noch weniger dasjenige, was sonst als philosophisch gerichtete Welt- und Lebensanschauung seit der Niederschrift des in dieser Schrift als «Ausgangspunkt» bezeichneten enstanden ist. Alles dies setzt doch voraus, daß die Wirklichkeit irgendwo außer dem Erkennen vorhanden sei, und in dem Erkennen eine menschliche, abbildliche Darstellung dieser Wirklichkeit sieh ergeben soll, oder auch, sich nicht ergeben kann. Daß diese Wirklichkeit durch das Erkennen nicht gefunden werden kann, weil sie als Wirklichkeit im Erkennen erst geschaffen wird, das wird kaum irgendwo empfunden. Die philosophisch Denkenden suchen das Leben und Sein außer dem Erkennen; Goethe steht im schaffenden Leben und Sein, indem er sieh erkennend betätigt. Deshalb stehen auch die neueren Weltanschauungsversuche außerhalb der Goetheschen Ideenschöpfung.
Diese Erkenntnistheorie möchte innerhalb derselben stehen, weil dadurch Philosophie Lebens-Inhalt und das Interesse an ihr lebensnotwendig wird. enthält nichts, was einem meiner geistigen Bedürfnisse entsprechen würde; die Dinge, die da abgehandelt werden, gehen mich nichts an; sie hängen in keiner Weise mit dem zusammen, was ich zur Befriedigung meines Geistes notwendig habe.» An diesem Mangel an Interesse für alle Philosophie kann nur der von uns angedeutete Umstand die Schuld tragen, denn es steht jener Interesselosigkeit ein stets wachsendes Bedürfnis nach einer befriedigenden Welt- und Lebensanschauung gegenüber. Was für so viele lange Zeit ein voller Ersatz war: die religiösen Dogmen verlieren immer mehr an überzeugender Kraft. Der Drang nimmt immer zu, das durch die Arbeit des Denkens zu erringen, was man einst dem Offenbarungsglauben verdankte: Befriedigung des Geistes. An Teilnahme der Gebildeten könnte es daher nicht fehlen, wenn das in Rede stehende Wissenschaftsgebiet wirklich Hand in Hand ginge mit der ganzen Kulturentwickelung, wenn seine Vertreter Stellung nehmen würden zu den großen Fragen, die die Menschheit bewegen.
[ 4 ] Man muß sich dabei immer vor Augen halten, daß es sich nie darum handeln kann, erst künstlich ein geistiges Bedürfnis zu erzeugen, sondern allein darum, das bestehende aufzusuchen und ihm Befriedigung zu gewähren.a2Fragen des Erkennens entstehen an der Anschauung der Außenwelt durch die menschliche Seelenorganisation. In dem Seelenimpuls der Frage liegt die Kraft, an die Anschauung so heranzudringen, daß diese mit der Seelenbetätigung zusammen die Wirklichkeit des Angeschauten zur Offenbarung bringt. Nicht das Aufwerfen von Fragen ist die Aufgabe der Wissenschaft, sondern das sorgfältige Beobachten derselben, wenn sie von der Menschennatur und der jeweiligen Kulturstufe gestellt werden, und ihre Beantwortung. Unsere modernen Philosophen stellen sich Aufgaben, die durchaus kein natürlicher Ausfluß der Bildungsstufe sind, auf der wir stehen, und nach deren Beantwortung daher niemand frägt. An jenen Fragen aber, die unsere Bildung vermöge jenes Standortes, auf den sie unsere Klassiker gehoben haben, stellen muß, geht die Wissenschaft vorüber. So haben wir eine Wissenschaft, nach der niemand sucht, und ein wissenschaftliches Bedürfnis, das von niemandem befriedigt wird.
