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The Rudolf Steiner Archive

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Basic Issues of the Social Question
GA 23

IV. International Relations Between Social Organisms

[ 1 ] The internal formation of the healthy social organism being triformed. Each of the three sectors will have an independent relation to the corresponding sector of another social organism. Economic relations between countries will exist without being directly influenced by the relations between their respective rights-states.1To object that rights and economic relations really constitute a whole and cannot be separated is to misunderstand what is meant here concerning social formation. In the overall commercial process both kinds of relation of course act as a whole. There is, however, a difference if rights are established according to economic requirements, or if they are established according to the elementary sense of human rights and then are applied to economic affairs. Conversely, the relations between rights-states will develop, within certain limits, completely independent of economic relations. Through this independence of development, the relations will act upon each other in a conciliatory way in cases of conflict. The resulting complex of mutual interests among the individual social organisms will make national frontiers seem inconsequential for human coexistence.

The spiritual/cultural organizations of the various countries will be able to enter into mutual relations which derive exclusively from the common spiritual life of mankind. The self-sustaining spiritual sector, independent of the state, will develop conditions which are impossible to attain when recognition of spiritual activities is dependent on the rights-state instead of the spiritual organism's administration. In this respect there is no difference between scientific activities, which are obviously international, and other spiritual activities. A people's own language and everything related to it also constitute a spiritual area. National awareness itself belongs to this area. The people of one language region do not come into unnatural conflict with the people of another if political organizations and economic power are not used to assert their cultures. Should one people's culture have a greater capability for expansion and spiritual productivity than another, then its expansion will be justified and will come about peacefully if its only means of doing so are the institutions which depend on the spiritual organism.

[ 2 ] At the present time, the strongest opposition to a threefold social organism will come from the communities which have developed from common language and culture. This opposition must give way before the goal which the times have set and of which mankind as a whole must become increasingly aware. Mankind will perceive that each of its parts can achieve a dignified existence only if all the parts are vigorously allied amongst themselves. Ethnic affinities, together with other natural impulses, are the historic cause of the formation of political and economic communities.

However, the forces by means of which the various peoples grow must develop with a reciprocity which is not hampered by relations between political states and economic cooperatives. This will be achieved when the ethnic communities have implemented their social triformation to the extent that each of the sectors can cultivate independent relations with other social organisms.

[ 3 ] Diversified relations are therewith established between peoples, states and economic bodies which ally all the parts of mankind so that each, in its own interest, is sensitive to the life of the others. A league of nations arises from impulses corresponding to reality.t7Page 129 ‘A League of Nations’—Reference is to the organization of this name established by the victorious allies on 28 July 1919, mostly at the initiative of President Wilson. It had no sooner been created than it suffered an almost mortal blow when the United States Congress rejected it. It will not need to be ‘installed’ because of one-sided political considerations.2To see ‘utopias’ in these ideas is to ignore the fact that the realities of life are striving toward just such arrangements, and that harm results because such arrangements are lacking.

[ 4 ] Of special significance is the fact that the social goals described here, although valid for humanity in general, can be realized by each individual social organism regardless of other countries' initial attitudes. Should a social organism form itself according to the three natural sectors, the representatives of each sector could enter into international relations with others, even if these others have not yet adopted the same forms. Those who lead the way to these forms are working for a common goal of humanity. What must be accomplished is far more likely to come about on the strength of human impulses which have their roots in life, than through decisions and agreements made at congresses and the like. The thoughts which underlie these goals are based on reality; they are to be pursued in all human communities.

[ 5 ] Whoever has followed the political events of the last decades from the point of view represented here, will have perceived how the various states, with their merged spiritual, rights and economic sectors, were approaching catastrophe in international relations. At the same time however, he could also see that forces of a contrary nature were arising as unconscious human impulses and pointing the way toward the triformation. This will be the remedy for the shock caused by fanaticism for uniform statism. But the ‘competent leaders of humanity’ were not able to see what had long since been in preparation. In the spring and early summer of 1914 one could still hear ‘statesmen’ saying that peace in Europe, as far as could be humanly foreseen, was secure thanks to the efforts of governments. These ‘statesmen’ had no idea that their words and deeds no longer had any relation whatsoever to the real course of events. But they were the ‘experts’. Those who had been developing contrary views during the last decades, such as those expressed by the author months before the outbreak of war and, finally, to a small audience in Vienna (a larger audience would only have been derisive) were considered to be ‘eccentric’.

Words to the following effect concerning the immediate dangers were spoken: ‘Today's prevalent tendencies will continue to gather momentum until they finally destroy themselves. Whoever observes society with spiritual insight sees a terrible disposition to social cancerous growths everywhere. This is cause for great concern. It is so terrible and distressing that even if a person could otherwise suppress all enthusiasm for the knowledge of life's events obtainable through a science which recognizes the spirit, he would still feel obliged to speak, to cry out to the world about the remedy. If the social organism continues to develop as it has until now, injuries to culture will occur which are to this organism what cancer is to the human physical organism.’ But the views of the ruling circles, based on just such undercurrents which they refused to recognize, led them to take measures better left undone and to take none which could have instilled mutual trust among the members of the various human communities.

Whoever believes that social exigencies played no direct role as a cause of the present world catastrophe, should consider what would have become of the political impulses of those states heading for war had their ‘statesmen’ taken these exigencies seriously and acted upon them. They would then not have created the inflammable conditions which eventually led to an explosion. If, during the past decades, one had observed the cancer which has grown into the relations between states as the result of the ruling circles' social conduct, one could understand how, as early as 1888, a personage of general human spiritual interests was obliged to state the following in view of how social will was being expressed in these ruling circles: ‘The goal is to turn the whole of humanity into an empire of brothers who, following only the noblest of motives, stride forward in unison. Whoever follows history on the map of Europe, however, can easily believe that what the immediate future holds in store is a general mass slaughter’; and only the thought that a ‘way to the true goodness of human life’ must be found can maintain a sense of human dignity. This thought is one ‘which does not seem to coincide with our and our neighbours' enormous war-like preparations; it is one in which I, nevertheless, believe, and which must enlighten us, unless we prefer to simply do away with human life by common consent and designate an official suicide day.’ (Herman Grimm, 1888, on page 46 of his book: Fifteen Essays—The Last Five Years). What were these ‘war-like preparations’ but measures enacted by people who wanted to maintain the uniform state structure in spite of the fact that this form has become contradictory to the fundamentals of healthy cooperation between peoples? Such healthy cooperation could, however, be accomplished by that social organism which is based on the necessities of the times.

[ 6 ] The Austro-Hungarian state structure had been in need of a reorganization for more than half a century.t8Page 132 ‘The Austro-Hungarian state ... in need of a reorganization.’ An American journalist-historian has since seen it this way. ‘The Danube monarchy was dying of indigestion. For centuries a minority of German-Austrians had ruled over the polyglot empire of a dozen nationalities and stamped their language and culture on it. But since 1848 their hold had been weakening. The minorities could not be digested. Austria was not a melting pot. In the 1860s the Italians had broken away and in 1867 the Hungarians had won equality with the Germans under the so-called Dual Monarchy. Now, as the twentieth century began, the various Slav peoples—the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Serbs, the Croats and the others—were demanding equality and at least national autonomy. Austrian politics had become dominated by the bitter quarrel of the nationalities. But this was not all. There was social revolt too and this often transcended the racial struggle ...’ William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1960. Its spiritual life, with roots in a multiplicity of ethnic communities, required the development of a form for which the obsolete uniform state was a hindrance. The Serbo-Austrian conflict, which was the starting-point of the world-war catastrophe, is the most valid proof that, as of a certain time, the political borders of this uniform state should not have constituted the borders for its ethnic life as well.t9Page 132 ‘The Serbo-Austrian conflict’—The Austrian Grand Duke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated on 28 June 1914 in Sarajevo by members of a Serbian secret society. The assassination was the outward event which triggered the war. Had the possibility existed for a self-sustaining spiritual life, independent of the political state and its borders, to develop beyond these borders in harmony with the goals of the ethnic groups, then the conflict, which had its roots in the spiritual sector, would not have exploded in a political catastrophe. Development in this direction seemed completely impossible, if not outright nonsensical, to those in Austro-Hungary who imagined that their thinking was ‘statesman-like’. Their thought-habits could not conceive of any other possibility but that the state borders must coincide with national communities. An understanding of the fact that spiritual organizations, including schools and other branches of spiritual life, could be established without regard to state borders was contrary to their thought-habits. Nevertheless, this ‘unthinkable’ arrangement constitutes the requirement of modern times for international relations. The practical thinker should not let himself be restrained by the seemingly impossible, and believe that arrangements which satisfy this requirement would meet with insurmountable difficulties; he should rather direct his efforts toward overcoming these difficulties. Instead of bringing the ‘statesmanlike’ thinking into agreement with the requirements of the times, efforts were made to sustain the uniform state in opposition to these requirements. This state therefore took on an increasingly impossible structure. By the second decade of the twentieth century, it was unable to preserve itself in the old form and had the choice of awaiting dissolution or outwardly maintaining the inwardly impossible by means of the force which manifested itself in the war. The Austro-Hungarian ‘statesmen’ had only two choices in 1914: either to direct their efforts toward achieving the conditions necessary for a healthy social organism, and inform the world of their purpose, thereby awakening new confidence, or they had to unleash a war in order to maintain the old structure. Only by considering the events of 1914 with this background in mind can one judge the question of guilt fairly. Through the participation of many ethnic groups in its state structure, Austro-Hungary's historical mission may well have been above all to develop a healthy social organism. This mission was not recognized. It was this sin against the spirit of historical evolution that drove Austro-Hungary to war.

