The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity
GA 4
III. Thinking in the Service of Understanding the World
[ 1 ] When I see how a billiard ball, when struck, communicates its motion to another ball, I remain entirely without influence on the course of this event which I observe. The direction and velocity of the second ball is determined by the direction and velocity of the first. As long as I do no more than observe, I cannot say anything about the motion of the second ball until it actually moves. The situation alters if I begin to reflect on the content of my observation. The purpose of my reflection is to form concepts of the event. I bring the concept of an elastic ball into connection with certain other concepts of mechanics, and take into consideration the special circumstances prevailing in this particular instance. In other words, to the action taking place without my doing, I try to add a second action which unfolds in the conceptual sphere. The latter is dependent on me. This is shown by the fact that I could rest content with the observation and forgo all search for concepts if I had no need of them. If, however, this need is present, then I am not satisfied until I have brought the concepts ball, elasticity, motion, impact, velocity, etc., into a certain connection, to which the observed process is related in a definite way. As certain as it is that the event takes place independently of me, so certain is it also that the conceptual process cannot take place without my doing it.
[ 2 ] We shall consider later whether this activity of mine is really a product of my own independent being or whether the modern physiologists are right who say that we cannot think as we will, but that we must think exactly as the thoughts and thought-connections present in our consciousness determine.17See Ziehen, Theodore, Leitfaden der Physiologischen Psychologie, Guide to Physiological Psychology, Jena, 1893, p. 171 of the Ger. ed. For the time being we wish merely to establish the fact that we constantly feel compelled to seek for concepts and connections of concepts standing in a certain relation to objects and events given independently of us. Whether this activity is really ours, or whether we accomplish it according to an unalterable necessity, we shall leave aside for the moment. That at first sight it appears to be our activity is beyond doubt. We know with absolute certainty that we are not given the concepts together with the objects. That I myself am the doer may be illusion, but to immediate observation this certainly appears to be the case. The question here is: What do we gain by finding a conceptual counterpart to an event?
[ 3 ] There is a profound difference between the ways in which, for me, the parts of an event are related to one another before and after the discovery of the corresponding concepts. Mere observation can follow the parts of a given event as they occur, but their connection remains obscure without the help of concepts. I see the first billiard ball move toward the second in a certain direction and with a definite velocity. I must wait for what will happen after the impact, and again I can follow what happens only with my eyes. Let us assume that at the moment the impact occurs someone obstructs my view of the field where the event takes place: then—as mere onlooker—I have no knowledge of what happens afterward. The situation is different if before my view was obstructed I had discovered the concepts corresponding to the nexus of events. In that case I can estimate what occurs, even when I am no longer able to observe. An object or event which has only been observed does not of itself reveal anything about its connection with other objects or events. This connection comes to light only when observation combines with thinking.
[ 4 ] Observation and thinking are the two points of departure for all spiritual striving of man insofar as he is conscious of such striving. What is accomplished by ordinary human reason as well as by the most complicated scientific investigations rests on these two fundamental pillars of our spirit. Philosophers have started from various primary antitheses: idea and reality, subject and object, appearance and thing-in-itself, ego and non-ego, idea and will, concept and matter, force and substance, the conscious and the unconscious. It is easy to show, however, that all these antitheses must be preceded by that of observation and thinking, as the one the most important for man.
[ 5 ] Whatever principle we wish to advance, we must prove that somewhere we have observed it, or express it in the form of a clear thought which can be re-thought by others. Every philosopher who begins to speak about his fundamental principles must make use of the conceptual form, and thereby makes use of thinking. He therefore indirectly admits that for his activity he presupposes thinking. Whether thinking or something else is the main element in the evolution of the world, we shall not decide as yet. But that without thinking the philosopher can gain no knowledge of the evolution of the world, is immediately clear. Thinking may play a minor part in the coming into being of world phenomena, but thinking certainly plays a major part in the coming into being of a view about them.
[ 6 ] As regards observation, it is due to our organization that we need it. For us, our thinking about a horse and the object horse are two separate things. But we have access to the object only through observation. As little as we can form a concept of a horse by merely staring at it, just as little are we able to produce a corresponding object by mere thinking.
[ 7 ] In sequence of time, observation even precedes thinking. For even thinking we learn to know first by means of observation. It was essentially a description of an observation when, at the opening of this chapter, we gave an account of how thinking is kindled by an event and of how it goes beyond what is given without its activity. Whatever enters the circle of our experiences we first become aware of through observation. The contents of sensation, of perception, of contemplation, of feelings, of acts of will, of the pictures of dreams and fantasy, of representations, of concepts and ideas, of all illusions and hallucinations are given us through observation.
[ 8 ] However, as object of observation, thinking differs essentially from all other objects. The observation of a table or a tree occurs in me as soon as these objects appear within the range of my experience. But my thinking that goes on about these things, I do not observe at the same time. I observe the table; the thinking about the table I carry out, but I do not observe it at the same moment. I would first have to transport myself to a place outside my own activity if, besides observing the table, I wanted also to observe my thinking about the table. Whereas observation of things and events, and thinking about them, are but ordinary occurrences filling daily life, the observation of thinking itself is a sort of exceptional situation. This fact must be taken into account sufficiently when we come to determine the relation of thinking to all other contents of observation. It is essential to be clear about the fact that when thinking is observed the same procedure is applied to it as the one we normally apply to the rest of the world-content, only in ordinary life we do not apply it to thinking.
[ 9 ] Someone might object that what I have said here about thinking also holds good for feeling and for all other soul activities. When, for example, we feel pleasure, the feeling is also kindled by an object, and it is this object I observe, and not the feeling of pleasure. This objection, however, is based upon an error. Pleasure does not have at all the same relationship to its object has has the concept which thinking builds up. I am absolutely conscious of the fact that the concept of a thing is built up by my activity, whereas pleasure is produced in me by an object in the same way as, for instance, a change is caused in an object by a stone which falls upon it. For observation, a pleasure is given in exactly the same way as that is given which causes it. The same is not true of concepts. I can ask: Why does a particular event arouse in me a feeling of pleasure? But it is never possible to ask: Why does an event produce in me a certain number of concepts? That simply has no sense. When I reflect about an event there is no question of an effect on me. I learn nothing about myself by knowing the concepts which correspond to the change observed in a pane of glass when a stone is thrown against it. But I very definitely do learn something about my personality when I know the feeling which a certain event arouses in me. When I say of an observed object: This is a rose, I say absolutely nothing about myself; but when I say of the same thing: It gives me a feeling of pleasure, I characterize not only the rose but also myself in my relation to the rose.
[ 10 ] There can, therefore, be no question of comparing thinking and feeling as objects of observation. And the same could easily be shown concerning other activities of the human soul. Unlike thinking, they belong in the same sphere as other observed objects and events. It is characteristic of the nature of thinking that it is an activity directed solely upon the observed object and not upon the thinking personality. This can already be seen from the way we express our thoughts, as distinct from the way we express our feelings or acts of will in relation to objects. When I see an object and recognize it as a table, generally I would not say: I am thinking of a table, but: This is a table. But I would say: I am pleased with the table. In the first instance I am not at all interested in pointing out that I have entered into any relationship with the table, whereas in the second it is just this relationship that matters. In saying: I am thinking of a table, I already enter the exceptional situation characterized above, where something is made an object of observation which is always contained within our soul's activity, only normally it is not made an object of observation.
[ 11 ] It is characteristic of thinking that the thinker forgets thinking while doing it. What occupies him is not thinking, but the object of thinking which he observes.
[ 12 ] The first thing then, that we observe about thinking is that it is the unobserved element in our ordinary life of thought.
[ 13 ] The reason we do not observe thinking in our daily life of thought is because it depends upon our own activity. What I myself do not bring about, enters my field of observation as something objective. I find myself confronted by it as by something that has come about independently of me; it comes to meet me; I must take it as the presupposition of my thinking process. While I reflect on the object, I am occupied with it, my attention is turned to it. This activity is, in fact, thinking contemplation. My attention is directed not to my activity but to the object of this activity. In other words: while I think, I do not look at my thinking which I produce, but at the object of thinking which I do not produce.
[ 14 ] I am even in the same position when I let the exceptional situation come about and think about my own thinking. I can never observe my present thinking, but only afterward can I make into an object of thinking the experience I have had of my thinking-process. If I wanted to observe my present thinking, I would have to split myself into two persons: one to do the thinking, the other to observe this thinking. This I cannot do. I can only accomplish it in two separate acts. The thinking to be observed is never the one actually being produced, but another one. Whether for this purpose I observe my own earlier thinking, or follow the thinking process of another person, or else, as in the above example of the movements of the billiard balls, presuppose an imaginary thinking process, makes no difference.
[ 15 ] Two things that do not go together are actively producing something and confronting this in contemplation. This is already shown in the First Book of Moses. The latter represents God as creating the world in the first six days, and only when the world is there is the possibility of contemplating it also present: “And God saw everything that he had made and, behold, it was very good.” So it is also with our thinking. It must first be present before we can observe it.
[ 16 ] The reason it is impossible for us to observe thinking when it is actually taking place, is also the reason it is possible for us to know it more directly and more intimately than any other process in the world. It is just because we ourselves bring it forth that we know the characteristic features of its course, the manner in which the process takes place. What in the other spheres of observation can be found only indirectly: the relevant context and the connection between the individual objects—in the case of thinking is known to us in an absolutely direct way. Off-hand, I do not know why, for my observation, thunder follows lightning, but from the content of the two concepts I know immediately why my thinking connects the concept of thunder with the concept of lightning. Naturally here it does not matter whether I have correct concepts of thunder and lightning. The connection between those concepts I have is clear to me, and indeed this is the case through the concepts themselves.
[ 17 ] This transparent clarity of the process of thinking is quite independent of our knowledge of the physiological basis of thinking. I speak here of thinking insofar as it presents itself to observation of our spiritual activity. How one material process in my brain causes or influences another while I carry out a line of thought, does not come into consideration at all. What I see when I observe thinking is not what process in my brain connects the concept of lightning with the concept of thunder, but I see what motivates me to bring the two concepts into a particular relationship. My observation of thinking shows me that there is nothing that directs me in my connecting one thought with another, except the content of my thoughts; I am not directed by the material processes in my brain. In a less materialistic age than ours this remark would of course be entirely superfluous. Today however, when there are people who believe: When we know what matter is, we shall also know how matter thinks,—it has to be said that it is possible to speak about thinking without entering the domain of brain physiology at the same time. Today many people find it difficult to grasp the concept of thinking in its purity. Anyone who wants to contrast the representation of thinking I have here developed, with Cabanis 18Pierre Jean George Cabanis (1757–1808), French physiologist. A precocious child, Cabanis was enrolled at the age of 10 in the College of Brives. Later studied in Paris, afterward traveled widely in Poland and Germany. In 1789 he was appointed administrator of hospitals for Paris, and in 1795 became professor of hygiene and history of medicine in the medical school of that city. In 1799 he was made professor of legal medicine and history of medicine. He was an intimate friend of Mirabeau, and attended him as physician in his last illness. He had a deep interest in medical and psychological problems. Active in the cause of the French Revolution, Cabanis was a member of the Council of Five Hundred. Though Napoleon Bonaparte repeatedly offered him governmental positions, Cabanis declined them, since he was a foe of the former's policies. Cabanis died at Meulan on May 5, 1808, principally honored for his contributions to medical science, and especially for his main work, Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme, a series of papers read to the Institute in 1796–97. The sentence quoted is probably from Cabanis' book, written in 1802, translated into German, 2 vols., 1808, under the title, Verhältnis der Seele zum Körper, Relationship of the Soul to the Body. The thought has also been paraphrased: “Just as the stomach and intestines receive food and digest it, so the brain receives impressions, digests them, and has as its organic secretion, thought.” statement, “The brain secretes thoughts as the liver does gall or the spittle-glands spittle, etc.,” simply does not know what I am talking about. He tries to find thinking by means of a mere process of observation such as we apply to other objects that make up the content of the world. He cannot find it in this manner because as I have shown, it eludes normal observation. Whoever cannot overcome materialism lacks the ability to bring about in himself the exceptional situation described above, which brings to his consciousness what remains unconscious in all other spiritual activities. If a person does not have the good will to place himself in this situation, then one can no more speak to him about thinking than one can speak about color to a person who is blind. However, he must not believe that we consider physiological processes to be thinking. He cannot explain thinking because he simply does not see it.
