The Case for Anthroposophy
GA 21
VIII. The Real Basis of Intentional Relation
[ 1 ] In Brentano’s psychology, the “intentional relation” is treated simply as a fact of ordinary consciousness. It is a psychic fact; but no attempt is made to clarify further by showing how that fact is articulated into the whole psychic experience. Perhaps I may be permitted, in bare outline, to advance a corollary to it on the basis of my own systematic and extensive observations. These latter really call for presentation in much greater detail and with all the supporting evidence. But up to now circumstances have made it impossible for me to go beyond introducing them cursorily into oral lectures; and what I can add here is still only a brief outline statement of the results. I invite the reader to entertain them provisionally on that footing. At the same time they are not put forward merely as hazarded “insights”, but rather as something I have striven year in and year out to establish with the means that modern science makes available.
[ 2 ] In the particular psychic experience which Brentano denotes by the term judgment1See Introduction, p. 17. there is added to the mere representation (which consists in the formation of an inner image) an acknowledgment or repudiation of the image. The question that arises for the psychologist is: What exactly is it, within the psyche’s experience, where through is brought about not merely the presented image “green tree”, but also the judgment “there is a green tree”? This somewhat cannot be located within the rather circumscribed area of representational activity that is assigned to ordinary consciousness. (In the second volume of my Riddles of Philosophy (Die Rätsel der Philosophie), in the section entitled “The World as Illusion”, I gave some account of the various epistemological ideas to which this difficulty has given rise.) We have to do with an experience that lies outside that area. The problem is to find its “where”. Where, when the human being confronts a sense-object in the act of perception, is this “somewhat” to be looked for? Not in anything he so receives in the process of perception, that the receiving can be understood through any physiological or psychological ideas that posit outer object on one side and immediate sensation on the other. When someone has the visual perception “green tree”, the fact of the judgment “there is a green tree” is not to be found in that relation between “tree” and “eye” which is viable to either physiological or psychological explication. The experience had by the psyche, which amounts to this inner fact of judgment, is an additional relation between “man” and “tree” strictly other than the bare relation between “tree” and “eye”. Yet it is only this latter relation that is fully and sharply experienced in ordinary-level consciousness. The former relation remains a dull, subconscious one, which only comes to light in its product—namely the acknowledgment of the “green tree” as an existent. In every perception that reaches the point of a “judgment” we have a double relation to objectivity.
It is only possible to gain insight into this double relation, if the prevailing fragmentary doctrine of the senses is replaced by an exhaustive one. If we take into account the whole of what is relevant in assigning the characteristics of a human sense, we shall find we must allow the name “senses” to more than is usually so labeled. That which constitutes the “eye”, for example, a “sense” is also present when we experience the fact: another “I” is being observed, or: the thought of another human being is being recognised as such. The mistake usually made, in the face of such facts as these, is failure to maintain a certain very valid and necessary distinction. As an instance of this, people imagine that, when they hear somebody else’s words, “sense” only comes in to the extent that “hearing” as such is involved, and that all the rest is assignable to an inner, non-sensory activity. But that is not the case. In the hearing of human words and in the understanding of them as thoughts a threefold activity is involved, and each component of this threefold activity requires separate consideration, if we mean to conceptualise in a scientifically valid way. One of these activities is “hearing”. But “hearing” per se is no more a “becoming aware of words” than “touching” is a “seeing”. And just as it is proper to distinguish the sense of “touch” from that of “sight”, so is it to distinguish the sense of “hearing” from that of “being aware of words”, and again from that of “comprehending thoughts”. A starveling psychology and a starveling epistemology both follow as consequences from the failure to sharply distinguish the “comprehending of thoughts” from the activity of thinking, and to recognise the “sense” character of the former process. The only reason for our common failure to distinguish is, that the organ of “being aware of words” and that of “comprehending thoughts” are neither of them outwardly perceptible like the ear, which is the organ of “hearing”. Actually there are “organs” for both these perceptual activities, just as, for “hearing”, there is the ear.