[ 7 ] And the German Empire? t10Page 134 ‘And the German Empire?’ The ‘second’ German Empire was founded on 18 January 1871 through the efforts of its chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. On that date, King Wilhelm I of Prussia was proclaimed Emperor of Germany in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. It was founded at a time when the modern requirements for a healthy social organism were striving for recognition. This recognition could have given the Empire's existence its historical justification. Social impulses were concentrated in this central European Empire as though historically predestined to live themselves out within its borders. Social thinking arose in many places, but in the German Empire it took a special form which indicated where it was heading. This should have supplied the Empire with a purpose. This should have shown its administrators where its mission lay. The justification for this Empire could have been contained in a modern compatibility of nations, had the newly-created Empire been given a purpose which coincided with the forces of history. Instead of rising to the greatness of this mission, those responsible remained at the level of ‘social reforms’ corresponding to the needs of the moment, and were happy when these reforms were admired abroad.t11Page 135 ‘social reforms’—During the period 1883 to 1889 Bismarck had enacted various such reforms, which went far beyond anything known at that time in other countries. They included compulsory insurance for old-age sickness, accidents and incapacity and they were operated by the state, but financed by employees and employers. Such reforms had the effect of dampening the workers' enthusiasm for extreme socialism but, at the same time, increased their faith in the state as protector. At the same time they were moving toward an external power structure based on forms deriving from the most antiquated concepts about the power and splendour of states. An empire was built which, like the Austro-Hungarian state structure, contradicted the forces present in the various ethnic communities at that historic moment. The administrators of this empire saw nothing of these forces. The state structure which they had in mind could only be based on military power. The requirements of modern history would have been satisfied by the implementation of the impulse for a healthy social organism. If this had been done, relations between nations would have been different in 1914. Because of their lack of understanding of modern requirements in ethnic relations, German policy had reached the zero-point in 1914 as far as possibilities for further action were concerned. During the preceding decades they had understood nothing of what should have been done, and German policy had been occupied with every possibility that had no relation to modern evolutionary forces, and therefore had to collapse like a house of cards due to its lack of content.

[ 8 ] A true picture of the historic events surrounding the German Empire's tragic destiny would emerge if an examination were made of the decisive events in Berlin at the end of July and August 1, 1914, and the facts presented truthfully to the world.t12Page 135 ‘the decisive events in Berlin’. The memoirs of General Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff at the outbreak of the war, were ready for publication in May 1919. Von Moltke describes the German Government's attitude at that time, especially on 31 July and 1 August 1914: ‘The atmosphere grew steadily more tense and I was completely alone.’ Then he was told by the Kaiser, ‘So now you can do whatever you want.’ Rudolf Steiner wrote in a commentary: ‘So there it was: the Chief of the General Staff stood completely alone. Due to the fact that German policy had reached the zero-point, Europe's destiny on 31 July and 1 August rested in the hands of a man who was obliged to do his military duty.’ (Vorbemerkungen zu Die Schuld am Krieg, Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen des Generalstabschefs H. von Moltke.) Aufsätze über die Dreigliederung des Sozialen Organismus. This ‘military duty’ involved implementing the German army's predetermined war-plan, prepared by von Moltke's predecessor General Schlieffen, which provided for the domination of France before invading Russia. France was to be attacked through Belgium and Holland. Von Moltke modified the plan to the extent that Holland was omitted. His memoirs were suppressed in 1919, but Rudolf Steiner, who was personally acquainted with him, was familiar with their contents. In an interview which appeared in the French newspaper Le Matin in October 1921, Steiner said that the memoirs should have been published in 1919, but they were suppressed because of fear on the part of the authorities. ‘Why this fear? These memoirs are in no way an accusation against the imperial government. Something else is involved, which is perhaps even worse: that this imperial government found itself in a state of complete confusion and under an incredibly frivolous and ignorant leadership.’ Jules Sauerman's interview with Dr. Rudolf Steiner on the unpublished memoirs of the late Chief of the German General Staff von Moltke. ibid. Little is known of these events, either in Germany or abroad. Whoever is familiar with them knows that German policy at that time was comparable to a house of cards, and because of its arrival at a zero-point of activity, the decision as to whether and how the war was to begin had to be left to the military. The responsible military authorities at that time could not, from the military view-point, have acted in any other way than they did, because from this viewpoint the situation could only be seen as they saw it—for outside the military sector things had come to the point where action was no longer possible. All this would emerge as historical fact if someone were to occupy himself with bringing to light the events which took place in Berlin at the end of July and the beginning of August, namely, everything which occurred on August 1, and July 31. The illusion persists that an insight into these events would not be particularly enlightening if one is familiar with the events which led up to this time. It is not possible, however, to discuss the ‘guilt question’ without this insight. Certainly one may have knowledge through other means of the causes which were long present; but the insight shows how these causes acted on events.

[ 9 ] The concepts which at that time drove Germany's leaders to war continued their ruinous work. They became the national sentiment. They prevented those in power from developing the necessary insight through the bitter experience of these last terrible years. The author, wishing to take advantage of the receptivity which might have resulted from this experience, attempted to make known during the war—which he considered to be the most suitable time—the concepts of the healthy social organism and its consequences for German policy to personages in Germany and Austria whose influence could still have been brought to bear in furthering these impulses.t13Page 137 ‘The author ... attempted to make known ...’ Steiner wrote memoranda directed to leading government circles in Germany and Austria which contained his ideas concerning the way these countries could act in a manner which would have been beneficial to themselves and the world. Count Otto Lerchenfeld brought a memorandum to the German state secretary Kuhlman among others, and Count Ludwig Polzer-Hoditz to his brother, Austria's chief cabinet officer. The memoranda were not published during Steiner's lifetime. They are included in Aufsätze über die Dreigliederung des Sozialen Organismus. Those persons who honestly had the German people's destiny at heart participated in the attempt to gain a hearing for these ideas. But the attempt was futile. The thought-habits resisted such impulses which, to the military mentality, appeared unworkable. ‘Separation of church and school’: yes, that would be something; but they got no further. The thoughts of the ‘statesman-like’ thinkers had long been running along the same track, and more drastic measures were beyond them. Well-meaning people suggested that I make these ideas public. This was most unsuitable advice at the time. What good could it have done to have these ideas, among so many others, and coming from a private individual, disseminated in the field of ‘literature’. It is in the nature of these impulses that they could only have been influential, at that time, if they had come from the appropriate places. Had the sense of these impulses been favourably proclaimed from the right quarters, the peoples of central Europe would have realized that here is something which coincides with their more or less conscious desires. And the Russian peoples in the east would surely have been sympathetic to these impulses as an alternative to czarism. This can only be denied by someone who has no feeling for the receptivity of the East-European intellect—fresh as it still was—for healthy social ideas. Instead of a pronouncement of such ideas, however, came Brest-Litovsk.t14Page 137 ‘Brest-Litovsk’. On 15 December 1917, the peace treaty between Germany and Russia was signed at Brest-Litovsk. The conditions imposed by Germany were extremely hard (very comparable to those imposed on her by the allies a year later). As a result of this accord, Germany was free to concentrate her troops in the west. In Russia, only two months after the revolution, the new communist government led by Lenin was anxious to consolidate its power at home without having to continue the inherited war. The suspicion also exists that Lenin had secretly agreed to make peace with Germany while he was still in exile in Switzerland, in return for his famous trip from Zürich to Russia through Germany in a sealed railway carriage in order to take command of the revolution.