[ 18 ] However, one possessing the ability to observe thinking,—and with goodwill every normally organized person has this ability,—this observation is the most important he can make. For he observes something which he himself brings to existence; he finds himself confronted not by a foreign object, to begin with, but by his own activity. He knows how what he observes comes to be. He sees through the connections and relations. A firm point is attained from which, with well-founded hope, one can seek for the explanation of the rest of the world's phenomena.
[ 19 ] The feeling of possessing such a firm point caused the founder of modern philosophy, Renatus Cartesius,19Renatus Cartesius, Rene Descartes (1596–1650). The father of modern rationalism, soldier of fortune, scholar, pilgrim, traveler, and firm adherent of the Roman Catholic faith. His philosophical work, which has often been summed up in his words, J pense, donc je suis (Cogito ergo sum), “I think, therefore I am,” was given significant impulse by a dream he had on November 10, 1619. This revealed to him the method of philosophical speculation he was to follow, and his subsequent work is said to have stemmed from this experience. An extensive literature on Descartes and his teachings exists in English translation. See any standard encyclopedia for further details. to base the whole of human knowledge on the principle, I think, therefore I am. All other things, all other events are present independent of me. Whether they are there as truth or illusion or dream I know not. Only one thing do I know with absolute certainty, for I myself bring it to its sure existence: my thinking. Perhaps it also has some other origin as well, perhaps it comes from God or from elsewhere, but that it is present in the sense that I myself bring it forth, of that I am certain. Cartesius had, to begin with, no justification for giving his statement any other meaning. He could maintain only that within the whole world content it is in my thinking that I grasp myself within that activity which is most essentially my own. What is meant by the attached therefore I am, has been much debated. It can have a meaning in one sense only. The simplest assertion I can make about something is that it is, that it exists. How this existence can be further defined I cannot say straight away about anything that comes to meet me. Each thing must first be studied in its relation to others before it can be determined in what sense it can be said to exist. An event that comes to meet me may be a set of perceptions, but it could also be a dream, a hallucination, and so forth. In short, I am unable to say in what sense it exists. I cannot gather this from the event in itself, but I shall learn it when I consider the event in its relation to other things. From this, however, I can, again, learn no more than how it is related to these other things. My search only reaches solid ground if I find an object which exists in a sense which I can derive from the object itself. As thinker I am such an object, for I give my existence the definite, self-dependent content of the activity of thinking. Having reached this, I can go on from here and ask: Do the other objects exist in the same or in some other sense?
[ 20 ] When thinking is made the object of observation, to the rest of the elements to be observed is added something which usually escapes attention; but the manner in which the other things are approached by man is not altered. One increases the number of observed objects, but not the number of methods of observation. While we are observing the other things, there mingles in the universal process—in which I now include observation—one process which is overlooked. Something different from all other processes is present, but is not noticed. But when I observe my thinking, no such unnoticed element is present. For what now hovers in the background is, again, nothing but thinking. The observed object is qualitatively the same as the activity directed upon it. And that is another characteristic feature of thinking. When we observe it, we do not find ourselves compelled to do so with the help of something qualitatively different, but can remain within the same element.
[ 21 ] When I weave an object, given independently of me, into my thinking, then I go beyond my observation, and the question is: Have I any right to do so? Why do I not simply let the object act upon me? In what way is it possible that my thinking could be related to the object? These are questions which everyone who reflects on his own thought processes must put to himself. They cease to exist when one thinks about thinking. We do not add anything foreign to thinking, and consequently do not have to justify such an addition.
[ 22 ] Schelling 20Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854). Often referred to as the Proteus among philosophers, Schelling was noted for his ever-changing alertness and brightness of mind and expression. Goethe (see note 16, above) had a very high regard for him, and spoke of him as “the most congenial philosopher I know.” Schelling had a profound influence among the thinkers of his time, including philosophers of France and England. His last years were dedicated to what he termed “positive philosophy,” radically different from the philosophy of identity, the transcendental idealism, and the pantheistic tendencies of his earlier time. Rudolf Steiner made extensive reference to Schelling in his writings and lectures, on various occasions praising that philosopher's “important inspirations and suggestions for what must afterwards be said by Anthroposophy, directly out of spiritual vision, on many points of Christianity.” Steiner further spoke of Schelling, “who really always made a significant impression whenever he appeared in public—the short, thick-set man, with the extremely impressive head, and eyes which even in extreme old age were sparkling with fire, for from his eyes there spoke the fire of Truth, the fire of Knowledge.” (From a lecture given at Dornach, Switzerland, Sept. 16, 1924) Perhaps Steiner's greatest study of Schelling is to be found in his Die Rätsel der Philosophie, The Riddles of Philosophy, Vol. I, Ch. 7. For English translations of Schelling and further details on his life, see any standard encyclopedia. says: “To gain knowledge of nature means to create nature.” If these words of the bold nature-philosopher are taken literally, we should have to renounce forever all knowledge of nature. For after all, nature is there already, and in order to create it a second time, one must know the principles according to which it originated. From the nature already in existence one would have to learn the conditions of its existence in order to apply them to the nature one wanted to create. But this learning, which would have to precede the creating, would, however, be knowing nature, and would remain this even if, after the learning, no creation took place. Only a nature not yet in existence could be created without knowing it beforehand.
[ 23 ] What is impossible with regard to nature: creating before knowing, we achieve in the case of thinking. If we wanted to wait and not think until we had first learned to know thinking, then we would never think at all. We have to plunge straight into thinking in order to be able, afterward, to know thinking by observing what we ourselves have done. We ourselves first create an object when we observe thinking. All other objects have been created without our help.
[ 24 ] Against my sentence, We must think before we can contemplate thinking, someone might easily set another sentence as being equally valid: We cannot wait with digesting, either, until we have observed the process of digestion. This objection would be similar to the one made by Pascal 21Blaise Pascal (1623–1662). Known as one of the greatest of mathematicians and physicists, Pascal's tame long ago spread far beyond the confines of his native France. His contributions to the establishment of the mathematical theory of probability, to the science of hydrodynamics, to the study of gravity and the vacuum, and his elaboration of the theory of conic sections have given Pascal a lasting place among the great men of science. As a Christian thinker, his devotion to truth and piety, and his acceptance of mystical experience have made his name revered. His philosophical speculations and deep psychological insight, as well as his remarkable gifts as a writer of French prose have secured him a leading position among philosophers and literary historians. Pascal's Pensées, Thoughts, is one of the great books of the world. For details on Pascal's very eventful and highly interesting life, as well as an account of his fundamental ideas, see any standard encyclopedia. against Cartesius, when he maintained that one could also say: I go for a walk, therefore I am. Certainly I must resolutely get on with digesting before I have studied the physiological process of digestion. But this could only be compared with the contemplation of thinking if, after having digested, I were not to contemplate it with thinking, but were to eat and digest it. It is, after all, not without significance that whereas digestion cannot become the object of digestion, thinking can very well become the object of thinking.
[ 25 ] This, then, is beyond doubt: In thinking we are grasping a corner of the universal process, where our presence is required if anything is to come about. And, after all, this is just the point. The reason things are so enigmatical to me is that I do not participate in their creation. I simply find them there, whereas in the case of thinking I know how it is made. This is why a more basic starting point than thinking, from which to consider all else in the world, does not exist.
[ 26 ] Here I should mention another widely current error which prevails with regard to thinking. It consists in this, that it is said: Thinking, as it is in itself, we never encounter. That thinking which connects the observations we make of our experiences and weaves them into a network of concepts, is not at all the same as that thinking which later we extract from the objects we have observed and then make the object of our consideration. What we first unconsciously weave into things is something quite different from what we consciously extract from them afterward.
[ 27 ] To draw such conclusions is not to see that in this way it is impossible to escape from thinking. It is absolutely impossible to come out of thinking if one wants to consider it. When one distinguishes an unconscious thinking from a later conscious thinking, then one must not forget that this distinction is quite external and has nothing to do with thinking as such. I do not in the least alter a thing by considering it with my thinking. I can well imagine that a being with quite differently organized sense organs and with a differently functioning intelligence would have a quite different representation of a horse from mine, but I cannot imagine that my own thinking becomes something different because I observe it. What I observe is what I myself bring about. What my thinking looks like to an intelligence different from mine is not what we are speaking about now; we are speaking about what it looks like to me. In any case, the picture of my thinking in another intelligence cannot be truer than my own picture of it. Only if I were not myself the thinking being, but thinking confronted me as the activity of a being foreign to me, could I say that my picture of thinking appeared in quite a definite way, and that I could not know what in itself the thinking of the being was like.
[ 28 ] So far there is not the slightest reason to view my own thinking from a standpoint different from the one applied to other things. After all, I consider the rest of the world by means of thinking. How should I make of my thinking an exception?
[ 29 ] With this I consider that I have sufficiently justified making thinking my starting point in my approach to an understanding of the world. When Archimedes 22Archimedes (c 287–212 B.C.) Greek mathematician and inventor. He was born at Syracuse in Sicily, and studied at the famous university in Alexandria. Archimedes spent the remainder of his life at Syracuse, where he engaged in constant mathematical research. He is noted for his many mechanical inventions, but his first love was mathematics. His work as a pioneer in mechanics is illustrated by his famous remark, “Give me a place to stand, and I will move the earth!” During the sack of Syracuse by the army of the Roman general, Marcellus, Archimedes was discovered drawing a mathematical figure in the sand beside his garden bench. Deep in meditation upon the problem before him, Archimedes was instantly killed when he was run through the body by a sword in the hand of a Roman infantryman. For details on the life of Archimedes, see Plutarch's Life of Marcellus. A complete, standard edition of the Works of Archimedes with valuable notes by T. L. Heath was issued by Cambridge University Press, 1897. had discovered the lever, he thought that with its help he could lift the whole cosmos from its hinges if only he could find a point upon which he could support his instrument. He needed something that was supported by itself, that was not carried by anything else. In thinking we have a principle which exists by means of itself. From this principle let us attempt to understand the world. Thinking we can understand through itself. So the question is only whether we can also understand other things through it.
[ 30 ] I have so far spoken of thinking without considering its vehicle, man's consciousness. Most present-day philosophers would object: Before there can be thinking, there must be consciousness. Therefore, one should begin, not from thinking, but from consciousness. No thinking can exist without consciousness. To them I must reply: If I want to have an explanation of what relation exists between thinking and consciousness, I must think about it. In doing so I presuppose thinking. To this could be said: When the philosopher wants to understand consciousness he makes use of thinking, and to that extent presupposes it, but in the ordinary course of life thinking does arise within consciousness and, therefore, presupposes this. If this answer were given to the World Creator who wished to create thinking, it would no doubt be justified. One naturally cannot let thinking arise without first having brought about consciousness. However, the philosopher is not concerned with the creation of the world, but with the understanding of it. Therefore he has to find the starting point, not for the creation, but for the understanding of the world. I consider it most extraordinary that a philosopher should be reproached for being concerned first and foremost about the correctness of his principles, rather than turning straight to the objects he wants to understand. The World Creator had to know, above all, how to find a vehicle for thinking; the philosopher has to find a secure foundation for his understanding of what already exists. How can it help us to start from consciousness and apply thinking to it, if first we do not know whether it is possible to reach any explanation of things by means of thinking?
