A Theory of Knowledge
GA 2
XV. Inorganic Nature
[ 1 ] The simplest form of action in Nature seems to us to be that in which an occurrence results wholly from factors external to one another. Here is an occurrence, or a relationship between two objects, not necessitated by an entity which manifests itself in the external forms of appearance—an individuality which exhibits its capacities and character in an effect produced outwardly. The occurrence or relationship has been called forth merely by the fact that one thing which has occurred has, in its occurrence, produced a certain effect upon another thing, has transferred its own state to some other thing. The states of one thing appear as results of those of another. The system of actions which happen in this fashion, so that one fact is always the result of others of similar sort, is called inorganic Nature.
[ 2 ] Here the course of an occurrence or the characteristic of a relationship depends upon external determinants; the facts bear marks in themselves which are the results of these determinants. If the form is altered in which these external factors meet, the result of their combined existence is also naturally altered; the phenomenon thus brought about is altered.
[ 3 ] What is, now, the manner of this combined existence in the case of inorganic Nature as it enters directly into our field of observation? It bears altogether the character which we designated above as that of immediate experience. We have here merely a special case of that experience in general. We have to deal here with connections between facts of the senses. But it is just these connections which seem to us in the experience not to be clear or transparent. The fact a confronts us, but at the same moment also numerous others. When we cast our glance over the multiplicity here presented to us, we are in complete uncertainty as to which of these other facts stand in closer and which in more remote relationships to the fact a, now under discussion. There may be some present of such sort that the event could not occur without them, and others which merely modify it but without which it could nevertheless occur, except that it would have, under the different circumstances, another form.
[ 4 ] In this way we see at once the path which cognition must take in this field. If the combination of facts in immediate experience does not suffice us, then we must go forward to another combination satisfying to our need for explanation. We have to create such conditions that an occurrence will appear to us in transparent clarity as the inevitable result of these conditions.
[ 5 ] We recall why it is that thought contains its own essential nature in immediate experience. It is because we stand within and not without that process which creates thought combinations out of the single thought elements. Here, therefore, we are given, not only the finished process, the product, but that which produces. And the important point is that, when we confront any occurrence in the external world, we shall above all perceive the impelling forces which bring this forth from the center of the world-totality to its periphery. The opacity or obscurity of any phenomenon or relationship in the sense-world can be overcome only when we perceive adequately that it is the result of a certain association of facts. We must know that the occurrence we now see arises through the interaction of this and that element of the sense-world. Then the manner of this interaction must be completely penetrable by our intellect. The relation into which the facts are brought must be an ideal relation, one suited to our minds. Of course, in the relationships into which things are brought by our intellect, they comport themselves according to their own natures.
[ 6 ] We see at once what is hereby gained. If I look haphazard into the sense-world, I see occurrences brought about by the interaction of so many factors that it is impossible for me to see directly what really stands behind this effect as the causative element. I observe an occurrence and at the same time the facts \(a\), \(b\), \(c\), \(d\). How shall I know at once which of these facts participate to greater and which to lesser extent in the occurrence? The thing becomes transparent when I first inquire which of the four facts is absolutely necessary if the process is to occur at all. I find for example that \(a\) and \(c\) are absolutely necessary. Then I find that without \(d\) the process occurs, indeed, but with important modification; and, on the contrary, that \(b\) has no essential significance but could be replaced by some other factor. In the above diagram let \(I\) represent symbolically the grouping of the elements for mere sense-perception; \(II\) that for the mind. Thus the mind so groups the facts of the inorganic world that it perceives in an occurrence or a condition the result of the relationship of the facts. Thus the mind introduces necessity into the midst of chance. We will make this clear by an example. When I have before me a triangle \(abc\), I do not see at first glance that the sum of the three angles is always equal to two right angles. This becomes clear when I group the facts in the following manner.
From the figures by the side of the triangle it becomes clear at once that the angle \(a'\) equals the angle \(a\); the angle \(b'\) equals the angle \(b\). (\(AB\) and \(CD\) are parallel to \(A'B'\) and \(C'D'\) respectively.) [ 7 ] If, now, I draw through the apex \(C\) of a triangle a line parallel to the base \(AB\),I find, when I apply the above example, that the angle \(a'\) equals the angle \(a\); \(b'\) equals \(b\). Since, now, \(c\) equals itself, then of necessity the three angles of the triangle equal together two right angles. Here I have explained a complicated combination of facts by reducing it to such simple facts that, by reason of the condition presented to the mind, the corresponding relationship is necessarily inferred from the nature of the things given.
[ 8 ] Another example is the following. I throw a stone in a horizontal direction. It describes a path which we have represented in the line \(ll'\). When I consider the impelling forces which are here to be taken into account, I find: 1. the propelling force which I exerted. 2. the force with which the earth attracts the stone. 3. the force of the atmospheric resistance
[ 9 ] Upon closer examination, I find that the first two forces are essential and determine the character of the path, while the third is subsidiary. If only the first two were present, the stone would describe the path \(LL'\). This latter I find when I ignore the third force and bring into combination only the former two. To carry this out in actual fact is neither possible nor necessary. I cannot eliminate all resistance. But for my purpose I need only apprehend in thought the nature of the first two forces, and then bring them into the necessary relationship likewise in thought, and I deduce the path \(LL'\) as that which must necessarily result when only these two forces interact.