[ 10 ] That military thinking could not avert the catastrophe in central and eastern Europe was apparent to all but the military minds. The cause of the German people's misfortune was unwillingness to see that the catastrophe was unavoidable. Nobody wanted to believe that there was no sense of historic necessity in the places where decisions were being made. Whoever knew something of these necessities also realized that there were personages among the English-speaking peoples who understood the forces at work in the peoples of central and eastern Europe. They were convinced that a situation was brewing which must result in mighty social upheavals—but only in central and eastern Europe, for it was felt that there was not yet either a historical necessity or a possibility for such upheavals in the English-speaking world. Policy was formulated accordingly. This was not understood in central and eastern Europe, and policy was formulated in such a way that it had to ‘collapse like a house of cards’. The only effective policy would have been one based on an insight into the English-speaking world's liberal recognition of historical necessities—from an English point of view of course. But the ‘diplomats’ would have found a suggestion for such a policy highly superfluous.

[ 11 ] Instead of such a policy, which could have been very advantageous for central and eastern Europe before the catastrophe of war overtook it, they continued in the same old diplomatic rut in spite of the liberal orientation of English policy. Furthermore, during the horrors of war they did not learn from bitter experience that the mission presented to the world in political declarations from America should be countered by one born of the vital forces of Europe. An understanding could have been reached between the mission presented by Woodrow Wilson from the American point of view, and one heard over the thunder of cannons as a European spiritual impulse. Any other talk of an understanding rang hollow in view of the historical necessities.

But a sense of mission based on modern humanity's true needs was lacking in those responsible for the German empire's administration. Therefore, what the autumn of 1918 brought was inevitable. The collapse of military power was accompanied by a spiritual capitulation. Instead of exerting European will at that time in an attempt to assert the German people's spiritual impulses, came the simple submission to Wilson's fourteen points.t15Page 139 President Wilson's ‘fourteen points’ constituted the ideological basis for the principle of ‘self-determination of peoples’, which was to underlie the political restructuring of Europe after the war. This principle presupposes that ethnic groups (peoples, nations) are perfectly separable and definable, like so many individual pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. If each governs itself through its own national state, then the cause of political morality is served. In fact, Europe was and is a quilt of nations with many overlapping ethnic ‘grey’ regions. The effect of self-determination or the ‘nationalities principle’ is the disenfranchisement of many smaller or larger minorities with the resultant bitterness and frustration. The course of history since this principle was put into effect in Europe and elsewhere would seem to support such criticism. Winston Churchill wrote the following about the carving up of the Austro-Hungarian empire: ‘The second cardinal tragedy was the complete break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire ... There is not one of these peoples or provinces that constituted the Empire of the Hapsburgs to whom gaining their independence has not brought the tortures which ancient poets and theologians had reserved for the damned.’ The Second World War, Vol. 1, Chap. I, The Gathering Storm. According to the idea of the ‘social triformation’, or ‘threefold society’, the nationalities (ethnic) problem can only be solved by liberating ‘national’ life from the power of the political state. In other words, the creation of a free cultural-spiritual sector. Wilson was confronted with a Germany which had nothing to say for itself. Whatever Wilson may think about his own fourteen points, he can only help Germany to fulfil what the country itself wills. Surely he must have expected a demonstration of this desire. But to the nullity of German policy at the beginning of the war was added the nullity of 1918; the terrible spiritual capitulation came, brought on by a man in whom many in the German lands had placed something like a last hope.

[ 12 ] Lack of faith in insights derived from historically active forces; unwillingness to recognize knowledge derived from spiritually related impulses: this was what produced central Europe's situation. Now a new situation has been created by the catastrophe of war. It can be characterized by the idea of humanity's social impulses as it has been interpreted in this book. These social impulses speak a language which confronts the whole civilized world with a mission. Shall thinking about what must now come about in respect of the social question reach the same zero-point as did central European policy in respect of its mission in 1914? Countries which were able to remain aloof from the events of that time may not do so as far as the social movement is concerned. In this question there should be no political opponents and no neutrals; there should only be one mankind, working together, which is able to read the signs of the times and act in accordance with them.

The intentions described in this book make it possible to understand why the appeal ‘To the German People and the Civilized World’, which is reproduced in the following chapter, was formulated by the author some time ago and communicated to the world—especially to the peoples of central Europe—by a committee which sympathized with its aims. The present situation is different from the one prevalent at the time in which it was communicated to relatively few. At that time a wider propagation would have been considered ‘literature’. Today the public must bring to it what it could not have brought a short time ago: understanding men and women who want to work for what it advocates—if it is worth being understood and being put into practice. What should come about now is only possible through the activity of such people.

IV. Internationale Beziehungen der sozialen Organismen

[ 1 ] Die innere Gliederung des gesunden sozialen Organismus macht auch die internationalen Beziehungen dreigliedrig. Jedes der drei Gebiete wird sein selbständiges Verhältnis zu den entsprechenden Gebieten der andern sozialen Organismen haben. Wirtschaftliche Beziehungen des einen Landesgebietes werden zu ebensolchen eines andern entstehen, ohne daß die Beziehungen der Rechtsstaaten darauf einen unmittelbaren Einfluß haben.1Wer dagegen einwendet, dass die Rechts- und Wirtschaftsverhältnisse doch in Wirklichkeit ein Ganzes bilden und nicht voreinander getrennt werden können, der beachtet nicht, worauf es bei der hier gemeinten Gliederung ankommt. Im gesamten Verkehrsprozess wirken die beiderlei Verhältnisse selbstverständlich als ein Ganzes. Aber es ist etwas anderes, ob man Rechte aus den wirtschaftlichen Bedürfnissen heraus gestaltet und, was daraus entsteht, mit dem Wirtschaftsverkehr zusammenwirken lässt. Und umgekehrt, die Verhältnisse der Rechtsstaaten werden sich innerhalb gewisser Grenzen in völliger Unabhängigkeit von den wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen ausbilden. Durch diese Unabhängigkeit im Entstehen der Beziehungen werden diese in Konfliktfällen ausgleichend aufeinander wirken können. Interessenzusammenhänge der einzelnen sozialen Organismen werden sich ergeben, welche die Landesgrenzen als unbeträchtlich für das Zusammenleben der Menschen erscheinen lassen werden. - Die geistigen Organisationen der einzelnen Landesgebiete werden zueinander in Beziehungen treten können, die nur aus dem gemeinsamen Geistesleben der Menschheit selbst sich ergeben. Das vom Staate unabhängige, auf sich gestellte Geistesleben wird Verhältnisse ausbilden, die dann unmöglich sind, wenn die Anerkennung der geistigen Leistungen nicht von der Verwaltung eines geistigen Organismus, sondern vom Rechtsstaate abhängt. In dieser Beziehung herrscht auch kein Unterschied zwischen den Leistungen der ganz offenbar internationalen Wissenschaft und denjenigen anderer geistiger Gebiete. Ein geistiges Gebiet stellt ja auch die einem Volke eigene Sprache dar und alles, was sich in unmittelbarem Zusammenhange mit der Sprache ergibt. Das Volksbewußtsein selbst gehört in dieses Gebiet. Die Menschen eines Sprachgebietes kommen mit denen eines andern nicht in unnatürliche Konflikte, wenn sie sich nicht zur Geltendmachung ihrer Volkskultur der staatlichen Organisation oder der wirtschaftlichen Gewalt bedienen wollen. Hat eine Volkskultur gegenüber einer andern eine größere Ausbreitungsfähigkeit und geistige Fruchtbarkeit, so wird die Ausbreitung eine gerechtfertigte sein, und sie wird sich friedlich vollziehen, wenn sie nur durch die Einrichtungen zustande kommt, die von den geistigen Organismen abhängig sind.

[ 2 ] Gegenwärtig wird der Dreigliederung des sozialen Organismus noch der schärfste Widerstand von seiten derjenigen Menschheitszusammenhänge erwachsen, die aus den Gemeinsamkeiten der Sprachen und Volkskulturen sich entwickelt haben. Dieser Widerstand wird sich brechen müssen an dem Ziel, das sich aus den Lebensnotwendigkeiten der neueren Zeit die Menschheit als Ganzes immer bewußter wird setzen müssen. Diese Menschheit wird empfinden, daß ein jeder ihrer Teile zu einem wahrhaft menschenwürdigen Dasein nur kommen kann, wenn er sich lebenskräftig mit allen anderen Teilen verbindet. Volkszusammenhänge sind neben anderen naturgemäßen Impulsen die Ursachen, durch die sich Rechts- und Wirtschaftsgemeinsamkeiten geschichtlich gebildet haben. Aber die Kräfte, durch welche die Volkstümer wachsen, müssen sich in einer Wechselwirkung entfalten, die nicht gehemmt ist durch die Beziehungen, welche die Staatskörper und Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften zueinander entwickeln. Das wird erreicht, wenn die Volksgemeinschaften die innere Dreigliederung ihrer sozialen Organismen so durchführen, daß jedes der Glieder seine selbständigen Beziehungen zu anderen sozialen Organismen entfalten kann.