[ 31 ] We must first consider thinking quite impartially, without reference to a thinking subject or a thought object. For in subject and object we already have concepts formed by thinking. There is no denying: Before anything else can be understood, thinking must be understood. To deny this is to fail to realize that man is not a first link in creation, but the last. Therefore, for an explanation of the world by means of concepts, one cannot start from the first elements of existence, but must begin with what is nearest to us and is most intimately ours. We cannot at one bound transport ourselves to the beginning of the world, in order to begin our investigations there; we must start from the present moment and see whether we cannot ascend from the later to the earlier. As long as geology spoke in terms of assumed revolutions in order to explain the present condition of the earth, it groped in darkness. It was only when it made its beginnings from the investigations of those processes at present at work on the earth, and from these drew conclusions about the past, that it gained a secure foundation. As long as philosophy assumes all sorts of principles such as atom, motion, matter, will, the unconscious, it will get nowhere. Only when the philosopher recognizes as his absolute first that which came as the absolute last, can he reach his goal. But this absolute last in world evolution is Thinking.
[ 32 ] There are people who say: Whether or not our thinking is right in itself cannot be established with certainty, after all. And to this extent the point of departure is still a doubtful one. It would be just as sensible to raise doubts as to whether in itself a tree is right or wrong. Thinking is a fact, and to speak of the rightness or wrongness of a fact has no sense. At most, I can have doubts as to whether thinking is being rightly applied, just as I can doubt whether a certain tree supplies a wood suitable for making tools for a particular purpose. To show to what extent the application of thinking to the world is right or wrong, is just the task of this book. I can understand anyone doubting whether we can ascertain anything about the world by means of thinking, but it is incomprehensible to me how anyone can doubt the rightness of thinking in itself.
Addition to the Revised Edition (1918):
[ 33 ] In the preceding discussion, the significant difference between thinking and all other activities of the soul has been referred to as a fact which reveals itself to a really unprejudiced observation. Unless this unprejudiced observation is achieved, against this discussion one is tempted to raise objections such as these: When I think about a rose, then, after all, this also is only an expression of a relation of my “I” to the rose, just as when I feel the beauty of the rose. In the case of thinking, a relation between “I” and object exists in the same way as in the case of feeling or perceiving. To make this objection is to fail to realize that it is only in the activity of thinking that the “I” knows itself to be completely at one with that which is active-going into all the ramifications of the activity. In the case of no other soul activity is this completely so. When, for example, a pleasure is felt, a more sensitive observation can quite easily detect to what extent the “I” knows itself to be one with something active, and to what extent there is something passive in it so that the pleasure merely happens to the “I.” And this is the case with the other soul activities. But one should not confuse “having thought-images” with the working through of thought by means of thinking. Thought-images can arise in the soul in the same way as dreams or vague intimations. This is not thinking.—To this could be said: If this is what is meant by thinking, then the element of will is within thinking, and so we have to do not merely with thinking, but also with the will within thinking. However, this would only justify one in saying: Real thinking must always be willed. But this has nothing to do with the characterization of thinking as given in this discussion. The nature of thinking may be such that it must necessarily always be willed; the point is that everything that is willed is—while being willed—surveyed by the “I” as an activity entirely its own. Indeed it must be said that just because this is the nature of thinking, it appears to the observer as willed through and through. Anyone who really takes the trouble to understand all that has to be considered in order to reach a judgment about thinking, cannot fail to recognize that this soul activity does have the unique character we have described here.
[ 34 ] A personality highly appreciated as a thinker by the author of this book, has objected that it is impossible to speak about thinking as is done here, because what one believes one is observing as active thinking only appears to be so. In reality one is observing only the results of an unconscious activity, which is the foundation of thinking. Only because this unconscious activity is not observed does the illusion arise that the observed thinking exists through itself, just as when in an illumination made by a rapid succession of electric sparks one believes one is seeing a continuous movement. This objection, too, rests on an inaccurate examination of the facts. To make it means that one has not taken into consideration that it is the “I” itself, standing within thinking, that observes its own activity. The “I” would have to stand outside thinking to be deluded as in the case of an illumination with a rapid succession of electric sparks. Indeed one could say: To make such a comparison is to deceive oneself forcibly, like someone who, seeing a moving light, insisted that it was being freshly lit by an unknown hand at every point where it appeared.—No, whoever wants to see in thinking anything other than a surveyable activity brought about within the “I,” must first make himself blind to the plain facts that are there for the seeing, in order to be able to set up a hypothetical activity as the basis of thinking. He who does not so blind himself cannot fail to recognize that everything he “thinks into” thinking in this manner takes him away from the essence of thinking. Unprejudiced observation shows that nothing belongs to thinking's own nature that is not found in thinking itself. If one leaves the realm of thinking, one cannot come to what causes it.
III. Das Denken im Dienste der Weltanschauung
[ 1 ] Wenn ich beobachte, wie eine Billardkugel, die gestoßen wird, ihre Bewegung auf eine andere überträgt, so bleibe ich auf den Verlauf dieses beobachteten Vorganges ganz ohne Einfluß. Die Bewegungsrichtung und Schnelligkeit der zweiten Kugel ist durch die Richtung und Schnelligkeit der ersten bestimmt. Solange ich mich bloß als Beobachter verhalte, weiß ich über die Bewegung der zweiten Kugel erst dann etwas zu sagen, wenn dieselbe eingetreten ist. Anders ist die Sache, wenn ich über den Inhalt meiner Beobachtung nachzudenken beginne. Mein Nachdenken hat den Zweck, von dem Vorgange Begriffe zu bilden. Ich bringe den Begriff einer elastischen Kugel in Verbindung mit gewissen anderen Begriffen der Mechanik und ziehe die besonderen Umstände in Erwägung, die in dem vorkommenden Falle obwalten. Ich suche also zu dem Vorgange, der sich ohne mein Zutun abspielt, einen zweiten hinzuzufügen, der sich in der begrifflichen Sphäre vollzieht. Der letztere ist von mir abhängig. Das zeigt sich dadurch, daß ich mich mit der Beobachtung begnügen und auf alles Begriffesuchen verzichten kann, wenn ich kein Bedürfnis danach habe. Wenn dieses Bedürfnis aber vorhanden ist, dann beruhige ich mich erst, wenn ich die Begriffe: Kugel, Elastizität, Bewegung, Stoß, Geschwindigkeit usw. in eine gewisse Verbindung gebracht habe, zu welcher der beobachtete Vorgang in einem bestimmten Verhältnisse steht. So gewiß es nun ist, daß sich der Vorgang unabhängig von mir vollzieht, so gewiß ist es, daß sich der begriffliche Prozeß ohne mein Zutun nicht abspielen kann.
[ 2 ] Ob diese meine Tätigkeit wirklich der Ausfluß meines selbständigen Wesens ist, oder ob die modernen Physiologen recht haben, welche sagen, daß wir nicht denken können, wie wir wollen, sondern denken müssen, wie es die gerade in unserem Bewußtsein vorhandenen Gedanken und Gedankenverbindungen bestimmen (vergleiche Ziehen, Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie, Jena 1893, S. 171), wird Gegenstand einer späteren Auseinandersetzung sein. Vorläufig wollen wir bloß die Tatsache feststellen, daß wir uns fortwährend gezwungen fühlen, zu den ohne unser Zutun uns gegebenen Gegenständen und Vorgängen Begriffe und Begriffsverbindungen zu suchen, die zu jenen in einer gewissen Beziehung stehen. Ob dies Tun in Wahrheit unser Tun ist, oder ob wir es einer unabänderlichen Notwendigkeit gemäß vollziehen, lassen wir vorläufig dahingestellt. Daß es uns zunächst als das unsrige erscheint, ist ohne Frage. Wir wissen ganz genau, daß uns mit den Gegenständen nicht zugleich deren Begriffe mitgegeben werden. Daß ich selbst der Tätige bin, mag auf einem Schein beruhen; der unmittelbaren Beobachtung stellt sich die Sache jedenfalls so dar. Die Frage ist nun: was gewinnen wir dadurch, daß wir zu einem Vorgange ein begriffliches Gegenstück hinzufinden?
[ 3 ] Es ist ein tiefgreifender Unterschied zwischen der Art, wie sich für mich die Teile eines Vorganges zueinander verhalten vor und nach der Auffindung der entsprechenden Begriffe. Die bloße Beobachtung kann dieTeile eines gegebenen Vorganges in ihrem Verlaufe verfolgen; ihr Zusammenhang bleibt aber vor der Zuhilfenahme von Begriffen dunkel. Ich sehe die erste Billardkugel in einer gewissen Richtung und mit einer bestimmten Geschwindigkeit gegen die zweite sich bewegen; was nach erfolgtem Stoß geschieht, muß ich abwarten und kann es dann auch wieder nur mit den Augen verfolgen. Nehmen wir an, es verdecke mir im Augenblicke des Stoßes jemand das Feld, auf dem der Vorgang sich abspielt, so bin ich — als bloßer Beobachter — ohne Kenntnis, was nachher geschieht. Anders ist das, wenn ich für die Konstellation der Verhältnisse vor dem Verdecken die entsprechenden Begriffe gefunden habe. In diesem Falle kann ich angeben, was geschieht, auch wenn die Möglichkeit der Beobachtung aufhört. Ein bloß beobachteter Vorgang oder Gegenstand ergibt aus sich selbst nichts über seinen Zusammenhang mit anderen Vorgängen oder Gegenständen. Dieser Zusammenhang wird erst ersichtlich, wenn sich die Beobachtung mit dem Denken verbindet.
[ 4 ] Beobachtung und Denken sind die beiden Ausgangspunkte für alles geistige Streben des Menschen, insoferne er sich eines solchen bewußt ist. Die Verrichtungen des gemeinen Menschenverstandes und die verwickeltesten wissenschaftlichen Forschungen ruhen auf diesen beiden Grundsäulen unseres Geistes. Die Philosophen sind von verschiedenen Urgegensätzen ausgegangen: Idee und Wirklichkeit, Subjekt und Objekt, Erscheinung und Ding an sich, Ich und Nicht-Ich, Idee und Wille, Begriff und Materie, Kraft und Stoff, Bewußtes und Unbewußtes. Es läßt sich aber leicht zeigen, daß allen diesen Gegensätzen der von Beobachtung und Denken, als der für den Menschen wichtigste, vorangehen muß.
[ 5 ] Was für ein Prinzip wir auch aufstellen mögen: wir müssen es irgendwo als von uns beobachtet nachweisen, oder in Form eines klaren Gedankens, der von jedem anderen nachgedacht werden kann, aussprechen. Jeder Philosoph, der anfängt über seine Urprinzipien zu sprechen, muß sich der begrifflichen Form, und damit des Denkens bedienen. Er gibt damit indirekt zu, daß er zu seiner Betätigung das Denken bereits voraussetzt. Ob das Denken oder irgend etwas anderes Hauptelement der Weltentwickelung ist, darüber werde hier noch nichts ausgemacht. Daß aber der Philosoph ohne das Denken kein Wissen darüber gewinnen kann, das ist von vornherein klar. Beim Zustandekommen der Welterscheinungen mag das Denken eine Nebenrolle spielen, beim Zustandekommen einer Ansicht darüber kommt ihm aber sicher eine Hauptrolle zu.
