The Rudolf Steiner Archive

Countering Objections Raised About the “Matin” Interview

Dreigliederung, Vol. 3, No. 19 of November 10, 1921

[ 1 ] I feel obliged to respond to the thoroughly objective objections raised by Major Muff ("Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt", November 1, 1921) against the intention and content of the "Matin" interview. For the time being, however, I would like to express my satisfaction with this objectivity; for when one continually hears only personal slurs from so many sides, one is glad to have to deal with a noble tone in polemics for once.

[ 2 ] First of all, Major Muff says that I added to Dr. Sauerwein's interview in subsequent remarks: "One cannot speak of guilt in the way one does. There is tragedy. And the war was caused by a tragic situation." If you read a few more sentences in my "supplementary remarks", you will come across the following words: "And I think that what he (Moltke) said is suitable for putting the discussion about the 'guilt' of the war on a different basis than the one on which it stands in the world today." Major Muff says: "As Germans, we have every reason to oppose such a shift in the level of discussion." To be honest, that seems a little unworldly to me. The whole context of my words implies that the discussion "in the world", that is, under today's conditions, should essentially be placed on a different footing from the one on which it stands among Germany's opponents. On what basis does it stand? On no other basis than that Germany deliberately brought about the war. The fact that Lloyd George sometimes speaks this way, sometimes a little differently, cannot really lead to the belief that "the truth about the guilt of the war" ... "is already on the march". If one looks at the discussion about war guilt today without being unworldly, then one could be satisfied if the discussion were based on the following by reasonable people outside Germany: there is no "guilt" on the German side, as has been thought up to now, but at the starting point there is a tragic situation in Germany. I believe that it is really not in Germany's interest to reject such a shift in the basis for discussion. Especially not if one admits the essence of this tragic situation, as Major Muff does. He speaks of the "political harmlessness, to put it mildly" of the leading German politicians in the face of Moltke's judgment at the outbreak of the war. Now, in view of the magnitude of the matter, it is perhaps not entirely necessary to express oneself "mildly". If this is not the case, Major Muff's sentence will also have to be seen as proof that the German politicians failed completely in 1914. But therein lies the tragic situation.

[ 3 ] That is what is so peculiar about the polemic surrounding the "Matin" interview: One says that what this interview contains is mistaken; and one then states what one oneself has to say: and in everything factual one only gives confirmations of what is in the interview.

[ 4 ] Major Muff believes that the "Matin" article will cause the "normal thinker" to "blame" Germany after all, because it is said that the German mobilization plan provided for war not only against Russia but also against France, and that this plan had to be carried out with an "inexorable automatism". To support this belief, Major Muff quotes a sentence from the interview, to which he adds an interjection of his own: "So it came about that the decision on the outbreak of war had to be made out of purely military considerations - meaning the inflexible deployment plan of the German General Staff." This quote becomes incorrect when Major Muff adds the words: "what is meant is the inflexible deployment plan of the German General Staff". These words are not in the interview. What is meant is stated in the words that precede them in the interview. And these are: "With the mobilization order in his hand, which Wilhelm II has just signed, he (Moltke) is dismissed, leaving the others in a state of complete confusion." After pointing out that the leading political figures were in "complete confusion", Major Muff says the following: "So it came about that the decision on the outbreak of war had to be made for purely military reasons." Major Muff now construes a decision which, according to Moltke's clear statements, according to his records (and also according to Haeftens' statements in the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung"), cannot be understood as anything other than military, into a political one brought about by Molike. He says that Moltke had the firm conviction "that Russia would attack and that France and England would side with him. For him, this meant a war on two fronts, not for military but for political reasons". Moltke told the Kaiser, when he expressed his will to march east with the entire army for political reasons, that the deployment of an army of millions could not be improvised, that it was the result of long, arduous work, and that once it had been decided, it could not be changed. If the emperor wanted to lead the entire army to the east, he would not have a ready army, but a desolate heap of disorganized armed men without provisions. What could be clearer than that military reasons are being pitted against political ones. Major Muff actually feels compelled to admit this. That is why he says Moltke's reasons were political; but he gave military ones. And he constructs his train of thought as follows: "If Moltke refused to abandon the two-front deployment, which was based on Schlieffen's operational studies, this was ... not because it would not have been technically possible to carry out a different deployment, but because he was firmly convinced that France and England would immediately side with Russia... . He, the soldier, had no political grounds against the appointed leaders of German foreign policy. He had to use every means at his disposal to prevent a decision which, as head of military operations, presented him with an insoluble and disastrous task for Germany. Naturally, he resorted to a means by which alone he could expect success. For technical reasons, he declared himself unable to carry out the deployment against Russia alone, as demanded by the Kaiser and his political advisors. However, Moltke's records clearly show that his refusal was in fact based solely on political reasons." The opposite is the case. If anything is clear from Moltke's notes, it is that for military-technical reasons - Major Muff says: "as head of military operations" - he considered the strict implementation of the two-front war to be absolutely necessary at the hour in which the relevant decisions had to be made. Given Moltke's character, I cannot imagine that he would have simply closed his mind to the reasons that were certainly expressed. If one then does not quibble over words, if one refrains from describing what is certainly characterized as military-technical as political, then one can compare Major Muff's statements with those of the interview without bias. And lo and behold: the interview states: "He (Moltke) clearly foresaw the tragic development that things had to take, that is, he believed in the participation of France and England in the world conflict." Moltke's decision is attributed exactly the same as that of Major Muff. And he too thinks nothing of the appointed political leaders. But he thus admits that the decision was in von Moltke's hands. And he had to do his military duty. - How one can then still believe that the interview leads to the assertion that the German general staff brought about the tragic situation is unfathomable. From beginning to end, the interview wants to show that the tragic situation was due to the politicians' incompetence and that the German Chief of Staff acted as he had to act according to his duty. For Dr. Sauerwein, there was no reason to "laugh up his sleeve". This could only arise if people in Germany continued to say that they were "opposed" to the "shift in the level of discussion" in the direction that one could not speak of "German guilt" in the sense in which it had previously been spoken of in the non-German world.

