The Rudolf Steiner Archive

On “Rejoinders” to the “Matin” Article

Dreigliederung, Vol. 3, No. 17 of October 26, 1921

[ 1 ] When I wrote the few "subsequent remarks" in No. 15 of this weekly on Dr. Sauerwein's reproduction of a conversation between him and me, I had not yet read any of the comments that appeared in the press about the "Matin" article. I assumed that every unbiased reader of this article must recognize that there is something in what I have communicated about von Moltke's oral or written statements, the right further discussion of which must lead to the world no longer being able to speak of a "guilt" of Germany, but of a tragic doom. For these statements make it clear:

[ 2 ] 1. that the circumstances at the end of July 1914 in Germany placed the decision on the measures to be taken in the hands of one man, the Chief of the General Staff von Moltke. At the decisive moment, he was allowed to do nothing other than his military duty. This eliminates all talk of German warmongers. For it is precisely von Moltke's account that proves that even if such warmongers had been present, they would have had no influence on von Moltke's decision. Moltke's account is not that of a party, but that of a man who acted with a highly developed sense of responsibility. His word comes before all others. It is not spoken to the detriment of Germany.

[ 3 ] 2 It is clear from the reproduction of von Moltke's statements that he knew nothing of a Potsdam consultation (an alleged Crown Council) on July 5 or 6 until his death. This disproves all the fairy tales that have linked decisive events to such a council. How anyone can say that I continue to perpetuate this fairy tale is beyond me.

[ 4 ] 3. I have often heard from von Moltke that the war plan essentially originated with von Schlieffen. It seems important that von Moltke emphasized that he had abandoned von Schlieffen's intention of marching through southern Holland with the right wing, preferring to take on the great technical difficulties caused by the fact that the right wing of the German army had to force its way through the narrow space between Aachen and the southern border of the province of Limburg. From this it is clear to any unbiased person that the German army command was most earnestly endeavoring not to do a single bit more towards the west of what was then regarded as such a grave injustice than it had to do according to the responsibility it bore. Anything else would have been a matter for the political leadership. The fact that von Schlieffen considered more to be necessary can serve as proof of this fact. From the fact that more than a decade before the outbreak of war there was the intention to march through Holland, nothing can really be concluded about the events of 1914. To want to incriminate Germany with this is simply ridiculous.

[ 5 ] 4. Anyone who knew von Moltke should know that no untruth could come from his lips in any of these matters. But it is important for the world to know how he found himself in his surroundings in that hour which he regarded like no other as Germany's hour of destiny. To conceal what was going on between him and those around him is to withhold from the world the most important thing that can be known about the outbreak of war. Others may think differently, perhaps to spare this or that person. But they should not impute dishonest intentions to those who cannot agree with them.

[ 6 ] Now, of the press statements that have been linked to Dr. Sauerwein's article, those in the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" are probably the ones that can be taken most seriously.

[ 7 ] In response to Major General von Haeften's remark that my reports are intended to make it clear that "all those men in whose hands the fate of Germany lay at that time were more or less weaklings", I will only say this: After all, one need only read the many memoirs that have been written since the end of the war to see what "those men" threw at each other; and one will then hardly say, with an unbiased judgment, "Such a tendency cannot be opposed explicitly enough. " I have reproduced Moltke's judgment. If you want proof of this, read von Tirpitz's memoirs. What I cannot accept, however, is von Haeften's sentence: ... . for weakness and recklessness in such a situation are perhaps more burdensome and a greater guilt than a conscious will to war." Can one speak like this if one lives in the real world and not in a ghost world? What Germany is accused of is a "conscious will to war". It is seen as its fault. If one can no longer speak of a conscious will to war, but only of "légèreté" and "ignorance inconcevables" (incomprehensible recklessness and ignorance), then it is possible to work towards revising the views on "guilt". Incidentally, it is significant that von Haeften does not speak of what I actually said, but of "weakness and recklessness". I have often heard and read these words in Germany, but I have not used them. The fact that recklessness and ignorance, i.e. qualities for which those who have them are ultimately not responsible, can justify "greater guilt" than a "conscious will to war", will firstly be difficult to convey to a legal mind, and secondly, if viewed correctly, "in such a situation" as that of July 1914, it may well lead to tragic doom, but not to a conviction for "conscious" guilt.