If, scrutinising them without omissions, one carries the findings of physiology and psychology through to their logical conclusion, one will arrive at the following view of human sensory organisation. We have to distinguish: The sense for perceiving the “I” of the other human being; the sense for comprehending thoughts; the sense for being aware of words; the sense of hearing; the sense of warmth; the sense of sight, the sense of taste; the sense of balance (the perceptual experience, that is, of oneself as being in a certain equilibrium with the outer world); the sense of movement (the perceptual experiencing of the stillness or the motion of one’s own limbs or, alternatively, of one’s own stillness or motion by contrast with the outer world); the sense of life (experience of being situated within an organism—feeling of subjective self-awareness); and the sense of touch. All these senses bear the distinguishing marks by virtue whereof we properly call “eye” and “ear” by the name of “senses”.
To ignore the validity of such distinctions is to import disorder into the whole relation between our knowledge and reality. It is to suffer the ignominious burden of ideas that cut us off from experiencing the actual. For instance, if a man calls the “eye” a “sense” and refuses to accept any “sense” for “being aware of words”, then the idea which that man forms of the “eye” remains an unreal fancy.
I am persuaded that Fritz Mauthner in his brilliant way speaks, in his linguistic works, of a “happening-sense” (Zufallssinnen) only because he has in view a too fragmentary doctrine of the senses. If it were not for that, he would detect how a “sense” inserts itself into “reality”. In practice, when a human being confronts a sensory object, it is never through one sense that he acquires an impression, but always, in addition, through at least one other of those just enumerated. The relation to one particular sense enters ordinary-level consciousness with especial sharpness; while the other remains more obtuse. But the senses also differ from one another in a further respect: some of them afford a relation to the outer world that is experienced more as external nexus; the others more one that is bound up very intimately with our own being. Senses that are most intimately bound up with our own being are (for example) the sense of equilibrium, the sense of motion, the sense of life and also of course the sense of touch. When there is perception by these senses of the outer world, it is always obscurely accompanied by experience of the percipient’s own being. You can even say that in their case a certain obtuseness of conscious percipience obtains, precisely because the element in it of external relationship is shouted down by the experience of our own being. For instance: a physical object is seen, and at the same time the sense of equilibrium furnishes an impression. What is seen is sharply perceived. This “seen” leads to representation of a physical object. The experience through the sense of equilibrium remains, qua perception, dull and obtuse; but it comes to life in the judgment: “That which is seen exists” or “There is a thing seen”. Natures are not, in reality, juxtaposed to one another in abstract mutual exclusion; they, together with their distinguishing marks, overlap and interpenetrate. Hence, in the whole gamut of the “senses” there are some that mediate relation to the outer world rather less and the experience of one’s own being rather more. These latter are sunken further into the inner life of the psyche than, for example, eye and ear; and, for that reason, their perceptual function manifests as inner psychic experience. But one must still distinguish, even in their case, the properly psychic from the perceptual element, just as in the case of, say, seeing one distinguishes the outer event or object from the inner psychic experience evoked with it.
For those who adopt the anthroposophical standpoint, there can be no shirking of refined notional distinctions of this kind. They must be capable of distinguishing “awareness of words” from hearing, in one direction; and of distinguishing, in the other, this “awareness of words” from the “understanding of words” brought about by one’s own intellection; just as ordinary consciousness distinguishes between a tree and a lump of rock. If this were less frequently ignored, it would be recognised that anthroposophy has two aspects; not only the one that people usually dub “mystical”, but also the other one, the one that conduces to investigations not less scientific than those of natural science, but in fact more scientific, since they necessitate a more refined and methodical habit of conceptualisation than even ordinary philosophy does. I suspect that Wilhelm Dilthey2Compare the author’s Die Rätsel der Philosophie, 8th Edition was tending, in his philosophical enquiries, towards the doctrine I have outlined here concerning the senses; but that he was unable to achieve his purpose because he never reached the point of sufficiently elaborating the requisite ideas.
