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A Theory of Knowledge
GA 2

III. The Function of This Branch of Science

[ 1 ] With regard to all knowledge, that holds true which Goethe expressed so aptly in the words: “Theory is of no use in and of itself save as it causes us to believe in the interrelationship of phenomena.” By means of science, we are always bringing separate facts of experience into relationship. We perceive in inorganic Nature causes and effects separated, and we seek for their connection in the appropriate sciences. In the organic world we become aware of species and genera of organisms, and we endeavor to establish the reciprocal relationships among them. Single cultural epochs of humanity appear before us in history, and we endeavor to learn the inner dependence of one evolutionary stage upon another. Thus every branch of science has to work in some definite field of phenomena in the sense conveyed by the statement quoted above from Goethe.

[ 2 ] Each branch of science has its sphere in which it seeks for the interrelationship among phenomena. But there yet remains a great antithesis in our scientific endeavors: on one side, the ideal world4die ideele Welt—the world of ideas gained by the sciences, and, on the other, the objects upon which that world is based. There must be a branch of science which here also clarifies the interrelationships. The ideal and the real world, the antithesis between idea and reality,—these constitute the problem of such a science. These contrasting elements also must be understood in their reciprocal relationships.

[ 3 ] It is the purpose of the following discussion to seek for these relationships. The facts of science on the one hand and Nature and history on the other are to be brought into relationship. What is the significance of the reflection of the external world in human consciousness? What relationship exists between our thinking about the objects of reality and these objects themselves?

3. Die Aufgabe unserer Wissenschaft

[ 1 ] Von aller Wissenschaft gilt zuletzt das, was Goethe so bezeichnend mit den Worten ausspricht: «Die Theorie an und für sich ist nichts nütze, als insofern sie uns an den Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen glauben macht.» Stets bringen wir durch die Wissenschaft getrennte Tatsachen der Erfahrung in einen Zusammenhang. Wir sehen in der unorganischen Natur Ursachen und Wirkungen getrennt und suchen nach deren Zusammenhang in den entsprechenden Wissenschaften. Wir nehmen in der organischen Welt Arten und Gattungen von Organismen wahr und bemühen uns, die gegenseitigen Verhältnisse derselben festzustellen. In der Geschichte treten uns einzelne Kulturepochen der Menschheit gegenüber; wir bemühen uns, die innere Abhängigkeit der einen Entwickelungsstufe von der andern zu erkennen. So hat jede Wissenschaft in einem bestimmten Erscheinungsgebiete im Sinne des obigen Goetheschen Satzes zu wirken.

[ 2 ] Jede Wissenschaft hat ihr Gebiet, auf dem sie den Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen sucht. Dann bleibt noch immer ein großer Gegensatz in unseren wissenschaftlichen Bemühungen bestehen: die durch die Wissenschaften gewonnene ideelle Welt einerseits und die ihr zugrunde liegenden Gegenstände andererseits. Es muß eine Wissenschaft geben, die auch hier die gegenseitigen Beziehungen klarlegt. Die ideelle und reale Welt, der Gegensatz von Idee und Wirklichkeit, sind die Aufgabe einer solchen Wissenschaft. Auch diese Gegensätze müssen in ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehung erkannt werden.

[ 3 ] Diese Beziehungen zu suchen, ist der Zweck der folgenden Ausführungen. Die Tatsache der Wissenschaft einerseits und die Natur und Geschichte andererseits sind in ein Verhältnis zu bringen. Was für eine Bedeutung hat die Spiegelung der Außenwelt in dem menschlichen Bewußtsein, welche Beziehung besteht zwischen unserem Denken über die Gegenstände der Wirklichkeit und den letzteren selbst?

3. The task of our science

[ 1 ] For all science, what Goethe so characteristically expresses with the words: "Theory in and of itself is of no use except in so far as it makes us believe in the connection of phenomena." We always bring separate facts of experience into a context through science. We see causes and effects separately in inorganic nature and search for their connection in the corresponding sciences. In the organic world we perceive species and genera of organisms and endeavor to determine their mutual relationships. In history we are confronted with individual cultural epochs of mankind; we endeavour to recognize the inner dependence of one stage of development on the other. In this way, every science has to work in a certain field of manifestation in the sense of Goethe's sentence above.

[ 2 ] Each science has its field in which it seeks the connection between phenomena. Then there still remains a great contrast in our scientific endeavors: the ideal world gained through the sciences on the one hand and the objects underlying it on the other. There must be a science that clarifies the mutual relationships here as well. The ideal and the real world, the contrast between idea and reality, are the task of such a science. These opposites must also be recognized in their mutual relationship.

[ 3 ] The purpose of the following remarks is to seek these relationships. The fact of science on the one hand and nature and history on the other are to be brought into a relationship. What is the significance of the reflection of the external world in human consciousness, what is the relationship between our thinking about the objects of reality and the latter themselves?