Philosophy of Spiritual Activity
GA 4
XII. Moral Imagination
Darwinism and Morality
[ 1 ] A free spirit acts according to his impulses, i.e., intuitions, which his thinking has selected out of the whole world of his Ideas. For an unfree spirit, the reason why he singles out a particular intuition from his world of Ideas, in order to make it the basis of an action, lies in the perceptual world which is given to him, i.e., in his past experiences. He recalls, before making a decision, what someone else has done, or recommended as proper in an analogous case, or what God has commanded to be done in such a case, etc., and he acts on these recollections. For a free spirit these preliminary conditions are not the only impulses to action. He takes an absolutely original decision. He cares as little what others have done in such a case as what commands they had laid down. He has purely ideal reasons which determine him to select a particular concept out of the sum of his concepts, and to realize it in action. But his action will belong to perceptible reality. Consequently, what he achieves will be identical with a definite content of perception. The concept will have to realize itself in a concrete particular event. As a concept it will not contain this particular event. It will refer to the event only in the same way as, in general, a concept is related to a percept, e.g., the concept lion to a particular lion. The link between concept and percept is the representation.1See Translator's Preface (cp. p. 80 ff.) To the unfree spirit this intermediate link is given from the outset. Motives exist in his consciousness from the first in the form of representations. Whenever he intends to do anything he acts as he has seen others act, or as he is ordered to do in each separate case. Hence authority is most effective in the form of examples, i.e., in the form of quite definite particular actions handed down for the consciousness of the unfree spirit. A Christian models his conduct less on the teaching than on the model of the Saviour. Rules have less value for telling men positively what to do than for telling them what to leave undone. Laws take on the form of general concepts only when they forbid actions, not when they prescribe actions. Laws concerning what we ought to do must be given to the unfree spirit in wholly concrete form. Clean the street in front of your door! Pay your taxes to such and such an amount to the tax-collector! etc. Conceptual form belongs to laws which inhibit actions. Thou shalt not steal! Thou shalt not commit adultery! These laws, too, influence the unfree spirit only by means of a concrete representation, e.g., that of the punishments attached by human authority, or of the pangs of conscience, or of eternal damnation, etc.
[ 2 ] When the motive to an action exists in general conceptual form (e.g., Thou shalt do good to thy fellow-men! Thou shalt live so that thou promotest best thy welfare!) there must first be found, in the particular case, the concrete representation of the action (the relation of the concept to a content of perception). For a free spirit who is not compelled by any model nor by fear of punishment, etc., this translation of the concept into a representation is always necessary.
[ 3 ] Now man produces concrete representations from out of the sum of his Ideas by means of the imagination. Hence what the free spirit needs in order to realize his Ideas, in order to assert himself in the world, is moral imagination. This is the source of the free spirit's action. Only those men, therefore, who are endowed with moral imagination are, properly speaking, morally productive. Those who merely preach morality, i.e., those who merely excogitate moral rules without being able to condense them into concrete representations, are morally unproductive. They are like those critics who can explain very reasonably how a work of art ought to be made, but who are themselves incapable of the smallest artistic production.
[ 4 ] Moral imagination, in order to realize its representation, must set to work upon a determinate sphere of percepts. Human action does not create percepts, but transforms already existing percepts and gives them a new form. In order to be able to transform a definite object of perception, or a sum of such objects, in accordance with a moral representation, one must have grasped the law-abiding content of the percept-picture (its hitherto existing mode of working to which one wants to give a new form or a new direction). Further, it is necessary to discover the procedure by which it is possible to change the given law into the new one. This part of effective moral activity depends on knowledge of the particular world of phenomena with which one has got to deal. We shall, therefore, find it in some branch of scientific knowledge in general. Moral action, then, presupposes, in addition to the faculty of moral Ideation 2Only a superficial critic will find in the use of the word “faculty,” in this and other passages, a relapse into the old-fashioned doctrine of faculties of the soul. The precise meaning of this word is evident from what is said on pp. 70 – 71. and of moral imagination, the ability to transform the world of percepts without breaking the natural laws by which they are connected. This ability is moral technique. It may be learnt in the same sense in which science in general may be learnt. For, in general, men are better able to find concepts for the ready-made world than productively to originate out of their imagination future, and as yet non-existing, actions. Hence, it is very well possible for men without moral imagination to receive moral representations from others, and to engrave them skillfully into the actual world. Vice versa, it may happen that men with moral imagination lack technical skill, and are dependent on the service of other men for the realization of their representations.
[ 5 ] In so far as we require for moral action knowledge of the objects upon which we are about to act, our action depends upon such knowledge. What we need to know here are laws of nature. These belong to the Natural Sciences, not to Ethics.
[ 6 ] Moral imagination and the faculty of moral Ideation can become objects of knowledge only after they have first been produced by the individual. But, then, they no longer regulate life, but have already regulated it. They must now be treated as efficient causes, like all other causes (they are purposes only for the subject). The study of them is, as it were, the Natural Science of moral representations.
[ 7 ] Ethics as a Normative Science, over and above this science, cannot exist.
[ 8 ] Some would maintain the normative character of moral laws at least in the sense that Ethics is to be taken as a kind of dietetic which from the conditions of the organism's life, deduces general rules, on the basis of which it hopes to give detailed directions to the body. (Paulsen, System der Ethik.) This comparison is mistaken, because our moral life cannot be compared with the life of the organism. The function of the organism occurs without any volition on our part. We find its laws ready-made in the world; hence we can discover them and apply them when discovered. Moral laws, on the other hand, do not exist until we create them. We cannot apply them until we have created them. The error is due to the fact that moral laws are not, in their content, at every moment new creations, but are handed down by tradition. Those which we take over from our ancestors appear to be given like the natural laws of the organism. But it does not follow that a later generation has the right to apply them in the same way as dietetic rules. For they apply to individuals, and not, like natural laws, to specimens of a genus. Considered as an organism I am such a generic specimen, and I shall live in accordance with nature if I apply the laws of my genus to my particular case. As a moral being I am an individual and have laws which are wholly my own.3When Paulsen, p. 15 of the book mentioned above, says: “Different natural endowments and different conditions of life demand both a different bodily and also a different spiritual-moral diet,” he is very close to the correct view, but yet he misses the decisive point. In so far as I am an individual, I need no diet. Dietetic means the art of bringing a particular specimen into harmony with the general laws of the genus. But as an individual I am not a specimen of a genus.
