The Rudolf Steiner Archive

New Facts About the Prehistory of the World War

An interview by "Matin" reporter Jules Sauerwein with Dr. Rudolf Steiner about the unpublished memoirs of the late German Chief of Staff von Moltke October 1921

[ 1 ] "You know that, if your opponents are to be believed, the Chief of the General Staff is said to have lost first his head and then the Battle of Marne through you."

[ 2 ] This is the question I put to the famous spiritual researcher and sociologist Rudolf Steiner, born a German-Austrian. I have had sincere admiration and friendly feelings for him for more than fifteen years. It gave me great satisfaction at the time to translate several of his theosophical works into French. Whenever my travels permit, I never fail to pay a brief visit to Dr. Steiner in Dornach when passing through Basel.

[ 3 ] This time, too, I met him at the strange and imposing building that was given the name Goetheanum by his students in honor of Goethe as a forerunner of spiritual science. I have already written in the "Matin" about the man as well as the building and its wonderful location on the last foothills of the Jura, crowned by castle ruins.

[ 4 ] Rudolf Steiner had just returned from Germany after giving lectures on his teachings to thousands of enthusiastic listeners in Stuttgart and Berlin. In Dornach on the same day he received a group of 120 theologians with whom he had entered into a discussion of theological and religious questions. Quite a number of these theologians intended to tackle a reorganization of religious life on the basis of the teachings advocated by Dr. Steiner.

[ 5 ] Dr. Steiner was working on a huge group of wooden sculptures depicting Christ and the underlying seductive powers, Lucifer and Ahriman. It is one of the most impressive creations I have ever seen; it will form the central end of the smaller domed room in the Goetheanum. As I watched the listeners coming up the hill in small groups at dusk to gather for the lecture, Dr. Steiner told me about the attacks of his opponents. Clerics and all-Germans and fanatical followers of various religious denominations are fighting against him with every weapon and at every opportunity.

The fear of the truth

[ 6 ] When I asked him the question about General von Moltke straight away, he turned his penetrating eyes on me, which looked at me from a face furrowed by forty years of intense spiritual struggle.

[ 7 ] "What you tell me does not astonish me. No means will be spared to drive me out of Germany and possibly also out of Switzerland. These attacks are based on a wide variety of grounds. But insofar as they extend to my relations with Moltke, they have a very specific aim. They want to prevent the publication of some notes that Moltke made for his family before his death and whose publication in the book trade I was supposed to arrange in agreement with Mrs. von Moltke.

[ 8 ] These memoirs should have been published in 1919. Immediately before its publication, a person in charge of Prussia's diplomatic representation in Stuttgart came to see me to tell me that this publication was impossible and that they would not want it in Berlin. Later, a general who had been in positions around General von Moltke and Wilhelm II came to me and gave me the same ideas. I protested against this and wanted to disregard it. I thought of turning to Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, who was present in Versailles at the time, but could achieve nothing. My efforts were all the more unsuccessful as at the same time Mrs. von Moltke was approached with ideas that she could not resist.

[ 9 ] Why these fears? These memoirs are by no means an indictment of the imperial government. But it is clear from them, what is perhaps worse, that the imperial government was in a state of complete confusion and under incomprehensibly reckless and ignorant leadership. One can apply to the responsible personalities the sentence I wrote down in my preface: 'It was not what they did that contributed to bringing about the disaster, but the whole nature of their personalities.

[ 10 ] I might add that it was the peculiar circumstances which caused the weight of the decisive decisions to rest finally on a single man, the Chief of the General Staff, who saw himself compelled to do his military duty because politics had come to a standstill. I never spoke to him about political or military issues before Moltke's resignation. It was only later, when he was seriously ill, that he naturally spoke openly to me about all these matters, and since this will interest you, I will tell you what he told me himself and what is also evident from his unpublished memoirs.

[ 11 ] At the end of June 1914, Moltke, who had been Chief of the General Staff since 1905, went to Carlsbad for health reasons. Until his death, he knew nothing of a Potsdam consultation on July 5 or 6. He had only returned to Berlin in good health after the ultimatum to Serbia. Since his return he had, as he said, been firmly convinced that Russia would attack. He clearly foresaw the tragic development that things were bound to take, that is, he believed in the participation of France and England in the world conflict. He wrote a memorandum for the Kaiser pointing out the necessity of measures to be taken. The plan of the German General Staff had essentially been laid down for a long time. It had been drawn up by Moltke's predecessor, von Schlieffen. You know its main features: Large masses were to be thrown against France in order to achieve a quick decision in the west at any cost. A weak defensive army was planned against Russia, which was to be replenished later after the decision on the western theater of war.

Disturbed people

[ 12 ] Von Moltke had changed his predecessor's plan on one important point, however. While Schlieffen had envisaged a simultaneous march through Belgium and Holland, Moltke had renounced Holland in order to give Germany breathing space in the event of a blockade.