[ 10 ] In this way the mind resolves all phenomena of the inorganic world into those in which the effect seems to the mind to come directly and of necessity from the causative factor.
[ 11 ] If, then, after arriving at the law of the motion of the stone under the influence of the two forces, one introduces the third force, the result is path \(ll'\). Additional conditions might complicate the matter still further. Every composite occurrence in the sense-world appears as a web of such simple facts, which can be penetrated by the mind; and it is reducible to these.
[ 12 ] Now, a phenomenon in which the character of the occurrence can be seen in transparently clear fashion to result directly from the nature of the factors under consideration is called a primal phenomenon, or fundamental fact.
[ 13] This primal phenomenon is identical with objective natural law. For in it there is expressed the fact, not only that an occurrence happened under certain definite conditions, but that it had to happen. It has been seen clearly that the occurrence had to happen because of the very nature of the thing under consideration. The reason why empiricism is to-day so generally demanded is that it is supposed that any assumption which goes beyond what is empirically given leaves us groping in the uncertain. We see that we may remain wholly within the phenomena and yet meet with the inevitable. The inductive method, to-day so much espoused, can never do this. In reality it proceeds in the following manner. It observes a phenomenon which comes about in a definite manner under given conditions. Again it sees the same phenomenon occur under similar conditions. From this it concludes that there exists a general law according to which this occurrence must take place, and postulates this law as such. Such a method remains entirely external to the phenomena. It does not penetrate into the depths. Its laws are generalizations from individual facts. It must always await the establishment of the rule by the individual facts. Our method knows that its laws are simply facts which are torn out of the confusion of chance and made into matters of necessity. We know that, when the factors a and b are present, a definite effect must appear. We do not go beyond the world of phenomena. The content of knowledge, as we view it, is nothing more than objective occurrence. The only change is in the form of the combination of facts. But this change advances one step deeper into objectivity than experience enables one to penetrate. We so combine the facts that they act according to their own natures and only thus, and that this effect cannot be modified by this or that circumstance.
[ 14 ] We attach the greatest importance to the fact that these discussions can be confirmed wherever one may look into the real functioning of science. They are contradicted only by the fallacious opinions that are held in regard to the scope and nature of scientific principles. While many of our contemporaries contradict their own theories when they enter the field of practical research, the harmony between our explanation and all true research can easily be shown in every single instance.
[ 15 ] Our theory demands for every natural law a definite form. It presupposes a combination of facts and maintains that, when this appears anywhere in reality, a definite occurrence must take place.
[ 16 ] Every natural law, therefore, has this form: When this fact interacts with that, this phenomenon arises. It would be easy to show that all natural laws really have this form: When two bodies of unequal temperature are in contact, heat passes from the warmer to the less warm until the temperature of the two is the same. If a fluid is contained in two vessels which are connected, the level becomes identical in the two vessels. If a body stands between a source of light and another body, it casts a shadow upon the latter. In mathematics, physics, and mechanics, anything which is not mere description must be a primal phenomenon.
[ 17 ] All advance in knowledge rests upon the perception of primal phenomena. When we are able to remove an occurrence from its connection with other occurrences and explain it as the effect of definite elements of experience, then we have penetrated a step deeper into the fabric of the world.
[ 18 ] We have seen that the primal phenomenon yields itself wholly to thinking when the factors concerned are brought together in thought according to their nature. But one can also create artificially the necessary conditions. This happens in scientific research. There we have in our own control the occurrence of definite factors. Naturally we cannot ignore all related circumstances. Yet there is a way by which we may surmount the latter. We may produce a phenomenon under various modifications. We allow first one and then another contributing circumstance to be active. We then find that one constant persists through all these modifications. We must retain the essential thing in all the combinations. We find that in all these individual experiences a factual component of these is constant. This is higher experience within experience. It is the fundamental fact, or primal phenomenon.
[ 19 ] The experiment is intended to convince us that nothing else influences a definite occurrence except what we take into account. We bring together certain conditions whose nature is known to us and observe what follows from these. Here we have an objective phenomenon on the basis of subjective creation. We have something objective which is at the same time thoroughly subjective. The experiment is, therefore, the true mediator between subject and object in inorganic science.
[ 20 ] The germ of the view we have here developed is to be found in the correspondence between Goethe and Schiller. Goethe's letters 410 and 413 and Schiller's 412 and 414 are concerned with this. They designate this method as rational empiricism, because it takes as content for knowledge nothing except objective occurrences, but these objective occurrences are held together by a web of concepts (laws) which our minds discover in them. Sensible occurrences in an interconnection which only thought can grasp—this is rational empiricism. If these letters are compared with Goethe's essay Der Versuch als Vermittler von Subjekt and Object,11The Experiment as Mediator between Subject and Object. the theory given above will be found to be the logical conclusion to be drawn from them.
[ 21 ] Thus the general relation we have defined between experience and knowledge is valid everywhere in inorganic Nature. Ordinary experience is only one half of reality. To the senses this half alone exists. The other half is present only to the conceptual capacities of our minds. The mind raises experience from an “appearance for the senses” to something belonging to itself. We have shown how it is possible in this realm to raise oneself from the product to the producing. It is the mind that finds this latter when it confronts the former.