[ 6] Was nun die Beobachtung betrifft, so liegt es in unserer Organisation, daß wir derselben bedürfen. Unser Denken über ein Pferd und der Gegenstand Pferd sind zwei Dinge, die für uns getrennt auftreten. Und dieser Gegenstand ist uns nur durch Beobachtung zugänglich. So wenig wir durch das bloße Anstarren eines Pferdes uns einen Begriff von demselben machen können, ebensowenig sind wir imstande, durch bloßes Denken einen entsprechenden Gegenstand hervorzubringen.
[ 7 ] Zeitlich geht die Beobachtung sogar dem Denken voraus. Denn auch das Denken müssen wir erst durch Beobachtung kennenlernen. Es war wesentlich die Beschreibung einer Beobachtung, als wir am Eingange dieses Kapitels darstellten, wie sich das Denken an einem Vorgange entzündet und über das ohne sein Zutun Gegebene hinausgeht. Alles was in den Kreis unserer Erlebnisse eintritt, werden wir durch die Beobachtung erst gewahr. Der Inhalt von Empfindungen, Wahrnehmungen, Anschauungen, die Gefühle, Willensakte, Traum, und Phantasiegebilde, Vorstellungen, Begriffe und Ideen, sämtliche Illusionen und Halluzinationen werden uns durch die Beobachtung gegeben.
[ 8 ] Nur unterscheidet sich das Denken als Beobachtungsobjekt doch wesentlich von allen andern Dingen. Die Beobachtung eines Tisches, eines Baumes tritt bei mir ein, sobald diese Gegenstände auf dem Horizonte meiner Erlebnisse auftauchen. Das Denken aber über diese Gegenstände beobachte ich nicht gleichzeitig. Den Tisch beobachte ich, das Denken über den Tisch führe ich aus, aber ich beobachte es nicht in demselben Augenblicke. Ich muß mich erst auf einen Standpunkt außerhalb meiner eigenen Tätigkeit versetzen, wenn ich neben dem Tische auch mein Denken über den Tisch beobachten will. Während das Beobachten der Gegenstände und Vorgänge und das Denken darüber ganz alltägliche, mein fortlaufendes Leben ausfüllende Zustände sind, ist die Beobachtung des Denkens eine Art Ausnahmezustand. Diese Tatsache muß in entsprechender Weise berücksichtigt werden, wenn es sich darum handelt, das Verhältnis des Denkens zu allen anderen Beobachtungsinhalten zu bestimmen. Man muß sich klar darüber sein, daß man bei der Beobachtung des Denkens auf dieses ein Verfahren anwendet, das für dieBetrachtung des ganzen übrigen Weltinhaltes den normalen Zustand bildet, das aber im Verfolge dieses normalen Zustandes für das Denken selbst nicht eintritt.
[ 9 ] Es könnte jemand den Einwand machen, daß das gleiche, was ich hier von dem Denken bemerkt habe, auch von dem Fühlen und den übrigen geistigen Tätigkeiten gelte. Wenn wir zum Beispiel das Gefühl der Lust haben, so entzünde sich das auch an einem Gegenstande, und ich beobachte zwar diesen Gegenstand, nicht aber das Gefühl der Lust. Dieser Einwand beruht aber auf einem Irrtum. Die Lust steht durchaus nicht in demselben Verhältnisse zu ihrem Gegenstande wie der Begriff, den das Denken bildet. Ich bin mir auf das bestimmteste bewußt, daß der Begriff einer Sache durch meine Tätigkeit gebildet wird, während die Lust in mir auf ähnliche Art durch einen Gegenstand erzeugt wird, wie zum Beispiel die Veränderung, die ein fallender Stein in einem Gegenstande bewirkt, auf den er auffällt. Für die Beobachtung ist die Lust in genau derselben Weise gegeben, wie der sie veranlassende Vorgang. Ein gleiches gilt nicht vom Begriffe. Ich kann fragen: warum erzeugt ein bestimmter Vorgang bei mir das Gefühl der Lust? Aber ich kann durchaus nicht fragen: warum erzeugt ein Vorgang bei mir eine bestimmte Summe von Begriffen? Das hätte einfach keinen Sinn. Bei dem Nachdenken über einen Vorgang handelt es sich gar nicht um eine Wirkung auf mich. Ich kann dadurch nichts über mich erfahren, daß ich für die beobachtete Veränderung, die ein gegen eine Fensterscheibe geworfener Stein in dieser bewirkt, die entsprechenden Begriffe kenne. Aber ich erfahre sehr wohl etwas über meine Persönlichkeit, wenn ich das Gefühl kenne, das ein bestimmter Vorgang in mir erweckt. Wenn ich einem beobachteten Gegenstand gegenüber sage: dies ist eine Rose, so sage ich über mich selbst nicht das geringste aus; wenn ich aber von demselben Dinge sage: es bereitet mir das Gefühl der Lust, so habe ich nicht nur die Rose, sondern auch mich selbst in meinem Verhältnis zur Rose charakterisiert.
[ 10 ] Von einer Gleichstellung des Denkens mit dem Fühlen der Beobachtung gegenüber kann also nicht die Rede sein. Dasselbe ließe sich leicht auch für die andern Tätigkeiten des menschlichen Geistes ableiten. Sie gehören dem Denken gegenüber in eine Reihe mit anderen beobachteten Gegenständen und Vorgängen. Es gehört eben zu der eigentüm lichen Natur des Denkens, daß es eine Tätigkeit ist, die bloß auf den beobachteten Gegenstand gelenkt ist und nicht auf die denkende Persönlichkeit. Das spricht sich schon in der Art aus, wie wir unsere Gedanken über eine Sache zum Ausdruck bringen im Gegensatz zu unseren Gefühlen oder Willensakten. Wenn ich einen Gegenstand sehe und diesen als einen Tisch erkenne, werde ich im allgemeinen nicht sagen: ich denke über einen Tisch, sondern: dies ist ein Tisch. Wohl aber werde ich sagen: ich freue mich über den Tisch. Im ersteren Falle kommt es mir eben gar nicht darauf an, auszusprechen, daß ich zu dem Tisch in ein Verhältnis trete; in dem zweiten Falle handelt es sich aber gerade um dieses Verhältnis. Mit dem Ausspruch: ich denke über einen Tisch, trete ich bereits in den oben charakterisierten Ausnahmezustand ein, wo etwas zum Gegenstand der Beobachtung gemacht wird, was in unserer geistigen Tätigkeit immer mit-enthalten ist, aber nicht als beobachtetes Objekt.
[ 11 ] Das ist die eigentümliche Natur des Denkens, daß der Denkende das Denken vergißt, während er es ausübt. Nicht das Denken beschäftigt ihn, sondern der Gegenstand des Denkens, den er beobachtet.
[ 12 ] Die erste Beobachtung, die wir über das Denken machen, ist also die, daß es das unbeobachtete Element unseres gewöhnlichen Geisteslebens ist.
[ 13 ] Der Grund, warum wir das Denken im alltäglichen Geistesleben nicht beobachten, ist kein anderer als der, daß es auf unserer eigenen Tätigkeit beruht. Was ich nicht selbst hervorbringe, tritt als ein Gegenständliches in mein Beobachtungsfeld ein. Ich sehe mich ihm als einem ohne mich zustande Gekommenen gegenüber; es tritt an mich heran; ich muß es als die Voraussetzung meines Denkprozesses hinnehmen. Während ich über den Gegenstand nachdenke, bin ich mit diesem beschäftigt, mein Blick ist ihm zugewandt. Diese Beschäftigung ist eben die denkende Betrachtung. Nicht auf meine Tätigkeit, sondern auf das Objekt dieser Tätigkeit ist meine Aufmerksamkeit gerichtet. Mit anderen Worten: während ich denke, sehe ich nicht auf mein Denken, das ich selbst hervorbringe, sondern auf das Objekt des Denkens, das ich nicht hervorbringe.
[ 14 ] Ich bin sogar in demselben Fall, wenn ich den Ausnahmezustand eintreten lasse, und über mein Denken selbst nachdenke. Ich kann mein gegenwärtigesDenken nie beobachten; sondern nur die Erfahrungen, die ich über meinen Denkprozeß gemacht habe, kann ich nachher zum Objekt des Denkens machen. Ich müßte mich in zwei Persönlichkeiten spalten: in eine, die denkt, und in die andere, welche sich bei diesem Denken selbst zusieht, wenn ich mein gegenwärtiges Denken beobachten wollte. Das kann ich nicht. Ich kann das nur in zwei getrennten Akten ausführen. Das Denken, das beobachtet werden soll, ist nie das dabei in Tätigkeit befindliche, sondern ein anderes. Ob ich zu diesem Zwecke meine Beobachtungen an meinem eigenen früheren Denken mache, oder ob ich den Gedankenprozeß einer anderen Person verfolge, oder endlich, ob ich, wie im obigen Falle mit der Bewegung der Billardkugeln, einen fingierten Gedankenprozeß voraussetze, darauf kommt es nicht an.
[ 15 ] Zwei Dinge vertragen sich nicht: tätiges Hervorbringen und beschauliches Gegenüberstellen. Das weiß schon das erste Buch Moses. An den ersten sechs Welttagen läßt es Gott die Welt hervorbringen, und erst als sie da ist, ist die Möglichkeit vorhanden, sie zu beschauen: «Und Gott sahe an alles, was er gemacht hatte; und siehe da, es war sehr gut.» So ist es auch mit unserem Denken. Es muß erst da sein, wenn wir es beobachten wollen.
[ 16 ] Der Grund, der es uns unmöglich macht, das Denken in seinem jeweilig gegenwärtigen Verlauf zu beobachten, ist der gleiche wie der, der es uns unmittelbarer und intimer erkennen läßt als jeden andern Prozeß der Welt. Eben weil wir es selbst hervorbringen, kennen wir das Charakteristische seines Verlaufs, dieArt, wie sich das dabei in Betracht kommende Geschehen vollzieht. Was in den übrigen Beobachtungssphären nur auf mittelbare Weise gefunden werden kann: der sachlich-entsprechende Zusammenhang und das Verhältnis der einzelnen Gegenstände, das wissen wir beim Denken auf ganz unmittelbare Weise. Warum für meine Beobachtung der Donner auf den Blitz folgt, weiß ich nicht ohne weiteres; warum mein Denken den Begriff Donner mit dem des Blitzes verbindet, weiß ich unmittelbar aus den Inhalten der beiden Begriffe. Es kommt natürlich gar nicht darauf an, ob ich die richtigen Begriffe von Blitz und Donner habe. Der Zusammenhang derer, die ich habe, ist mir klar, und zwar durch sie selbst.