[ 5 ] Unsere zentrale Wissenschaft, jene Wissenschaft, die uns die eigentlichen Welträtsel lösen soll, darf keine Ausnahme machen gegenüber allen anderen Zweigen des Geisteslebens. Sie muß ihre Quellen dort suchen,wo sie die letzteren gefunden haben. Sie muß sich mit unseren Klassikern nicht nur auseinandersetzen; sie muß bei ihnen auch die Keime zu ihrer Entwickelung suchen; es muß sie der gleiche Zug wie unsere übrige Kultur durchwehen. Das ist eine in der Natur der Sache liegende Notwendigkeit. Ihr ist es auch zuzuschreiben, daß die oben bereits berührten Auseinandersetzungen moderner Forscher mit den Klassikern stattgefunden haben. Sie zeigen aber nichts weiter, als daß man ein dunkles Gefühl hat von der Unstatthaftigkeit, über die Überzeugungen jener Geister einfach zur Tagesordnung überzugehen. Sie zeigen aber auch, daß man es zur wirklichen Weiterentwickelung ihrer Ansichten nicht gebracht hat. Dafür spricht die Art, wie man an Lessing, Herder, Goethe, Schiller herangetreten ist. Bei aller Vortrefflichkeit vieler hierher gehöriger Schriften muß man doch fast von allem, was über Goethes und Schillers wissenschaftliche Arbeiten geschrieben worden ist, sagen, daß es sich nicht organisch aus deren Anschauungen herausgebildet, sondern sich in ein nachträgliches Verhältnis zu denselben gesetzt hat. Keine Tatsache kann das mehr erhärten als die, daß die entgegengesetztesten wissenschaftlichen Richtungen in Goethe den Geist gesehen haben, der ihre Ansichten «vorausgeahnt» hat. Weltanschauungen, die gar nichts miteinander gemein haben, weisen mit scheinbar gleichem Recht auf Goethe hin, wenn sie das Bedürfnis empfinden, ihren Standpunkt auf den Höhen der Menschheit anerkannt zu sehen. Man kann sich keine schärferen Gegensätze denken als die Lehre Hegels und Schopenhauers. Dieser nennt Hegel einen Scharlatan, seine Philosophie seichten Wortkram, baren Unsinn, barbarische Wortzusammenstellungen. Beide Männer haben eigentlich gar nichts miteinander gemein als eine unbegrenzte Verehrung für Goethe und den Glauben, daß der letztere sich zu ihrer Weltansicht bekannt habe.
[ 6 ] Mit neueren wissenschaftlichen Richtungen ist es nicht anders. Haeckel, der mit eiserner Konsequenz und in genialischer Weise den Darwinismus ausgebaut hat, den wir als den weitaus bedeutendsten Anhänger des englischen Forschers ansehen müssen, sieht in der Goetheschen Ansicht die seinige vorgebildet. Ein anderer Naturforscher der Gegenwart, C. F. W. Jessen, schreibt von der Theorie Darwins: «Das Aufsehen, welches diese früher schon oft vorgebrachte und von gründlicher Forschung ebenso oft widerlegte, jetzt aber mit vielen Scheingründen unterstützte Theorie bei manchen Spezialforschern und vielen Laien gefunden hat, zeigt, wie wenig leider noch immer die Ergebnisse der Naturforschung von den Völkern erkannt und begriffen sind.» 3C. F. W. Jessen, Botanik der Gegenwart und Vorzeit in Kulturhistorischer Entwicklung, Leipzig 1864, Seite 459. Von Goethe sagt derselbe Forscher, daß er sich «zu umfassenden Forschungen in der leblosen wie in der belebten Natur aufgeschwungen» 4ebenda, Seite 343. habe, indem er «in sinniger, tiefdringender Naturbetrachtung das Grundgesetz aller Pflanzenbildung» 5ebenda, Seite 332. fand. Jeder der genannten Forscher weiß in schier erdrückender Zahl Belege für die Übereinstimmung seiner wissenschaftlichen Richtung mit den «sinnigen Beobachtungen Goethes» zu erbringen. Es müßte denn doch wohl ein bedenkliches Licht auf die Einheitlichkeit Goetheschen Denkens werfen, wenn sich jeder dieser Standpunkte mit Recht auf dasselbe berufen könnte. Der Grund dieser Erscheinung liegt aber eben darinnen, daß doch keine dieser Ansichten wirklich aus der Goetheschen Weltanschauung herausgewachsen ist, sondern daß jede ihre Wurzeln außerhalb derselben hat. Er liegt darinnen, daß man zwar nach äußerer Übereinstimmung mit Einzelheiten, die, aus dem ganzen Goetheschen Denken herausgerissen, ihren Sinn verlieren, sucht, daß man aber diesem Ganzen selbst nicht die innere Gediegenheit zugestehen will, eine wissenschaftliche Richtung zu begründen. Goethes Ansichten waren nie Ausgangspunkt wissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen, sondern stets nur Vergleichungsobjekt. Die sich mit ihm beschäftigten, waren selten Schüler, die sich unbefangenen Sinnes seinen Ideen hingaben, sondern zumeist Kritiker, die über ihn zu Gericht saßen.
