The Rudolf Steiner Archive

4. International Relations of Social Organisms

[ 1 ] The internal organization of the healthy social organism also makes international relations tripartite. Each of the three areas will have its own independent relationship to the corresponding areas of the other social organisms. The economic relations of one national territory will develop with those of another, without the relations of the constitutional states having any direct influence upon them.^{1Those who object that the legal and economic relations form in reality a whole and cannot be separated from each other, do not consider what is important in the division meant here. In the overall process of intercourse, the two relations naturally act as a whole. But it is a different matter whether rights are created out of economic needs and whether what arises from them interacts with commercial traffic.} And conversely, the relations of constitutional states will develop within certain limits in complete independence of economic relations. This independence in the development of relations will enable them to have a balancing effect on each other in cases of conflict. Connections of interest between the individual social organisms will arise which will make the national borders appear insignificant for the coexistence of people. - The spiritual organizations of the individual national territories will be able to enter into relationships with one another that arise only from the common spiritual life of mankind itself. Spiritual life, independent of the state and on its own, will develop relationships that are impossible if the recognition of spiritual achievements does not depend on the administration of a spiritual organism, but on the rule of law. In this respect, there is also no difference between the achievements of what is obviously an international science and those of other intellectual fields. The language of a people and everything that arises in direct connection with language is also a spiritual field. The consciousness of the people itself belongs to this area. The people of one linguistic area do not come into unnatural conflict with those of another if they do not wish to make use of state organization or economic power to assert their folk culture. If one national culture has a greater capacity for expansion and spiritual fertility than another, the expansion will be justified, and it will take place peacefully if it comes about only through the institutions that are dependent on the spiritual organisms.

[ 2 ] At present, the threefolding of the social organism will still encounter the fiercest resistance from those human contexts that have developed from the commonalities of languages and popular cultures. This resistance will have to be broken by the goal which humanity as a whole will have to set itself more and more consciously as a result of the necessities of life in modern times. This humanity will realize that each of its parts can only attain a truly humane existence if it unites with all other parts in a vital way. Among other natural impulses, national connections are the causes by which legal and economic communities have been formed historically. But the forces through which the nationalities grow must unfold in an interaction that is not hindered by the relationships that the state bodies and economic cooperatives develop with one another. This is achieved when the national communities carry out the internal tripartite organization of their social organisms in such a way that each of the members can develop its independent relations with other social organisms.

[ 3 ] This creates multiform connections between peoples, states and economic bodies, which link each part of humanity with other parts in such a way that one feels the life of the others in its own interests. A League of Nations arises out of realistic basic impulses. It will not have to be "established" on the basis of one-sided legal views.^{2Those who see "utopias" in such things do not take into account that in reality life strives towards these institutions, which they consider utopian, and that the damage to this reality comes precisely from the fact that these institutions do not exist.}

[ 4 ] It must appear of particular importance to a realistic thinking that the aims of a social organism described here are valid for mankind as a whole, but that they can be realized by each individual social organism, regardless of how other countries may provisionally behave towards this realization. If a social organism is divided into the three natural regions, the representatives of these can enter into international relations with others as a unified body, even if these others have not yet undertaken this division for themselves. Whoever leads the way with this division will work for a common human goal. What is to be done will be achieved much more through the power that a goal rooted in real human impulses demonstrates in life than through a declaration at congresses and out of agreements. This goal is conceived on a basis of reality; it can be striven for in real life, at every point in human communities.