IV-5. Über die wirkliche Grundlage der intenlionalen Beziehung
[ 1 ] Mit der in der vorliegenden Schrift (3. Kapitel über Franz Brentano) charakterisierten «intentionalen Beziehung» tritt in Brentanos Psychologie ein Seelisches nur als Tatbestand des gewöhnlichen Bewußtseins auf, ohne daß dieser Tatbestand weiter in das seelische Erleben erklärend eingegliedert wird. Ich möchte mir nun hier gestatten, über diesen Tatbestand einiges skizzenhaft vorzubringen, das bei mir in durchgearbeiteten Anschauungen nach den verschiedensten Richtungen hin begründet ist. Diese Anschauungen verlangen allerdings, daß sie auch noch in ausführlicherer Gestalt - mit allen Begründungen - gegeben werden. Doch haben mir die Verhältnisse bisher nur möglich gemacht, manches Einschlägige in mündlichen Vorträgen vorzubringen. Was ich hier anführen kann, sind Ergebnisse in kurzer skizzenhafter Darstellung. Und ich bitte den Leser, sie vorläufig als solche aufzunehmen. Es handelt sich nicht um «Einfälle», sondern um etwas, dessen Begründung mit den wissenschaftlichen Mitteln der Gegenwart von mir in jahrelanger Arbeit versucht worden ist.
[ 2 ] Bei demjenigen Seelen-Erleben, das von Franz Brentano als Urteilen bezeichnet wird, kommt zu dem bloßen Vorstellen, das in einem inneren Bildgestalten besteht, ein Anerkennen oder Verwerfen der Vorstellungsbilder hinzu. Es entsteht für den Seelenforscher die Frage: was ist im seelischen Erleben dasjenige, wodurch nicht bloß das Vorstellungsbild: «grüner Baum», sondern das Urteil: «es ist ein grüner Baum» zustande kommt? Innerhalb des engeren Kreises des Vorstellungslebens, den man im gewöhnlichen Bewußtsein umschreibt, kann dieses «Etwas» nicht liegen. Daß man es hier nicht finden kann, hat zu denjenigen erkenntnistheoretischen Gedanken geführt, welche ich im zweiten Bande meiner «Rätsel der Philosophie» in dem Abschnitte: «Die Welt als Illusion» dargestellt habe. Es handelt sich dabei um ein Erlebnis, das außerhalb dieses Kreises liegt. Es kommt darauf an, das «Wo» im Bereich der seelischen Erlebnisse zu finden.
Steht der Mensch in wahrnehmender Tätigkeit einem Sinnesobjekt gegenüber, so kann dieses «Etwas»in alledem nicht gefunden werden, was der Mensch in dem Wahrnehmungsvorgange so empfängt, daß dieses Empfangen durch die physiologischen und psychologischen Vorstellungen erfaßt wird, welche sich auf das äußere Objekt einerseits und den unmittelbar in Betracht kommenden Sinn anderseits beziehen. Hat jemand die Seh-Wahrnehmung «grüner Baum», so kann der Tatbestand des Urteiles «es ist ein grüner Baum» nicht in der physiologisch oder psychologisch unmittelbar aufzeigbaren Beziehung zwischen «Baum» und «Auge» gefunden werden. Was in der Seele als solcher innerer Tatbestand des Urteilens erlebt wird, ist eben noch eine andere Beziehung zwischen dem «Menschen» und «dem Baum» als diejenige ist zwischen dem «Baum» und dem «Auge». Doch wird nur die letztere Beziehung in dem gewöhnlichen Bewußtsein mit voller Schärfe erlebt. Die andere Beziehung bleibt in einem dumpfen Unterbewußtsein und tritt nur in dem Ergebnis zutage, das in der Anerkennung des «grünen Baumes» als eines Seienden liegt. Man hat es bei jeder Wahrnehmung, die auf ein Urteil sich zuspitzt, mit einer Doppelbeziehung des Menschen zu der Objektivität zu tun.