[ 3 ] Dadurch bilden sich vielgestaltige Zusammenhänge zwischen Völkern, Staaten und Wirtschaftskörpern, die jeden Teil der Menschheit mit anderen Teilen so verbinden, daß der eine in seinen eigenen Interessen das Leben der andern mitempfindet. Ein Völkerbund entsteht aus wirklichkeitsgemäßen Grundimpulsen heraus. Er wird nicht aus einseitigen Rechtsanschauungen «eingesetzt» werden müssen.2Wer in solchen Dingen «Utopien» sieht, der beachtet nicht, dass in Wirklichkeit des Lebens nach diesen von ihm für utopistisch gehaltenen Einrichtungen hinstrebt, und dass die Schäden dieser Wirklichkeit gerade davon kommen, dass diese Einrichtungen nich da sind.

[ 4 ] Von besonderer Bedeutung muß einem wirklichkeitsgemäßen Denken erscheinen, daß die hier dargestellten Ziele eines sozialen Organismus zwar ihre Geltung haben für die gesamte Menschheit, daß sie aber von jedem einzelnen sozialen Organismus verwirklicht werden können, gleichgültig, wie sich andere Länder zu dieser Verwirklichung vorläufig verhalten. Gliedert sich ein sozialer Organismus in die naturgemäßen drei Gebiete, so können die Vertretungen derselben als einheitliche Körperschaft mit anderen in internationale Beziehungen treten, auch wenn diese anderen für sich die Gliederung noch nicht vorgenommen haben. Wer mit dieser Gliederung vorangeht, der wird für ein gemeinschaftliches Menschheitsziel wirken. Was getan werden soll, wird sich durchsetzen viel mehr durch die Kraft, welche ein in wirklichen Menschheitsimpulsen wurzelndes Ziel im Leben erweist, als durch eine Feststellung auf Kongressen und aus Verabredungen heraus. Auf einer Wirklichkeitsgrundlage ist dieses Ziel gedacht; im wirklichen Leben, an jedem Punkte der Menschengemeinschaften läßt es sich erstreben.

[ 5 ] Wer in den letzten Jahrzehnten die Vorgänge im Leben der Völker und Staaten von einem Gesichtspunkte aus verfolgte, wie derjenige dieser Darstellung ist, der konnte wahrnehmen, wie die geschichtlich gewordenen Staatengebilde mit ihrer Zusammenfassung von Geistes-, Rechts- und Wirtschaftsleben sich in internationale Beziehungen brachten, die zu einer Katastrophe drängten. Ebenso aber konnte ein solcher auch sehen, wie die Gegenkräfte aus unbewußten Menschheitsimpulsen heraus zur Dreigliederung wiesen. Diese wird das Heilmittel gegen die Erschütterungen sein, welche der Einheitsfanatismus bewirkt hat. Aber das Leben der «maßgebenden Menschheitsleiter» war nicht darauf eingestellt, zu sehen, was sich seit langem vorbereitete. Im Frühling und Frühsommer 1914 konnte man noch «Staatsmänner» davon sprechen hören, daß der Friede Europas dank der Bemühungen der Regierungen nach menschlicher Voraussicht gesichert sei. Diese «Staatsmänner» hatten eben keine Ahnung davon, daß, was sie taten und redeten, mit dem Gang der wirklichen Ereignisse nichts mehr zu tun hatte. Aber sie galten als die «Praktiker». Und als «Schwärmer» galt damals wohl, wer entgegen den Anschauungen der «Staatsmänner» Anschauungen durch die letzten Jahrzehnte hindurch sich ausbildete, wie sie der Schreiber dieser Ausführungen monatelang vor der Kriegskatastrophe zuletzt in Wien vor einem kleinen Zuhörerkreise aussprach (vor einem größeren wäre er wohl verlacht worden). Er sagte über das, was drohte, ungefähr das Folgende: Die in der Gegenwart herrschenden Lebenstendenzen werden immer stärker werden, bis sie sich zuletzt in sich selber vernichten werden. Da schaut derjenige, der das soziale Leben geistig durchblickt, wie überall furchtbare Anlagen zu sozialen Geschwürbildungen aufsprossen. Das ist die große Kultursorge, die auftritt für denjenigen, der das Dasein durchschaut. Das ist das Furchtbare, was so bedrückend wirkt und was selbst dann, wenn man allen Enthusiasmus sonst für das Erkennen der Lebensvorgänge durch die Mittel einer geisterkennenden Wissenschaft unterdrücken könnte, einen dazu bringen müßte, von dem Heilmittel so zu sprechen, daß man Worte darüber der Welt gleichsam entgegenschreien möchte. Wenn der soziale Organismus sich so weiter entwickelt, wie er es bisher getan hat, dann entstehen Schäden der Kultur, die für diesen Organismus dasselbe sind, was Krebsbildungen im menschlichen natürlichen Organismus sind. Aber die Lebensanschauung herrschender Kreise bildete auf diesem Untergrunde des Lebens, den sie nicht sehen konnte und wollte, Impulse aus, die zu Maßnahmen führten, die hätten unterbleiben sollen und zu keinen solchen, die geeignet waren, Vertrauen der verschiedenen Menschengemeinschaften zueinander zu begründen. - Wer glaubt, daß unter den unmittelbaren Ursachen der gegenwärtigen Weltkatastrophe die sozialen Lebensnotwendigkeiten keine Rolle gespielt haben, der sollte sich überlegen, was aus den politischen Impulsen der in den Krieg drängenden Staaten dann geworden wäre, wenn die «Staatsmänner» in den Inhalt ihres Wollens diese sozialen Notwendigkeiten aufgenommen hätten. Und was unterblieben wäre, wenn man durch solchen Willensinhalt etwas anderes zu tun gehabt hätte als die Zündstoffe zu schaffen, die dann die Explosion bringen mußten. Wenn man in den letzten Jahrzehnten das schleichende Krebs-Erkranken in den Staatenbeziehungen als Folge des sozialen Lebens der führenden Teile der Menschheit ins Auge faßte, so konnte man verstehen, wie eine in allgemeinen menschlichen Geistesinteressen stehende Persönlichkeit angesichts des Ausdruckes, welchen das soziale Wollen in diesen führenden Teilen annahm, schon 1888 sagen mußte: «Das Ziel ist: die gesamte Menschheit in ihrer letzten Gestaltung zu einem Reiche von Brüdern zu machen, die, nur den edelsten Beweggründen nachgehend, gemeinsam sich weiter bewegen. Wer die Geschichte nur auf der Karte von Europa verfolgt, könnte glauben, ein gegenseitiger allgemeiner Mord müsse unsere nächste Zukunft erfüllen», aber nur der Gedanke, daß ein «Weg zu den wahren Gütern des menschlichen Lebens» gefunden werden müsse, kann den Sinn für Menschenwürde aufrechterhalten. Und dieser Gedanke ist ein solcher, «der mit unsern ungeheuern kriegerischen Rüstungen und denen unserer Nachbarn nicht im Einklange zu stehen scheint, an den ich aber glaube, und der uns erleuchten muß, wenn es nicht überhaupt besser sein sollte, das menschliche Leben durch einen Gemeinbeschluß abzuschaffen und einen offiziellen Tag des Selbstmordes anzuberaumen.» (So Herman Grimm 1888 auf S.46 seines Buches: «Fünfzehn Essays. Vierte Folge. Aus den letzten fünf Jahren».) Was waren die «kriegerischen Rüstungen» anderes als Maßnahmen solcher Menschen, welche Staatsgebilde in einer Einheitsform aufrechterhalten wollten, trotzdem diese Form durch die Entwickelung der neuen Zeit dem Wesen eines gesunden Zusammenlebens der Völker widersprechend geworden ist? Ein solches gesundes Zusammenleben aber könnte bewirkt werden durch denjenigen sozialen Organismus, welcher aus den Lebensnotwendigkeiten der neueren Zeit heraus gestaltet ist.