[ 7] Man sagt eben, Goethe habe viel zu wenig wissenschaftlichen Sinn gehabt; er war ein um so schlechterer Philosoph, als er besserer Dichter war. Deshalb wäre es unmöglich, einen wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt auf ihn zu stützen. Das ist eine vollständige Verkennung der Natur Goethes. Goethe war allerdings kein Philosoph im gewöhnlichen Sinne des Wortes; aber es darf nicht vergessen werden, daß die wunderbare Harmonie seiner Persönlichkeit Schiller zu dem Ausspruche führte: «Der Dichter ist der einzige wahre Mensch.» Das, was Schiller hier unter dem «wahren Menschen» versteht, das war Goethe. In seiner Persönlichkeit fehlte kein Element, das zur höchsten Ausprägung des Allgemein-Menschlichen gehört. Aber alle diese Elemente vereinigten sich in ihm zu einer Totalität, die als solche wirksam ist. So kommt es, daß seinen Ansichten über die Natur ein tiefer philosophischer Sinn zugrunde liegt, wenngleich dieser philosophische Sinn nicht in Form bestimmter wissenschaftlicher Sätze zu seinem Bewußtsein kommt. Wer sich in jene Totalität vertieft, der wird, wenn er philosophische Anlagen mitbringt, jenen philosophischen Sinn loslösen und ihn als Goethesche Wissenschaft darlegen können. Er muß aber von Goethe ausgehen und nicht mit einer fertigen Ansicht an ihn herantreten. Goethes Geisteskräfte sind immer in einer Weise wirksam, wie sie der strengsten Philosophie gemäß ist, wenn er auch kein systematisches Ganze derselben hinterlassen hat.
[ 8 ] Goethes Weltansicht ist die denkbar vielseitigste. Sie geht von einem Zentrum aus, das in der einheitlichen Natur des Dichters gelegen ist, und kehrt immer jene Seite hervor, die der Natur des betrachteten Gegenstandes entspricht. Die Einheitlichkeit der Betätigung der Geisteskräfte liegt in der Natur Goethes, die jeweilige Art dieser Betätigung wird durch das betreffende Objekt bestimmt. Goethe entlehnt die Betrachtungsweise der Außenwelt und zwingt sie ihr nicht auf. Nun ist aber das Denken vieler Menschen nur in einer bestimmten Weise wirksam; es ist nur für eine Gattung von Objekten dienlich; es ist nicht wie das Goethesche einheitlich, sondern einförmig Wir wollen uns genauer ausdrücken: Es gibt Menschen, deren Verstand vornehmlich geeignet ist, rein mechanische Abhängigkeiten und Wirkungen zu denken; sie stellen sich das ganze Universum als einen Mechanismus vor. Andere haben einen Drang, das geheimnisvolle, mystische Element der Außenwelt überall wahrzunehmen; sie werden Anhänger des Mystizismus. Aller Irrtum entsteht dadurch, daß eine solche Denkweise, die ja für eine Gattung von Objekten volle Geltung hat, für universell erklärt wird. So erklärt sich der Widerstreit der vielen Weltanschauungen. Tritt nun eine solche einseitige Auffassung der Goetheschen gegenüber, die unbeschränkt ist, weil sie die Betrachtungsweise überhaupt nicht aus dem Geiste des Betrachters, sondern aus der Natur des Betrachteten entnimmt, so ist es begreiflich, daß sie sich an jene Gedankenelemente derselben anklammert, die ihr gemäß sind. Goethes Weltansicht schließt eben in dem angedeuteten Sinne viele Denkrichtungen in sich, während sie von keiner einseitigen Auffassung je durchdrungen werden kann.