[ 9 ] The view here upheld appears to contradict that fundamental doctrine of modern Natural Science which is known as the Theory of Evolution. But it only appears to do so. By evolution we mean the real development of the later out of the earlier in accordance with natural law. In the organic world, evolution means that the later (more perfect) organic forms are real descendants of the earlier (imperfect) forms, and have grown out of them in accordance with natural laws. The upholders of the theory of organic evolution ought really to believe that there was once a time on our earth, when a being could have observed with his own eyes the gradual evolution of reptiles out of proto-amniotes, supposing that he could have been present as an observer, and had been endowed with a sufficiently long span of life. Similarly, Evolutionists ought to suppose that a being could have watched the development of the solar system out of the primordial nebula of the Kant-Laplace hypothesis, if he could have occupied a suitable spot in the world-ether during that infinitely long period. [That on this supposition, the nature of both the proto-amniotes and of the primordial nebula of the Kant-Laplace hypothesis would have to be conceived differently from the Materialist's conception of it, is here irrelevant.] But no Evolutionist should ever dream of maintaining that he could from his concept of the proto-amniote deduce that of the reptile with all its qualities, if he had never seen a reptile. Just as little would it be possible to derive the solar system from the concept of the Kant-Laplace nebula, if this concept of an original nebula had been formed only from the percept of the nebula. In other words, if the Evolutionist is to think consistently, he is bound to maintain that out of earlier phases of evolution later ones really develop; that once the concept of the imperfect and that of the perfect have been given, we can understand the connection. But in no case should he admit that the concept formed from the earlier phases is, in itself, sufficient for deducing from it the later phases. From this it follows for Ethics that, whilst we can understand the connection of later moral concepts with earlier ones, it is not possible to deduce a single new moral Idea from earlier ones. The individual, as a moral being, produces his own content. This content, thus produced, is for Ethics a datum, as much as reptiles are a datum for Natural Science. Reptiles have evolved out of proto-amniotes, but the scientist cannot manufacture the concept of reptiles out of the concept of the proto-amniotes. Later moral Ideas evolve out of the earlier ones, but Ethics cannot manufacture out of the moral principles of an earlier culture those of a later one. The confusion is due to the fact that, as scientists, we start with the facts before us, and then make them objects of knowledge, whereas in moral action we first produce the facts ourselves, and then gain knowledge of them. In the evolution of the moral world-order we accomplish what, at a lower level, nature accomplishes: we alter some part of the perceptual world. Hence the ethical norm cannot straightway be made an object of knowledge, like a law of nature, for it must first be created. Only when that has been done can the norm become an object of knowledge.
[ 10 ] But is it not possible to make the old a measure for the new? Is not every man compelled to measure the products of his moral imagination by the standard of traditional moral doctrines? If he would be truly productive in morality, such measuring is as much an absurdity as it would be an absurdity if one were to measure a new species in nature by an old one and say that reptiles, because they do not agree with the proto-amniotes, are an illegitimate (degenerate) species.
[ 11 ] Ethical Individualism, then, so far from being in opposition to the theory of evolution rightly understood, is a direct consequence of it. Haeckel's genealogical tree, from protozoa up to man as an organic being, ought to be capable of being worked out without a breach of natural law, and without a gap in its uniform evolution, up to the individual as a moral being in a definite sense. But in no case could we deduce the nature of a later species from the nature of an ancestral species. However true it is that the moral Ideas of the individual have perceptibly grown out of those of his ancestors, it is also true that the individual is morally barren, unless he has moral Ideas of his own.
[ 12 ] The same Ethical Individualism, which I have developed on the basis of the preceding conceptions, might be equally well developed on the basis of the theory of evolution. The final result would be the same; only the path by which it was reached would be different.
[ 13 ] That absolutely new moral Ideas should be developed by the moral imagination is for the theory of evolution no more miraculous than the development of one animal species out of another, provided only that this theory, as a Monistic world-view, rejects, in morality as in science, every transcendent (metaphysical) influence which cannot be ideally experienced. In doing so, it follows the same principle by which it is guided in seeking the causes of new organic forms without referring to the interference of an extra-mundane Being, who produces every new species in accordance with a new creative thought through supernatural influence. Just as Monism has no use for supernatural creative thoughts in explaining living organisms, so it is equally impossible for it to derive the moral world-order from causes which do not lie within the world of our experience. It cannot admit that the nature of moral will is exhausted by being traced back to a continuous supernatural influence upon moral life (divine government of the world from the outside), or a particular act of revelation at a particular moment in history (giving of the ten commandments), or through God's appearance on the earth (as Christ). All that happens in this way to and in man becomes a moral element only when it enters into human experience and becomes an individual's own. Moral processes are, for Monism, products of the world like everything else that exists, and their causes must be looked for in the world, i.e., in man, because man is the bearer of morality.
[ 14 ] Ethical Individualism, then, is the crown of the edifice that Darwin and Haeckel have striven for Natural Science. It is Spiritualized Evolutionism applied to the moral life.
[ 15 ] Anyone who restricts the concept of the natural from the outset to an arbitrarily narrowed sphere, is easily tempted not to find any room within it for free individual action. The consistent Evolutionist does not easily fall a prey to such a narrow-minded view. He cannot let the natural process of evolution terminate with the ape, and acknowledge for man a “supernatural” origin. He is bound, in his very search for the natural progenitors of man to seek Spirit even in nature. Again, he cannot stop short at the organic functions of man, and regard only these as natural. He is bound to look on the life of moral self-determination as the spiritual continuation of organic life.
[ 16 ] The Evolutionist, then, in accordance with his fundamental principles, can maintain only that the present form of moral action evolves out of other kinds of world-happenings. He must leave the characterization of action, i.e., its determination as a free action, to the immediate observation of each action. All that he maintains is only that men have developed out of non-human ancestors. What the nature of men actually is must be determined by observation of men themselves. The results of this observation cannot possibly contradict the true history of evolution. Only the assertion that the results are such as to exclude their being due to a natural world-order would contradict recent developments in the Natural Sciences.4We are entitled to speak of thoughts (ethical Ideas) as objects of observation. For, although the products of thinking do not enter the field of observation, so long as thinking goes on, they may well become objects of observation subsequently. In this way we have gained our characterization of action.
[ 17 ] Ethical Individualism, then, has nothing to fear from a Natural Science which understands itself. Observation yields spiritual activity (freedom) as the characteristic quality of the perfect form of human action. Freedom must be attributed to the human will, in so far as the will realizes purely ideal intuitions. For these are not the results of a necessity acting upon them from without, but are grounded in themselves. When we find that an action embodies such an ideal intuition, we feel it to be free. Freedom consists in this character of an action.
[ 18 ] What, then, from this standpoint are we to say of the distinction, already mentioned above (p. 7) between the two statements “To be free means to be able to do what you will,” and “To be able, as you please, to desire or not to desire is the real meaning of the dogma of freewill”? Hamerling bases his theory of freewill precisely on this distinction, by declaring the first statement to be correct but the second to be an absurd tautology. He says, “I can do what I will, but to say I can will what I will is an empty tautology.” Whether I am able to do, i.e., to make real, what I will, i.e., what I have set before myself as my Idea of action, that depends on external circumstances and on my technical skill (cp. p. 156). To be free means to be able to determine by moral imagination out of oneself those representations (motives) which lie at the basis of the action. Freedom is impossible if anything other than I myself (whether a mechanical process or extra-mundane God whose existence is only inferred) determines my moral representations. In other words, I am free only when I myself produce these representations, but not when I am merely able to realize the motives which another being has implanted in me. A free being is one who can will what he regards as right. Whoever does anything other than what he wills must be impelled to it by motives which do not lie in himself. Such a man is unfree in his action. Accordingly, to be able to will, as you please, what you consider right or what you consider wrong would mean to be free or unfree as you please. This is, of course, just as absurd as to identify freedom with the ability to do what one is compelled to will. But this is just what Hamerling maintains when he says, “It is perfectly true that the will is always determined by motives, but it is absurd to say that on this ground it is unfree; for a greater freedom can neither be desired nor conceived than the freedom to realize oneself in proportion to one's own power and strength of decision.” On the contrary, it is well possible to desire a greater freedom and that a true freedom, viz., the freedom to determine for oneself the reasons for one's volitions.
[ 19 ] Under certain conditions a man may be induced to abandon the execution of his will; but to allow others to prescribe to him what he ought to do—in other words, to will what another and not what he himself regards as right—to this a man will submit only when he does not feel free.