Einsicht in diese Doppelbeziehung gewinnt man nur, wenn man die gegenwärtig vorhandene fragmentarische Sinnes-Lehre durch eine vollständige ersetzt. Wer alles in Betracht zieht, was zur Charakteristik eines menschlichen Sinnes in Betracht kommt, der findet, daß man noch anderes «Sinne» nennen muß als was man gewöhnlich so bezeichnet. Was das «Auge» zum «Sinn» macht, ist zum Beispiel auch dann vorhanden, wenn man den Tatbestand erlebt: «es wird ein anderes <Ich> beobachtet», oder «es wird ein menschlicher Gedanke eines anderen als solcher erkannt». Man macht gegenüber solchen Tatbeständen gewöhnlich den Fehler, daß man eine durchaus berechtigte und notwendige Unterscheidung nicht vollzieht. Man glaubt zum Beispiel, man käme damit aus, wenn man die Worte eines anderen hört, nur insoferne von «Sinn» zu sprechen, daß als solcher nur das «Gehör» in Frage kommt, und alles andere einer nicht-sinnlichen inneren Tätigkeit zuzuschreiben sei. So liegt aber die Sache nicht. Beim Hören menschlicher Worte und deren Verstehen als Gedanken kommt eine dreifache Tätigkeit in Betracht. Und jedes Glied dieser dreifachen Tätigkeit muß für sich betrachtet werden, wenn eine berechtigte wissenschaftliche Auffassung zustande kommen soll. Das «Hören»ist die eine Tätigkeit. Allein das «Hören»ist für sich ebenso wenig ein «Vernehmen von Worten» wie das «Tasten» ein «Sehen» ist. Und wie man sachgemäß unterscheiden muß zwischen dem Sinn des «Tastens» und demjenigen des «Sehens», so zwischen dem des «Hörens» und dem des «Vernehmens von Worten» und dem weiteren des «Erfassens von Gedanken». Es führt zu einer mangelhaften Psychologie und auch zu einer mangelhaften Erkenntnistheorie, wenn man das «Erfassen von Gedanken» nicht scharf von der Denktätigkeit absondert und den sinnesgemäßen Charakter des ersteren erkennt. Man begeht diesen Fehler nur deshalb, weil das Organ des «Vernehmens von Worten» und dasjenige des «Erfassens von Gedanken» nicht so äußerlich wahrnehmbar sind als das Ohr für das «Hören». In Wirklichkeit sind für die beiden Wahrnehmungstätigkeiten ebenso «Organe» vorhanden, wie für das «Hören» das Ohr.
Führt man durch, was Physiologie und Psychologie bei einer vollständigen Betrachtung in dieser Beziehung ergeben, so gelangt man zur folgenden Anschauung über die menschliche Sinnes-Organisation. Man muß unterscheiden: den Sinn für die «Ich-Wahrnehmung» des andern Menschen; den Sinn für «Gedanken-Erfassung»; den Sinn für «Vernehmen von Worten»; den Gehörsinn; den Wärmesinn; den Sehsinn; den Geschmacksinn; den Geruchsinn; den Gleichgewichtssinn (das wahrnehmende Erleben des sich in einer gewissen Gleichgewichtslage-Befindens gegenüber der Außenwelt); den Bewegungssinn (das wahrnehmende Erleben der Ruhe und Bewegung der eigenen Glieder einerseits, oder des Ruhens oder sich Bewegens gegenüber der Außenwelt andrerseits); den Lebenssinn (das Erleben der Verfassung im Organismus; Gefühl von dem subjektiven Sich-Befinden); den Tastsinn. Alle diese «Sinne» tragen die Merkmale in sich, wegen deren man «Auge» und «Ohr» in Wahrheit «Sinne» nennt.