[ 17 ] Diese durchsichtige Klarheit in bezug auf den Denkprozeß ist ganz unabhängig von unserer Kenntnis der physiologischen Grundlagen des Denkens. Ich spreche hier von dem Denken, insoferne es sich aus der Beobachtung unserer geistigen Tätigkeit ergibt. Wie ein materieller Vorgang meines Gehirns einen andern veranlaßt oder beeinflußt, während ich eine Gedankenoperation ausführe, kommt dabei gar nicht in Betracht. Was ich am Denken beobachte, ist nicht: welcher Vorgang in meinem Gehirne den Begriff des Blitz es mit dem des Donners verbindet, sondern, was mich veranlaßt, die beiden Begriffe in ein bestimmtes Verhältnis zu bringen. Meine Beobachtung ergibt, daß mir für meine Gedankenverbindungen nichts vorliegt, nach dem ich mich richte, als der Inhalt meiner Gedanken; nicht nach den materiellen Vorgängen in meinem Gehirn richte ich mich. Für ein weniger materialistisches Zeitalter als das unsrige wäre diese Bemerkung natürlich vollständig überflüssig. Gegenwärtig aber, wo es Leute gibt, die glauben: wenn wir wissen, was Materie ist, werden wir auch wissen, wie die Materie denkt, muß doch gesagt werden, daß man vom Denken reden kann, ohne sogleich mit der Gehirnphysiologie in Kollision zu treten. Es wird heute sehr vielen Menschen schwer, den Begriff des Denkens in seiner Reinheit zu fassen. Wer der Vorstellung, die ich hier vom Denken entwickelt habe, sogleich den Satz des Cabanis entgegensetzt: «Das Gehirn sondert Gedanken ab wie die Leber Galle, die Speicheldrüse Speichel usw.», der weiß einfach nicht, wovon ich rede. Er sucht das Denken durch einen bloßen Beobachtungsprozeß zu finden in derselben Art, wie wir bei anderen Gegenständen des Weltinhaltes verfahren. Er kann es aber auf diesem Wege nicht finden, weil es sich, wie ich nachgewiesen habe, gerade da der normalen Beobachtung entzieht. Wer den Materialismus nicht überwinden kann, dem fehlt die Fähigkeit, bei sich den geschilderten Ausnahmezustand herbeizuführen, der ihm zum Bewußtsein bringt, was bei aller andern Geistestätigkeit unbewußt bleibt. Wer den guten Willen nicht hat, sich in diesen Standpunkt zu versetzen, mit dem könnte man über das Denken so wenig wie mit dem Blinden über die Farbe sprechen. Er möge nur aber nicht glauben, daß wir physiologische Prozesse für Denken halten. Er erklärt das Denken nicht, weil er es überhaupt nicht sieht.
[ 18 ] Für jeden aber, der die Fähigkeit hat, das Denken zu beobachten — und bei gutem Willen hat sie jeder normal organisierte Mensch — , ist diese Beobachtung die allerwichtigste, die er machen kann. Denn er beobachtet etwas, dessen Hervorbringer er selbst ist; er sieht sich nicht einem zunächst fremden Gegenstande, sondern seiner eigenen Tätigkeit gegenüber. Er weiß, wie das zustande kommt, was er beobachtet. Er durchschaut die Verhältnisse und Beziehungen. Es ist ein fester Punkt gewonnen, von dem aus man mit begründeter Hoffnung nach der Erklärung der übrigen Welterscheinungen suchen kann.
[ 19 ] Das Gefühl, einen solchen festen Punkt zu haben, veranlaßte den Begründer der neueren Philosophie, Renatus Cartesius, das ganze menschliche Wissen auf den Satz zu gründen: Ich denke, also bin ich. Alle andern Dinge, alles andere Geschehen ist ohne mich da; ich weiß nicht, ob als Wahrheit, ob als Gaukelspiel und Traum. Nur eines weiß ich ganz unbedingt sicher, denn ich bringe es selbst zu seinem sichern Dasein: mein Denken. Mag es noch einen andern Ursprung seines Daseins haben, mag es von Gott oder anderswoher kommen; daß es in dem Sinne da ist, in dem ich es selbst hervorbringe, dessen bin ich gewiß. Einen andern Sinn seinem Satze unterzulegen hatte Cartesius zunächst keine Berechtigung. Nur daß ich mich innerhalb des Weltinhaltes in meinem Denken als in meiner ureigensten Tätigkeit erfasse, konnte er behaupten. Was das daran-gehängte: also bin ich heißen soll, darüber ist viel gestritten worden. Einen Sinn kann es aber nur unter einer einzigen Bedingung haben. Die einfachste Aussage, die ich von einem Dinge machen kann, ist die, daß es ist, daß es existiert. Wie dann dieses Dasein näher zu bestimmen ist, das ist bei keinem Dinge, das in den Horizont meiner Erlebnisse eintritt, sogleich im Augenblicke zu sagen. Es wird jeder Gegenstand erst in seinem Verhältnisse zu andern zu untersuchen sein, um bestimmen zu können, in welchem Sinne von ihm als einem existierenden gesprochen werden kann. Ein erlebter Vorgang kann eine Summe von Wahrnehmungen, aber auch ein Traum, eine Halluzination und so weiter sein. Kurz, ich kann nicht sagen, in welchem Sinne er existiert. Das werde ich dem Vorgange selbst nicht entnehmen können, sondern ich werde es erfahren, wenn ich ihn im Verhältnisse zu andern Dingen betrachte. Da kann ich aber wieder nicht mehr wissen, als wie er im Verhältnisse zu diesen Dingen steht. Mein Suchen kommt erst auf einen festen Grund, wenn ich ein Objekt finde, bei dem ich den Sinn seines Daseins aus ihm selbst schöpfen kann. Das bin ich aber selbst als Denkender, denn ich gebe meinem Dasein den bestimmten, in sich beruhenden Inhalt der denkenden Tätigkeit. Nun kann ich von da ausgehen und fragen: Existieren die andern Dinge in dem gleichen oder in einem andern Sinne?
[ 20] Wenn man das Denken zum Objekt der Beobachtung macht, fügt man zu dem übrigen beobachteten Weltinhalte etwas dazu, was sonst der Aufmerksamkeit entgeht; man ändert aber nicht die Art, wie sich der Mensch auch den andern Dingen gegenüber verhält. Man vermehrt die Zahl der Beobachtungsobjekte, aber nicht die Methode des Beobachtens. Während wir die andern Dinge beobachten, mischt sich in das Weltgeschehen — zu dem ich jetzt das Beobachten mitzähle — ein Prozeß, der übersehen wird. Es ist etwas von allem andern Geschehen verschiedenes vorhanden, das nicht mitberücksichtigt wird. Wenn ich aber mein Denken betrachte, so ist kein solches unberücksichtigtes Element vorhanden. Denn was jetzt im Hintergrunde schwebt, ist selbst wieder nur das Denken. Der beobachtete Gegenstand ist qualitativ derselbe wie die Tätigkeit, die sich auf ihn richtet. Und das ist wieder eine charakteristische Eigentümlichkeit des Denkens. Wenn wir es zum Betrachtungsobjekt machen, sehen wir uns nicht gezwungen, dies mit Hilfe eines Oualitativ-Verschiedenen zu tun, sondern wir können in demselben Element verbleiben.
[ 21 ] Wenn ich einen ohne mein Zutun gegebenen Gegenstand in mein Denken einspinne, so gehe ich über meine Beobachtung hinaus, und es wird sich darum handeln: was gibt mir ein Recht dazu? Warum lasse ich den Gegenstand nicht einfach auf mich einwirken? Auf welche Weise ist es möglich, daß mein Denken einen Bezug zu dem Gegenstande hat? Das sind Fragen, die sich jeder stellen muß, der über seine eigenen Gedankenprozesse nachdenkt. Sie fallen weg, wenn man über das Denken selbst nachdenkt. Wir fügen zu dem Denken nichts ihm Fremdes hinzu, haben uns also auch über ein solches Hinzufügen nicht zu rechtfertigen.
[ 22 ] Schelling sagt: Die Natur erkennen, heißt die Natur schaffen. — Wer diese Worte des kühnen Naturphilosophen wörtlich nimmt, wird wohl zeitlebens auf alles Naturerkennen verzichten müssen. Denn die Natur ist einmal da, und um sie ein zweites Mal zu schaffen, muß man die Prinzipien erkennen, nach denen sie entstanden ist. Für die Natur, die man erst schaffen wollte, müßte man der bereits bestehenden die Bedingungen ihres Daseins abgucken. Dieses Abgucken, das dem Schaffen vorausgehen müßte, wäre aber das Erkennen der Natur, und zwar auch dann, wenn nach erfolgtem Abgucken das Schaffen ganz unterbliebe. Nur eine noch nicht vorhandene Natur könnte man schaffen, ohne sie vorher zu erkennen.
[ 23 ] Was bei der Natur unmöglich ist: das Schaffen vor dem Erkennen; beim Denken vollbringen wir es. Wollten wir mit dem Denken warten, bis wir es erkannt haben, dann kämen wir nie dazu. Wir müssen resolut darauf losdenken, um hinterher mittels der Beobachtung des Selbstgetanen zu seiner Erkenntnis zu kommen. Der Beobachtung des Denkens schaffen wir selbst erst ein Objekt. Für das Vorhandensein aller anderen Objekte ist ohne unser Zutun gesorgt worden.
[ 24 ] Leicht könnte jemand meinem Satze: wir müssen denken, bevor wir das Denken betrachten können, den andern als gleichberechtigt entgegenstellen: wir können auch mit dem Verdauen nicht warten, bis wir den Vorgang des Verdauens beobachtet haben. Das wäre ein Einwand ähnlich dem, den Pascal dem Cartesius machte, indem er behauptete, man könne auch sagen: ich gehe spazieren, also bin ich. Ganz gewiß muß ich auch resolut verdauen, bevor ich den physiologischen Prozeß der Verdauung studiert habe. Aber mit der Betrachtung des Denkens ließe sich das nur vergleichen, wenn ich die Verdauung hinterher nicht denkend betrachten, sondern essen und verdauen wollte. Das ist doch eben auch nicht ohne Grund, daß das Verdauen zwar nicht Gegenstand des Verdauens, das Denken aber sehr wohl Gegenstand des Denkens werden kann.
[ 25 ] Es ist also zweifellos: in dem Denken halten wir das Weltgeschehen an einem Zipfel, wo wir dabei sein müssen, wenn etwas zustandekommen soll. Und das ist doch gerade das, worauf es ankommt. Das ist gerade der Grund, warum mir die Dinge so rätselhaft gegenüberstehen: daß ich an ihrem Zustandekommen so unbeteiligt bin. Ich finde sie einfach vor; beim Denken aber weiß ich, wie es gemacht wird. Daher gibt es keinen ursprünglicheren Ausgangspunkt für das Betrachten alles Weltgeschehens als das Denken.
[ 26 ] Ich möchte nun einen weitverbreiteten Irrtum noch erwähnen, der in bezug auf das Denken herrscht. Er besteht darin, daß man sagt: das Denken, so wie es an sich selbst ist, ist uns nirgends gegeben. Das Denken, das die Beobachtungen unserer Erfahrungen verbindet und mit einem Netz von Begriffen durchspinnt, sei durchaus nicht dasselbe, wie dasjenige, das wir hinterher wieder von den Gegenständen der Beobachtung herausschälen und zum Gegenstande unserer Betrachtung machen. Was wir erst unbewußt in die Dinge hineinweben, sei ein ganz anderes, als was wir dann mit Bewußtsein wieder herauslösen.
