The Rudolf Steiner Archive

An Award-winning Academic work on the History of the Outbreak of War

"Neue Badische Landeszeitung" Mannheim, 62nd vol. no. 193, evening edition of April 17, 1917

[ 1 ] Within the vast body of war literature, Dr. Jacob Ruchti's "Zur Geschichte des Kriegsausbruches nach den amtlichen Akten der königlich großbritannischen Regierung", which was awarded a prize by the historical seminar at the University of Bern, is of particular value. This is because it contains an examination that is carried out according to the strict rules of historical research and that scientific conscientiousness that the historian seeks when he wants to form an opinion about factual contexts. What is usually only attempted in the academic world long after the events in question have taken place, Ruchti undertakes for the events of the immediate present. After examining his work, it must be said that a favorable judgment of its content, an appreciation of its results need not be the consequence of the point of view towards the causes of war that one takes according to one's ethnicity or similar causes, but that the author's factually satisfactory scientific method can lead to such an appreciation for those who are at all accessible to scientifically obtainable convictions.

[ 2 ] Now many people are of the opinion that a discussion of the causes of war has already become a fruitless matter. But such a view cannot be maintained in the face of the way in which the statesmen and the press of the Entente are trying to persuade the world that they are compelled to continue the war in spite of the peace offer of the Central Powers. Among the reasons they give, the fact that the beginning of the war proves that peaceful coexistence with the Central Powers can only be achieved through a devastating blow by the Entente against these powers plays a very special role. Now Ruchti shows that this assertion is based on an untrue legend, forged by the Entente against the statements of its own documents, in order to teach the world the view that it considers good to teach it about the outcome and aim of the war. Admittedly, Ruchti's conclusion has already been stated many times and in various forms. But the significance of his writing lies firstly in his scientific treatment of the facts, and secondly in the fact that a member of a neutral state unreservedly communicates his findings, and that a scientific seminar of this state finds the writing to be so in line with scientific requirements that it crowns it with a prize. Ruchti's style also remains that of a scientific researcher, who nowhere goes beyond what the sources reveal; indeed, in the manner of such a researcher, he draws attention at the appropriate points to exactly where the factual material becomes uncertain and objective judgment must be withheld. He relies almost exclusively on English documents and uses the other states only to supplement this or that factual account. And by this method he arrives at a result which may be summarized in the following words. The assertions by which the statesmen of the Entente seek to persuade the world are recognized by the English documents as the opposite of the truth. The whole fabric of assertions made by Grey and his comrades about the Entente statesmen's efforts for peace falls apart before Ruchti's scientific analysis and becomes one that shows only the appearance of peace efforts, but which in reality was not only bound to lead to war between Russia and France on the one hand and Germany and Austria on the other, but was also likely to place England on the side of the former powers. It is clear from these explanations how Sasonov makes the dispute between Austria and Serbia the starting point of a European conflict and how Grey makes this Russian starting point his own from the outset and establishes his so-called peace efforts from it. There is not the slightest evidence that it could have occurred to Grey to arrange his diplomatic steps in such a way that Russia would have been forced to let Austria fight out its dispute with Serbia alone. Since Austria had given the assurance that she intended to achieve nothing else by her warlike measures against Serbia than the complete recognition of her ultimatum, and this ultimatum demanded nothing but a reasonable attitude on the part of Serbia towards the Austrian state within its present boundaries, there would have been no reason for war for any other power if Grey had dissuaded Russia from interfering in the Austro-Serbian dispute. As a result, however, England was Russia's ally and opponent of the Central Powers from the outset, and Grey had initiated a policy that was bound to lead to the war in the form in which it came about. In contrast to what Grey did, the assertion that he did not succeed in maintaining peace only because Germany did not want it, turns out to be a reprehensible untruth precisely because it is as likely as possible to mislead the world by emphasizing a truth that is quite self-evident but also quite meaningless. For it is certainly clear that England, and indeed France and even Russia, would have preferred peace to war if it had not been possible to use diplomatic means to reduce Germany and Austria to political insignificance vis-à-vis the Entente and make them submit to the Entente's will to power. It is not a question of whether Grey wanted peace or war, but of his attitude to the claims of those powers at the outbreak of war which were England's allies in the war. And Ruchti proves that Grey's position was such that war was necessarily brought about by his behavior. One may certainly add to Ruchti's evidence that Grey himself did not want to push for war, but that he was a weakling who was pushed to his steps by others. However, this does not alter the historical assessment of his actions. Ruchti succeeds completely in proving that Grey's diplomatic steps do not give him the slightest right to claim that he did anything to prevent the war. But the Swiss historian also succeeds in showing that the English statesmen behaved in such a way in the negotiations with Germany that they had been offered a reason for war by breaking neutrality towards Belgium, which they could have avoided if they had accepted certain offers from Germany. But they needed this reason for war in order to make it acceptable to their people, who could not have been persuaded to go to war because of Serbia and Russia's European claims. And a forgery was also necessary to persuade the people, as Ruchti proves in the English White Book. False dates in a correspondence that Grey had conducted were intended to show the English people how peace-loving France had been invaded by Germany. By falsifying dates, the impression was created that Germany had attacked France much earlier than was actually the case. In addition, in his war speech of August 6, 1914, Asquith simply concealed decisive negotiations with Germany with the same success of deceiving the people. By objectively weighing up all these facts, Ruchti forms a judgment that entitles him to present the so-called peace efforts of the English statesmen as an untrue legend and even to point out the forces driving them to war. At the end he utters the grave words: "History cannot be falsified in the long run, the legend cannot stand up to scientific research, the dark fabric will be brought to light and torn apart, no matter how artfully and finely it was woven." But for the time being, the Entente is still seeking in this dark fabric one of the means to foist its dark craft of war on the world as a necessity of civilization and the noblest humanity.