Wer die Berechtigung einer solchen Unterscheidung nicht anerkennt, der gerät mit seiner Erkenntnis gegenüber der Wirklichkeit in Unordnung. Er verfällt mit seinen Vorstellungen dem Schicksal, daß sie ihn kein wahrhaft Wirkliches erleben lassen. Wer zum Beispiel das «Auge» einen «Sinn» nennt und keinen «Sinn» annimmt für das «Vernehmen von Worten», für den bleibt auch die Vorstellung, die er sich vom «Auge» bildet, ein unwirkliches Gebilde. - Ich bin der Meinung, daß Fritz Mauthner in seiner geistreichen Art - in seinen sprachkritischen Werken - nur deshalb von «Zufallssinnen» spricht, weil er bloß eine fragmentarische Sinnes-Lehre im Auge hat. Wäre dies nicht der Fall, so würde er bemerken, wie der «Sinn» sich in die «Wirklichkeit» hineinstellt.
Nun liegt, wenn der Mensch einem Sinnes-Objekte gegenübersteht, die Sache so, daß er niemals bloß durch einen Sinn einen Eindruck erhält, sondern außerdem immer noch durch wenigstens einen andern aus der Reihe der oben angeführten. Die Beziehung zu einem Sinne tritt mit besonderer Schärfe in das gewöhnliche Bewußtsein; die andere bleibt dumpfer. Es besteht aber zwischen den Sinnen der Unterschied, daß eine Anzahl der selben die Beziehung zur Außenwelt mehr als eine äußerliche erleben läßt; die andere mehr als etwas, was mit dem Eigen-Sein in engster Verknüpfung ist. Sinne, die mit dem Eigensein in engster Verknüpfung sich befinden, sind zum Beispiel der Gleichgewichtssinn, der Bewegungssinn, der Lebenssinn, ja auch der Tastsinn. In den Wahrnehmungen solcher Sinne gegenüber der Außenwelt wird stets das eigene Sein dumpf mitempfunden. Ja, man kann sagen, es tritt eine Dumpfheit des bewußten Wahrnehmens eben deshalb ein, weil die Beziehung nach außen von dem Erleben des Eigen-Seins übertönt wird. Ereignet sich zum Beispiel, daß ein Gegenstand gesehen wird, und zugleich der Gleichgewichtssinn einen Eindruck vermittelt, so wird scharf wahrgenommen das Gesehene. Dieses Gesehene führt zu der Vorstellung des Gegenstandes. Das Erlebnis durch den Gleichgewichtssinn bleibt als Wahrnehmung dumpf; jedoch es lebt auf in dem Urteile: «das Gesehene ist» oder «es ist das Gesehene».
Im Wirklichen stehen die Dinge nicht in abstrakten Unterschieden nebeneinander, sondern sie gehen mit ihren Merkmalen in einander über. So kommt es, daß in der vollständigen Reihe der «Sinne» solche sind, die weniger die Beziehung zur Außenwelt, sondern mehr das Erleben des Eigen-Seins vermitteln. Diese letzteren tauchen mehr in das innere seelische Leben ein als zum Beispiel Auge und Ohr; dadurch erscheint das Ergebnis ihrer Wahrnehmungs-Vermittelung als inneres seelisches Erlebnis. Aber man sollte auch bei ihnen das eigentlich Seelische von dem Wahrnehmungselemente so unterscheiden, wie man zum Beispiel beim Gesehenen den äußeren Tatbestand von dem an ihm gemachten inneren Seelen-Erlebnisse unterscheidet.
Für denjenigen, der sich auf den anthroposophischen Gesichtspunkt stellt, darf kein Zurückschrecken bestehen vor solchen feinen Vorstellungs-Unterscheidungen, wie sie hier gemacht werden. Er muß das «Vernehmen der Worte» von dem Gehör einerseits, und dieses «Vernehmen der Worte» von dem durch die eigenen Gedanken vermittelten «Verstehen der Worte» so unterscheiden können, wie das gewöhnliche Bewußtsein unterscheidet zwischen einem Baum und einem Felsblock. Würde dies mehr berücksichtigt, so würde man erkennen, daß die Anthroposophie nicht nur die eine Seite hat, welche man gewöhnlich als eine mystische bezeichnet, sondern auch die andere, durch die sie nicht zu einer weniger wissenschaftlichen Forschung führt als die Naturwissenschaft, sondern zu einer mehr wissenschaftlichen, die eine feinere, methodischere Ausarbeitung des Vorstellenslebens nötig macht als selbst die gewöhnliche Philosophie. Ich glaube, daß Wilhelm Dilthey mit seinen philosophischen Forschungen auf dem Wege war zu derjenigen Sinnes-Lehre, die ich hier skizziert habe, daß er aber nicht zu einem Ziele kommen konnte, weil er nicht durchdrang bis zu einer völligen Ausarbeitung der in Frage kommenden Vorstellungen. Vergleiche auch, was ich darüber im zweiten Bande meiner «Rätsel der Philosophie» gesagt habe, 7. Auflage, Seiten 567-572.