[ 22 ] Scientific satisfaction will come to us from a point of view only when it leads us into a totality complete in itself. But the sense-world as inorganic does not appear at any point as brought to a conclusion; nowhere does an individual whole appear. Every occurrence points to another upon which it depends; this to a third; etc. Where is there any conclusion in this? The sense-world as inorganic does not arrive at individuality. Only in its totality is it complete in itself. We must strive, therefore, if we would have a whole, to conceive the assemblage of the inorganic as a system. Such a system is the cosmos.
[ 23 ] A thorough understanding of the cosmos is the goal and ideal of inorganic natural science. Every scientific endeavor which does not attain to this is merely preparatory: a member of the whole, but not the whole itself.
15. Die unorganische Natur
[ 1 ] Als die einfachste Art von Naturwirksamkeit erscheint uns jene, bei der ein Vorgang ganz das Ergebnis von Faktoren ist, die einander äußerlich gegenüberstehen. Da ist ein Ereignis oder eine Beziehung zwischen zwei Objekten nicht bedingt von einem Wesen, das sich in den äußeren Erscheinungsformen darlebt, von einer Individualität, die ihre inneren Fähigkeiten und ihren Charakter in einer Wirkung nach außen kundgibt. Sie sind allein dadurch hervorgerufen, daß ein Ding in seinem Geschehen einen gewissen Einfluß auf das andere ausübt, seine eigenen Zustände auf andere überträgt. Es erscheinen die Zustände des einen Dinges als Folge jener des anderen. Das System von Wirksamkeiten, die in dieser Weise erfolgen, daß immer eine Tatsache die Folge von anderen ihr gleichartigen ist, nennt man unorganische Natur.
[ 2 ] Es hängt hier der Verlauf eines Vorganges oder das Charakteristische eines Verhältnisses von äußeren Bedingungen ab; die Tatsachen tragen Merkmale an sich, die das Resultat jener Bedingungen sind. Ändert sich die Art, in der diese äußeren Faktoren zusammentreten, so ändert sich natürlich auch die Folge ihres Zusammenbestehens; es ändert sich das herbeigeführte Phänomen.
[ 3 ] Wie ist nun diese Weise des Zusammenbestehens bei der unorganischen Natur, so wie sie unmittelbar in das Feld unserer Beobachtungen eintritt? Sie trägt ganz jenen Charakter, den wir oben als den der unmittelbaren Erfahrung kennzeichneten. Wir haben es hier nur mit einem Spezialfall jener «Erfahrung im allgemeinen» zu tun. Es kommt hier auf die Verbindungen der sinnenfälligen Tatsachen an. Diese Verbindungen aber sind es gerade, die uns in der Erfahrung unklar, undurchsichtig erscheinen. Eine Tatsache a tritt uns gegenüber, gleichzeitig aber zahlreiche andere. Wenn wir unseren Blick über die hier gebotene Mannigfaltigkeit schweifen lassen, sind wir völlig im unklaren, welche von den anderen Tatsachen mit der in Rede stehenden a in näherer, welche in entfernterer Beziehung stehen. Es können solche da sein, ohne die das Ereignis gar nicht eintreten kann; und wieder solche, die es nur modifizieren, ohne die es also ganz wohl eintreten könnte, nur hätte es dann unter anderen Nebenumständen eine andere Gestalt.
[ 4 ] Damit ist uns zugleich der Weg gewiesen, den das Erkennen auf diesem Felde zu nehmen hat. Genügt uns die Kombination der Tatsachen in der unmittelbaren Erfahrung nicht, dann müssen wir zu einer anderen, unser Erklärungsbedürfnis befriedigenden fortschreiten. Wir haben Bedingungen zu schaffen, auf daß uns ein Vorgang in durchsichtiger Klarheit als die notwendige Folge dieser Bedingungen erscheine.
[ 5 ] Wir erinnern uns, warum eigentlich das Denken in unmittelbarer Erfahrung bereits sein Wesen enthält. Weil wir innerhalb, nicht außerhalb jenes Prozesses stehen, der aus den einzelnen Gedankenelementen Gedankenverbindungen schafft. Dadurch ist uns nicht allein der vollendete Prozeß, das Bewirkte gegeben, sondern das Wirkende. Und darauf kommt es an, daß wir in irgendeinem Vorgange der Außenwelt, der uns gegenübertritt, zuerst die treibenden Gewalten sehen, die ihn vom Mittelpunkte des Weltganzen heraus an die Peripherie bringen. Die Undurchsichtigkeit und Unklarheit einer Erscheinung oder eines Verhältnisses der Sinnenwelt kann nur überwunden werden, wenn wir ganz genau ersehen, daß sie das Ergebnis einer bestimmten Tatsachenkonstellation sind. Wir müssen wissen, der Vorgang, den wir jetzt sehen, entsteht durch das Zusammenwirken dieses und jenes Elementes der Sinnenwelt. Dann muß eben die Weise dieses Zusammenwirkens unserm Verstande vollkommen durchdringlich sein. Das Verhältnis, in das die Tatsachen gebracht werden, muß ein ideelles, ein unserem Geiste gemäßes sein. Die Dinge werden sich natürlich, in den Verhältnissen, in die sie durch den Verstand gebracht werden, ihrer Natur gemäß verhalten.