[ 20 ] External powers may prevent me from doing what I will, but that is only to condemn me to do nothing or to be unfree. Not until they enslave my spirit, drive my motives out of my head, and put their own motives in the place of mine, do they really aim at making me unfree. That is the reason why the church attacks not only the mere doing, but especially the impure thoughts, i.e., motives of my action. The church makes me unfree if she calls impure all those motives which she has not enunciated. A church or other community produces unfreedom when its priests or teachers turn themselves into rulers of consciences, i.e., when the faithful are compelled to go to them (to the confessional) for the motives of their actions.
Addition to the Revised Edition, 1918
[ 21 ] In the preceding chapters on human willing I have pointed out what man can experience in his actions, so as, through this experience, to become conscious that his willing is free. It is especially important to recognize that we derive the right to call an act of will free from the experiment of an ideal intuition realizing itself in the act. This can be nothing but a result of observation, in the sense that we observe the development of human volition in the direction towards the goal of attaining the possibility of just-such volition sustained by purely ideal intuition. This attainment is possible because the ideal intuition is effective through nothing but its own self-dependent essence. Where such an intuition is present in human consciousness, it has not developed itself out of the processes in the organism (cp. p. 111 ff.), but the organic activity has retired to make room for the ideal activity. Observation of an act of will which is an image of an intuition shows that out of it, likewise, all organically necessary activity has retired. The act of will is free. No one can observe this freedom of will who is unable to see how free will consists in this, that, first, the intuitive element lames and represses the necessary activity of the human organism and then puts in its place the spiritual activity of a will permeated by the Idea. Only those who are unable to observe these two factors in the free act of will believe that every act of will is unfree. Those who are able to observe them win through to the recognition that man is unfree in so far as he cannot carry through the repressing of the organic activity, but that this unfreedom is tending towards freedom, and that this freedom, so far from being an abstract ideal, is a directive force inherent in human nature. Man is free in proportion as he succeeds in realizing in his acts of will the same mood of soul which pervades him when he is conscious in himself of the formation of purely ideal (spiritual) intuitions.
XII. Die Moralische Phantasie
(Darwinismus und Sittlichkeit)
[ 1 ] Der freie Geist handelt nach seinen Impulsen, das sind Intuitionen, die aus dem Ganzen seiner Ideenwelt durch das Denken ausgewählt sind. Für den unfreien Geist liegt der Grund, warum er aus seiner Ideenwelt eine bestimmte Intuition aussondert, um sie einer Handlung zugrunde zu legen, in der ihm gegebenen Wahrnehmungswelt, das heißt in seinen bisherigen Erlebnissen. Er erinnert sich, bevor er zu einem Entschluß kommt, daran, was jemand in einem dem seinigen analogen Falle getan oder zu tun für gut geheißen hat, oder was Gott für diesen Fall befohlen hat und so weiter, und danach handelt er. Dem freien Geist sind diese Vorbedingungen nicht einzige Antriebe des Handelns. Er faßt einen schlechthin ersten Entschluß. Es kümmert ihn — dabei ebensowenig, was andere in diesem Falle getan, noch was sie dafür befohlen haben. Er hat rein ideelle Gründe, die ihn bewegen, aus der Summe seiner Begriffe gerade einen bestimmten herauszuheben und ihn in Handlung umzusetzen. Seine Handlung wird aber der wahrnehmbaren Wirklichkeit angehören. Was er vollbringt, wird also mit einem ganz bestimmten Wahrnehmungsinhalte identisch sein. Der Begriff wird sich in einem konkreten Einzelgeschehnis zu verwirklichen haben. Er wird als Begriff diesen Einzelfall nicht enthalten können. Er wird sich darauf nur in der Art beziehen können, wie überhaupt ein Begriff sich auf eine Wahrnehmung bezieht, zum Beispiel wie der Begriff des Löwen auf einen einzelnen Löwen. Das Mittelglied zwischen Begriff und Wahrnehmung ist die Vorstellung (vgl. 5. 107 f.). Dem unfreien Geist ist dieses Mittelglied von vornherein gegeben. Die Motive sind von vornherein als Vorstellungen in seinem Bewußtsein vorhanden. Wenn er etwas ausführen will, so macht er das so, wie er es gesehen hat, oder wie es ihm für den einzelnen Fall befohlen wird. Die Autorität wirkt daher am besten durch Beispiele, das heißt durch Überlieferung ganz bestimmter Einzelhandlungen an das Bewußtsein des unfreien Geistes. Der Christ handelt weniger nach den Lehren als nach dem Vorbilde des Erlösers. Regeln haben für das positive Handeln weniger Wert als für das Unterlassen bestimmter Handlungen. Gesetze treten nur dann in die allgemeine Begriffsform, wenn sie Handlungen verbieten, nicht aber wenn sie sie zu tun gebieten. Gesetze über das, was er tun soll, müssen dem unfreien Geiste in ganz konkreter Form gegeben werden: Reinige die Straße vor deinem Haustore! Zahle deine Steuern in dieser bestimmten Höhe bei dem Steueramte X! und so weiter. Begriffsform haben die Gesetze zur Verhinderung von Handlungen: Du sollst nicht stehlen! Du sollst nicht ehebrechen! Diese Gesetze wirken auf den unfreien Geist aber auch nur durch den Hinweis auf eine konkrete Vorstellung, zum Beispiel die der entsprechenden zeitlichen Strafen, oder der Gewissensqual, oder der ewigen Verdammnis, und so weiter.
[ 2 ] Sobald der Antrieb zu einer Handlung in der allgemein-begrifflichen Form vorhanden ist (zum Beispiel: du sollst deinen Mitmenschen Gutes tun! du sollst so leben, daß du dein Wohlsein am besten beförderst!), dann muß in jedem einzelnen Fall die konkrete Vorstellung des Handelns (die Beziehung des Begriffes auf einen Wahrnehmungsinhalt) erst gefunden werden. Bei dem freien Geiste, den kein Vorbild und keine Furcht vor Strafe usw. treibt, ist diese Umsetzung des Begriffes in die Vorstellung immer notwendig.
[ 3 ] Konkrete Vorstellungen aus der Summe seiner Ideen heraus produziert der Mensch zunächst durch die Phantasie. Was der freie Geist nötig hat, um seine Ideen zu verwirklichen, um sich durchzusetzen, ist also die moralische Phantasie. Sie ist die Quelle für das Handeln des freien Geistes. Deshalb sind auch nur Menschen mit moralischer Phantasie eigentlich sittlich produktiv. Die bloßen Moralprediger, das ist: die Leute, die sittliche Regeln ausspinnen, ohne sie zu konkreten Vorstellungen verdichten zu können, sind moralisch unproduktiv. Sie gleichen den Kritikern, die verständig auseinanderzusetzen wissen, wie ein Kunstwerk beschaffen sein soll, selbst aber auch nicht das geringste zustande bringen können.
