Riddles of the Soul
GA 21
8. An Objection Often Raised against Anthroposophy
[ 1 ] An objection is often raised against anthroposophy that is just as comprehensible to the soul attitude of the personality from which it comes as it is unjustified to the spirit from which anthroposophical research is undertaken. This objection seems to me to be entirely insignificant because its refutation is near at hand for anyone who follows with true understanding the presentations made from the anthroposophical point of view. Only because it arises ever anew do I say something about it here, as I have already done also in the sixth edition of Theosophy, 1914, at the end.
In order to raise this objection, the demand is made that the results of spiritual observation which anthroposophy is presenting be “proven” in the sense of purely natural-scientific methods of experimentation. One imagines, for example, that several people who assert that they can arrive at such results are confronted by a number of other people in a properly ordered experiment, and the “spiritual researchers” would then say what they have “seen” about the subjects in front of them. Their statements would then have to agree, or at least be similar in a sufficiently high percentage. It is comprehensible that someone who only knows anthroposophy without having understood it will raise this demand again and again, for its fulfillment would spare him the trouble of working his own way through to the correct path of proof which consists in the attainment of one's own vision, which is possible for everyone. Anyone who has really understood anthroposophy, however, also sees that an experiment set up in the way just described to gain the results of truly spiritual vision is about as appropriate as stopping the hands on a clock in order to tell time. For, in order to bring about the conditions under which something spiritual can be seen, paths must be taken that arise from circumstances of the soul life itself. Outer arrangements like those leading to a natural-scientific experiment are not formed out of such soul circumstances. These circumstances must be such, for example, that the will impulse leading to vision issue exclusively and entirely from the primal, individual, inner impulse of the person who is to see. And that there is nothing in the way of artificial outer measures flowing into and shaping this inner impulse.
It is actually surprising that the fact is so little considered that everyone, after all, through one's own appropriate soul attitude, can directly create for oneself the proofs for the truth of anthroposophy; that therefore these “proofs” are accessible to everyone. As little as one wants to admit this to oneself, the fact is that the reasons for requiring “outer proofs” lie, after all, only in the fact that outer proofs would be attainable in a more comfortable way than upon the difficult, uncomfortable, but truly spiritual-scientific path.
[ 2 ] What Brentano wanted, when he endeavored again and again to be able to work in a psychological laboratory, lies in an entirely different direction than this demand for comfortable experimental proofs for anthroposophical truths. His longing to have such a laboratory at his disposal often appears in his writings. The circumstances denying him this affected his life tragically. Precisely through his approach to psychological questions he would have accomplished great things with such a laboratory. If one wishes, in fact, to establish the best foundation for anthropological-psychological findings, extending to the “borderland of knowledge” where anthropology and anthroposophy must meet, this can best be accomplished through a psychological laboratory such as Brentano envisaged. In order to demonstrate the facts of a “seeming consciousness” no experimental methods would need to be sought in such a laboratory; but through those experimental methods that are sought, it would become clear how the being of man is predisposed to this vision, and how seeing consciousness is demanded by ordinary consciousness. Anyone who stands upon the anthroposophical viewpoint longs as Brentano did to be able to work in a genuine psychological laboratory—which is impossible because of the prejudices still holding sway today against anthroposophy.
IV-8. Ein oft erhobener Einwand gegen die Anthroposophie
[ 1 ] Es wird oft ein Einwand gegen die Anthroposophie erhoben, der ebenso begreiflich aus der Seelenstimmung der Persönlichkeiten heraus ist, von denen er kommt, wie er unberechtigt ist gegenüber dem Geiste, aus dem heraus das anthroposophische Forschen angestellt wird. Mir erscheint er deshalb ganz unbeträchtlich, weil die Widerlegung für jeden nahe liegt, der mit wirklichem Verständnisse den vom anthroposophischen Gesichtspunkte gegebenen Darstellungen folgt. Nur weil er immer von neuem auftritt, sage ich hiereiniges über ihn, wie ich es auch schon in der 6. Auflage meiner «Theosophie», am Schlusse, 1914 getan habe. - Es wird, um diesen Einwand aufzustellen, gefordert, daß die geistigen Beobachtungsergebnisse, die von der Anthroposophie vorgebracht werden, im Sinne der rein naturwissenschaftlichen Experimentiermethode «bewiesen» werden sollen. Man stellt sich etwa vor, einige Personen, die behaupten, sie können zu solchen Ergebnissen kommen, werden einer Anzahl andererPersonen in einem regelrecht angeordneten Experiment gegenübergesetzt, und die« Geistesforscher» hätten dann anzugeben, was sie an den zu untersuchenden Personen «geschaut» haben. Ihre Angaben müßten dann übereinstimmen, oder doch wenigstens in einem genügend großen Prozentsatze sich ähnlich sein. Man kann begreifen, daß, wer Anthroposophienur kennt, ohne sie verstanden zu haben, eine solche Forderung immer wieder erhebt, denn durch deren Erfüllung würde ihm erspart, sich zu dem richtigen Beweiswege durchzuarbeiten, der in der Aneignung des jedem erreichbaren eigenen Schauens besteht. Wer aber Anthroposophie wirklich verstanden hat, der hat auch die Einsicht, daß ein in der angedeuteten Art angestelltes Experiment zur Gewinnung wahrhaft geistiger Anschauungsergebnisse ungefähr ebenso geeignet ist wie zur Beobachtung der Zeit an einer Uhr die Stillesetzung der Zeiger. Denn zur Herbeiführung der Bedingungen, unter denen Geistiges geschaut werden kann, führen Wege, die aus den Verhältnissen des seelischen Lebens selbst sich heraus ergeben müssen. Äußere Veranstaltungen, wie sie zu einem naturwissenschaftlichen Experiment führen, sind nicht aus solchen Verhältnissen heraus gebildet. Innerhalb dieser Verhältnisse muß zum Beispiel gelegen sein, daß der Willensimpuls, der zum Schauen führt, nur aus dem ureigenen inneren Impuls desjenigen restlos hervorgeht, der schauen soll. Und daß nicht in künstlichen äußeren Maß-nahmen etwas gegeben ist, was gestaltend in diesen inneren Impuls einfließt.—Es ist eigentlich zu verwundern, daß so wenig berücksichtigt wird, wie doch jedermann sich die Beweise für die Anthroposophie unmittelbar durch die eigene entsprechende Seelenverfassung verschaffen kann; daß also diese «Beweise»jedermann zugänglich sind. So wenig man dieses wird eingestehen wollen: der Grund des Verlangens nach «äußeren Beweisen» liegt doch nur darinnen, daß diese letztern auf bequemerem Wege zu erreichen wären als auf dem mühsamen, unbequemen, aber wahrhaft geisteswissenschaftlichen.