[ 6 ] Wir sehen sogleich, was damit gewonnen wird. Blicke ich aufs Geratewohl in die Sinnenwelt, so sehe ich Vorgänge, die durch das Zusammenwirken so vieler Faktoren hervorgebracht sind, daß es mir unmöglich ist, unmittelbar zu sehen, was eigentlich als Wirkendes hinter dieser Wirkung steht. Ich sehe einen Vorgang und zugleich die Tatsachen \(a\), \(b\), \(c\) und \(d\). Wie soll ich da sogleich wissen, welche von diesen Tatsachen mehr, welche weniger an dem Vorgang beteiligt sind? Die Sache wird durchsichtig, wenn ich erst untersuche, welche von den vier Tatsachen unbedingt notwendig sind, damit der Prozeß überhaupt eintrete. Ich finde zum Beispiel, daß \(a\) und \(c\) unbedingt nötig sind. Hernach finde ich, daß ohne \(d\) der Prozeß zwar eintrete, aber mit erheblicher Änderung, wogegen ich ersehe, daß \(b\) gar keine wesentliche Bedeutung hat und auch durch anderes ersetzt werden könnte. Im Vorstehenden soll \(I\) die Gruppierung der Elemente für die bloße Sinneswahrnehmung, \(II\) die für den Geist symbolisch dargestellt werden. Der Geist gruppiert also die Tatsachen der unorganischen Welt so, daß er in einem Geschehen oder einer Beziehung die Folge der Verhältnisse der Tatsachen erblickt. So bringt der Geist die Notwendigkeit in die Zufälligkeit. Wir wollen das an einigen Beispielen klarlegen. Wenn ich ein Dreieck \(abc\) vor mir habe, so ersehe ich auf den ersten Blick wohl nicht, daß die Summe der drei Winkel stets einem gestreckten gleichkommt. Es wird dies sogleich klar, wenn ich die Tatsachen in folgender Weise gruppiere. Aus den nachstehenden Figuren ergibt sich wohl sogleich, daß die Winkel \(a'= a\); \(b'= b\) sind. ((AB\) und \(CD\) respektive \(A'B'\) und \(C'D'\) sind parallel).
[ 7 ] Habe ich nun ein Dreieck vor mir und ziehe ich durch die Spitze \(C\) eine parallele Gerade zur Grundlinie AB, so finde ich, wenn ich obiges anwende, in bezug auf die Winkel \(a' = a\); \(b' = b\). Da nun \(c\) sich selbst gleich ist, so sind notwendig alle drei Dreieckswinkel zusammen einem gestreckten Winkel gleich.Ich habe hier einen komplizierten Tatsachenzusammenhang dadurch erklärt, daß ich ihn auf solche einfache Tatsachen zurückführte, durch die aus dem Verhältnisse, das dem Geiste gegeben ist, die entsprechende Beziehung mit Notwendigkeit aus der Natur der gegebenen Dinge folgt.
[ 8 ] Ein anderes Beispiel ist folgendes: Ich werfe einen Stein in waagerechter Richtung. Er beschreibt eine Bahn, die wir in der Linie \(ll'\) abgebildet haben. Wenn ich mir die treibenden Kräfte betrachte, die hier in Betracht kommen, so finde ich: 1. die Stoßkraft, die ich ausgeübt; 2. die Kraft, mit der die Erde den Stein anzieht; 3. die Kraft des Luftwiderstandes.
[ 9 ] Ich finde bei näherer Überlegung, daß die beiden ersten Kräfte die wesentlichen, die Eigentümlichkeit der Bahn bewirkenden sind, während die dritte nebensächlich ist. Wirkten nur die beiden ersten, so beschriebe der Stein die Bahn LL'. Die letztere finde ich, wenn ich von der dritten Kraft ganz absehe und nur die beiden ersten in Zusammenhang bringe. Das tatsächlich auszuführen, ist weder möglich noch nötig. Ich kann nicht allen Widerstand beseitigen. Ich brauche dafür aber nur das Wesen der beiden ersten Kräfte gedanklich zu erfassen, sie dann in die notwendige Beziehung ebenfalls nur gedanklich zu bringen; und es ergibt sich die Bahn LL' als jene, die notwendig erfolgen müßte, wenn nur die zwei Kräfte zusammenwirkten.
[ 10 ] In dieser Weise löst der Geist alle Phänomene der unorganischen Natur in solche auf wo ihm die Wirkung unmittelbar mit Notwendigkeit aus dem Bewirkenden hervorzugehen scheint.
[ 11 ] Bringt man dann, wenn man das Bewegungsgesetz des Steines infolge der beiden ersten Kräfte hat, noch die dritte Kraft hinzu, so ergibt sich die Bahn \(ll'\). Weitere Bedingungen könnten die Sache noch mehr komplizieren. Jeder zusammengesetzte Vorgang der Sinnenwelt erscheint als ein Gewebe jener einfachen, vom Geiste durchdrungenen Tatsachen und ist in dieselben auflösbar.
[ 12 ] Ein solches Phänomen nun, bei dem der Charakter des Vorganges unmittelbar aus der Natur der in Betracht kommenden Faktoren in durchsichtig klarer Weise folgt, nennen wir ein Urphänomen oder eine Grundtatsache.