[ 4 ] Die moralische Phantasie muß, um ihre Vorstellung zu verwirklichen, in ein bestimmtes Gebiet von Wahrnehmungen eingreifen. Die Handlung des Menschen schafft keine Wahrnehmungen, sondern prägt die Wahrnehmungen, die bereits vorhanden sind, um, erteilt ihnen eine neue Gestalt. Um ein bestimmtes Wahrnehmungsobjekt oder eine Summe von solchen, einer moralischen Vorstellung gemäß, umbilden zu können, muß man den gesetzmäßigen Inhalt (die bisherige Wirkungsweise, die man neu gestalten oder der man eine neue Richtung geben will) dieses Wahrnehmungsbildes begriffen haben. Man muß ferner den Modus finden, nach dem sich diese Gesetzmäßigkeit in eine neue verwandeln läßt. Dieser Teil der moralischen Wirksamkeit beruht auf Kenntnis der Erscheinungswelt, mit der man es zu tun hat. Er ist also zu suchen in einem Zweige der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis überhaupt. Das moralische Handeln setzt also voraus neben dem moralischen Ideenvermögen 1Nur Oberflächlichkeit könnte im Gebrauch des Wortes Vermögen an dieser und andern Stellen dieser Schrift einen Rückfall in die Lehre der alten Psychologie von den Seelenvermögen erblicken. Der Zusammenhang mit dem 5. 95 f. Gesagten ergibt genau die Bedeutung des Wortes und der moralischen Phantasie die Fähigkeit, die Welt der Wahrnehmungen umzuformen, ohne ihren naturgesetzlichen Zusammenhang zu durchbrechen. Diese Fähigkeit ist moralische Technik. Sie ist in dem Sinne lernbar, wie Wissenschaft überhaupt lernbar ist. Im allgemeinen sind Menschen nämlich geeigneter, die Begriffe für die schon fertige Welt zu finden, als produktiv aus der Phantasie die noch nicht vorhandenen zukünftigen Handlungen zu bestimmen. Deshalb ist es sehr wohl möglich, daß Menschen ohne moralische Phantasie die moralischen Vorstellungen von andern empfangen und diese geschickt der Wirklichkeit einprägen. Auch der umgekehrte Fall kann vorkommen, daß Menschen mit moralischer Phantasie ohne die technische Geschicklichkeit sind und sich dann anderer Menschen zur Verwirklichung ihrer Vorstellungen bedienen müssen.
[ 5 ] Insofern zum moralischen Handeln die Kenntnis der Objekte unseres Handelnsgebietes notwendig ist, beruht unser Handeln auf dieser Kenntnis. Was hier in Betracht kommt, sind Naturgesetze. Wir haben es mit Naturwissenschaft zu tun, nicht mit Ethik.
[ 6 ] Die moralische Phantasie und das moralische Ideenvermögen können erst Gegenstand des Wissens werden, nachdem sie vom Individuum produziert sind. Dann aber regeln sie nicht mehr das Leben, sondern haben es bereits geregelt. Sie sind als wirkende Ursachen wie alle andern aufzufassen (Zwecke sind sie bloß für das Subjekt). Wir beschäftigen uns mit ihnen als mit einer Naturlehre der moralischen Vorstellungen.
[ 7 ] Eine Ethik als Normwissenschaft kann es daneben nicht geben.
[ 8 ] Man hat den normativen Charakter der moralischen Gesetze wenigstens insofern halten wollen, daß man die Ethik im Sinne der Diätetik auffaßte, welche aus den Lebensbedingungen des Organismus allgemeine Regeln ableitet, um auf Grund derselben dann den Körper im besonderen zu beeinflussen (Paulsen, System der Ethik). Dieser Vergleich ist falsch, weil unser moralisches Leben sich nicht mit dem Leben des Organismus vergleichen läßt. Die Wirksamkeit des Organismus ist ohne unser Zutun da; wir finden dessen Gesetze in der Welt fertig vor, können sie also suchen, und dann die gefundenen anwenden. Die moralischen Gesetze werden aber von uns erst geschaffen. Wir können sie nicht anwenden, bevor sie geschaffen sind. Der Irrtum entsteht dadurch, daß die moralischen Gesetze nicht in jedem Momente inhaltlich neu geschaffen werden, sondern sich forterben. Die von den Vorfahren übernommenen erscheinen dann gegeben wie die Naturgesetze des Organismus. Sie werden aber durchaus nicht mit demselben Rechte von einer späteren Generation wie diätetische Regeln angewendet. Denn sie gehen auf das Individuum und nicht wie das Naturgesetz auf das Exemplar einer Gattung. Als Organismus bin ich ein solches Gattungsexemplar, und ich werde naturgemäß leben, wenn ich die Naturgesetze der Gattung in meinem besonderen Falle anwende; als sittliches Wesen bin ich Individuum und habe meine ganz eigenen Gesetze. 2Wenn Paulsen (5. 15 des angeführten Buches) sagt: «Verschiedene Naturanlagen und Lebensbedingungen erfordern wie eine verschiedene leibliche so auch eine verschiedene geistig-moralische Diät«, so Ist er der richtigen Erkenntnis ganz nahe, trifft aber den entscheidenden Punkt doch nicht. Insofern ich Individuum bin, brauche ich keine Diät. Diätetik heißt die Kunst, das besondere Exemplar mit den allgemeinen Gesetzen der Gattung in Einklang zu bringen. Als Individuum bin ich aber kein Exemplar der Gattung.
[ 9 ] Die hier vertretene Ansicht scheint in Widerspruch zu stehen mit jener Grundlehre der modernen Naturwissenschaft, die man als Entwickelungstheorie bezeichnet. Aber sie scheint es nur. Unter Entwickelung wird verstanden das reale Hervorgehen des Späteren aus dem Früheren auf naturgesetzlichem Wege. Unter Entwickelung in der organischen Welt versteht man den Umstand, daß die späteren (vollkommeneren) organischen Formen reale Abkömmlinge der früheren (unvollkommenen) sind und auf naturgesetzliche Weise aus ihnen hervorgegangen sind. Die Bekenner der organischen Entwickelungstheorie müßten sich eigentlich vorstellen, daß es auf der Erde einmal eine Zeitepoche gegeben hat, wo ein Wesen das allmähliche Hervorgehen der Reptilien aus den Uramnioten mit Augen hätte verfolgen können, wenn er damals als Beobachter hätte dabei sein können und mit entsprechend langer Lebensdauer ausgestattet gewesen wäre. Ebenso müßten sich die Entwickelungstheoretiker vorstellen, daß ein Wesen das Hervorgehen des Sonnensystems aus dem Kant-Laplaceschen Urnebel hätte beobachten können, wenn es während der unendlich langen Zeit frei im Gebiet des Weltäthers sich an einem entsprechenden Orte hätte aufhalten können. Daß bei solcher Vorstellung sowohl die Wesenheit der Uramnioten wie auch die des Kant-Laplaceschen Weltnebels anders gedacht werden müßte als die materialistischen Denker dies tun, kommt hier nicht in Betracht. Keinem Entwickelungstheoretiker sollte es aber einfallen, zu behaupten, daß er aus seinem Begriffe des Uramniontieres den des Reptils mit allen seinen Eigenschaften herausholen kann, auch wenn er nie ein Reptil gesehen hat. Ebensowenig sollte aus dem Begriff des KantLaplaceschen Urnebels das Sonnensystem abgeleitet werden, wenn dieser Begriff des Urnebels direkt nur an der Wahrnehmung des Urnebels bestimmt gedacht ist. Das heißt mit anderenWorten: derEntwickelungstheoretiker muß,wenn er konsequent denkt, behaupten, daß aus früheren Entwickelungsphasen spätere sich real ergeben, daß wir, wenn wir den Begriff des Unvollkommenen und den des Vollkommenen gegeben haben, den Zusammenhang einsehen können; keineswegs aber sollte er zugeben, daß der an dem Früheren erlangte Begriff hinreicht, um das Spätere daraus zu entwickeln. Daraus folgt für den Ethiker, daß er zwar den Zusammenhang späterer moralischer Begriffe mit früheren einsehen kann; aber nicht, daß auch nur eine einzige neue moralischeldee aus früheren geholt werden kann.Als moralisches Wesen produziert das Individuum seinen Inhalt. Dieser produzierte Inhalt ist für den Ethiker gerade so ein Gegebenes, wie für den Naturforscher die Reptilien ein Gegebenes sind. Die Reptilien sind aus den Uramnioten hervorgegangen; aber der Naturforscher kann aus dem Begriff derUramnioten den derReptilien nicht herausholen. Spätere moralische Ideen entwickeln sich aus früheren; der Ethiker kann aber aus den sittlichen Begriffen einer früheren Kulturperiode die der späteren nicht herausholen. Die Verwirrung wird dadurch hervorgerufen, daß wir als Naturforscher die Tatsachen bereits vor uns haben und hinterher sie erst erkennend betrachten; während wir beim sittlichen Handeln selbst erst die Tatsachen schaffen, die wir hinterher erkennen. Beim Entwickelungsprozeß der sittlichen Weltordnung verrichten wir das, was die Natur auf niedrigerer Stufe verrichtet: wir verändern ein Wahrnehmbares. Die ethische Norm kann also zunächst nicht wie ein Naturgesetz erkannt, sondern sie muß geschaffen werden. Erst wenn sie da ist, kann sie Gegenstand des Erkennens werden.