[ 13 ] When Moltke arrived at the castle on Friday, July 31, he found people completely confused. He had the impression, as he said, that he found himself in the position of having to make a decision all by himself. The Kaiser had not yet signed the mobilization order that day, an order which in Germany was tantamount to a declaration of war, for as soon as this order was given, everything, including the first operation, was carried out at specific times with a relentless automatism. Wilhelm II contented himself for that day with proclaiming the imminent threat of war. The following day, on Saturday, August 1, at four o'clock in the afternoon, he summoned Moltke again, and in the six hours that followed, the following drama unfolded.

[ 14 ] Moltke met the Emperor in the presence of Bethmann Hollweg, whose knees were literally trembling, the War Minister Falkenhayn, General von Plessen, Lyncker and several others. The Emperor voiced strong opposition to the intentions of the Chief of Staff. He had, he said, received the best news from England. England would not only remain neutral - as George V informed him - but would even prevent France from taking part in the war. Under these conditions, it would be logical to throw the whole army against Russia. No, replied Moltke, the plan must be carried out in the East as well as in the West as it is laid down, if we do not wish to bring about the greatest misfortune.

The technical reasons

[ 15 ] The objections do not affect Moltke; he refuses to change anything. He asserts that the mobilization order must be complied with without delay. He does not believe in the English telegrams, and with the mobilization order in his hand, which Wilhelm II has just signed, he is dismissed, leaving the others in a state of complete confusion. Thus it came about that the decision on the outbreak of war had to be made for purely military reasons. On the way from the palace to the General Staff, his car was overtaken by an imperial automobile. Moltke is recalled on behalf of the Emperor. The Emperor is more excited than ever. He shows his Chief of Staff a telegram from England. He believes he can see with absolute certainty from this telegram that the conflict is confined to the East and that England and France will remain neutral. 'An order must be sent immediately to the army,' he concludes, 'not to proceed in the west. Moltke's reply was that an army could not be exposed to the alternative of orders and counter-orders. While Moltke was standing there, the Kaiser turned to the wing adjutant on duty and ordered him to immediately transmit an order to the command of the 16th Division in Trier that it was not to march into Luxembourg. Moltke went home. Shaken, because he expects the greatest disaster from such measures, he sits down at his table. He declares that he cannot take any measures for the army in accordance with the Emperor's telephonic order. This order is brought to him by an adjutant for his signature. He refuses to sign and pushes the order back. He remained in a state of dull exhaustion until 11 o'clock in the evening, even though he had returned from Karlsbad in good health. At 11 o'clock he is rung up. The Emperor asks for him again. He immediately goes to the palace. Wilhelm II, who had already retired, throws on a robe and says: "Everything has changed. Disaster is on its way. The King of England has just declared in a new telegram that he has been misunderstood and that he will not accept any obligation on behalf of himself or France. He concludes with the words: "Now you can do what you like. And now the war begins.

Bloomy omens

[ 16 ] In the month of August, I saw General von Moltke only once, on August 27 in Koblenz. Our conversation revolved around purely human matters. The German army was still in full victory mode. There was no reason to talk about what was not yet there. The Battle of Marne unfolded later. I had not seen von Moltke until then. It took place under conditions which must have shaken von Moltke's expectations to the core. During the trial maneuvers he had several times ordered a cautious advance on the right wing, which could have been considered in a march on Paris. Three times Kluck, who had supreme command of the right wing, had advanced too quickly. Each time Moltke said to him, "If you advance just as quickly at the decisive moment, we will lose the war in an emergency. When Kluck's army was threatened with being surrounded, Moltke was seized by a terrible premonition. The thought came to him: the war could be lost for Germany. This seems to me to be part of the 'psychology' of the course of the war. When von Moltke returned to headquarters on September 13, he gave the impression of a deeply shaken man. Those around the Kaiser thought he was ill. From that moment on, Falkenhayn, without having the official title, was in fact in command. Later, when Moltke was confined to bed, Wilhelm II visited him. Is it still me who is in charge of the operations? he asked the Emperor. I do indeed believe that it is still you, replied Wilhelm II. For weeks, the Kaiser did not even know who was the actual commander-in-chief of his troops.

[ 17 ] But now a new example of the opinion people had of Wilhelm II in his own environment. One day, when von Moltke was describing to me the feelings of deep sorrow he was experiencing on his return to Belgium after the capture of Antwerp, I asked him for the first time about the invasion of Belgium. How was it, I asked, that a Minister of War could claim in the Reichstag that the plan to invade Belgium had not existed? This minister, Moltke replied, did not know my plan, but the Chancellor was up to date. And the Kaiser? Never, said Moltke: he was too talkative and indiscreet. He would have blabbed it to the whole world!"

Jules Sauerwein

Note from the editors, Rudolf Steiner, whom we informed of our intention to publish his conversation with Jules Sauerwein here as well, writes the following