[ 27 ] Wer so schließt, der begreift nicht, daß es ihm auf diese Art gar nicht möglich ist, dem Denken zu entschlüpfen. Ich kann aus dem Denken gar nicht herauskommen, wenn ich das Denken betrachten will. Wenn man das vorbewußte Denken von dem nachher bewußten Denken unterscheidet, so sollte man doch nicht vergessen, daß diese Unterscheidung eine ganz äußerliche ist, die mit der Sache selbst gar nichts zu tun hat. Ich mache eine Sache dadurch überhaupt nicht zu einer andern, daß ich sie denkend betrachte. Ich kann mir denken, daß ein Wesen mit ganz anders gearteten Sinnesorganen und mit einer anders funktionierenden Intelligenz von einem Pferde eine ganz andere Vorstellung habe als ich, aber ich kann mir nicht denken, daß mein eigenes Denken dadurch ein anderes wird, daß ich es beobachte. Ich beobachte selbst, was ich selbst vollbringe. Wie mein Denken sich für eine andere Intelligenz ausnimmt als die meine, davon ist jetzt nicht die Rede; sondern davon, wie es sich für mich ausnimmt. Jedenfalls aber kann das Bild meines Denkens in einer andern Intelligenz nicht ein wahreres sein als mein eigenes. Nur wenn ich nicht selbst das denkende Wesen wäre, sondern dasDenken mir als Tätigkeit eines mir fremdartigen Wesens gegenüberträte, könnte ich davon sprechen, daß mein Bild des Denkens zwar auf eine bestimmte Weise auftrete; wie das Denken des Wesens aber an sich selber sei, das könne ich nicht wissen.
[ 28 ] Mein eigenes Denken von einem anderen Standpunkte aus anzusehen, liegt aber vorläufig für mich nicht die geringste Veranlassung vor. Ich betrachte ja die ganze übrige Welt mit Hilfe des Denkens. Wie sollte ich bei meinem Denken hiervon eine Ausnahme machen?
[ 29 ] Damit betrachte ich für genügend gerechtfertigt, wenn ich in meiner Weltbetrachtung von dem Denken ausgehe. Als Archimedes den Hebel erfunden hatte, da glaubte er mit seiner Hilfe den ganzen Kosmos aus den Angeln heben zu können, wenn er nur einen Punkt fände, wo er sein Instrument aufstützen könnte. Er brauchte etwas, was durch sich selbst, nicht durch anderes getragen wird. Im Denken haben wir ein Prinzip, das durch sich selbst besteht. Von hier aus sei es versucht, die Welt zu begreifen. Das Denken können wir durch es selbst erfassen. Die Frage ist nur, ob wir durch dasselbe auch noch etwas anderes ergreifen können.
[ 30 ] Ich habe bisher von dem Denken gesprochen, ohne auf seinen Träger, das menschliche Bewußtsein, Rücksicht zu nehmen. Die meisten Philosophen der Gegenwart werden mir einwenden: bevor es ein Denken gibt, muß es ein Bewußtsein geben. Deshalb sei vom Bewußtsein und nicht vom Denken auszugehen. Es gebe kein Denken ohne Bewußtsein. Ich muß dem gegenüber erwidern: Wenn ich darüber Aufklärung haben will, welches Verhältnis zwischen Denken und Bewußtsein besteht, so muß ich darüber nachdenken. Ich setze das Denken damit voraus. Nun kann man darauf allerdings antworten: Wenn der Philosoph das Bewußtsein begreifen will, dann bedient er sich des Denkens; er setzt es insoferne voraus; im gewöhnlichen Verlaufe des Lebens aber entsteht das Denken innerhalb des Bewußtseins und setzt also dieses voraus. Wenn diese Antwort dem Weltschöpfer gegeben würde, der das Denken schaffen will, so wäre sie ohne Zweifel berechtigt. Man kann natürlich das Denken nicht entstehen lassen, ohne vorher das Bewußtsein zustande zu bringen. Dem Philosophen aber handelt es sich nicht um die Weltschöpfung, sondern um das Begreifen derselben. Er hat daher auch nicht die Ausgangspunkte für das Schaffen, sondern für das Begreifen der Welt zu suchen. Ich finde es ganz sonderbar, wenn man dem Philosophen vorwirft, daß er sich vor allen andern Dingen um die Richtigkeit seiner Prinzipien, nicht aber sogleich um die Gegenstände bekümmert, die er begreifen will. Der Weltschöpfer mußte vor allem wissen, wie er einen Träger für das Denken findet, der Philosoph aber muß nach einer sichern Grundlage suchen, von der aus er das Vorhandene begreifen kann. Was frommt es uns, wenn wir vom Bewußtsein ausgehen und es der denkenden Betrachtung unterwerfen, wenn wir vorher über die Möglichkeit, durch denkende Betrachtung Aufschluß über die Dinge zu bekommen, nichts wissen?
[ 31 ] Wir müssen erst das Denken ganz neutral, ohne Beziehung auf ein denkendes Subjekt oder ein gedachtes Objekt betrachten. Denn in Subjekt und Objekt haben wir bereits Begriffe, die durch das Denken gebildet sind. Es ist nicht zu leugnen: Ehe anderes begriffen werden kann, muß es das Denken werden. Wer es leugnet, der übersieht, daß er als Mensch nicht einAnfangsglied der Schöpfung, sondern deren Endglied ist. Man kann deswegen behufs Erklärung der Welt durch Begriffe nicht von den zeitlich ersten Elementen des Daseins ausgehen, sondern von dem, was uns als das Nächste, als das Intimste gegeben ist. Wir können uns nicht mit einem Sprunge an den Anfang der Welt versetzen, um da unsere Betrachtung anzufangen, sondern wir müssen von dem gegenwärtigen Augenblick ausgehen und sehen, ob wir von dem Späteren zu dem Früheren aufsteigen können. Solange die Geologie von erdichteten Revolutionen gesprochen hat, um den gegenwärtigen Zustand der Erde zu erklären, solange tappte sie in der Finsternis. Erst als sie ihren Anfang damit machte, zu untersuchen, welche Vorgänge gegenwärtig noch auf der Erde sich abspielen und von diesen zurückschloß auf das Vergangene, hatte sie einen sicheren Boden gewonnen. Solange diePhilosophie alle möglichen Prinzipien annehmen wird, wie Atom, Bewegung, Materie, Wille, Unbewußtes, wird sie in der Luft schweben. Erst wenn der Philosoph das absolut Letzte als sein Erstes ansehen wird, kann er zum Ziele kommen. Dieses absolut Letzte, zu dem es die Weltentwickelung gebracht hat, ist aber das Denken.
[ 32 ] Es gibt Leute, die sagen: ob unser Denken an sich richtig sei oder nicht, können wir aber doch nicht mit Sicherheit feststellen. Insoferne bleibt also der Ausgangspunkt jedenfalls ein zweifelhafter. Das ist gerade so vernünftig gesprochen, wie wenn man Zweifel hegt, ob ein Baum an sich richtig sei oder nicht. Das Denken ist eine Tatsache; und über die Richtigkeit oder Falschheit einer solchen zu sprechen, ist sinnlos. Ich kann höchstens darüber Zweifel haben, ob das Denken richtig verwendet wird, wie ich zweifeln kann, ob ein gewisser Baum ein entsprechendes Holz zu einem zweckmäßigen Gerät gibt. Zu zeigen, inwieferne die Anwendung des Denkens auf die Welt eine richtige oder falsche ist, wird gerade Aufgabe dieser Schrift sein. Ich kann es verstehen, wenn jemand Zweifel hegt, daß durch das Denken über die Welt etwas ausgemacht werden kann; das aber ist mir unbegreiflich, wie jemand die Richtigkeit des Denkens an sich anzweifeln kann.
Zusatz zur Neuausgabe (1918)
[ 33 ] In den vorangehenden Ausführungen wird auf den bedeutungsvollen Unterschied zwischen dem Denken und allen andern Seelentätigkeiten hingewiesen als auf eine Tatsache, die sich einer wirklich unbefangenen Beobachtung ergibt. Wer diese unbefangene Beobachtung nicht anstrebt, der wird gegen diese Ausführungen versucht sein, Einwendungen zu machen wie diese: wenn ich über eine Rose denke, so ist damit doch auch nur ein Verhältnis meines «Ich» zur Rose ausgedrückt, wie wenn ich die Schönheit der Rose fühle. Es bestehe geradeso ein Verhältnis zwischen «Ich» und Gegenstand beim Denken, wie zum Beispiel beim Fühlen oder Wahrnehmen. Wer diesen Einwand macht, der zieht nicht in Erwägung, daß nur in der Betätigung des Denkens das «Ich» bis in alle Verzweigungen der Tätigkeit sich mit dem Tätigen als ein Wesen weiß. Bei keiner andern Seelentätigkeit ist dies restlos der Fall. Wenn zum Beispiel eine Lust gefühlt wird, kann eine feinere Beobachtung sehr wohl unterscheiden, inwieferne das «Ich» sich mit einem Tätigen eins weiß und inwiefern in ihm ein Passives vorhanden ist, so daß die Lust für das «Ich» bloß auftritt. Und so ist es auch bei den andern Seelenbetätigungen. Man sollte nur nicht verwechseln: «Gedankenbilder haben» und Gedanken durch das Denken verarbeiten. Gedankenbilder können traumhaft, wie vage Eingebungen in der Seele auftreten. Ein Denken ist dieses nicht. — Allerdings könnte nun jemand sagen: wenn das Denken so gemeint ist, steckt das Wollen in dem Denken drinnen, und man habe es dann nicht bloß mit dem Denken, sondern auch mit dem Wollen des Denkens zu tun. Doch würde dies nur berechtigen zu sagen: das wirkliche Denken muß immer gewollt sein. Nur hat dies mit der Kennzeichnung des Denkens, wie sie in diesen Ausführungen gemacht ist, nichts zu schaffen. Mag es das Wesen des Denkens immerhin notwendig machen, daß dieses gewollt wird: es kommt darauf an, daß nichts gewollt wird, was, indem es sich vollzieht, vor dem «Ich» nicht restlos als seine eigene, von ihm überschaubare Tätigkeit erscheint. Man muß sogar sagen, wegen der hier geltend gemachten Wesenheit des Denkens erscheint dieses dem Beobachter als durch und durch gewollt. Wer alles, was für die Beurteilung des Denkens in Betracht kommt, wirklich zu durchschauen sich bemüht, der wird nicht umhin können, zu bemerken, daß dieser Seelenbetätigung die Eigenheit zukommt, von der hier gesprochen ist.
[ 34] Von einer Persönlichkeit, welche der Verfasser dieses Buches als Denker sehr hochschätzt, ist ihm eingewendet worden, daß so, wie es hier geschieht, nicht über das Denken gesprochen werden könne, weil es nur ein Schein sei, was man als tätiges Denken zu beobachten glaube. In Wirklichkeit beobachte man nur die Ergebnisse einer nicht bewußten Tätigkeit, die dem Denken zugrunde liegt. Nur weil diese nicht bewußte Tätigkeit eben nicht beobachtet werde, entstehe die Täuschung, es bestehe das beobachtete Denken durch sich selbst, wie wenn man bei rasch aufeinanderfolgender Beleuchtung durch elektrische Funken eine Bewegung zu sehen glaubt. Auch dieser Einwand beruht nur auf einer ungenauen Anschauung der Sachlage. Wer ihn macht, berücksichtigt nicht, daß es das «Ich» selbst ist, das im Denken drinnen stehend seine Tätigkeit beobachtet. Es müßte das «Ich» außer dem Denken stehen, wenn es so getäuscht werden könnte, wie bei rasch aufeinanderfolgender Beleuchtung durch elektrische Funken. Man könnte vielmehr sagen: wer einen solchen Vergleich macht, der täuscht sich gewaltsam etwa wie jemand, der von einem in Bewegung begriffenen Licht durchaus sagen wollte: es wird an jedem Orte, an dem es erscheint, von unbekannter Hand neu angezündet. — Nein, wer in dem Denken etwas anderes sehen will als das im « Ich» selbst als überschaubare Tätigkeit Hervorgebrachte, der muß sich erst für den einfachen, der Beobachtung vorliegenden Tatbestand blind machen, um dann eine hypothetische Tätigkeit dem Denken zugrunde legen zu können. Wer sich nicht so blind macht, der muß erkennen, daß alles, was er in dieser Art zu dem Denken «hinzudenkt», aus dem Wesen des Denkens herausführt. Die unbefangene Beobachtung ergibt, daß nichts zum Wesen des Denkens gerechnet werden kann, was nicht im Denken selbst gefunden wird. Man kann nicht zu etwas kommen, was das Denken bewirkt, wenn man den Bereich des Denkens verläßt.