[ 10 ] Aber können wir denn nicht das Neue an dem Alten messen? Wird nicht jeder Mensch gezwungen sein, das durch seine moralische Phantasie Produzierte an den hergebrachten sittlichen Lehren zu bemessen? Für dasjenige, was als sittlich Produktives sich offenbaren soll, ist das ein ebensolches Unding, wie es das andere wäre, wenn man eine neue Naturform an der alten bemessen wollte und sagte: weil die Reptilien mit den Uramnioten nicht übereinstimmen, sind sie eine unberechtigte (krankhafte) Form.
[ 11 ] Der ethische Individualismus steht also nicht im Gegensatz zu einer recht verstandenen Entwickelungstheorie, sondern folgt direkt aus ihr. Der Haeckelsche Stammbaum von denUrtieren bis hinauf zum Menschen als organisches Wesen müßte sich ohne Unterbrechung der natürlichen Gesetzlichkeit und ohne eine Durchbrechung der einheitlichen Entwickelung heraufverfolgen lassen bis zu dem Individuum als einem im bestimmten Sinne sittlichen Wesen. Nirgends aber würde aus dem Wesen einer Vorfahrenart das Wesen einer nachfolgenden Art sich ableiten lassen. So wahr es aber ist, daß die sittlichen Ideen des Individuums wahrnehmbar aus denen seiner Vorfahren hervorgegangen sind, so wahr ist es auch, daß dasselbe sittlich unfruchtbar ist, wenn es nicht selbst moralische Ideen hat.
[ 12 ] Derselbe ethische Individualismus, den ich auf Grund der vorangehenden Anschauungen entwickelt habe, würde sich auch aus der Entwickelungstheorie ableiten lassen. Die schließliche Überzeugung wäre dieselbe; nur der Weg ein anderer, auf dem sie erlangt ist.
[ 13 ] Das Hervortreten völlig neuer sittlicher Ideen aus der moralischen Phantasie ist für die Entwickelungstheorie gerade so wenig wunderbar, wie das Hervorgehen einer neuen Tierart aus einer andern. Nur muß diese Theorie als monistische Weltanschauung im sittlichen Leben ebenso wie im natürlichen jeden bloß erschlossenen, nicht ideell erlebbaren jenseitigen (metaphysischen) Einfluß abweisen. Sie folgt dabei demselben Prinzip, das sie antreibt, wenn sie die Ursachen neuer organischer Formen sucht und dabei nicht auf das Eingreifen eines außerweltlichen Wesens sich beruft, das jede neue Art nach einem neuen Schöpfungsgedanken durch übernatürlichen Einfluß hervorruft. So wie der Monismus zur Erklärung des Lebewesens keinen übernatürlichen Schöpfungsgedanken brauchen kann, so ist es ihm auch unmöglich, die sittliche Weltordnung von Ursachen abzuleiten, die nicht innerhalb der erlebbaren Welt liegen. Er kann das Wesen eines Wollens als eines sittlichen nicht damit erschöpft finden, daß er es auf einen fortdauernden übernatürlichen Einfluß auf das sittliche Leben (göttliche Weltregierung von außen) zurückführt, oder auf eine zeitliche besondere Offenbarung (Erteilung der zehn Gebote) oder auf die Erscheinung Gottes auf der Erde (Christi). Was durch alles dieses geschieht an und in dem Menschen, wird erst zum Sittlichen, wenn es im menschlichen Erlebnis zu einem individuellen Eigenen wird. Die sittlichen Prozesse sind dem Monismus Weltprodukte wie alles andere Bestehende und ihre Ursachen müssen in der Welt, das heißt, weil der Mensch der Träger der Sittlichkeit ist, im Menschen gesucht werden.
[ 14 ] Der ethische Individualismus ist somit die Krönung des Gebäudes, das Darwin und Haeckel für die Naturwissenschaft erstrebt haben. Er ist vergeistigte Entwickelungslehre auf das sittliche Leben übertragen.
[ 15 ] Wer dem Begriff des Natürlichen von vornherein in engherziger Weise ein willkürlich begrenztes Gebiet anweist, der kann dann leicht dazu kommen, für die freie individuelle Handlung keinen Raum darin zu finden. Der konsequent verfahrende Entwickelungstheoretiker kann in solche Engherzigkeit nicht verfallen. Er kann die natürliche Entwickelungsweise beim Affen nicht abschließen und dem Menschen einen «übernatürlichen» Ursprung zugestehen; er muß, auch indem er die natürlichen Vorfahren des Menschen sucht, in der Natur schon den Geist suchen; er kann auch bei den organischen Verrichtungen des Menschen nicht stehen bleiben und nur diese natürlich finden, sondern er muß auch das sittlich-freie Leben als geistige Fortsetzung des organischen ansehen.
[ 16 ] Der Entwickelungstheoretiker kann, seiner Grundauffassung gemäß, nur behaupten, daß das gegenwärtige sittliche Handeln aus anderen Arten des Weltgeschehens hervorgeht; die Charakteristik des Handelns, das ist seine Bestimmung als eines freien, muß er der unmittelbaren Beobachtung des Handelns überlassen. Er behauptet ja auch nur, daß Menschen aus noch nicht menschlichen Vorfahren sich entwickelt haben. Wie die Menschen beschaffen sind, das muß durch Beobachtung dieser selbst festgestellt werden. Die Ergebnisse dieser Beobachtung können nicht in Widerspruch geraten mit einer richtig angesehenen Entwickelungsgeschichte. Nur die Behauptung, daß die Ergebnisse solche sind, die eine natürliche Weltordnung ausschließen, könnte nicht in Übereinstimmung mit der neueren Richtung der Naturwissenschaft gebracht werden. 3Daß wir Gedanken (ethische Ideen) als Objekte der Beobachtung bezeichnen, geschieht mit Recht. Denn wenn auch die Gebilde des Denkens während der gedanklichen Tätigkeit nicht mit ins Beobachtungsfeld eintreten, so können sie doch nachher Gegenstand der Beobachtung werden. Und auf diesem Wege haben wir unsere Charakteristik des Handelns gewonnen.