[ 2 ] Auf einem ganz anderen Felde als diese Forderung nach bequemen Experimentalbeweisen für die anthroposophischen Wahrheiten liegt, was Brentano wollte, indem er immer wieder darnach strebte, in einem psychologischen Laboratorium arbeiten zu können. Die Sehnsucht, ein solches zur Verfügung zu haben, tritt in seinen Schriften oft zutage. Die Umstände haben tragisch in sein Leben eingegriffen, die ihm ein solches versagt haben. Er würde gerade durch seine Stellung zu den psychologischen Fragen Wichtigstes durch ein solches Laboratorium geleistet haben. Will man nämlich die beste Grundlage schaffen zu anthropologisch-psychologischen Ergebnissen, die bis an die «Erkenntnis-Grenzorte» gehen, an denen sich Anthropologie mit Anthroposophie treffen muß, so kann dieses durch ein psychologisches Laboratorium geschehen, wie ein solches Brentano in Gedanken vorgeschwebt hat. Um die Tatsachen des «schauenden Bewußtseins» herbeizuführen, brauchten in einem solchen Laboratorium keine Experimentalmethoden gesucht zu werden; aber durch diejenigen Experimentalmethoden, die gesucht werden, würde sich offenbaren, wie die menschliche Wesenheit zu diesem Schauen veranlagt ist, und wie von dem gewöhnlichen das schauende Bewußtsein gefordert wird. Jeder, der auf dem anthroposophischen Gesichtspunkt steht, sehnt sich ebenso wie Brentano, in einem echten psychologischen Laboratorium arbeiten zu können, was durch die heute noch gegen die Anthroposophie herrschenden Vorurteile unmöglich ist.
IV-8 An objection often raised against anthroposophy
[ 1 ] An objection is often raised against anthroposophy which is just as understandable from the mood of soul of the personalities from whom it comes as it is unjustified in relation to the spirit from which anthroposophical research is undertaken. To me it seems quite insignificant because its refutation is obvious to anyone who follows with real understanding the explanations given from the anthroposophical point of view. It is only because it appears again and again that I say something about it here, as I already did in the 6th edition of my "Theosophy", at the end, 1914. - In order to raise this objection, it is demanded that the spiritual observational results put forward by anthroposophy should be "proved" in the sense of the purely scientific method of experimentation. Imagine, for example, that some people who claim to be able to arrive at such results are contrasted with a number of other people in a properly arranged experiment, and the "spiritual researchers" then have to state what they "saw" in the people to be examined. Their statements would then have to agree, or at least be similar in a sufficiently large percentage. It is understandable that those who only know anthroposophy without having understood it would repeatedly make such a demand, for its fulfillment would save them from having to work their way through to the correct path of proof, which consists in acquiring the own seeing that is available to everyone. But he who has really understood anthroposophy also has the insight that an experiment carried out in the manner indicated is about as suitable for obtaining truly spiritual results of perception as the stopping of the hands is for observing the time on a clock. For the way to bring about the conditions under which spiritual things can be seen is by means that must result from the conditions of the soul's life itself. External events, such as those leading to a scientific experiment, are not formed out of such conditions. Within these conditions it must be, for example, that the impulse of will that leads to seeing arises only from the intrinsic inner impulse of the one who is to see. And that something is not given in artificial external measures which flows formatively into this inner impulse - it is actually surprising that so little consideration is given to the fact that anyone can obtain the evidence for anthroposophy directly through their own corresponding state of soul; that these "proofs" are therefore accessible to everyone. As little as one will want to admit this, the reason for the desire for "external proofs" lies only in the fact that these latter could be obtained in a more comfortable way than in the laborious, uncomfortable, but truly spiritual-scientific way.
[ 2 ] What Brentano wanted, in that he repeatedly strove to be able to work in a psychological laboratory, lies in a completely different field from this demand for convenient experimental evidence for anthroposophical truths. The longing to have such a laboratory at his disposal is often evident in his writings. Circumstances tragically intervened in his life that denied him such a laboratory. Precisely because of his position on psychological questions, he would have achieved the most important things through such a laboratory. If one wants to create the best basis for anthropological-psychological results that reach the "cognitive boundaries" where anthropology and anthroposophy must meet, then this can be done through a psychological laboratory, such as Brentano had in mind. In order to bring about the facts of "seeing consciousness", no experimental methods need be sought in such a laboratory; but through those experimental methods that are sought, it would be revealed how the human being is predisposed to this seeing, and how seeing consciousness is demanded of the ordinary. Everyone who stands on the anthroposophical point of view longs, like Brentano, to be able to work in a genuine psychological laboratory, which is impossible because of the prejudices that still prevail today against anthroposophy.