[ 9 ] Der philosophische Sinn, der ein wesentliches Element in dem Organismus des Goetheschen Genius ist, hat auch für seine Dichtungen Bedeutung. Wenn es Goethe auch ferne lag, das, was dieser Sinn ihm vermittelte, in begrifflich klarer Form sich vorzulegen, wie dies Schiller imstande war, so ist es doch wie bei Schiller ein Faktor, der bei seinem künstlerischen Schaffen mitwirkt. Goethes und Schillers dichterische Produktionen sind ohne ihre im Hintergrunde derselben stehende Weltanschauung nicht denkbar. Dabei kommt es bei Schiller mehr auf seine wirklich ausgebildeten Grundsätze, bei Goethe auf die Art seines Anschauens an. Daß aber die größten Dichter unserer Nation auf der Höhe ihres Schaffens jenes philosophischen Elementes nicht entraten konnten, bürgt mehr als alles andere dafür, daß dasselbe in der Entwickelungsgeschichte der Menschheit ein notwendiges Glied ist. Gerade die Anlehnung an Goethe und Schiller wird es ermöglichen, unsere zentrale Wissenschaft ihrer Kathedereinsamkeit zu entreißen und der übrigen Kulturentwickelung einzuverleiben. Die wissenschaftlichen Überzeugungen unserer Klassiker hängen mit tausend Fäden an ihren übrigen Bestrebungen, sie sind solche,welche von der Kulturepoche, die sie geschaffen, gefordert werden.
1. Starting Point
[ 1 ] If we trace any of the main currents of contemporary intellectual life backwards to their sources, we will probably always encounter one of the spirits of our classical epoch. Goethe or Schiller, Herder or Lessing have given an impulse; and from this or that intellectual movement has proceeded, which still continues today. Our whole German education is based so much on our classics that many a man who thinks himself completely original accomplishes nothing more than to express what Goethe or Schiller have long since indicated. We have lived ourselves into the world created by them in such a way that hardly anyone can count on our understanding who wants to move outside the path they have laid out. Our way of viewing the world and life is so determined by them that no one can arouse our participation who does not seek points of contact with this world.
[ 2 ] Only of one branch of our spiritual culture must we confess that it has not yet found such a point of contact. It is that branch of science which goes beyond the mere collection of observations, beyond the knowledge of individual experiences, in order to provide a satisfactory overall view of the world and life. It is what is usually called philosophy. Our classical age seems to be virtually non-existent for it. It seeks its salvation in an artificial seclusion and noble isolation from all other intellectual life. This proposition is not refuted by the fact that a considerable number of older and newer philosophers and naturalists have discussed Goethe and Schiller. For they did not gain their scientific standpoint by developing the germs of the scientific achievements of those intellectual heroes. They gained their scientific point of view outside the world view that Schiller and Goethe represented and subsequently compared it with it. Nor did they do this with the intention of gaining something for their own direction from the scientific views of the classics, but rather to test whether they could stand up to their own direction. We will come back to this in more detail. For now, we would just like to point out the consequences that arise from this attitude towards the highest stage of development of modern culture for the field of science under consideration.
[ 3 ] A large part of the educated reading public today will immediately reject a literary-scientific work without reading it if it claims to be philosophical. There has hardly been a time when philosophy has enjoyed less popularity than it does today. Leaving aside the writings of Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann, which deal with problems of life and the world that are of the most general interest and have therefore been widely disseminated, it would not be going too far to say that philosophical works are only read by specialist philosophers today. No one except them cares. The educated person who is not a specialist has the vague feeling: "This literature a1The mood that lies behind this judgment about the nature of philosophical writing and the interest shown in it has arisen from the state of mind of scientific endeavor around the middle of the eighties of the last century. Since then, phenomena have come to light that no longer seem to justify this judgment. One need only think of the dazzling illumination that wide areas of life have experienced through Nietzsche's thoughts and feelings. And in the battles that took place and continue to take place today between the materialistically thinking monists and the defenders of a spiritual world view, both the striving of philosophical thought for life-fulfilling content and a broad general interest in the mysteries of existence are alive. Paths of thought such as Einstein's, which arose from the physical world view, have almost become the subject of general conversations and literary omissions.
And yet the motifs from which this judgment was made back then are still valid today. If it were written down today, it would have to be formulated differently. Since it appears as an almost old one again today, it is probably more appropriate to say to what extent it is still valid. - Goethe's world view, the epistemology of which was to be outlined in this essay, is based on the experience of the whole human being. Compared to this experience, the thinking view of the world is only one side. From the fullness of human existence, thought-forms rise to the surface of the soul's life. A part of these thought-images comprises an answer to the question: What is human cognition? And this answer turns out in such a way that one sifts: human existence only becomes what it is predisposed to be when it is cognitively active. Soul life without cognition would be like the human organism without a head; that is, it would not be at all. In the inner life of the soul grows a content which, like the starving organism, demands nourishment, so it demands perception from outside; and in the outer world there is perceptual content which does not carry its essence within itself, but only shows it when it is united with the soul content through the process of cognition. Thus the process of cognition becomes a link in the formation of world-reality. The human being co-creates this world-reality by recognizing. And if a plant root is inconceivable without the completion of its plants in the fruit, then not only the human being, but the world is not complete without cognition. In cognizing, man does not create something for himself alone, but he creates together with the world in the revelation of real being. What is in man is ideal appearance; what is in the world to be perceived is sense appearance; the cognitive working together of the two is only reality.