[ 13 ] Dieses Urphänomen ist identisch mit dem objektiven Naturgesetz. Denn es ist in demselben nicht allein ausgesprochen, daß ein Vorgang unter bestimmten Verhältnissen erfolgt ist, sondern daß er erfolgen mußte. Man hat eingesehen, daß er bei der Natur dessen, was da in Betracht kam, erfolgen mußte. Man fordert heute so allgemein den äußeren Empirismus, da man glaubt, mit jeder Annahme, die das empirisch Gegebene überschreitet, tappe man im Unsichern herum. Wir sehen, daß wir ganz innerhalb der Phänomene stehen bleiben können und doch das Notwendige antreffen. Die induktive Methode, die heute vielfach vertreten ist, kann das nie. Sie geht im wesentlichen in folgender Weise vor. Sie sieht ein Phänomen, das unter gegebenen Bedingungen in einer bestimmten Weise erfolgt. Ein zweites Mal sieht sie unter ähnlichen Bedingungen dasselbe Phänomen eintreten. Daraus folgert sie, daß ein allgemeines Gesetz bestehe, wonach dieses Ereignis eintreten müsse, und spricht dieses Gesetz als solches aus. Eine solche Methode bleibt den Erscheinungen vollkommen äußerlich. Sie dringt nicht in die Tiefe. Ihre Gesetze sind Verallgemeinerungen von einzelnen Tatsachen. Sie muß immer erst von den einzelnen Tatsachen die Bestätigung der Regel abwarten. Unsere Methode weiß, daß ihre Gesetze einfach Tatsachen sind, die aus dem Wirrsal der Zufälligkeit herausgerissen und zu notwendigen gemacht sind. Wir wissen, daß, wenn die Faktoren a und b da sind, notwendig eine bestimmte Wirkung eintreten muß. Wir gehen nicht über die Erscheinungswelt hinaus. Der Inhalt der Wissenschaft, wie wir ihn denken, ist nichts weiter als objektives Geschehen. Geändert ist nur die Form der Zusammenstellung der Fakten. Aber durch diese ist man gerade einen Schritt tiefer in die Objektivität hineingedrungen, als ihn die Erfahrung möglich macht. Wir stellen die Fakten so zusammen, daß sie ihrer eigenen Natur und nur dieser gemäß wirken und daß diese Wirkung nicht durch diese oder jene Verhältnisse modifiziert werde.
[ 14 ] Wir legen den größten Wert darauf, daß diese Ausführungen überall gerechtfertigt werden können, wo man in den wirklichen Betrieb der Wissenschaft blickt. Es widersprechen ihnen nur die irrtümlichen Ansichten, die man über die Tragweite und die Natur der wissenschaftlichen Sätze hat. Während sich viele unserer Zeitgenossen mit ihren eigenen Theorien in Widerspruch versetzen, wenn sie das Feld der praktischen Forschung betreten, ließe sich die Harmonie aller wahren Forschung mit unseren Auseinandersetzungen in jedem einzelnen Falle leicht nachweisen.
[ 15 ] Unsere Theorie fordert für jedes Naturgesetz eine bestimmte Form. Es setzt einen Zusammenhang von Tatsachen voraus und stellt fest, daß, wenn derselbe irgendwo in der Wirklichkeit eintrifft, ein bestimmter Vorgang statthaben muß.
[ 16 ] Jedes Naturgesetz hat daher die Form: Wenn dieses Faktum mit jenem zusammenwirkt, so entsteht diese Erscheinung ... Es wäre leicht nachzuweisen, daß alle Naturgesetze wirklich diese Form haben: Wenn zwei Körper von ungleicher Temperatur aneinander grenzen, so fließt so lange Wärme von dem wärmeren in den kälteren, bis die Temperatur in beiden gleich ist. Wenn eine Flüssigkeit in zwei Gefäßen ist, die miteinander in Verbindung stehen, so stellt sich das Niveau in beiden Gefäßen gleich hoch. Wenn ein Körper zwischen einer Lichtquelle und einem anderen Körper steht, so wirft er auf denselben einen Schatten. Was in Mathematik, Physik und Mechanik nicht bloße Beschreibung ist; das muß Urphänomen sein.
[ 17 ] Auf dem Gewahrwerden der Urphänomene beruht aller Fortschritt der Wissenschaft. Wenn es gelingt, einen Vorgang aus den Verbindungen mit anderen herauszulösen und ihn rein für die Folge bestimmter Erfahrungselemente zu erklären, ist man einen Schritt tiefer in das Weltgetriebe eingedrungen.
[ 18 ] Wir haben gesehen, daß sich das Urphänomen rein im Gedanken ergibt, wenn man die in Betracht kommenden Faktoren ihrem Wesen gemäß im Denken in Zusammenhang bringt. Man kann aber die notwendigen Bedingungen auch künstlich herstellen. Das geschieht beim wissenschaftlichen Versuche. Da haben wir das Eintreten gewisser Tatsachen in unserer Gewalt. Natürlich können wir nicht von allen Nebenumständen absehen. Aber es gibt ein Mittel, doch über die letzteren hinwegzukommen. Man stellt ein Phänomen in verschiedenen Modifikationen her. Man läßt einmal die, einmal jene Nebenumstände wirken. Dann findet man, daß sich ein Konstantes durch alle diese Modifikationen hindurchzieht. Man muß das Wesentliche eben in allen Kombinationen beibehalten. Man findet, daß in allen diesen einzelnen Erfahrungen ein Tatsachenbestandteil derselbe bleibt. Dieser ist höhere Erfahrung in der Erfahrung. Er ist Grundtatsache oder Urphänomen.