IV-5 On the real basis of the intenlional relationship
[ 1 ] With the "intentional relation" characterized in the present work (Chapter 3 on Franz Brentano), a psychic only appears in Brentano's psychology as a fact of ordinary consciousness, without this fact being further integrated into the psychic experience in an explanatory way. I would now like to take the liberty of sketching out a few things about this state of affairs, which are based on my well-developed views in various directions. These views, however, demand that they be given in more detail - with all their justifications. So far, however, circumstances have only made it possible for me to give some relevant information in oral presentations. What I can present here are results in brief sketch form. And I ask the reader to take them as such for the time being. They are not "ideas", but something that I have tried to substantiate over many years using the scientific means of the present day.
[ 2 ] In the experience of the soul that Franz Brentano calls judging, in addition to the mere imagining, which consists of an inner image-forming, there is an acknowledgment or rejection of the imagined images. The question arises for the soul researcher: what is it in the soul's experience that brings about not only the mental image: "green tree", but also the judgment: "it is a green tree"? This "something" cannot lie within the narrower circle of the imaginative life that is described in ordinary consciousness. The fact that it cannot be found here has led to those epistemological thoughts which I have presented in the second volume of my "Riddles of Philosophy" in the section: "The World as Illusion". This is an experience that lies outside this circle. The important thing is to find the "where" in the realm of mental experiences.
If a person faces a sensory object in perceptual activity, this "something" cannot be found in anything that the person receives in the perceptual process in such a way that this reception is grasped by the physiological and psychological ideas that relate to the external object on the one hand and the sense directly in question on the other. If someone has the visual perception "green tree", then the facts of the judgment "it is a green tree" cannot be found in the physiologically or psychologically directly demonstrable relationship between "tree" and "eye". What is experienced in the soul as such an inner fact of judgment is yet another relationship between the "human being" and "the tree" than that between the "tree" and the "eye". But only the latter relationship is experienced in ordinary consciousness with full acuity. The other relationship remains in a dull subconsciousness and only emerges in the result that lies in the recognition of the "green tree" as a being. With every perception that culminates in a judgment, we are dealing with a double relationship between the human being and objectivity.
Insight into this dual relationship can only be gained by replacing the current fragmentary doctrine of the senses with a complete one. Anyone who takes into consideration everything that can be considered to characterize a human sense will find that one must call something else "sense" than what is usually referred to as such. What makes the "eye" a "sense" is also present, for example, when one experiences the fact: "an other <I> is observed", or "a human thought of another is recognized as such". We usually make the mistake of not making a perfectly justified and necessary distinction in relation to such facts. One believes, for example, that one can get by with speaking of "sense" when one hears the words of another only in so far as only "hearing" comes into question as such, and that everything else is to be ascribed to a non-sensory inner activity. But this is not the case. In hearing human words and understanding them as thoughts, a threefold activity comes into consideration. And each element of this threefold activity must be considered separately if a justified scientific view is to be arrived at. Hearing" is the one activity. But "hearing" in itself is no more a "hearing of words" than "touching" is a "seeing". And just as a proper distinction must be made between the sense of "touching" and that of "seeing", so too between the sense of "hearing" and that of "hearing words" and the further sense of "grasping thoughts". It leads to an inadequate psychology and also to an inadequate theory of knowledge if one does not clearly separate the "grasping of thoughts" from the activity of thinking and recognize the sensory character of the former. This mistake is only made because the organ of "hearing words" and the organ of "grasping thoughts" are not as externally perceptible as the ear for "hearing". In reality, there are just as many "organs" for the two perceptual activities as there are ears for "hearing".