III Thinking in the service of worldview
[ 1 ] If I observe how a billiard ball that is hit transfers its movement to another, I have no influence whatsoever on the course of this observed process. The direction of movement and speed of the second ball is determined by the direction and speed of the first. As long as I act merely as an observer, I can only say something about the movement of the second ball when it has occurred. The situation is different when I begin to think about the content of my observation. The purpose of my reflection is to form concepts of the process. I bring the concept of an elastic sphere into connection with certain other concepts of mechanics and take into consideration the particular circumstances that prevail in the case in question. I thus seek to add to the process that takes place without my intervention a second process that takes place in the conceptual sphere. The latter is dependent on me. This is shown by the fact that I can content myself with observation and dispense with all search for concepts if I have no need for them. But if this need is present, then I only calm down when I have brought the concepts: ball, elasticity, movement, impact, speed etc. into a certain connection with which the observed process stands in a certain relationship. As certain as it is that the process takes place independently of me, it is equally certain that the conceptual process cannot take place without my intervention.
[ 2 ] Whether this activity of mine is really the outflow of my independent being, or whether the modern physiologists are right, who say that we cannot think as we want, but must think as determined by the thoughts and thought connections present in our consciousness (see Ziehen, Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie, Jena 1893, p. 171), will be the subject of a later discussion. For the present we merely wish to establish the fact that we feel ourselves continually compelled to seek concepts and conceptual connections to objects and processes given to us without our intervention, which stand in a certain relationship to those objects and processes. Whether this action is in truth our action, or whether we carry it out according to an unalterable necessity, we leave aside for the time being. That it initially appears to us as our own is without question. We know quite well that we are not given their concepts at the same time as the objects. That I myself am the doer may be based on an appearance; to direct observation, at any rate, this is how the matter presents itself. The question now is: what do we gain by finding a conceptual counterpart to a process?
[ 3 ] There is a profound difference between the way in which the parts of a process relate to each other before and after the corresponding concepts have been found. Mere observation can follow the parts of a given process in their course; but their connection remains obscure before the aid of concepts. I see the first billiard ball moving in a certain direction and at a certain speed towards the second; I have to wait and see what happens after the shot and can then follow it again only with my eyes. Let us assume that at the moment of impact someone obscures the field on which the process takes place, then I - as a mere observer - am unaware of what happens afterwards. The situation is different if I have found the corresponding concepts for the constellation of conditions before the obscuring. In this case, I can state what happens, even if the possibility of observation ceases. A merely observed process or object does not in itself reveal anything about its connection with other processes or objects. This connection only becomes apparent when observation is combined with thinking.
[ 4 ] Observation and thinking are the two starting points for all of man's spiritual endeavors, insofar as he is aware of them. The operations of common sense and the most intricate scientific research rest on these two basic pillars of our mind. Philosophers have proceeded from various primordial opposites: Idea and reality, subject and object, appearance and thing-in-itself, ego and non-ego, idea and will, concept and matter, force and substance, conscious and unconscious. But it is easy to show that all these opposites must be preceded by that of observation and thought, as the most important for man.
[ 5 ] Whatever principle we may establish: we must prove it somewhere as observed by us, or express it in the form of a clear thought that can be thought by anyone else. Every philosopher who begins to speak about his original principles must make use of the conceptual form, and thus of thought. He thus indirectly admits that he already presupposes thinking for his activity. Whether thinking or something else is the main element in the development of the world is not yet decided here. But it is clear from the outset that the philosopher cannot gain any knowledge about it without thinking. Thinking may play a secondary role in the emergence of world phenomena, but it certainly plays a major role in the emergence of an opinion about them.
[ 6] As far as observation is concerned, it is in our organization that we need it. Our thinking about a horse and the object horse are two things that appear separately to us. And this object is only accessible to us through observation. Just as we cannot form an idea of a horse by merely staring at it, we are just as little able to produce a corresponding object by merely thinking about it.
[ 7 ] In terms of time, observation even precedes thinking. For we must first get to know thinking through observation. It was essentially the description of an observation when we described at the beginning of this chapter how thinking is ignited by a process and goes beyond what is given without its intervention. We first become aware of everything that enters the circle of our experiences through observation. The content of sensations, perceptions, views, feelings, acts of will, dreams and fantasies, notions, concepts and ideas, all illusions and hallucinations are given to us through observation.
[ 8 ] But thinking as an object of observation is essentially different from all other things. The observation of a table or a tree occurs to me as soon as these objects appear on the horizon of my experiences. But I do not observe thinking about these objects at the same time. I observe the table, I carry out the thinking about the table, but I do not observe it at the same moment. I must first place myself in a position outside my own activity if I want to observe my thinking about the table as well as the table. While observing objects and processes and thinking about them are quite everyday states that fill my ongoing life, the observation of thinking is a kind of exceptional state. This fact must be taken into account accordingly when it comes to determining the relationship of thinking to all other contents of observation. One must be clear about the fact that in the observation of thinking one applies to it a procedure that forms the normal state for the observation of the entire remaining content of the world, but which does not occur in the pursuit of this normal state for thinking itself.
[ 9 ] Someone might object that what I have said here about thinking also applies to feeling and other mental activities. If, for example, we have the feeling of pleasure, it is also kindled by an object, and I observe this object, but not the feeling of pleasure. But this objection is based on a mistake. Pleasure does not stand in the same relation to its object as the concept formed by thought. I am most definitely aware that the concept of a thing is formed by my activity, whereas pleasure is produced in me in a similar way by an object, as, for example, the change that a falling stone causes in an object on which it falls. For observation, pleasure is given in exactly the same way as the process that causes it. The same is not true of the concept. I can ask: why does a certain process produce the feeling of pleasure in me? But I cannot ask: why does a process produce a certain sum of concepts in me? That would simply make no sense. Thinking about a process has no effect on me at all. I cannot learn anything about myself by knowing the corresponding concepts for the observed change that a stone thrown against a window pane causes in it. But I can learn something about my personality if I know the feeling that a certain process arouses in me. If I say to an observed object: this is a rose, I am not saying the slightest thing about myself; but if I say of the same thing: it gives me a feeling of pleasure, I have characterized not only the rose but also myself in my relationship to the rose.
[ 10 ] There can therefore be no question of equating thinking with feeling in relation to observation. The same could easily be deduced for the other activities of the human mind. They belong to the same series as thinking as other observed objects and processes. It belongs to the peculiar nature of thinking that it is an activity which is directed merely to the observed object and not to the thinking personality. This is already expressed in the way we express our thoughts about a thing in contrast to our feelings or acts of will. If I see an object and recognize it as a table, I will generally not say: I am thinking about a table, but rather: this is a table. But I will say: I am happy about the table. In the former case it is not at all important for me to say that I enter into a relationship with the table; in the latter case, however, it is precisely about this relationship. By saying: I think about a table, I already enter into the exceptional state characterized above, where something is made the object of observation that is always included in our mental activity, but not as an observed object.
[ 11 ] This is the peculiar nature of thinking, that the thinker forgets thinking while he is practicing it. It is not thinking that preoccupies him, but the object of thinking that he observes.<
[ 12 ] The first observation we make about thinking, then, is that it is the unobserved element of our ordinary mental life.
[ 13 ] The reason why we do not observe thinking in everyday mental life is none other than that it is based on our own activity. What I do not produce myself enters my field of observation as something objective. I face it as something that has come about without me; it approaches me; I must accept it as the precondition of my thinking process. While I am thinking about the object, I am occupied with it, my gaze is turned towards it. This preoccupation is thinking contemplation. My attention is not focused on my activity, but on the object of this activity. In other words: while I am thinking, I am not looking at my thinking, which I produce myself, but at the object of thinking, which I do not produce.
[ 14 ] I am even in the same case when I allow the state of exception to occur and think about my thinking itself. I can never observe my present thinking; I can only make the experiences I have had about my thinking process the object of my thinking afterwards. I would have to divide myself into two personalities: one that thinks and the other that observes itself thinking, if I wanted to observe my present thinking. I can't do that. I can only do this in two separate acts. The thinking that is to be observed is never the one that is active, but a different one. Whether for this purpose I make my observations on my own earlier thinking, or whether I follow the thought process of another person, or finally, whether I presuppose a fictitious thought process, as in the above case with the movement of the billiard balls, it does not matter.
[ 15 ] Two things are not compatible: active production and contemplative juxtaposition. The first book of Moses already knows this. In the first six days of the world, God brings the world into being, and only when it is there is it possible to contemplate it: "And God looked upon all that he had made, and behold, it was very good." It is the same with our thinking. It must first be there if we want to observe it.
[ 16 ] The reason that makes it impossible for us to observe thinking in its respective present course is the same as the reason that allows us to recognize it more directly and intimately than any other process in the world. It is precisely because we produce it ourselves that we know the characteristic features of its course, the way in which the event under consideration takes place. What can only be found in an indirect way in the other spheres of observation: the factually corresponding connection and the relationship of the individual objects, we know in a very direct way in thinking. Why, for my observation, thunder follows lightning, I do not know without further ado; why my thinking connects the concept of thunder with that of lightning, I know directly from the contents of the two concepts. Of course, it is not at all important whether I have the right concepts of lightning and thunder. The connection of the ones I have is clear to me, through them themselves.<
[ 17 ] This transparent clarity with regard to the thinking process is completely independent of our knowledge of the physiological foundations of thinking. I am speaking here of thinking insofar as it arises from the observation of our mental activity. How one material process of my brain causes or influences another while I am carrying out an operation of thought does not come into consideration at all. What I observe in thinking is not: what process in my brain connects the concept of lightning with that of thunder, but what causes me to bring the two concepts into a certain relationship. My observation shows that there is nothing available to me for my thought connections that I am guided by other than the content of my thoughts; I am not guided by the material processes in my brain. For a less materialistic age than ours, this remark would of course be completely superfluous. At the present time, however, when there are people who believe that if we know what matter is, we will also know how matter thinks, it must be said that one can speak of thinking without immediately coming into collision with brain physiology. Many people today find it difficult to grasp the concept of thinking in its purity. Anyone who immediately opposes the idea I have developed here of thinking with the sentence of Cabanis: "The brain secretes thoughts like the liver secretes bile, the salivary gland secretes saliva, etc." simply does not know what I am talking about. He seeks to find thought through a mere process of observation in the same way that we proceed with other objects of the world's content. But he cannot find it in this way because, as I have shown, it eludes normal observation precisely there. He who cannot overcome materialism lacks the ability to bring about in himself the exceptional state I have described, which makes him conscious of what remains unconscious in all other mental activity. Anyone who does not have the good will to put himself in this position could no more talk to him about thinking than to a blind man about color. But let him not believe that we take physiological processes for thinking. He does not explain thinking because he does not see it at all.
[ 18 ] But for anyone who has the ability to observe thinking - and with good will every normally organized person has it - this observation is the most important one he can make. For he observes something of which he himself is the originator; he does not see himself confronted with an initially alien object, but with his own activity. He knows how what he observes comes about. He sees through the conditions and relationships. A firm point has been gained from which one can search with justified hope for an explanation of the other phenomena of the world.