[ 19 ] Der Versuch soll uns versichern, daß nichts anderes einen bestimmten Vorgang beeinflußt, als was wir in Rechnung bringen. Wir stellen gewisse Bedingungen zusammen, deren Natur wir kennen, und warten ab, was daraus erfolgt. Da haben wir das objektive Phänomen auf Grund subjektiver Schöpfung. Wir haben ein Objektives, das zugleich durch und durch subjektiv ist. Der Versuch ist daher der wahre Vermittler von Subjekt und Objekt in der unorganischen Naturwissenschaft.
[ 20 ] Die Keime zu der von uns hier entwickelten Ansicht finden sich in dem Briefwechsel Goethes mit Schiller. Die Briefe Goethes und Schillers vom Anfang des Jahres 1789 befassen sich damit. Sie bezeichnen diese Methode als rationellen Empirismus, weil sie nichts als objektive Vorgänge zum Inhalte der Wissenschaft macht; diese objektiven Vorgänge aber zusammengehalten werden von einem Gewebe von Begriffen (Gesetzen), das unser Geist in ihnen entdeckt. Die sinnenfälligen Vorgänge in einem nur dem Denken faßbaren Zusammenhange, das ist rationeller Empirismus. Hält man jene Briefe zusammen mit Goethes Aufsatz: «Der Versuch als Vermittler von Subjekt und Objekt», so wird man in der obigen Theorie die konsequente Folge davon erblicken.11Interessant ist, daß Goethe noch einen zweiten Aufsatz geschrieben hat, in dem er die Gedanken jenes über den Versuch weiter ausgeführt. Wir können uns den Aufsatz aus Schillers Brief vom 19. Januar 1798 rekonstruieren. Goethe teilt da die Methoden der Wissenschaft in: gemeinen Empirismus, der bei den äußerlichen, den Sinnen gegebenen Phänomenen stehen bleibt; in den Rationalismus, der auf ungenügende Beobachtung hin Gedankensysteme aufbaut, der also, statt die Tatsachen ihrem Wesen gemäß zu gruppieren, künstlich zuerst die Zusammenhänge ausklügelt und dann in phantastischer Weise daraus etwas in die Tatsachenwelt hineinliest; dann endlich in den rationellen Empirismus, der nicht bei der gemeinen Erfahrung stehen bleibt, sondern Bedingungen schafft, unter denen die Erfahrung ihr Wesen enthüllt. [Die Anmerkung 11 ist nun dahin zu ergänzen, daß der vom mir hier hypothetisch vorausgesetzte Aufsatz später im Goethe- und Schiller-Archiv wirklich aufgefunden worden und der Weimarischen Goethe-Ausgabe eingefügt worden ist.]
[ 21 ] In der unorganischen Natur trifft also durchaus das allgemeine Verhältnis, das wir zwischen Erfahrung und Wissenschaft festgestellt haben, zu. Die gewöhnliche Erfahrung ist nur die halbe Wirklichkeit. Für die Sinne ist nur diese eine Hälfte da. Die andere Hälfte ist nur für unser geistiges Auffassungsvermögen vorhanden. Der Geist erhebt die Erfahrung von einer «Erscheinung für die Sinne» zu seiner eigenen. Wir haben gezeigt, wie es auf diesem Felde möglich ist, sich vom Gewirkten zum Wirkenden zu erheben. Das letztere findet der Geist, wenn er an das erstere herantritt.
[ 22 ] Wissenschaftliche Befriedigung wird uns von einer Ansicht erst dann, wenn sie uns in eine abgeschlossene Ganzheit einführt. Nun zeigt sich aber die Sinnenwelt als unorganische an keinem ihrer Punkte als abgeschlossen, nirgends tritt ein individuelles Ganzes auf. Immer weist uns ein Vorgang auf einen andern, von dem er abhängt; dieser auf einen dritten und so weiter. Wo ist hier ein Abschluß? Die Sinnenwelt als unorganische bringt es nicht zur Individualität. Nur in ihrer Allheit ist sie abgeschlossen. Wir müssen daher streben, um ein Ganzes zu haben, die Gesamtheit des Unorganischen als ein System zu begreifen. Ein solches System ist der Kosmos.
[ 23 ] Das durchdringende Verständnis des Kosmos ist Ziel und Ideal der unorganischen Naturwissenschaft. Jedes nicht bis dahin vordringende wissenschaftliche Streben ist bloße Vorbereitung; ein Glied des Ganzen, nicht das Ganze selbst.
15. Inorganic Nature
[ 1 ] The simplest kind of natural effect appears to us to be that in which a process is entirely the result of factors that are externally opposed to one another. Here an event or a relationship between two objects is not conditioned by a being that lives itself out in external manifestations, by an individuality that manifests its inner abilities and character in an external effect. They are caused solely by the fact that one thing exerts a certain influence on the other in its events, transmitting its own states to others. The states of one thing appear as a consequence of those of the other. The system of effects that take place in such a way that one fact is always the consequence of others like it is called inorganic nature.