[ 6 ] Das österreichisch-ungarische Staatsgebilde drängte seit mehr als einem halben Jahrhundert nach einer Neugestaltung. Sein geistiges Leben, das in einer Vielheit von Völkergemeinschaften wurzelte, verlangte nach einer Form, für deren Entwickelung der aus veralteten Impulsen gebildete Einheitsstaat ein Hemmnis war. Der serbisch-österreichische Konflikt, der am Ausgangspunkte der Weltkriegskatastrophe steht, ist das vollgültigste Zeugnis dafür, daß die politischen Grenzen dieses Einheitsstaates von einem gewissen Zeitpunkte an keine Kulturgrenzen sein durften für das Völkerleben. Wäre eine Möglichkeit vorhanden gewesen, daß das auf sich selbst gestellte, von dem politischen Staate und seinen Grenzen unabhängige Geistesleben sich über diese Grenzen hinüber in einer Art hätte entwickeln können, die mit den Zielen der Völker im Einklange gewesen wäre, dann hätte der im Geistesleben verwurzelte Konflikt sich nicht in einer politischen Katastrophe entladen müssen. Eine dahin zielende Entwickelung erschien allen, die in Österreich-Ungarn sich einbildeten, «staatsmännisch» zu denken, als eine volle Unmöglichkeit, wohl gar als der reine Unsinn. Deren Denkgewohnheiten ließen nichts anderes zu als die Vorstellung, daß die Staatsgrenzen mit den Grenzen der nationalen Gemeinsamkeiten zusammenfallen. Verstehen, daß über die Staatsgrenzen hinweg sich geistige Organisationen bilden können, die das Schulwesen, die andere Zweige des Geisteslebens umfassen, das war diesen Denkgewohnheiten zuwider. Und dennoch: dieses «Undenkbare» ist die Forderung der neueren Zeit für das internationale Leben. Der praktisch Denkende darf nicht an dem scheinbar Unmöglichen hängen bleiben und glauben, daß Einrichtungen im Sinne dieser Forderung auf unüberwindliche Schwierigkeiten stoßen; sondern er muß sein Bestreben gerade darauf richten, diese Schwierigkeiten zu überwinden. Statt das «staatsmännische» Denken in eine Richtung zu bringen, welche den neuzeitlichen Forderungen entsprochen hätte, war man bestrebt, Einrichtungen zu bilden, welche den Einheitsstaat gegen diese Forderungen aufrechterhalten sollten. Dieser Staat wurde dadurch immer mehr zu einem unmöglichen Gebilde. Und im zweiten Jahrzehnt des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts stand er davor, für seine Selbsterhaltung in der alten Form nichts mehr tun zu können und die Auflösung zu erwarten, oder das innerlich Unmögliche äußerlich durch die Gewalt aufrechtzuerhalten, die sich auf die Maßnahmen des Krieges begründen ließ. Es gab 1914 für die österreichisch-ungarischen «Staatsmänner» nichts anderes als dieses: Entweder sie mußten ihre Intentionen in die Richtung der Lebensbedingungen des gesunden sozialen Organismus lenken und dies der Welt als ihren Willen, der ein neues Vertrauen hätte erwecken können, mitteilen, oder sie mußten einen Krieg entfesseln zur Aufrechterhaltung des Alten. Nur wer aus diesen Untergründen heraus beurteilt, was 1914 geschehen ist, wird über die Schuldfrage gerecht denken können. Durch die Teilnahme vieler Völkerschaften an dem österreichisch-ungarischen Staatsgebilde wäre diesem die weltgeschichtliche Aufgabe gestellt gewesen, den gesunden sozialen Organismus vor allem zu entwickeln. Man hat diese Aufgabe nicht erkannt. Diese Sünde wider den Geist des weltgeschichtlichen Werdens hat Österreich-Ungarn in den Krieg getrieben.

[ 7 ] Und das Deutsche Reich? Es ist gegründet worden in einer Zeit, in der die neuzeitlichen Forderungen nach dem gesunden sozialen Organismus ihrer Verwirklichung zustrebten. Diese Verwirklichung hätte dem Reiche seine weltgeschichtliche Daseinsberechtigung geben können. Die sozialen Impulse schlossen sich in diesem mitteleuropäischen Reiche wie in dem Gebiete zusammen, das für ihr Ausleben weltgeschichtlich vorbestimmt erscheinen konnte. Das soziale Denken, es trat an vielen Orten auf; im Deutschen Reiche nahm es eine besondere Gestalt an, aus der zu ersehen war, wohin es drängte. Das hätte zu einem Arbeits-Inhalt für dieses Reich führen müssen. Das hätte seinen Verwaltern die Aufgaben stellen müssen. Es hätte die Berechtigung dieses Reiches im modernen Völkerzusammenleben erweisen können, wenn man dem neugegründeten Reiche einen Arbeits-Inhalt gegeben hätte, der von den Kräften der Geschichte selbst gefordert gewesen wäre. Statt mit dieser Aufgabe sich ins Große zu wenden, blieb man bei «sozialen Reformen» stehen, die aus den Forderungen des Tages sich ergaben, und war froh, wenn man im Auslande die Mustergültigkeit dieser Reformen bewunderte. Man kam daneben immer mehr dazu, die äußere Welt-Machtstellung des Reiches auf Formen gründen zu wollen, die aus den ausgelebtesten Arten des Vorstellens über die Macht und den Glanz der Staaten heraus gebildet waren. Man gestaltete ein Reich, das ebenso wie das österreichisch-ungarische Staatsgebilde dem widersprach, was in den Kräften des Völkerlebens der neueren Zeit sich geschichtlich ankündigte. Von diesen Kräften sahen die Verwalter dieses Reiches nichts. Das Staatsgebilde, das sie im Auge hatten, konnte nur auf der Kraft des Militärischen ruhen. Dasjenige, das von der neueren Geschichte gefordert ist, hätte auf der Verwirklichung der Impulse für den gesunden sozialen Organismus ruhen müssen. Mit dieser Verwirklichung hätte man sich in die Gemeinsamkeit des modernen Völkerlebens anders hineingestellt, als man 1914 in ihr stand. Durch ihr Nicht-Verstehen der neuzeitlichen Forderungen des Völkerlebens war 1914 die deutsche Politik an dem Nullpunkte ihrer Betätigungsmöglichkeit angelangt. Sie hatte in den letzten Jahrzehnten nichts bemerkt von dem, was hätte geschehen sollen; sie hatte sich beschäftigt mit allem Möglichen, was in den neuzeitlichen Entwickelungskräften nicht lag und was durch seine Inhaltlosigkeit «wie ein Kartengebäude zusammenbrechen» mußte.

[ 8 ] Von dem, was sich in dieser Art als das tragische Schicksal des Deutschen Reiches aus dem geschichtlichen Verlauf heraus ergab, würde ein getreues Spiegelbild entstehen, wenn man sich herbeiließe, die Vorgänge innerhalb der maßgebenden Orte in Berlin Ende Juli und 1.August 1914 zu prüfen und vor die Welt getreulich hinzustellen. Von diesen Vorgängen weiß das In- und Ausland noch wenig. Wer sie kennt, der weiß, wie die deutsche Politik damals sich als die eines Kartenhauses verhielt, und wie durch ihr Ankommen im Nullpunkt ihrer Betätigung alle Entscheidung, ob und wie der Krieg zu beginnen war, in das Urteil der militärischen Verwaltung übergehen mußte. Wer maßgebend in dieser Verwaltung war, konnte damals aus den militärischen Gesichtspunkten heraus nicht anders handeln, als gehandelt worden ist, weil von diesen Gesichtspunkten die Situation nur so gesehen werden konnte, wie sie gesehen worden ist. Denn außer dem militärischen Gebiet hatte man sich in eine Lage gebracht, die zu einem Handeln gar nicht mehr führen konnte. Alles dieses würde sich als eine weltgeschichtliche Tatsache ergeben, wenn jemand sich fände, der darauf dringt, die Vorgänge in Berlin von Ende Juli und 1. August, namentlich alles das, was sich am 1. August und 31. Juli zutrug, an das Tageslicht zu bringen. Man gibt sich noch immer der Illusion hin, durch die Einsicht in diese Vorgänge könne man doch nichts gewinnen, wenn man die vorbereitenden Ereignisse aus der früheren Zeit kennt. Will man über das reden, was man gegenwärtig die «Schuldfrage» nennt, so darf man diese Einsicht nicht meiden. Gewiß kann man auch durch anderes über die längst vorher vorhandenen Ursachen wissen; aber diese Einsicht zeigt, wie diese Ursachen gewirkt haben.

