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Riddles of Philosophy
GA 18

Translated by Steiner Online Library

Preface to the New Edition (1918)

[ 1 ] In the following "Preface" I have indicated the thoughts from which the presentation of this book arose and on which it is based. I would like to add something to what I said then, which is connected with a question that lives more or less consciously in the soul of anyone who picks up a book on "The Riddles of Philosophy". It is that of the relationship of philosophical contemplation to immediate life. Every philosophical thought that is not demanded by this life itself is doomed to unfruitfulness, even if it attracts for a while this or that person who has a tendency to ponder. A fruitful thought must have its roots in the developmental processes that humanity has to undergo in the course of its historical development. And whoever wants to present the history of the development of philosophical thought from any point of view can only adhere to such thoughts demanded by life. They must be thoughts which, when carried over into the attitude of life, so permeate man that he has powers in them which guide his knowledge and which can be advisers and helpers to him in the tasks of his existence. Because mankind needs such thoughts, philosophical world views have emerged. If life could be mastered without such thoughts, no human being would ever have had a truly inner justification for thinking about the "riddles of philosophy". An age that is averse to such thinking only shows that it feels no need to shape human life in such a way that it really comes to manifestation in accordance with its tasks in all directions. But this aversion takes its revenge in the course of human development. Life remains stunted in such ages. And people do not notice the atrophy because they do not want to know about the demands that remain in the depths of the human being and which they simply do not fulfill. A subsequent age brings the non-fulfillment to light. The grandchildren find in the shaping of the stunted life something that the omission of the grandfathers has caused them. This omission of the previous time has become the imperfect life of the following time, into which these grandchildren find themselves placed. In lifeas a whole philosophy must prevail; one can sin against the demand; but. sin must produce its effects.

[ 2 ] The course of philosophical thought development, the existence of the "riddles of philosophy" can only be understood if one feels the task that the philosophical view of the world has for a whole, full human existence. And it is out of such a feeling that I have written about the development of the "Riddles of Philosophy". By describing this development, I have tried to make it clear that this feeling is an inwardly justified one.

[ 3 ] From the outset, some people will be inhibited by something that has the appearance of a fact about it. Philosophical contemplation is supposed to be a necessity of life: and yet, in the course of its development, human thought does not provide unambiguous, but rather ambiguous, seemingly completely contradictory solutions to the "riddles of philosophy". There are many historical considerations that attempt to explain the contradictions that impose themselves through an external conception of development. They are not convincing. One must take development itself much more seriously than is usually the case if one wants to find one's way in this field. One must come to the realization that there can be no thought that is capable of solving the riddles of the world once and for all. In human thinking it is rather the case that a found idea soon becomes a new riddle again. And the more significant the idea is, the more light it throws on a particular age, the more puzzling, the more questionable it becomes in a subsequent age. Whoever wants to look at the history of the development of human thought from a true point of view must be able to admire the greatness of the idea of one age and be able to muster the same enthusiasm to see this idea reveal itself in its imperfection in a subsequent age. He must also be able to think of the type of idea to which he professes himself that it will be replaced in the future by a completely different one. And this thought must not deter him from fully recognizing the "correctness" of the view he has attained. The attitude which regards previous thoughts as imperfectly dismissed by the "perfect" ones that are emerging in the present is not suitable for understanding the philosophical development of mankind. I have tried to comprehend the course of the development of human thought by grasping the meaning of the fact that a subsequent age philosophically refutes the preceding one. In the introductory remarks "On the Orientation of the Guidelines of Representation", I have expressed the ideas that such a comprehension produces. These ideas are ones that must naturally meet with manifold resistance. At first glance, they will appear as if I had experienced them as an "idea" and wanted to use them to rape the entire presentation of the history of philosophy in a fantastic way. I can only hope that one will find that these ideas were not previously thought out and then imposed on the consideration of the philosophical development, but that they were obtained in the same way as the natural scientist finds his laws. They have flowed out of the observation of the philosophical development of thought. And one does not have the right to reject the results of an observation because they contradict ideas that one considers to be correct from some inclination of thought without observation. The superstition - for such ideas show themselves as such - that in the historical development of mankind there cannot be forces which reveal themselves in a peculiar way in ages that are to be limited and which in a meaningful and lawful way dominate the development of human thoughts in a vital way, will oppose my presentation. For this was forced upon me because the observation of this becoming proved to me the existence of such forces. And because this observation has shown me that the history of philosophy only becomes a science when it does not shy away from recognizing such forces.

[ 4 ] I think that it is only possible to gain a position on the "riddles of philosophy" in the present that is fruitful for life if one knows these forces that dominated the past ages. And more than in any other branch of historical observation, the only possible thing in a history of thought is to allow the present to grow out of the past. For in grasping those ideas that meet the requirements of the present lies the basis for the insight that sheds the right light on the past. He who is not able to gain a view of the world truly appropriate to the driving forces of his own age must also remain ignorant of the meaning of past spiritual life. I will not decide here whether in any other field of historical observation an account can be fruitful which is not based at least on a view of the conditions of the present in the corresponding field. In the field of the history of thought, however, such an account can only be unfruitful. For here what is considered must necessarily be connected with immediate life. And this life, in which the thought becomes the practice of life, can only be that of the present.

[ 5 ] This is how I would like to characterize the feelings out of which this presentation of the "Riddles of Philosophy" has grown. The short period of time since the publication of the last edition gives no reason to change or add anything to the contents of the book.