[ 2 ] The course of a process or the characteristic of a relation depends here on external conditions; the facts have characteristics in themselves which are the result of those conditions. If the way in which these external factors come together changes, the consequence of their coexistence naturally also changes; the phenomenon brought about changes.
[ 3 ] What is this way of coexistence in inorganic nature, as it enters directly into the field of our observations? It has entirely the character that we characterized above as that of immediate experience. We are only dealing here with a special case of that "experience in general". What matters here are the connections between the sensory facts. But it is precisely these connections that appear unclear and opaque to us in experience. One fact a confronts us, but at the same time numerous others. If we allow our gaze to wander over the diversity offered here, we are completely unclear as to which of the other facts are more closely related to the a in question and which are more distantly related. There may be those without which the event cannot occur at all; and again there may be those which only modify it, without which it could well occur, only then it would have a different form under different circumstances.
[ 4 ] This also shows us the path that cognition must take in this field. If the combination of facts in direct experience is not sufficient for us, then we must proceed to another one that satisfies our need for explanation. We have to create conditions so that a process appears to us with transparent clarity as the necessary consequence of these conditions.
[ 5 ] We remember why thinking actually already contains its essence in direct experience. Because we are inside, not outside, the process that creates thought connections from the individual elements of thought. Thus we are not only given the completed process, the effectual, but also the working. And it depends on this that in any process of the outer world that confronts us we first see the driving forces that bring it from the center of the world whole to the periphery. The opacity and obscurity of a phenomenon or a relationship in the world of the senses can only be overcome if we can see quite clearly that they are the result of a determined constellation of facts. We must know that the process we now see arises through the interaction of this and that element of the sense world. Then the manner of this interaction must be completely penetrable to our understanding. The relation into which the facts are brought must be an ideal one, one that corresponds to our spirit. Things will naturally behave according to their nature in the relations into which they are brought by the mind.
[ 6 ] We can immediately see what is gained. If I look at random into the world of the senses, I see processes that are brought about by the interaction of so many factors that it is impossible for me to see directly what is actually behind this effect. I see a process and at the same time the facts \(a\), \(b\), \(c\) and \(d\). How am I supposed to know immediately which of these facts are more or less involved in the process? The matter becomes clear when I first examine which of the four facts are necessary for the process to occur at all. I find, for example, that \(a\) and \(c\) are absolutely necessary. Afterwards I find that without \(d\) the process occurs, but with considerable change, whereas I see that \(b\) has no essential meaning at all and could also be replaced by something else. In the foregoing, \(I\) shall symbolically represent the grouping of elements for mere sense perception, \(II\) that for the mind. The mind thus groups the facts of the inorganic world in such a way that it sees in an event or a relation the consequence of the relations of the facts. In this way the mind brings necessity into coincidence. Let us illustrate this with a few examples. If I have a triangle \(abc\) in front of me, I probably do not see at first glance that the sum of the three angles is always equal to an elongated one. This becomes immediately clear if I group the facts in the following way. From the figures below it is immediately clear that the angles are \(a'= a\); \(b'= b\). (\(AB\) and \(CD\) respectively \(A'B'\) and \(C'D'\) are parallel).
[ 7 ] If I now have a triangle in front of me and I draw a parallel straight line to the base line AB through the apex \(C\), I find, if I apply the above, with respect to the angles \(a' = a\); \(b' = b\). Now since \(c\) is equal to itself, all three triangular angles together are necessarily equal to an elongated angle. I have here explained a complicated relation of facts by reducing it to such simple facts by which, from the relation given to the mind, the corresponding relation necessarily follows from the nature of the given things.
[ 8 ] Another example is the following: I throw a stone in a horizontal direction. It describes a path that we have mapped in the line \(ll'\). If I look at the driving forces that come into consideration here, I find: 1. the impact force that I exert; 2. the force with which the earth attracts the stone; 3. the force of air resistance.
[ 9 ] On closer consideration, I find that the first two forces are the essential, those that cause the peculiarity of the orbit, while the third is secondary. If only the first two acted, the stone would describe the orbit \(LL'\). I find the latter if I disregard the third force altogether and relate only the first two. It is neither possible nor necessary to do this actually. I cannot eliminate all resistance. But I need only grasp the nature of the first two forces mentally, then bring them into the necessary relationship also only mentally; and the trajectory \(LL'\) results as that which would necessarily have to occur if only the two forces acted together.
[ 10 ] In this way, the mind resolves all phenomena of inorganic nature into those where the effect seems to it to emerge directly and necessarily from the agent.
[ 11 ] If we then add the third force to the law of motion of the stone as a result of the first two forces, we obtain the path ll'. Further conditions could complicate the matter even more. Every composite process of the sensory world appears as a fabric of those simple facts permeated by the spirit and can be dissolved into them.
[ 12 ] Now such a phenomenon, in which the character of the process follows directly from the nature of the factors under consideration in a transparently clear manner, we call an original phenomenon or a fundamental fact.