[ 17 ] Von einer sich selbst verstehenden Naturwissenschaft hat der ethische Individualismus nichts zu fürchten: die Beobachtung ergibt als Charakteristikum der vollkommenen Form des menschlichen Handelns die Freiheit. Diese Freiheit muß dem menschlichen Wollen zugesprochen werden, insoferne dieses rein ideelle Intuitionen verwirklicht. Denn diese sind nicht Ergebnisse einer von außen auf sie wirkenden Notwendigkeit, sondern ein auf sich selbst Stehendes. Findet der Mensch, daß eine Handlung das Abbild einer solchen ideellen Intuition ist, so empfindet er sie als eine freie. In diesem Kennzeichen einer Handlung liegt die Freiheit.
[ 18 ] Wie steht es nun, von diesem Standpunkte aus, mit der bereits oben (5. 22 und 16) erwähnten Unterscheidung zwischen den beiden Sätzen: Frei sein heißt tun können, was man will-und dem andern: Nach Belieben begehren können und nicht begehren können sei der eigentliche Sinn des Dogmas vorn freien Willen? Hamerling begründet gerade seine Ansicht vom freien Willen auf diese Unterscheidung, indem er das erste für richtig, das zweite für eine absurde Tautologie erklärt. Er sagt: Ich kann tun, was ich will. Aber zu sagen: ich kann wollen, was ich will, ist eine leere Tautologie. — Ob ich tun, das heißt, in Wirklichkeit umsetzen kann, was ich will, was ich mir also als Idee meines Tuns vorgesetzt habe, das hängt von äußeren Umständen und von meiner technischen Geschicklichkeit (vgl. S. 193 f.) ab. Frei sein heißt die dem Handeln zugrunde liegenden Vorstellungen (Beweggründe) durch die moralische Phantasie von sich aus bestimmen können. Freiheit ist unmöglich, wenn etwas außer mir (mechanischer Prozeß oder nur erschlossener außerweltlicher Gott) meine moralischen Vorstellungen bestimmt. Ich bin also nur dann frei, wenn ich selbst diese Vorstellungen produziere, nicht, wenn ich die Beweggründe, die ein anderes Wesen in mich gesetzt hat, ausführen kann. Ein freies Wesen ist dasjenige, welches wollen kann, was es selbst für richtig hält. Wer etwas anderes tut, als er will, der muß zu diesem anderen durch Motive getrieben werden, die nicht in ihm liegen. Ein solcher handelt unfrei. Nach Belieben wollen können, was man für richtig oder nicht richtig hält, heißt also: nach Belieben frei oder unfrei sein können. Das ist natürlich ebenso absurd, wie die Freiheit in dem Vermögen zu sehen, tun zu können, was man wollen muß. Das letztere aber behauptet Hamerling, wenn er sagt: Es ist vollkommen wahr, daß der Wille immer durch Beweggründe bestimmt wird, aber es ist absurd zu sagen, daß er deshalb unfrei sei; denn eine größere Freiheit läßt sich für ihn weder wünschen noch denken, als die, sich nach Maßgabe seiner eigenen Stärke und Entschiedenheit zu verwirklichen. — Jawohl: es läßt sich eine größere Freiheit wünschen, und das ist erst die wahre. Nämlich die: sich die Gründe seines Wollens selbst zu bestimmen.
[ 19 ] Von der Ausführung dessen abzusehen, was er will, dazu läßt sich der Mensch unter Umständen bewegen. Sich vorschreiben zu lassen, was er tun soll, das ist, zu wollen, was ein andrer und nicht er für richtig hält, dazu ist er nur zu haben, insofern er sich nicht frei fühlt.
[ 20 ] Die äußeren Gewalten können mich hindern, zu tun, was ich will. Dann verdammen sie mich einfach zum Nichtstun oder zur Unfreiheit. Erst wenn sie meinen Geist knechten und mir meine Beweggründe aus dem Kopfe jagen und an deren Stelle die ihrigen setzen wollen, dann beabsichtigen sie meine Unfreiheit. Die Kirche wendet sich daher nicht bloß gegen das Tun, sondern namentlich gegen die unreinen Gedanken, das ist: die Beweggründe meines Handelns. Unfrei macht sie mich, wenn ihr alle Beweggründe, die sie nicht angibt, als unrein erscheinen. Eine Kirche oder eine andere Gemeinschaft erzeugt dann Unfreiheit, wenn ihre Priester oder Lehrer sich zu Gewissensgebietern machen, das ist, wenn die Gläubigen sich von ihnen (aus dem Beichtstuhle) die Beweggründe ihres Handelns holen müssen.
Zusatz zur Neuausgabe 1918
[ 21 ] In diesen Ausführungen über das menschliche Wollen ist dargestellt, was der Mensch an seinen Handlungen erleben kann, um durch dieses Erlebnis zu dem Bewußtsein zu kommen: mein Wollen ist frei. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist, daß die Berechtigung, ein Wollen als frei zu bezeichnen, durch das Erlebnis erreicht wird: in dem Wollen verwirklicht sich eine ideelle Intuition. Dies kann nur Beobachtungsresultat sein, ist es aber in dem Sinne, in dem das menschliche Wollen sich in einer Entwickelungsströmung beobachtet, deren Ziel darin liegt, solche von rein ideeller Intuition getragene Möglichkeit des Wollens zu erreichen. Sie kann erreicht werden, weil in der ideellen Intuition nichts als deren eigene auf sich gebaute Wesenheit wirkt. Ist eine solche Intuition im menschlichen Bewußtsein anwesend, dann ist sie nicht aus den Vorgängen des Organismus heraus entwickelt (s. S. 145 ff.), sondern die organische Tätigkeit hat sich zurückgezogen, um der ideellen Platz zu machen. Beobachte ich ein Wollen, das Abbild der Intuition ist, dann ist auch aus diesem Wollen die organisch notwendige Tätigkeit zurückgezogen. Das Wollen ist frei. Diese Freiheit des Wollens wird der nicht beobachten können, der nicht zu schauen vermag, wie das freie Wollen darin besteht, daß erst durch das intuitive Element das notwendige Wirken des menschlichen Organismus abgelähmt, zurückgedrängt, und an seine Stelle die geistige Tätigkeit des idee-erfüllten Willens gesetzt wird. Nur wer diese Beobachtung der Zweigliedrigkeit eines freien Wollens nicht machen kann, glaubt an die Unfreiheit jedes Wollens. Wer sie machen kann, ringt sich zu der Einsicht durch, daß der Mensch, insofern er den Zurückdämmungsvorgang der organischen Tätigkeit nicht zu Ende führen kann, unfrei ist; daß aber diese Unfreiheit der Freiheit zustrebt, und diese Freiheit keineswegs ein abstraktes Ideal ist, sondern eine in der menschlichen Wesenheit liegende Richtkraft. Frei ist der Mensch in dem Maße, als er in seinem Wollen dieselbe Seelenstimmung verwirklichen kann, die in ihm lebt, wenn er sich der Ausgestaltung rein ideeller (geistiger) Intuitionen bewußt ist.