[ 8 ] What Mr. von Haeften further claims about von Moltke's relationship with me, he could know better. He says: "As long as he was in full possession of his health, Colonel General von Moltke was completely opposed to Mr. Steiner and his endeavours, even though Mrs. von Moltke, who was under the spell of Steiner's ideas, had often tried to influence her husband in Steiner's direction. Only the mentally and physically ill colonel general showed himself open to Steiner's ideas during his visit to Homburg Castle in November 1914, and after his resignation from his position as chief of the general staff of the army, he placed his trust in Mr. Steiner, a trust that the latter does not repay him well today." These assertions about my relationship with Mr. von Moltke are all objective falsehoods. Rather, the following is true. I have frequented Mr. von Moltke's house since 1904. I was invited to every single visit. The invitation came not only from Mrs. von Moltke, but also from Mr. von Moltke. I have the greatest admiration for Mr. von Moltke. But I never imposed myself on him. The conversations, which often lasted many hours, always covered questions of worldview. Mr. von Moltke was enlightened enough to see that my world view was far removed from all nebulous mysticism and wanted to rest on a secure foundation of knowledge. He would not have been easy to "influence", even if I had tried. But he saw that I was not at all interested in "influencing" him. He told me not once, but very often: "Your world view satisfies the mind, because it is the case with it, which I have never encountered with any other, all things support each other and fit together without contradiction." Because his thinking was quite healthy, he also had healthy skepticism and did not get over many things easily. He had doubts time and again. But even in the face of these doubts, he always made use of the above-mentioned sentence. He also said to me: "When people with the usual education of today find out about your views, you will have wonderful things to experience."

[ 9 ] This relationship has existed between Mr. von Moltke and me since 1904; and my visit to Homburg, which was also by invitation, has not changed it in the slightest. From my visit to Homburg until his death, he believed me no less and no more than he had done ten years earlier. - Whether, in his opinion, which is the only thing that really matters to me in this matter, I thank him less for his trust than someone who says that von Moltke only talked to me because he was mentally and physically ill, and yet he also enjoyed his trust, I don't want to argue about that at all. It just strikes me that someone who was "in the official environment" of Colonel General von Moltke at the outbreak of the war and during his stay in Homburg speaks of his "resignation from his position as Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army" without fear of using a dubious phrase with this formulation.

[ 10 ] I have already said above that Sauerwein's article disproves the fairy tale of the Crown Council on July 5. If it is said that I have concealed the fact that Colonel General von Moltke could not have known anything about the Crown Council because it never took place, then this seems to me to be a quibble, for if Mr. von Moltke knew nothing about such a thing, then nothing of any significance could have taken place.

[ 11 ] The fact that today Holland cannot be drawn into a new French propaganda campaign regarding the question of guilt by reasonable people, because it has been said that Mr. von Moltke wanted to refrain from marching through Holland, seems to me, as I have said above, quite clear. Mr. von Moltke's words prove that long before 1914 such a march through Holland was refrained from, despite the fact that Mr. von Schlieffen, whom Mr. von Moltke also regarded as a great military authority, believed that such a march might be necessary. But it is not entirely irrelevant that this march through, which Mr. von Haeften also admits that von Schlieffen had included in the "circle of his considerations", should only have been carried out on the condition that "Holland would voluntarily join the German side in the event of the outbreak of war". So says Mr. von Haeften. No one will dispute this. And if, as must certainly be admitted from the military point of view, this is a relief for Germany, it may also be asserted that, on further examination of this matter, the mention of von Schlieffen's intentions with regard to Holland should also make the march through Belgium appear in a different light than the one in which it has hitherto been seen alone. For this premise also applies to Belgium within certain limits. Mr. von Moltke reckoned that although Belgium would not side with the Germans, it would be friendly enough not to put up any resistance in arms to the march through. It is therefore not at all certain that Germany would have marched through Belgium in any case if things had not simply been rushed in the decisive days. How to judge these things politically is not for me to discuss here, although I know that the Belgian guarantee of neutrality was a very special one; for I did not speak about it with Dr. Sauerwein, but only about Mr. von Moltke's opinion.