Seen in this way, epistemology becomes a part of life. And this is how it must be regarded when it is connected to the life-widths of Goethean soul-experience. But Nietzsche's thinking and feeling are not linked to such life-spans either. Still less that which has otherwise emerged as a philosophically directed world- and life-view since the writing of what is called the "starting point" in this essay. All this presupposes that reality exists somewhere outside of cognition, and that a human, pictorial representation of this reality should arise in cognition, or that it cannot arise. The fact that this reality cannot be found through cognition, because it is first created as reality in cognition, is hardly felt anywhere. Those who think philosophically seek life and being apart from cognition; Goethe stands in creative life and being by being active in cognition. That is why the newer attempts at a world view also stand outside Goethe's creation of ideas. This theory of knowledge would like to stand within it, because philosophy thereby becomes the content of life and interest in it becomes vital. contains nothing that would correspond to one of my spiritual needs; the things that are dealt with there are of no concern to me; they are in no way connected with what I need to satisfy my spirit." This lack of interest in all philosophy can only be due to the circumstance we have indicated, because this lack of interest is countered by an ever-growing need for a satisfying view of the world and life. What for so many was a full substitute for a long time: religious dogmas are losing more and more of their convincing power. The urge to achieve through the work of thinking what was once owed to revelatory faith is increasing: satisfaction of the spirit. There could therefore be no lack of participation by the educated if the field of science in question really went hand in hand with the whole development of culture, if its representatives were to take a stand on the great questions that move humanity.
[ 4 ] It must always be borne in mind that it can never be a question of first artificially creating a spiritual need, but only of seeking out the existing need and granting it satisfaction.a2Questions of cognition arise from the perception of the external world through the human soul organization. In the soul impulse of the question lies the power to approach the perception in such a way that this, together with the soul activity, brings the reality of what is seen to revelation. The task of science is not to raise questions, but to carefully observe them when they are posed by human nature and the respective cultural stage, and to answer them. Our modern philosophers set themselves tasks which are by no means a natural outgrowth of the stage of education at which we stand, and the answers to which no one therefore asks. But science passes by those questions which our education must ask because of the position to which our classics have elevated it. So we have a science that no one is looking for and a scientific need that no one satisfies.
[ 5 ] Our central science, the science that is supposed to solve the real riddles of the world, must make no exceptions to all other branches of intellectual life. It must seek its sources where the latter have found them. It must not only deal with our classics; it must also look to them for the seeds of its development; it must be imbued with the same spirit as the rest of our culture. This is a necessity in the nature of things. It is also due to this necessity that the above-mentioned disputes between modern scholars and the classics have taken place. But they show nothing more than that one has a dark feeling of the inadmissibility of simply passing over the convictions of those spirits to the order of the day. They also show, however, that no real further development of their views has been achieved. The way in which Lessing, Herder, Goethe and Schiller were approached speaks for this. For all the excellence of many of the writings belonging here, it must be said of almost everything that has been written about Goethe's and Schiller's scientific work that it has not developed organically from their views, but has been placed in a subsequent relationship to them. No fact can substantiate this more than the fact that the most opposing scientific schools saw in Goethe the spirit that "foreshadowed" their views. World views that have nothing at all in common with each other point to Goethe with seemingly equal justification when they feel the need to see their point of view recognized on the heights of humanity. No sharper contrasts can be imagined than the teachings of Hegel and Schopenhauer. The latter calls Hegel a charlatan, his philosophy shallow verbiage, barbaric nonsense, barbaric combinations of words. The two men have nothing in common except an unbounded admiration for Goethe and the belief that the latter subscribed to their world view.