[ 9 ] Die Vorstellungen, die Deutschlands Führer damals in den Krieg getrieben haben, sie wirkten dann verhängnisvoll fort. Sie wurden Volksstimmung. Und sie verhinderten, daß während der letzten Schreckensjahre die Einsicht bei den Machthabern sich durch die bitteren Erfahrungen entwickelte, deren Nichtvorhandensein vorher in die Tragik hineingetrieben hatte. Auf die mögliche Empfänglichkeit, die sich aus diesen Erfahrungen heraus hätte ergeben können, wollte der Schreiber dieser Ausführungen bauen, als er sich bemühte, innerhalb Deutschlands und Österreichs in dem Zeitpunkte der Kriegskatastrophe, der ihm der geeignete erschien, die Ideen von dem gesunden sozialen Organismus und deren Konsequenzen für das politische Verhalten nach außen an Persönlichkeiten heranzubringen, deren Einfluß damals noch sich hätte für eine Geltendmachung dieser Impulse betätigen können. Persönlichkeiten, welche es mit dem Schicksal des deutschen Volkes ehrlich meinten, beteiligten sich daran, einen solchen Zugang für diese Ideen zu gewinnen. Man sprach vergebens. Die Denkgewohnheiten sträubten sich gegen solche Impulse, welche dem nur militärisch orientierten Vorstellungsleben als etwas erschienen, mit dem man nichts Rechtes anfangen könne. Höchstens daß man fand, «Trennung der Kirche von der Schule», ja, das wäre etwas. In solcher Bahn liefen eben die Gedanken der «staatsmännisch» Denkenden schon seit lange, und in eine Richtung, die zu Durchgreifendem führen sollte, ließen sie sich nicht bringen. Wohlwollende sprachen davon, ich solle diese Gedanken «veröffentlichen». Das war in jenem Zeitpunkte wohl der unzweckmäßigste Rat. Was konnte es helfen, wenn auf dem Gebiete der «Literatur» unter manchem andern auch von diesen Impulsen gesprochen worden wäre; von einem Privatmanne. In der Natur dieser Impulse liegt es doch, daß sie damals eine Bedeutung nur hätten erlangen können durch den Ort, von dem aus sie gesprochen worden wären. Die Völker Mitteleuropas hätten, wenn von der rechten Stelle im Sinne dieser Impulse gesprochen worden wäre, gesehen, daß es etwas geben kann, was ihrem mehr oder weniger bewußten Drang entsprochen hätte. Und die Völker des russischen Ostens hätten ganz gewiß in jenem Zeitpunkte Verständnis gehabt für eine Ablösung des Zarismus durch solche Impulse. Daß sie dies Verständnis gehabt hätten, kann nur der in Abrede stellen, der keine Empfindung hat für die Empfänglichkeit des noch unverbrauchten osteuropäischen Intellekts für gesunde soziale Ideen. Statt der Kundgebung im Sinne solcher Ideen kam Brest-Litowsk.

[ 10 ] Daß militärisches Denken die Katastrophe Mittel- und Osteuropas nicht abwenden konnte, das vermochte sich nur eben dem - militärischen Denken zu verbergen. Daß man an die Unabwendbarkeit der Katastrophe nicht glauben wollte, das war die Ursache des Unglückes des deutschen Volkes. Niemand wollte einsehen, wie man an den Stellen, bei denen die Entscheidung lag, keinen Sinn hatte für weltgeschichtliche Notwendigkeiten. Wer von diesen Notwendigkeiten etwas wußte, dem war auch bekannt, wie die englischsprechenden Völker Persönlichkeiten in ihrer Mitte hatten, welche durchschauten, was in den Volkskräften Mittel- und Osteuropas sich regte. Man konnte wissen, wie solche Persönlichkeiten der Überzeugung waren, in Mittel- und Osteuropa bereite sich etwas vor, was in mächtigen sozialen Umwälzungen sich ausleben muß. In solchen Umwälzungen, von denen man glaubte, daß in den englisch sprechenden Gebieten für sie weder schon geschichtlich eine Notwendigkeit, noch eine Möglichkeit vorlag. Auf solches Denken richtete man die eigene Politik ein. In Mittel- und Osteuropa sah man das alles nicht, sondern orientierte die Politik so, daß sie «wie ein Kartengebäude zusammenstürzen» mußte. Nur eine Politik, die auf die Einsicht gebaut gewesen wäre, daß man in englisch sprechenden Gebieten großzügig, und ganz selbstverständlich vom englischen Gesichtspunkte, mit historischen Notwendigkeiten rechnete, hätte Grund und Boden gehabt. Aber die Anregung zu solcher Politik wäre wohl besonders den «Diplomaten» als etwas höchst Überflüssiges erschienen.

[ 11 ] Statt eine solche Politik, die zu Gedeihlichem hätte auch für Mittel- und Osteuropa vor dem Hereinbrechen der Weltkriegskatastrophe führen können trotz der Großzügigkeit der englisch orientierten Politik, zu treiben, fuhr man fort, in den eingefahrenen Diplomatengeleisen sich weiter zu bewegen. Und während der Kriegsschrecken lernte man aus bitteren Erfahrungen nicht, daß es notwendig geworden war, der Aufgabe, welche von Amerika aus in politischen Kundgebungen der Welt gestellt worden ist, von Europa aus eine andere entgegenzustellen, die aus den Lebenskräften dieses Europa heraus geboren war. Zwischen der Aufgabe, die aus amerikanischen Gesichtspunkten Wilson gestellt hatte, und derjenigen, die in den Donner der Kanonen als geistiger Impuls Europas hineingetönt hätte, wäre eine Verständigung möglich gewesen. Jedes andere Verständigungs-Gerede klang vor den geschichtlichen Notwendigkeiten hohl. - Aber der Sinn für ein Aufgaben-Stellen aus der Erfassung der im neueren Menschheitsleben liegenden Keime fehlte denen, die aus den Verhältnissen heraus an die Verwaltung des Deutschen Reiches herankamen. Und deshalb mußte der Herbst 1918 bringen, was er gebracht hat. Der Zusammenbruch der militärischen Gewalt wurde begleitet von einer geistigen Kapitulation. Statt wenigstens in dieser Zeit sich aufzuraffen zu einer aus europäischem Wollen heraus geholten Geltendmachung der geistigen Impulse des deutschen Volkes, kam die bloße Unterwerfung unter die vierzehn Punkte Wilsons. Man stellte Wilson vor ein Deutschland, das von sich aus nichts zu sagen hatte. Wie auch Wilson über seine eigenen vierzehn Punkte denkt, er kann doch Deutschland nur in dem helfen, was es selbst will. Er mußte doch eine Kundgebung dieses Wollens erwarten. Zu der Nichtigkeit der Politik vom Anfange des Krieges kam die andere vom Oktober 1918; kam die furchtbare geistige Kapitulation, herbeigeführt von einem Manne, auf den viele in deutschen Landen so etwas wie eine letzte Hoffnung setzten.

[ 12 ] Unglaube an die Einsicht aus geschichtlich wirkenden Kräften heraus; Abneigung, hinzusehen auf solche aus Erkenntnis geistiger Zusammenhänge sich ergebenden Impulse: das hat die Lage Mitteleuropas hervorgebracht. Jetzt ist durch die Tatsachen, die sich aus der Wirkung der Kriegskatastrophe ergeben haben, eine neue Lage geschaffen. Sie kann gekennzeichnet werden durch die Idee der sozialen Impulse der Menschheit, so wie diese Idee in dieser Schrift gemeint ist. Diese sozialen Impulse sprechen eine Sprache, der gegenüber die ganze zivilisierte Weit eine Aufgabe hat. Soll das Denken über dasjenige, was geschehen muß, heute gegenüber der sozialen Frage ebenso auf dem Nullpunkt angelangen, wie die mitteleuropäische Politik für ihre Aufgaben 1914 angekommen war? Landesgebiete, die sich von den damals in Frage kommenden Angelegenheiten abseits halten konnten: gegenüber der sozialen Bewegung dürfen sie es nicht. Gegenüber dieser Frage sollte es keine politischen Gegner, sollte es keine Neutralen geben; sollte es nur geben eine gemeinschaftlich wirkende Menschheit, welche geneigt ist, die Zeichen der Zeit zu vernehmen und ihr Handeln nach diesen Zeichen einzurichten. Man wird aus den Intentionen, die in dieser Schrift vorgetragen sind, heraus verstehen, warum der in dem folgenden Kapitel wiedergegebene Aufruf an das deutsche Volk und an die Kulturwelt von dem Schreiber dieser Ausführungen vor einiger Zeit verfaßt worden, und von einem Komitee, das für ihn Verständnis gefaßt hat, der Welt, vor allem den mitteleuropäischen Völkern mitgeteilt worden ist. Gegenwärtig sind andere Verhältnisse als zu der Zeit, in der sein Inhalt engeren Kreisen mitgeteilt worden ist. Dazumal hätte ihn die öffentliche Mitteilung ganz notwendig zur «Literatur» gemacht. Heute muß die Öffentlichkeit ihm dasjenige bringen, was sie ihm vor kurzer Zeit noch nicht hätte bringen können: verstehende Menschen, die in seinem Sinne wirken wollen, wenn er des Verständnisses und der Verwirklichung wert ist. Denn was jetzt entstehen soll, kann nur durch solche Menschen entstehen.