XII. Moral Imagination
(Darwinism and Morality)
[ 1 ] The free mind acts according to its impulses, which are intuitions that are selected from the whole of its world of ideas through thinking. For the unfree mind, the reason why it selects a certain intuition from its world of ideas in order to base an action on it lies in the world of perception given to it, i.e. in its previous experiences. Before coming to a decision, he remembers what someone has done or approved of doing in a case analogous to his own, or what God has commanded for this case and so on, and he acts accordingly. For the free spirit, these preconditions are not the only impulses for action. It makes an absolutely first decision. It does not care what others have done in this case, nor what they have ordered in return. He has purely idealistic reasons that move him to single out a particular one from the sum of his concepts and to translate it into action. His action, however, will belong to perceptible reality. What he accomplishes will therefore be identical with a very specific perceptual content. The concept will have to be realized in a concrete individual event. As a concept it will not be able to contain this individual case. It will only be able to relate to it in the same way that a concept relates to a perception, for example, as the concept of a lion relates to a single lion. The middle link between concept and perception is the conception (cf. 5. 107 f.). The unfree spirit is given this middle link from the outset. The motives are present in its consciousness from the outset as ideas. If it wants to do something, it does it as it has seen it, or as it is ordered to do it for the individual case. Authority therefore works best through examples, that is, by transmitting very specific individual actions to the consciousness of the unfree spirit. The Christian acts less according to the teachings than according to the example of the Savior. Rules have less value for positive action than for refraining from certain actions. Laws only enter into the general conceptual form when they forbid actions, but not when they command them to be done. Laws about what it should do must be given to the unfree spirit in a very concrete form: Clean the street in front of your front gate! Pay your taxes in this particular amount at tax office X! and so on. The laws to prevent actions have a conceptual form: Thou shalt not steal! Thou shalt not commit adultery! However, these laws only have an effect on the unfree spirit by referring to a specific idea, for example the corresponding temporal punishments, or the torment of conscience, or eternal damnation, and so on.
[ 2 ] As soon as the impulse to an action is present in the general conceptual form (for example: you should do good to your fellow human beings! you should live in such a way that you best promote your well-being!), then the concrete idea of the action (the relationship of the concept to a perceptual content) must first be found in each individual case. With the free spirit, which is not driven by any example or fear of punishment, etc., this transformation of the concept into the imagination is always necessary.
[ 3 ] Man first produces concrete concepts from the sum of his ideas through the imagination. What the free spirit needs in order to realize its ideas, in order to assert itself, is therefore the moral imagination. It is the source of the free spirit's actions. That is why only people with a moral imagination are actually morally productive. Mere moral preachers, i.e. people who spin out moral rules without being able to condense them into concrete ideas, are morally unproductive. They are like critics who know how to intelligently explain what a work of art should be like, but are themselves unable to achieve the slightest thing.
[ 4 ] The moral imagination, in order to realize its conception, must intervene in a certain field of perceptions. Man's action does not create perceptions, but reshapes the perceptions that already exist, giving them a new form. In order to be able to reshape a certain object of perception or a sum of such objects according to a moral conception, one must have understood the lawful content (the previous mode of action that one wants to reshape or give a new direction to) of this perceptual image. One must also find the mode by which this lawfulness can be transformed into a new one. This part of moral effectiveness is based on knowledge of the phenomenal world with which one is dealing. It is therefore to be sought in a branch of scientific knowledge in general. Moral action thus presupposes, in addition to the moral faculty of ideas, 1only superficiality could see in the use of the word faculty in this and other passages of this writing a relapse into the doctrine of the old psychology of the faculties of the soul. The connection with 5. 95 f. The connection with what has been said gives precisely the meaning of the word and of the moral imagination the ability to transform the world of perceptions without breaking through its natural-law connection. This ability is moral technique. It can be learned in the same way that science can be learned. In general, people are more suited to finding concepts for the already finished world than to productively determining future actions from their imagination that do not yet exist. It is therefore quite possible for people without a moral imagination to receive moral concepts from others and skillfully imprint them on reality. The reverse case can also occur, where people with moral imagination are without the technical skill and then have to use other people to realize their ideas.
[ 5 ] In so far as knowledge of the objects of our sphere of action is necessary for moral action, our action is based on this knowledge. What comes into consideration here are natural laws. We are dealing with natural science, not ethics.
[ 6 ] The moral imagination and the moral faculty of ideas can only become the object of knowledge after they have been produced by the individual. Then, however, they no longer regulate life, but have already regulated it. They are to be understood as acting causes like all others (they are merely purposes for the subject). We deal with them as a natural theory of moral ideas.
[ 7 ] An ethics as a science of norms cannot exist alongside this.
[ 8 ] The normative character of moral laws has been maintained at least to the extent that ethics has been understood in the sense of dietetics, which derives general rules from the living conditions of the organism in order to then influence the body in particular on the basis of these rules (Paulsen, System der Ethik). This comparison is false because our moral life cannot be compared with the life of the organism. The effectiveness of the organism is there without our intervention; we find its laws ready-made in the world, so we can search for them and then apply the ones we find. Moral laws, however, are first created by us. We cannot apply them before they are created. The error arises from the fact that moral laws are not created anew at every moment, but are perpetuated. Those inherited from the ancestors then appear to be given like the natural laws of the organism. They are not, however, applied by a later generation with the same right as dietary rules. For they apply to the individual and not, like the laws of nature, to the specimen of a species. As an organism I am such a specimen of a species, and I will live according to nature if I apply the natural laws of the species in my particular case; as a moral being I am an individual and have my own laws. 2When Paulsen (5. 15 of the book cited) says: "Different natural dispositions and living conditions require a different spiritual and moral diet, just as they require a different physical diet", he is very close to the correct insight, but he does not hit the decisive point. Insofar as I am an individual, I do not need a diet. Dietetics is the art of harmonizing the particular specimen with the general laws of the species. As an individual, however, I am not a specimen of the species.
[ 9 ] The view expressed here seems to contradict the basic doctrine of modern natural science, which is known as the theory of evolution. But it only appears to. By evolution is understood the real emergence of the later from the earlier in a natural-law way. Development in the organic world is understood to mean the fact that the later (more perfect) organic forms are real descendants of the earlier (imperfect) ones and have emerged from them in accordance with natural law. The proponents of the organic theory of development would actually have to imagine that there was once an epoch on earth when a being could have followed the gradual emergence of the reptiles from the uramniotes with his eyes, if he could have been present as an observer at that time and had been endowed with a correspondingly long life span. In the same way, evolutionary theorists would have to imagine that a being could have observed the emergence of the solar system from the Kant-Laplace primordial nebula if it had been able to stay freely in the region of the world ether in a corresponding place during the infinitely long time. The fact that in such a conception both the nature of the uramniotes and that of the Kant-Laplace world nebula would have to be thought of differently than the materialistic thinkers do is not a consideration here. But it should not occur to any evolutionary theorist to claim that he can extract from his concept of the primordial animal that of the reptile with all its characteristics, even if he has never seen a reptile. Nor should the solar system be deduced from the concept of Kant-Laplace's primordial nebula, if this concept of the primordial nebula is thought to be directly determined only by the perception of the primordial nebula. In other words, the developmental theorist, if he thinks consistently, must maintain that later phases of development result in reality from earlier ones, that when we have given the concept of the imperfect and that of the perfect, we can see the connection; but in no way should he admit that the concept obtained from the earlier is sufficient to develop the later from it. From this it follows for the ethicist that he can indeed see the connection of later moral concepts with earlier ones; but not that even a single new moral idea can be drawn from earlier ones. This produced content is a given for the ethicist just as the reptiles are a given for the naturalist. The reptiles emerged from the uramniotes; but the naturalist cannot extract the concept of reptiles from the concept of uramniotes. Later moral ideas develop from earlier ones; but the ethicist cannot extract from the moral concepts of an earlier cultural period those of a later one. The confusion is caused by the fact that we, as natural scientists, already have the facts before us and only recognize them afterwards; whereas in moral action we ourselves first create the facts which we recognize afterwards. In the process of developing the moral world order, we do what nature does at a lower level: we change something perceptible. The ethical norm can therefore not initially be recognized like a natural law, but must be created. Only when it is there can it become an object of cognition.