[ 13 ] This primordial phenomenon is identical with the objective law of nature. For it is not only expressed in it that a process has taken place under certain conditions, but that it had to take place. It has been realized that it had to take place given the nature of what was under consideration. Today, external empiricism is so generally demanded because it is believed that any assumption that goes beyond what is empirically given is groping around in uncertainty. We see that we can remain completely within the phenomena and still arrive at what is necessary. The inductive method, which is widely used today, can never do this. It essentially proceeds as follows. It sees a phenomenon that occurs in a certain way under given conditions. A second time it sees the same phenomenon occurring under similar conditions. From this it concludes that a general law exists according to which this event must occur, and pronounces this law as such. Such a method remains completely external to the phenomena. It does not penetrate into the depths. Its laws are generalizations of individual facts. It must always await confirmation of the rule from the individual facts. Our method knows that its laws are simply facts which have been torn out of the confusion of contingency and made necessary. We know that if the factors a and b are there, a certain effect must necessarily occur. We do not go beyond the phenomenal world. The content of science, as we think of it, is nothing more than objective events. Only the form of the compilation of facts has changed. But through this we have penetrated one step deeper into objectivity than experience makes possible. We arrange the facts in such a way that they act according to their own nature and only according to this nature and that this effect is not modified by this or that relationship.
[ 14 ] We attach the greatest importance to the fact that these statements can be justified wherever one looks into the actual operation of science. They are contradicted only by the erroneous views held about the scope and nature of scientific propositions. While many of our contemporaries conflict with their own theories when they enter the field of practical research, the harmony of all true research with our disputes could easily be demonstrated in each individual case.
[ 15 ] Our theory demands a certain form for every law of nature. It presupposes a connection of facts and states that if the same occurs somewhere in reality, a certain process must take place.
[ 16 ] Every law of nature therefore has the form: If this fact interacts with that, then this phenomenon arises ... It would be easy to prove that all laws of nature really have this form: If two bodies of unequal temperature adjoin each other, heat flows from the warmer to the colder until the temperature in both is the same. If a liquid is in two vessels that are in contact with each other, the level in both vessels will be the same. If a body stands between a light source and another body, it casts a shadow on the latter. What is not a mere description in mathematics, physics and mechanics must be an original phenomenon.
[ 17 ] All progress in science is based on the realization of primordial phenomena. If one succeeds in separating a process from its connections with others and explaining it purely as the result of certain elements of experience, one has penetrated one step deeper into the workings of the world.
[ 18 ] We have seen that the primordial phenomenon arises purely in thought when the factors under consideration are brought into connection in thought according to their nature. However, the necessary conditions can also be created artificially. This is done in scientific experiments. There we have the occurrence of certain facts under our control. Of course, we cannot disregard all secondary circumstances. But there is a way to get past the latter. One produces a phenomenon in various modifications. One allows one set of circumstances to take effect and another set of circumstances to take effect. Then one finds that a constant runs through all these modifications. One must retain the essential in all combinations. One finds that in all these individual experiences one factual element remains the same. This is higher experience in experience. It is fundamental fact or phenomenon.
[ 19 ] The experiment should assure us that nothing else influences a certain process than what we take into account. We put together certain conditions, the nature of which we know, and wait to see what happens as a result. There we have the objective phenomenon on the basis of subjective creation. We have an objective that is at the same time thoroughly subjective. The experiment is therefore the true mediator of subject and object in inorganic natural science.
[ 20 ] The seeds of the view we have developed here can be found in Goethe's correspondence with Schiller. Goethe's and Schiller's letters from the beginning of 1789 deal with this. They refer to this method as rational empiricism because it makes nothing but objective processes the content of science; these objective processes, however, are held together by a web of concepts (laws) that our mind discovers in them. The sensory processes in a context that can only be grasped by thinking, that is rational empiricism. If one holds these letters together with Goethe's essay: "The Experiment as Mediator of Subject and Object", one will see in the above theory the logical consequence of this.11It is interesting to note that Goethe wrote a second essay in which he further elaborated on the thoughts of the first essay on the experiment. We can reconstruct the essay from Schiller's letter of January 19, 1798. Goethe divides the methods of science into: common empiricism, which stops at the external phenomena given to the senses; rationalism, which builds systems of thought on insufficient observation, which, instead of grouping the facts according to their essence, first artificially works out the connections and then reads something into the world of facts from them in a fantastic way; then, finally, rational empiricism, which does not stop at common experience, but creates conditions under which experience reveals its essence. [Note 11 should now be supplemented to the effect that the essay I am hypothesizing here was actually found later in the Goethe and Schiller Archive and added to the Weimar Goethe edition]
[ 21 ] In inorganic nature, therefore, the general relationship that we have established between experience and science applies. Ordinary experience is only half of reality. Only this half is there for the senses. The other half is only there for our mental comprehension. The mind elevates the experience from an "appearance for the senses" to its own. We have shown how it is possible in this field to rise from the effected to the active. The latter is found by the spirit when it approaches the former.
[ 22 ] We only get scientific satisfaction from a view when it introduces us to a self-contained wholeness. But the world of the senses, as an inorganic world, does not present itself as complete at any of its points; nowhere does an individual whole appear. One process always points us to another on which it depends; this to a third and so on. Where is there a conclusion here? The sense world as inorganic does not achieve individuality. It is only complete in its universality. We must therefore strive, in order to have a whole, to understand the totality of the inorganic as a system. Such a system is the cosmos.
[ 23 ] The penetrating understanding of the cosmos is the goal and ideal of inorganic natural science. Any scientific endeavor that does not advance to this point is mere preparation; a part of the whole, not the whole itself.