IV. International relations of social organisms

[ 1 ] The internal organization of the healthy social organism also makes international relations tripartite. Each of the three areas will have its own independent relationship to the corresponding areas of the other social organisms. The economic relations of one national territory will develop with those of another, without the relations of the constitutional states having any direct influence upon them.1Those who object that the legal and economic relations form in reality a whole and cannot be separated from each other, do not consider what is important in the division meant here. In the overall process of intercourse, the two relations naturally act as a whole. But it is a different matter whether rights are created out of economic needs and whether what arises from them interacts with commercial traffic. And conversely, the relations of constitutional states will develop within certain limits in complete independence of economic relations. This independence in the development of relations will enable them to have a balancing effect on each other in cases of conflict. Connections of interest between the individual social organisms will arise which will make the national borders appear insignificant for the coexistence of people. - The spiritual organizations of the individual national territories will be able to enter into relationships with one another that arise only from the common spiritual life of mankind itself. Spiritual life, independent of the state and on its own, will develop relationships that are impossible if the recognition of spiritual achievements does not depend on the administration of a spiritual organism, but on the rule of law. In this respect, there is also no difference between the achievements of what is obviously an international science and those of other intellectual fields. The language of a people and everything that arises in direct connection with language is also a spiritual field. The consciousness of the people itself belongs to this area. The people of one linguistic area do not come into unnatural conflict with those of another if they do not wish to make use of state organization or economic power to assert their folk culture. If one national culture has a greater capacity for expansion and spiritual fertility than another, the expansion will be justified, and it will take place peacefully if it comes about only through the institutions that are dependent on the spiritual organisms.

[ 2 ] At present, the threefolding of the social organism will still encounter the fiercest resistance from those human contexts that have developed from the commonalities of languages and popular cultures. This resistance will have to be broken by the goal which humanity as a whole will have to set itself more and more consciously as a result of the necessities of life in modern times. This humanity will realize that each of its parts can only attain a truly humane existence if it unites with all other parts in a vital way. Among other natural impulses, national connections are the causes by which legal and economic communities have been formed historically. But the forces through which the nationalities grow must unfold in an interaction that is not hindered by the relationships that the state bodies and economic cooperatives develop with one another. This is achieved when the national communities carry out the internal tripartite organization of their social organisms in such a way that each of the members can develop its independent relations with other social organisms.

[ 3 ] This creates multiform connections between peoples, states and economic bodies, which link each part of humanity with other parts in such a way that one feels the life of the others in its own interests. A League of Nations arises out of realistic basic impulses. It will not have to be "established" on the basis of one-sided legal views.2Those who see "utopias" in such things do not take into account that in reality life strives towards these institutions, which they consider utopian, and that the damage to this reality comes precisely from the fact that these institutions do not exist.

[ 4 ] It must appear of particular importance to a realistic thinking that the aims of a social organism described here are valid for mankind as a whole, but that they can be realized by each individual social organism, regardless of how other countries may provisionally behave towards this realization. If a social organism is divided into the three natural regions, the representatives of these can enter into international relations with others as a unified body, even if these others have not yet undertaken this division for themselves. Whoever leads the way with this division will work for a common human goal. What is to be done will be achieved much more through the power that a goal rooted in real human impulses demonstrates in life than through a declaration at congresses and out of agreements. This goal is conceived on a basis of reality; it can be striven for in real life, at every point in human communities.

[ 5 ] Those who in recent decades have followed the events in the life of peoples and states from a point of view such as that of this presentation have been able to perceive how the historical state formations, with their combination of intellectual, legal and economic life, have brought themselves into international relations that were pushing towards catastrophe. At the same time, however, such a person could also see how the opposing forces of unconscious human impulses pointed towards the threefold structure. This will be the remedy for the upheavals caused by the fanaticism of unity. But the lives of the "authoritative leaders of humanity" were not prepared to see what had long been in the offing. In the spring and early summer of 1914 one could still hear "statesmen" talking about the peace of Europe being secured thanks to the efforts of the governments according to human foresight. These "statesmen" had no idea that what they did and said had nothing to do with the course of actual events. But they were regarded as the "practitioners". And anyone who, contrary to the views of the "statesmen", formed views over the last few decades, such as those expressed by the writer of these remarks months before the war catastrophe, most recently in Vienna in front of a small audience (he would probably have been laughed at in front of a larger audience), was probably considered a "fanatic" at the time. He said roughly the following about what was threatening: The prevailing tendencies of life in the present will become stronger and stronger until they finally destroy themselves. Those who have a spiritual insight into social life can see how terrible tendencies towards social ulcerations are sprouting up everywhere. This is the great cultural concern that arises for those who see through existence. This is the dreadful thing which has such an oppressive effect and which, even if all enthusiasm for the recognition of the processes of life could otherwise be suppressed by the means of a science that recognizes spirits, should lead one to speak of the remedy in such a way that one would like to shout out words about it to the world. If the social organism continues to develop as it has done hitherto, damage to culture will arise which will be to this organism what cancerous formations are to the natural human organism. But the conception of life of the ruling circles formed impulses on this foundation of life, which they could not and would not see, which led to measures that should not have been taken and to none that were suitable to establish confidence between the various human communities. - Those who believe that the social necessities of life played no part among the immediate causes of the present world catastrophe should consider what would have become of the political impulses of the states pushing into war if the "statesmen" had included these social necessities in the content of their will. And what would not have happened if this content of will had been used to do anything other than create the explosives that were then bound to cause the explosion. When, in the last few decades, the creeping cancer in the relations between states as a consequence of the social life of the leading parts of humanity was considered, one could understand how a personality with general human spiritual interests, in view of the expression which the social will took on in these leading parts, had to say as early as 1888: "The aim is: to make the whole of humanity in its final organization into a realm of brothers who, pursuing only the noblest motives, move forward together. Whoever follows history only on the map of Europe could believe that a mutual general murder must fill our next future", but only the thought that a "path to the true goods of human life" must be found can maintain the sense of human dignity. And this thought is one "which does not seem to be in harmony with our immense warlike armaments and those of our neighbors, but in which I believe, and which must enlighten us if it should not be better at all to abolish human life by a common decision and to call for an official day of suicide." (Thus Herman Grimm 1888 on p.46 of his book: "Fifteen Essays. Fourth installment. From the last five years"). What were the "warlike armaments" other than measures taken by people who wanted to maintain state formations in a unified form, even though this form has become contradictory to the nature of a healthy coexistence of peoples due to the development of the new age? But such a healthy coexistence could be brought about by that social organism which is formed out of the necessities of life in the new age.

[ 6 ] The Austro-Hungarian state has been pressing for a reorganization for more than half a century. Its spiritual life, which was rooted in a multiplicity of communities of peoples, demanded a form for whose development the unified state formed from outdated impulses was an obstacle. The Serbian-Austrian conflict, which stood at the starting point of the world war catastrophe, is the most valid testimony to the fact that from a certain point in time the political borders of this unitary state could not be cultural borders for the life of nations. If there had been a possibility that spiritual life, left to itself and independent of the political state and its borders, could have developed beyond these borders in a way that would have been in harmony with the aims of the peoples, then the conflict rooted in spiritual life would not have had to discharge itself in a political catastrophe. To all those in Austria-Hungary who imagined that they were thinking "statesmanlike", such a development appeared to be a complete impossibility, even pure nonsense. Their habits of thought allowed for nothing other than the idea that state borders coincided with the borders of national commonalities. Understanding that intellectual organizations could form across national borders, encompassing the school system and other branches of intellectual life, was contrary to these habits of thought. And yet this "unthinkable" is the demand of modern times for international life. The practical thinker must not get stuck on the seemingly impossible and believe that institutions in the sense of this demand encounter insurmountable difficulties; rather, he must direct his efforts precisely towards overcoming these difficulties. Instead of taking "statesmanlike" thinking in a direction that would have corresponded to modern demands, efforts were made to form institutions that would uphold the unitary state against these demands. As a result, this state became more and more of an impossible entity. And in the second decade of the twentieth century, it was faced with the prospect of being unable to do anything more to preserve itself in its old form and having to expect its dissolution, or to maintain what was internally impossible externally through the violence that could be justified by the measures of the war. In 1914, the Austro-Hungarian "statesmen" had no other option than this: Either they had to steer their intentions in the direction of the living conditions of the healthy social organism and communicate this to the world as their will, which could have inspired a new confidence, or they had to unleash a war to maintain the old. Only those who judge what happened in 1914 from this background will be able to think fairly about the question of guilt. The participation of many peoples in the Austro-Hungarian state would have given it the world-historical task of developing a healthy social organism above all. This task was not recognized. This sin against the spirit of world-historical development drove Austria-Hungary into war.