[ 12 ] The shifts in dates mentioned by Mr. von Haeften, which can be found in Sauerwein's article, have been corrected in No. 15 of this weekly publication. What Mr. von Haeften adds in detail to what was said in the "Matin" article does not essentially contradict what was said there; it even supplements it and confirms it in essential points. Mr. von Haeften says: "Mr. Steiner's assertion that Colonel General von Moltke refused to countersign an order from the Kaiser delivered to him by a wing adjutant and sent the officer back is a free invention. Colonel-General von Moltke merely refused to sign a corresponding draft order from the head of the Operations Department (Lieutenant-Colonel Tappen)." There is nothing to correct other than the "wing adjutant", because I did not claim that the "draft order" was written by the Kaiser himself. And I readily admit that an officer knows more about wing adjutants than Sauerwein. Von Moltke's own words about it are: "As the dispatch to the 16th Division was presented to me, repeating the order given by telephone, I struck the pen on the table and declared I would not sign it." Mr. von Haeften emphasizes: "General von Moltke was a soldier unwaveringly loyal to his Emperor, despite some conflicting opinions, especially during the last years of his life." I fully agree with this. One can say even more. Von Moltke was one of the very best servants of his Emperor. And as a man who was always fully aware of his responsibilities, he never held back from giving the Emperor the advice he considered most suitable for him, even if it ran counter to the Emperor's opinions. But that is precisely what makes von Moltke's statements, which are reproduced completely correctly, so valuable. It was not an opponent of the Emperor who made them, but one of his most loyal servants who wrested them out of the matter. Anyone who believes that von Moltke spoke out of resentment or bitterness misjudges the colonel general. Everything that he experienced from the end of July 1914 onwards has cast him down; but he was never in a state that can be described as mentally ill in the sense that those who now believe they have to excuse his statements with the state of his soul do.

[ 13 ] What he said is, in my firm conviction, suitable for placing all previous discussion about the "question of guilt" on a basis on which the present rulers of the victorious states do not want it, but for which more and more reasonable people all over the world will be accessible. I cannot understand why Mr. von Haeften, whom I have come to know as a reasonable man, is not open to such a consideration today. One should realize that the German people will have the most to "pay for" if saying things like those of Moltke's opinion is repeatedly portrayed as an offence. The German people have no need to hold back with the truth. Those who believed they had to do so have done them the most harm so far. The truth will not incriminate the German people, it will exonerate them. We should have realized this in the days leading up to the Versailles peace treaty. We should realize it again today. Those who want to defend the German politicians of 1914 should be reminded of what von Tirpitz wrote in his "Memoirs". For example, on page 242: "The impression of the headlessness of our political leadership became more and more disturbing. The march through Belgium did not seem to have been an established fact beforehand (he means on the night of August 1 to 2). Since the Russian mobilization, the Chancellor gave the impression of a drowning man... . While the lawyers of the Foreign Office were engrossed in the doctoral question of whether we were already at war with Russia or not yet, it turned out in passing that they had forgotten to ask Austria whether it wanted to fight with us against Russia." On page 245, the same von Tirpitz says: "After the Chancellor left the meeting, Moltke complained to the Kaiser about the 'deplorable' state of the political leadership, which had no preparations for the situation and now that the avalanche was rolling, was still thinking of nothing but legal notes." And men about whom someone (von Tirpitz) who has worked with them has to speak in this way should not be criticized by the German people, but "thanked". They should be satisfied with the opinion that they "thought and acted logically and dutifully". On page 248, von Tirpitz says: "The moral blamelessness of our government at that time can only be made clear by an open presentation of its diplomatic inadequacy.....

[ 14 ] Von Moltke's views and statements are certainly in the direction in which these matters must be clarified. If they are discussed correctly, they cannot fail to have an effect. However, if they are discussed in the way they have been so far, this will of course result in something that the German "people will have to pay for", as unfortunately they already have to "pay for" enough.

[ 15 ] Whether one has a right to speak of "political dilettantes" in the way Mr. von Haeften does, with the background provided by von Tirpitz's words on page 248, among others, must be seriously questioned. It says that the politicians of 1914 "were lacking" ... "through lack of straight and clear thinking."

[ 16 ] I would prefer to remain silent for the time being about personal slurs such as those contained in sentences about my "addiction to playing a political role". I would not have expected this judgment from Mr. von Haeften, whom I once got to know as a noble-minded man. It seems as if you can't just have prejudices from the outset, but as if, even if you didn't have them once, you can still acquire them afterwards.

[ 17 ] What I have said I believed I could not conceal, because unfortunately I see that personalities who can certainly have the subjective opinion that they do not want to do the "business of their enemies" do so precisely because they do not want to give the truth free rein. In my opinion, I have to recognize again today how some people are sinning in this direction.