[ 6 ] It is no different with more recent scientific trends. Haeckel, who developed Darwinism with iron consistency and in an ingenious manner, and whom we must regard as by far the most important follower of the English scientist, sees Goethe's view as prefiguring his own. Another contemporary naturalist, C. F. W. Jessen, writes of Darwin's theory: "The sensation which this theory, often put forward in the past and just as often refuted by thorough research, but now supported by many bogus reasons, has caused among some specialist researchers and many laymen, shows how little the results of natural research are unfortunately still recognized and understood by the people." 3C. F. W. Jessen, Botanik der Gegenwart und Vorzeit in Kulturhistorischer Entwicklung, Leipzig 1864, page 459. The same researcher says of Goethe that he "rose to comprehensive research in both inanimate and animate nature" 4ibid, page 343 by finding "the basic law of all plant formation" 5ibid, page 332 in a sensible, deeply penetrating observation of nature. Each of the aforementioned researchers knows how to provide an almost overwhelming number of proofs for the agreement of his scientific direction with Goethe's "sensible observations". It would have to cast a dubious light on the unity of Goethe's thought if each of these points of view could justifiably refer to the same thing. The reason for this phenomenon, however, lies precisely in the fact that none of these views has really grown out of Goethe's world view, but that each has its roots outside it. It lies in the fact that one seeks external agreement with details which, torn out of Goethe's thinking as a whole, lose their meaning, but that one does not want to concede to this whole itself the internal solidity to establish a scientific direction. Goethe's views were never the starting point of scientific investigations, but always only the object of comparison. Those who studied him were rarely students who devoted themselves to his ideas with an unbiased mind, but mostly critics who sat in judgment of him.
[ 7] It is said that Goethe had far too little scientific sense; he was all the worse a philosopher than he was a better poet. It would therefore be impossible to base a scientific point of view on him. That is a complete misjudgment of Goethe's nature. Goethe was certainly not a philosopher in the ordinary sense of the word; but it must not be forgotten that the wonderful harmony of his personality led Schiller to say: "The poet is the only true man." That which Schiller here understands by the "true man" was Goethe. There was no element missing in his personality that belonged to the highest expression of the universal human. But all these elements united in him to form a totality that is effective as such. So it happens that his views on nature are based on a deep philosophical meaning, even if this philosophical meaning does not come to his consciousness in the form of specific scientific propositions. Anyone who immerses himself in that totality will, if he has philosophical dispositions, be able to detach that philosophical sense and present it as a Goethean science. But he must start from Goethe and not approach him with a ready-made view. Goethe's intellectual powers are always active in a way that corresponds to the strictest philosophy, even if he did not leave behind a systematic whole of it.
[ 8 ] Goethe's view of the world is the most versatile imaginable. It proceeds from a center which is situated in the unified nature of the poet, and always brings out that side which corresponds to the nature of the object under consideration. The uniformity of the activity of the spiritual forces lies in Goethe's nature; the respective kind of this activity is determined by the object in question. Goethe borrows the way of looking at the outside world and does not impose it on it. However, the thinking of many people is only effective in one particular way; it is only useful for one kind of object; it is not uniform like Goethe's, but uniform. Let us be more precise: there are people whose minds are primarily suited to thinking purely mechanical dependencies and effects; they imagine the whole universe as a mechanism. Others have an urge to perceive the mysterious, mystical element of the outer world everywhere; they become followers of mysticism. All error arises from the fact that such a way of thinking, which is fully valid for one kind of object, is declared to be universal. This explains the conflict between the many world views. If such a one-sided view now confronts Goethe's, which is unrestricted because it takes the way of looking at things not at all from the mind of the observer but from the nature of what is observed, it is understandable that it clings to those elements of thought in it which are in accordance with it. Goethe's view of the world includes many schools of thought in the sense indicated, while it can never be penetrated by any one-sided view.
[ 9 ] The philosophical sense, which is an essential element in the organism of Goethe's genius, also has significance for his poetry. Even if Goethe was far removed from presenting what this sense conveyed to him in a conceptually clear form, as Schiller was able to do, it is nevertheless, as with Schiller, a factor that contributes to his artistic creation. Goethe's and Schiller's poetic productions are inconceivable without their underlying world view. In Schiller's case it depends more on his truly developed principles, in Goethe's on the kind of his view. But the fact that the greatest poets of our nation at the height of their creativity could not do without this philosophical element is more than anything else a guarantee that it is a necessary element in the history of human development. It is precisely the reference to Goethe and Schiller that will make it possible to wrest our central science from its cathederal isolation and incorporate it into the rest of cultural development. The scientific convictions of our classicists are linked by a thousand threads to their other endeavors, they are those that are demanded by the cultural epoch that created them.