[ 5 ] If one wishes to stick to the straightforward, unconcealed facts as described by von Moltke, it is not a matter of discussing the doctoral question of whether the assertion that the mobilization order in Germany was equivalent to a declaration of war was nonsensical from a military point of view. We are not talking about military-technical definitions, but about the reality of late July and early August 1914. And Major Muff himself says of this reality that the military-technical "nonsense" was politically correct insofar as "in our efforts to localize the war, unlike our opponents, we had postponed every military measure until the very last minute, thereby giving them a valuable head start, so that the mobilization order and the start of the war coincided in time". One would think that for events taking place in time, this temporal coincidence would come into consideration, not the fact that the mobilization order and the beginning of the war have theoretically different definitions. Major Muff says: "According to plan, however, the deployment should follow immediately after mobilization so as not to lose any time. But according to the nature and manner of the preparations, the simple addition to the mobilization order should have been made: Aufmarsch wird zunächst nicht ausgeführt, would have sufficed to merely bring the mobilization to a conclusion." Certainly, according to everything that can be known from Moltke's statements, he would not have made this addition after issuing the mobilization order. For he was of the opinion that any delay would be detrimental. So although this assertion is theoretically correct, it is of no practical significance.

[ 6 ] Major Muff attaches great importance to the fact that there was also a plan for a sole deployment in the east. In contrast, two questions must be asked. First, why did von Moltke not reckon with this plan at the moment of the decision? Major Muff will say because he thought the politicians' opinion that the West would remain neutral was nonsense. But then he could not say to the Emperor: if you marched in the East, you would not have a powerful army, but rather a desolate pile of armed, unprovisioned people. And secondly: if he said this - and he did say it - why wasn't he told back? We also have the deployment plan for the East alone? There is no need to doubt that Major Muff rightly spoke of such a deployment plan on paper; but Moltke obviously did not consider it feasible for military reasons at the time when the decision had to be made by him.

[ 7 ] Major Muff also says: "Steiner undoubtedly wants to hold his shield over Moltke's memory. In truth, however, he places a tremendous responsibility on him when he claims that the decision on the outbreak of war was made by the Chief of Staff's rigid deployment plan." Firstly, I have not "claimed" anything at all, as far as I am concerned, but simply reproduced Moltke's own statements faithfully. Secondly, it is clear from this reproduction that, according to the wording of the interview, the final decision was made as follows: "At 11 o'clock he (Moltke) is rung... He goes immediately to the castle. Wilhelm II.... says: Everything has changed. The King of England has just declared in a new telegram that he has been misunderstood and that he does not assume any obligation on his behalf or on behalf of France. He concludes with the words: Now you can do what you like."

[ 8 ] I have already discussed the passage through Holland in No. 17 of this weekly publication. With regard to the Battle of the Marne, the sentences in the interview are based on von Moltke's statements; what Major Muff says is largely based on conclusions, which, however, do not affect the essence of the interview at all. For this lies in the emphasis on the "psychology" of the course of the war at the time of the Battle of the Marne. I have spoken of this because, as Major Muff does again, it is claimed that "the Chief of the General Staff, whose leadership lacked a sure hand, was more to blame than the leader of the 1st Army". Moltke's statement is a psychological counter to this assertion. - If one were to confront the "Matin" interview impartially, one would see what could be gained from Moltke's statements to exonerate Germany. In France, they are not "laughing up their sleeves" about it, but are trying to discuss it as little as possible for the time being. Because the right discussion leads to things that people don't want to hear yet. In Germany, this discussion should be conducted differently than it is. There will be more to say about this in this weekly publication.