[ 10 ] But can we not measure the new by the old? Will not every person be forced to measure what is produced by his moral imagination against the traditional moral teachings? For that which is to reveal itself as morally productive, this is just as absurd as it would be to measure a new natural form against the old and say: because the reptiles do not agree with the primordial omniotes, they are an unjustified (pathological) form.
[ 11 ] Ethical individualism is therefore not in opposition to a correctly understood theory of development, but follows directly from it. Haeckel's family tree from the primitive animals up to man as an organic being should be able to be traced up to the individual as a moral being in a certain sense without interrupting the natural laws and without breaking through the uniform development. Nowhere, however, could the being of an ancestral species be deduced from the being of a subsequent species. But as true as it is that the moral ideas of the individual have perceptibly emerged from those of its ancestors, it is also true that the same is morally unfruitful if it does not itself have moral ideas.
[ 12 ] The same ethical individualism that I have developed on the basis of the preceding views could also be derived from the theory of development. The final conviction would be the same; only the path by which it is attained would be different.
[ 13 ] The emergence of completely new moral ideas from the moral imagination is just as little miraculous for the theory of development as the emergence of a new animal species from another. But this theory, as a monistic view of the world, must reject in moral life as well as in natural life any merely accessible, non-ideally perceptible otherworldly (metaphysical) influence. It follows the same principle that drives it when it seeks the causes of new organic forms and does not invoke the intervention of an otherworldly being that brings forth every new species according to a new idea of creation through supernatural influence. Just as monism cannot use a supernatural idea of creation to explain living beings, it is also impossible for it to derive the moral order of the world from causes that do not lie within the tangible world. He cannot find the essence of a will as a moral one exhausted by attributing it to a continuing supernatural influence on moral life (divine world government from outside), or to a special temporal revelation (the giving of the ten commandments), or to the appearance of God on earth (Christ). What happens to and in the human being through all of this only becomes moral when it becomes an individual possession in the human experience. For monism, moral processes are products of the world like everything else that exists and their causes must be sought in the world, that is, because man is the bearer of morality, in man.
[ 14 ] Ethical individualism is thus the culmination of the edifice that Darwin and Haeckel strove for in natural science. It is a spiritualized theory of development applied to moral life.
[ 15 ] Whoever from the outset assigns the concept of the natural an arbitrarily limited area in a narrow-minded manner can then easily come to find no room in it for free individual action. The consistent developmental theorist cannot fall into such narrow-mindedness. He cannot conclude the natural mode of development in the ape and grant man a "supernatural" origin; he must, even in seeking the natural ancestors of man, already seek the spirit in nature; nor can he stop at the organic activities of man and find only these natural, but he must also regard the morally free life as a spiritual continuation of the organic.
[ 16 ] In accordance with his basic conception, the developmental theorist can only assert that present moral action emerges from other kinds of world events; he must leave the characteristics of action, that is, its determination as a free, to the immediate observation of action. After all, he only claims that humans have evolved from ancestors who are not yet human. How humans are constituted must be determined by observing them. The results of this observation cannot contradict a correctly considered history of development. Only the assertion that the results are such as to exclude a natural world order could not be brought into agreement with the newer direction of natural science. 3It is right that we call thoughts (ethical ideas) objects of observation. For even if the formations of thought do not enter the field of observation during mental activity, they can nevertheless become objects of observation afterwards. And in this way we have gained our characteristic of action.
[ 17 ] Ethical individualism has nothing to fear from a self-understanding natural science: observation yields freedom as a characteristic of the perfect form of human action. This freedom must be attributed to human volition insofar as it realizes purely ideal intuitions. For these are not the results of a necessity acting on them from outside, but rather something that stands on its own. If man finds that an action is the image of such an ideal intuition, he perceives it as a free one. Freedom lies in this characteristic of an action.
[ 18 ] From this point of view, what about the distinction between the two sentences already mentioned above (5. 22 and 16)? To be free is to be able to do what one wants-and the other: To be able to desire and not to desire at will is the real meaning of the dogma of free will? Hamerling bases his view of free will precisely on this distinction by declaring the first to be correct and the second to be an absurd tautology. He says: I can do what I want. But to say: I can want what I want is an empty tautology. - Whether I can do, that is, realize in reality, what I want, that is, what I have set before myself as the idea of my action, depends on external circumstances and on my technical skill (cf. p. 193 f.). To be free means to be able to determine the ideas (motives) on which my actions are based through my moral imagination. Freedom is impossible if something outside of me (mechanical process or only an inferred otherworldly God) determines my moral ideas. I am therefore only free when I produce these ideas myself, not when I can carry out the motives that another being has placed in me. A free being is one who can want what he himself considers to be right. He who does something other than what he wants must be driven to this other by motives that do not lie within him. Such a person acts unfree. To be able to want at will what one considers right or not right therefore means: to be free or unfree at will. This is of course just as absurd as seeing freedom in the ability to do what one must want. But Hamerling asserts the latter when he says: "It is perfectly true that the will is always determined by motives, but it is absurd to say that it is therefore unfree; for a greater freedom can neither be desired nor conceived for it than that of realizing itself according to its own strength and determination. - Yes, there is a greater freedom to be desired, and that is the true one. Namely: to determine the reasons for one's own will.
[ 19 ] A man can be induced under certain circumstances to refrain from carrying out what he wants. To be dictated what he should do, that is, to want what another and not he considers right, is something he is only capable of insofar as he does not feel free.
[ 20 ] The external powers can prevent me from doing what I want. Then they simply condemn me to do nothing or to lack freedom. Only when they subjugate my spirit and chase my motives out of my head and want to put their own in their place do they intend my lack of freedom. The church is therefore not only against doing, but especially against impure thoughts, that is: the motives of my actions. It makes me impure when all motives that it does not specify appear impure to it. A church or other community creates bondage when its priests or teachers make themselves masters of conscience, that is, when the faithful must obtain from them (from the confessional) the motives of their actions.
Addition to the new edition 1918
[ 21 ] In these remarks on human volition, it is shown what man can experience in his actions in order to come to the awareness through this experience: my volition is free. It is of particular importance that the justification for describing a volition as free is achieved through the experience: an ideal intuition is realized in the volition. This can only be the result of observation, but it is so in the sense that human volition observes itself in a developmental current whose goal is to achieve such a possibility of volition borne by purely ideal intuition. It can be achieved because in ideal intuition nothing but its own being built upon itself is at work. If such an intuition is present in human consciousness, then it has not developed out of the processes of the organism (see p. 145 ff.), but the organic activity has withdrawn to make room for the ideal. If I observe a volition that is the image of intuition, then the organically necessary activity has also withdrawn from this volition. The will is free. He will not be able to observe this freedom of volition who is not able to see how free volition consists in the fact that it is only through the intuitive element that the necessary activity of the human organism is paralyzed, pushed back, and replaced by the spiritual activity of the idea-filled will. Only those who cannot make this observation of the twofoldness of a free will believe in the lack of freedom of every will. Those who can make this observation come to the realization that man is unfree in so far as he cannot complete the process of restraining organic activity; but that this lack of freedom strives towards freedom, and that this freedom is by no means an abstract ideal, but a directive force inherent in human nature. Man is free to the extent that he can realize in his will the same mood of soul that lives in him when he is conscious of the development of purely ideal (spiritual) intuitions.