[ 19 ] The feeling of having such a fixed point prompted the founder of modern philosophy, René Descartes, to base all human knowledge on the sentence: I think, therefore I am. All other things, all other events are there without me; I do not know whether as truth or as a fairy tale and dream. I only know one thing for certain, because I myself bring it to its secure existence: my thinking. May it have another origin of its existence, may it come from God or elsewhere; that it is there in the sense in which I myself bring it forth, of that I am certain. Descartes initially had no justification for attributing a different meaning to his proposition. He could only assert that I grasp myself within the content of the world in my thinking as in my very own activity. What the attached: therefore I am should mean has been much debated. But it can only have a meaning under one single condition. The simplest statement I can make about a thing is that it is, that it exists. How this existence is then to be determined more precisely cannot be said at once about any thing that enters the horizon of my experience. Each object will first have to be examined in its relation to others in order to be able to determine in what sense it can be spoken of as existing. An experienced process can be a sum of perceptions, but it can also be a dream, a hallucination and so on. In short, I cannot say in what sense it exists. I will not be able to deduce this from the process itself, but I will find out when I look at it in relation to other things. But there again I cannot know more than how it stands in relation to these things. My search only comes to a firm foundation when I find an object for which I can draw the meaning of its existence from itself. But this is myself as a thinker, for I give my existence the definite, intrinsically based content of thinking activity. Now I can start from there and ask: Do the other things exist in the same or in a different sense?
[ 120] If one makes thinking the object of observation, one adds something to the other observed contents of the world that otherwise escapes attention; but one does not change the way in which man also behaves towards other things. The number of objects of observation is increased, but not the method of observation. While we are observing other things, a process is intermingled with world events - to which I now include observation - which is overlooked. There is something different from all other events that is not taken into account. But when I look at my thinking, there is no such unconsidered element. For what now hovers in the background is itself only thinking. The observed object is qualitatively the same as the activity that is directed towards it. And this is again a characteristic peculiarity of thinking. When we make it an object of observation, we are not forced to do so with the help of an oualitative-different, but we can remain in the same element.
[ 21 ] If I spin an object given without my intervention into my thinking, I go beyond my observation, and it will be a question of: what gives me a right to do so? Why do I not simply allow the object to have an effect on me? In what way is it possible for my thinking to have a relation to the object? These are questions that everyone who thinks about his own thought processes must ask himself. They fall away when we think about thinking itself. We do not add anything foreign to thinking, so we do not have to justify such an addition.
[ 22 ] Schelling says: To recognize nature is to create nature. - Anyone who takes these words of the bold natural philosopher literally will probably have to do without all knowledge of nature for the rest of their lives. For nature exists once, and in order to create it a second time, one must recognize the principles according to which it came into being. For the nature that we first wanted to create, we would have to copy the conditions of its existence from those that already exist. But this copying, which would have to precede creation, would be the recognition of nature, even if, after copying has taken place, creation would not take place at all. Only a nature that does not yet exist could be created without recognizing it beforehand.
[ 23 ] What is impossible with nature: creating before recognizing; with thinking we accomplish it. If we wanted to wait to think until we had recognized it, we would never get around to it. We have to think resolutely in order to come to its realization afterwards by observing what we have created. We ourselves first create an object for the observation of thought. The existence of all other objects has been taken care of without our intervention.
[ 24 ] Someone could easily counter my sentence: we must think before we can observe thinking, with the other as equally valid: we cannot wait with digesting until we have observed the process of digesting. That would be an objection similar to the one Pascal made to Cartesius, claiming that one could also say: I am walking, therefore I am. Certainly I must also digest resolutely before I have studied the physiological process of digestion. But this could only be compared with the contemplation of thinking if I did not want to contemplate digestion afterwards in terms of thinking, but rather wanted to eat and digest. It is not without reason that digestion cannot be the object of digestion, but thinking can very well become the object of thinking.
[ 25 ] There is therefore no doubt that in thinking we hold world events at a point where we have to be present if something is to come about. And that is precisely what matters. That is precisely the reason why things are so mysterious to me: that I am so uninvolved in their creation. I simply find them; in thinking, however, I know how they are made. Therefore, there is no more original starting point for observing everything that happens in the world than thinking.
[ 26 ] I would now like to mention a widespread misconception that prevails with regard to thinking. It consists in saying that thinking, as it is in itself, is not given to us anywhere. The thinking that connects the observations of our experiences and weaves them into a web of concepts is not at all the same as that which we subsequently extract from the objects of observation and make the object of our contemplation. What we first unconsciously weave into things is quite different from what we then consciously separate out again.
[ 27 ] Those who conclude in this way do not understand that it is not possible for them to escape from thinking in this way. I cannot get out of thinking at all if I want to look at thinking. If one distinguishes preconscious thinking from later conscious thinking, one should not forget that this distinction is an entirely external one that has nothing at all to do with the thing itself. I do not make one thing into another at all by looking at it thinking. I can imagine that a being with completely different sensory organs and with a differently functioning intelligence has a completely different idea of a horse than I do, but I cannot imagine that my own thinking becomes different by the fact that I observe it. I myself observe what I myself accomplish. What my thinking looks like to another intelligence than mine is not the question now; but what it looks like to me. In any case, however, the image of my thinking in another intelligence cannot be a truer one than my own. Only if I were not the thinking being myself, but if thinking confronted me as the activity of a being alien to me, could I speak of my image of thinking appearing in a certain way, but I could not know what the thinking of the being itself was like.
[ 28 ] But for the time being I have not the slightest reason to view my own thinking from a different standpoint. I look at the rest of the world with the help of thinking. How could I make an exception to this in my own thinking?
[ 29 ] Thus I consider it sufficiently justified to start from thinking in my view of the world. When Archimedes invented the lever, he believed that he could unhinge the entire cosmos with its help if he could only find a point where he could support his instrument. He needed something that was supported by itself, not by something else. In thinking we have a principle that exists through itself. It is from here that an attempt is made to grasp the world. We can grasp thinking through itself. The only question is whether we can also grasp something else through it.
[ 30 ] I have so far spoken of thinking without taking its carrier, human consciousness, into consideration. Most contemporary philosophers will object to me: before there is thinking, there must be consciousness. Therefore, one should start from consciousness and not from thinking. There is no thinking without consciousness. I must reply to this: If I want to know the relationship between thinking and consciousness, I have to think about it. I thereby presuppose thinking. Now, however, one can reply to this: If the philosopher wants to comprehend consciousness, then he makes use of thinking; he presupposes it insofar; in the ordinary course of life, however, thinking arises within consciousness and thus presupposes it. If this answer were given to the creator of the world, who wants to create thinking, it would undoubtedly be justified. Of course, thinking cannot come into being without first bringing consciousness into being. The philosopher, however, is not concerned with the creation of the world, but with the comprehension of it. He must therefore not seek the starting points for creating the world, but for understanding it. I find it quite strange when the philosopher is reproached for being concerned above all else with the correctness of his principles, but not immediately with the objects he wants to comprehend. The creator of the world must above all know how to find a support for thought, but the philosopher must seek a secure foundation from which he can comprehend what exists. What good does it do us to start from consciousness and subject it to thinking contemplation if we know nothing beforehand about the possibility of gaining insight into things through thinking contemplation?
[ 31 ] We must first consider thinking in a completely neutral way, without reference to a thinking subject or a thought object. For in subject and object we already have concepts that are formed by thinking. It cannot be denied: before anything else can be understood, it must become thinking. Whoever denies it overlooks the fact that he, as a human being, is not the beginning of creation, but its end. Therefore, in order to explain the world through concepts, we cannot start from the temporally first elements of existence, but from what is given to us as the closest, as the most intimate. We cannot leap to the beginning of the world in order to begin our observation there, but we must start from the present moment and see whether we can ascend from the later to the earlier. As long as geology has spoken of imaginary revolutions to explain the present state of the earth, it has groped in the dark. Only when it began to investigate what processes were still taking place on the earth at the present time and inferred from them what had happened in the past, did it gain a firm footing. As long as philosophy assumes all possible principles, such as atom, movement, matter, will, the unconscious, it will hover in the air. Only when the philosopher will regard the absolute last as his first can he reach his goal. But this absolute ultimate, to which the development of the world has led, is thought.
[ 32] There are those who say that we cannot determine with certainty whether our thinking is correct or not. In this respect, the starting point remains dubious. That is just as reasonable as doubting whether a tree is right in itself or not. Thinking is a fact; and to talk about the rightness or wrongness of such a fact is pointless. The most I can do is to doubt whether reasoning is used rightly, just as I can doubt whether a certain tree gives the right wood for a useful tool. To show to what extent the application of thought to the world is right or wrong will be the task of this paper. I can understand if someone doubts that something can be determined about the world through thinking; but it is incomprehensible to me how someone can doubt the correctness of thinking itself.
Addition to the new edition (1918)
[ 33 ] In the preceding remarks, reference is made to the significant difference between thinking and all other activities of the soul as a fact that arises from truly impartial observation. Anyone who does not strive for this impartial observation will be tempted to make objections to these statements, such as the following: if I think about a rose, then this only expresses a relationship of my "I" to the rose, as if I feel the beauty of the rose. There is just as much a relationship between "I" and object in thinking as there is, for example, in feeling or perceiving. He who makes this objection does not take into consideration that only in the activity of thinking does the "I" know itself to be one being with the active being in all ramifications of the activity. In no other activity of the soul is this completely the case. When, for example, a pleasure is felt, a finer observation can very well distinguish to what extent the "I" knows itself to be one with an active being and to what extent a passive being is present in it, so that the pleasure merely arises for the "I". And so it is with the other activities of the soul. One should not confuse "having mental images" and processing thoughts through thinking. Thought images can appear in the soul like dreams, like vague intuitions. This is not thinking. - However, someone could now say: if thinking is meant in this way, the volition is in the thinking, and then one is not only dealing with thinking, but also with the volition of thinking. But this would only justify saying that real thinking must always be willed. But this has nothing to do with the characterization of thinking as it is made in these remarks. While the nature of thinking may make it necessary for it to be willed, what matters is that nothing is willed which, in the process of taking place, does not appear to the "I" completely as its own activity that it can comprehend. One must even say that because of the essence of thinking asserted here, it appears to the observer as thoroughly willed. Whoever really tries to see through everything that comes into consideration for the evaluation of thinking will not be able to avoid noticing that this activity of the soul has the peculiarity that is spoken of here.
[ 34] A person whom the author of this book holds in very high esteem as a thinker has objected to him that thinking cannot be spoken of as it is done here, because what one believes to observe as active thinking is only an appearance. In reality, one only observes the results of an unconscious activity that underlies thinking. It is only because this non-conscious activity is not observed that the illusion arises that the observed thinking exists by itself, as when one believes to see a movement in rapid successive illumination by electric sparks. This objection, too, is based only on an inaccurate view of the facts. Whoever makes it does not take into account that it is the "I" itself that observes its activity standing inside thinking. The "I" would have to be outside of thinking if it could be deceived in the same way as with rapid successive illumination by electric sparks. One could rather say: whoever makes such a comparison is violently deceiving himself, like someone who would say of a light in motion: it is lit anew by an unknown hand at every place where it appears. - No, whoever wants to see in thinking something other than that which is produced in the "I" itself as manageable activity, must first blind himself to the simple facts available to observation in order to be able to base thinking on a hypothetical activity. He who does not blind himself in this way must recognize that everything he "adds" to thinking in this way leads out of the essence of thinking. Unbiased observation shows that nothing can be counted as part of the essence of thinking that is not found in thinking itself. One cannot arrive at something that affects thinking if one leaves the realm of thinking.