[ 7 ] And the German Empire? It was founded at a time when the modern demands for a healthy social organism were striving towards their realization. This realization could have given the empire its right to exist in world history. The social impulses came together in this Central European empire as in the area that could appear predestined for their realization in world history. Social thinking appeared in many places; in the German Empire it took on a special form, from which it was clear where it was heading. This should have led to a working content for this empire. It should have set tasks for its administrators. It could have proved the justification of this empire in the modern coexistence of nations if the newly founded empire had been given a working content that would have been demanded by the forces of history itself. Instead of tackling this task on a grand scale, they stopped at "social reforms" that arose from the demands of the day and were happy when the exemplary validity of these reforms was admired abroad. In addition, there was a growing desire to base the external world power of the empire on forms that were formed from the most sophisticated ideas about the power and splendor of states. An empire was formed which, like the Austro-Hungarian state structure, contradicted what was historically heralded in the forces of international life in modern times. The administrators of this empire saw nothing of these forces. The state structure that they had in mind could only rest on the power of the military. The one demanded by modern history should have rested on the realization of the impulses for a healthy social organism. With this realization, one would have placed oneself in the commonality of the modern life of nations differently than one stood in it in 1914. Due to its failure to understand the modern demands of international life, German politics had reached the zero point of its possibilities for action in 1914. In recent decades, it had noticed nothing of what should have happened; it had occupied itself with all sorts of things that were not part of the forces of modern development and which, due to their lack of content, had to "collapse like a pack of cards".

[ 8 ] A true reflection of the tragic fate of the German Reich would emerge from the course of history if one were to take the liberty of examining the events in the key places in Berlin at the end of July and August 1, 1914 and presenting them faithfully to the world. Little is known about these events at home or abroad. Those who are familiar with them know how German politics at that time behaved like a house of cards, and how all decisions as to whether and how to start the war had to pass into the judgment of the military administration. Whoever was in charge of this administration could at that time, from the military point of view, not act differently than was done, because from these points of view the situation could only be seen as it was seen. For, apart from the military sphere, they had put themselves in a position that could no longer lead to action. All of this would be a fact of world history if someone could be found who insisted on bringing to light the events in Berlin at the end of July and August 1, in particular everything that happened on August 1 and July 31. People are still under the illusion that nothing can be gained from an insight into these events if we know the preparatory events from the earlier period. If we want to talk about what is currently called the "question of guilt", we must not avoid this insight. Certainly, one can also know about the causes that existed long before through other things; but this insight shows how these causes worked.

[ 9 ] The ideas that drove Germany's leaders into war at that time continued to have a disastrous effect. They became popular sentiment. And they prevented the insight of those in power from developing during the final years of horror through the bitter experiences whose absence had previously driven them to tragedy. The writer of these remarks wanted to build on the possible receptivity that could have resulted from these experiences when he tried to bring the ideas of the healthy social organism and its consequences for political behavior to personalities within Germany and Austria at the time of the war catastrophe, which seemed to him to be the appropriate time, whose influence could still have been used to assert these impulses. Personalities who were sincere about the fate of the German people were involved in gaining access to these ideas. They spoke in vain. The habits of thought resisted such impulses, which appeared to the only military-oriented imagination as something with which one could do nothing right. At most, they thought that "separating the church from the school", yes, that would be something. The thoughts of the "statesmanlike" thinkers had been running along these lines for a long time, and they could not be moved in a direction that would lead to anything radical. Well-meaning people said that I should "publish" these thoughts. That was probably the most inappropriate advice at the time. What good could it do if, in the field of "literature", these impulses had also been spoken of among many others; by a private man. It is in the nature of these impulses that at that time they could only have attained significance through the place from which they were spoken. The peoples of Central Europe, if they had spoken from the right place in the sense of these impulses, would have seen that there could be something that would have corresponded to their more or less conscious urge. And the peoples of the Russian East would certainly have had an understanding at that time for the replacement of Tsarism by such impulses. That they would have had this understanding can only be denied by those who have no feeling for the receptivity of the still unused East European intellect to healthy social ideas. Instead of a rally in the spirit of such ideas came Brest-Litovsk.

[ 10 ] The fact that military thinking could not avert the catastrophe of Central and Eastern Europe could only be concealed by military thinking. The fact that people did not want to believe in the inevitability of the catastrophe was the cause of the German people's misfortune. No one wanted to see how, in the places where the decision lay, there was no sense of world-historical necessities. Those who knew something of these necessities were also aware of how the English-speaking peoples had personalities in their midst who saw through what was stirring in the popular forces of Central and Eastern Europe. One could know how such personalities were convinced that something was preparing itself in Central and Eastern Europe which must find expression in mighty social upheavals. Such upheavals were believed to be neither a historical necessity nor a possibility in the English-speaking regions. Their own policies were geared towards such thinking. In Central and Eastern Europe, none of this was seen, but policy was oriented in such a way that it had to "collapse like a house of cards". Only a policy based on the realization that in English-speaking territories, historical necessities were taken into account generously and quite naturally from an English point of view would have had a basis. But the suggestion of such a policy would probably have appeared to the "diplomats" in particular as something highly superfluous.

[ 11 ] Instead of pursuing such a policy, which could have led to prosperity for Central and Eastern Europe before the onset of the world war catastrophe, despite the generosity of the English-oriented policy, they continued to move along the well-worn diplomatic tracks. And during the horrors of war they did not learn from bitter experience that it had become necessary to counter the task set by America in political rallies of the world with another task from Europe, one born out of the vital forces of this Europe. An understanding would have been possible between the task that Wilson had set from the American point of view and the one that would have resounded in the thunder of the cannons as the spiritual impulse of Europe. Any other talk of understanding sounded hollow in the face of historical necessities. - But those who approached the administration of the German Reich from within the circumstances lacked a sense of setting tasks based on a grasp of the germs of modern human life. And that is why the fall of 1918 had to bring what it brought. The collapse of military power was accompanied by a spiritual capitulation. Instead of, at least at this time, trying to muster a European will to assert the spiritual impulses of the German people, there was mere submission to Wilson's fourteen points. Wilson was presented with a Germany that had nothing to say of its own accord. Whatever Wilson thought of his own fourteen points, he could only help Germany in what she herself wanted. He had to expect a manifestation of this will. In addition to the inanity of the policy at the beginning of the war, there was the other one in October 1918; there was the terrible spiritual capitulation brought about by a man on whom many in German lands placed something like a last hope.

[ 12 ] Unbelief in the insight of historically active forces; reluctance to look at such impulses arising from knowledge of spiritual connections: this is what the situation in Central Europe has produced. Now a new situation has been created by the facts resulting from the effects of the war catastrophe. It can be characterized by the idea of the social impulses of humanity, as this idea is meant in this writing. These social impulses speak a language to which the entire civilized world has a task. Should thinking about what needs to happen in relation to the social question reach the same zero point today as Central European politics had reached for its tasks in 1914? The national territories, which were able to remain aloof from the issues in question at that time, must not do so with regard to the social movement. There should be no political opponents to this question, there should be no neutrals; there should only be a united humanity that is inclined to hear the signs of the times and to act according to these signs. From the intentions expressed in this writing, one will understand why the appeal to the German people and to the world of culture reproduced in the following chapter was written some time ago by the author of these remarks and communicated to the world, above all to the peoples of Central Europe, by a committee that has come to understand it. The present circumstances are different from those at the time when its contents were communicated to a narrower circle. In those days, public communication would necessarily have turned it into "literature". Today, the public must bring it what it could not have brought it a short time ago: understanding people who want to work in its spirit, if it is worthy of understanding and realization. For what is to be created now can only be created by such people.