If we consider what physiology and psychology reveal in a complete examination of this relationship, we arrive at the following view of the human sensory organization. One must distinguish between the sense of "ego-perception" of the other person; the sense of "thought-perception"; the sense of "hearing words"; the sense of hearing; the sense of heat; the sense of sight; the sense of taste; the sense of smell; the sense of balance (the perceptual experience of being in a certain state of equilibrium in relation to the outside world); the sense of movement (the perceptual experience of the rest and movement of one's own limbs on the one hand, or of resting or moving in relation to the outside world on the other); the sense of life (the experience of the state of the organism; the feeling of the subjective sense of self); the sense of touch. All these "senses" have the characteristics for which "eye" and "ear" are in fact called "senses".
Whoever does not recognize the legitimacy of such a distinction becomes confused with his knowledge of reality. With his ideas, he falls prey to the fate that they do not allow him to experience anything truly real. Whoever, for example, calls the "eye" a "sense" and does not accept a "sense" for the "hearing of words", for him the idea he forms of the "eye" also remains an unreal entity. - I am of the opinion that Fritz Mauthner, in his witty way - in his works on language criticism - only speaks of "accidental senses" because he only has a fragmentary doctrine of the senses in mind. If this were not the case, he would notice how the "sense" places itself in "reality".
Now, when man confronts a sense-object, the matter is such that he never receives an impression merely through one sense, but in addition always through at least one other of the series mentioned above. The relation to one sense enters the ordinary consciousness with particular acuteness; the other remains more dull. But there is the difference between the senses that a number of them allow the relation to the external world to be experienced more as an external one; the other more as something that is in closest connection with selfhood. Senses that are closely connected with the self are, for example, the sense of balance, the sense of movement, the sense of life, and even the sense of touch. In the perceptions of such senses in relation to the outside world, one's own being is always dully felt. Indeed, one can say that a dullness of conscious perception occurs precisely because the relationship to the outside world is drowned out by the experience of one's own being. If, for example, an object is seen and at the same time the sense of balance conveys an impression, then what is seen is perceived sharply. This sight leads to the perception of the object. The experience through the sense of balance remains dull as perception; however, it comes to life in the judgment: "what is seen is" or "it is what is seen".
In the real, things do not stand next to each other in abstract differences, but they merge into each other with their characteristics. Thus it is that in the complete series of "senses" there are those that convey less the relationship to the outside world and more the experience of being oneself. The latter immerse themselves more in the inner life of the soul than, for example, the eye and the ear; thus the result of their mediation of perception appears as an inner experience of the soul. However, one should also distinguish the actual spiritual from the perceptual element in the same way as one distinguishes, for example, the external fact from the inner spiritual experience of what is seen.
For those who adopt the anthroposophical point of view, there must be no shying away from such fine distinctions of perception as are made here. He must be able to distinguish the "hearing of the words" from the hearing on the one hand, and this "hearing of the words" from the "understanding of the words" conveyed by his own thoughts, just as the ordinary consciousness distinguishes between a tree and a boulder. If more consideration were given to this, it would be recognized that anthroposophy has not only the one side which is usually called a mystical one, but also the other, by which it does not lead to a less scientific research than natural science, but to a more scientific one, which necessitates a finer, more methodical elaboration of the life of the imagination than even ordinary philosophy. I believe that Wilhelm Dilthey's philosophical research was on the way to the doctrine of the senses that I have outlined here, but that he was unable to reach his goal because he did not penetrate as far as a complete elaboration of the ideas in question. Compare also what I have said about this in the second volume of my "Rätsel der Philosophie", 7th edition, pages 567-572.