[ 5 ] Those who in recent decades have followed the events in the life of peoples and states from a point of view such as that of this presentation have been able to perceive how the historical state formations, with their combination of intellectual, legal and economic life, have brought themselves into international relations that were pushing towards catastrophe. At the same time, however, such a person could also see how the opposing forces of unconscious human impulses pointed towards the threefold structure. This will be the remedy for the upheavals caused by the fanaticism of unity. But the lives of the "authoritative leaders of humanity" were not prepared to see what had long been in the offing. In the spring and early summer of 1914 one could still hear "statesmen" talking about the peace of Europe being secured thanks to the efforts of the governments according to human foresight. These "statesmen" had no idea that what they did and said had nothing to do with the course of actual events. But they were regarded as the "practitioners". And anyone who, contrary to the views of the "statesmen", formed views over the last few decades, such as those expressed by the writer of these remarks months before the war catastrophe, most recently in Vienna in front of a small audience (he would probably have been laughed at in front of a larger audience), was probably considered a "fanatic" at the time. He said roughly the following about what was threatening: The prevailing tendencies of life in the present will become stronger and stronger until they finally destroy themselves. Those who have a spiritual insight into social life can see how terrible tendencies towards social ulcerations are sprouting up everywhere. This is the great cultural concern that arises for those who see through existence. This is the dreadful thing which has such an oppressive effect and which, even if all enthusiasm for the recognition of the processes of life could otherwise be suppressed by the means of a science that recognizes spirits, should lead one to speak of the remedy in such a way that one would like to shout out words about it to the world. If the social organism continues to develop as it has done hitherto, damage to culture will arise which will be to this organism what cancerous formations are to the natural human organism. But the conception of life of the ruling circles formed impulses on this foundation of life, which they could not and would not see, which led to measures that should not have been taken and to none that were suitable to establish confidence between the various human communities. - Those who believe that the social necessities of life played no part among the immediate causes of the present world catastrophe should consider what would have become of the political impulses of the states pushing into war if the "statesmen" had included these social necessities in the content of their will. And what would not have happened if this content of will had been used to do anything other than create the explosives that were then bound to cause the explosion. When, in the last few decades, the creeping cancer in the relations between states as a consequence of the social life of the leading parts of humanity was considered, one could understand how a personality with general human spiritual interests, in view of the expression which the social will took on in these leading parts, had to say as early as 1888: "The aim is: to make the whole of humanity in its final organization into a realm of brothers who, pursuing only the noblest motives, move forward together. Whoever follows history only on the map of Europe could believe that a mutual general murder must fill our next future", but only the thought that a "path to the true goods of human life" must be found can maintain the sense of human dignity. And this thought is one "which does not seem to be in harmony with our immense warlike armaments and those of our neighbors, but in which I believe, and which must enlighten us if it should not be better at all to abolish human life by a common decision and to call for an official day of suicide." (Thus Herman Grimm 1888 on p.46 of his book: "Fifteen Essays. Fourth installment. From the last five years"). What were the "warlike armaments" other than measures taken by people who wanted to maintain state formations in a unified form, even though this form has become contradictory to the nature of a healthy coexistence of peoples due to the development of the new age? But such a healthy coexistence could be brought about by that social organism which is formed out of the necessities of life in the new age.

[ 6 ] The Austro-Hungarian state has been pressing for a reorganization for more than half a century. Its spiritual life, which was rooted in a multiplicity of communities of peoples, demanded a form for whose development the unified state formed from outdated impulses was an obstacle. The Serbian-Austrian conflict, which stood at the starting point of the world war catastrophe, is the most valid testimony to the fact that from a certain point in time the political borders of this unitary state could not be cultural borders for the life of nations. If there had been a possibility that spiritual life, left to itself and independent of the political state and its borders, could have developed beyond these borders in a way that would have been in harmony with the aims of the peoples, then the conflict rooted in spiritual life would not have had to discharge itself in a political catastrophe. To all those in Austria-Hungary who imagined that they were thinking "statesmanlike", such a development appeared to be a complete impossibility, even pure nonsense. Their habits of thought allowed for nothing other than the idea that state borders coincided with the borders of national commonalities. Understanding that intellectual organizations could form across national borders, encompassing the school system and other branches of intellectual life, was contrary to these habits of thought. And yet this "unthinkable" is the demand of modern times for international life. The practical thinker must not get stuck on the seemingly impossible and believe that institutions in the sense of this demand encounter insurmountable difficulties; rather, he must direct his efforts precisely towards overcoming these difficulties. Instead of taking "statesmanlike" thinking in a direction that would have corresponded to modern demands, efforts were made to form institutions that would uphold the unitary state against these demands. As a result, this state became more and more of an impossible entity. And in the second decade of the twentieth century, it was faced with the prospect of being unable to do anything more to preserve itself in its old form and having to expect its dissolution, or to maintain what was internally impossible externally through the violence that could be justified by the measures of the war. In 1914, the Austro-Hungarian "statesmen" had no other option than this: Either they had to steer their intentions in the direction of the living conditions of the healthy social organism and communicate this to the world as their will, which could have inspired a new confidence, or they had to unleash a war to maintain the old. Only those who judge what happened in 1914 from this background will be able to think fairly about the question of guilt. The participation of many peoples in the Austro-Hungarian state would have given it the world-historical task of developing a healthy social organism above all. This task was not recognized. This sin against the spirit of world-historical development drove Austria-Hungary into war.

[ 7 ] And the German Empire? It was founded at a time when the modern demands for a healthy social organism were striving towards their realization. This realization could have given the empire its right to exist in world history. The social impulses came together in this Central European empire as in the area that could appear predestined for their realization in world history. Social thinking appeared in many places; in the German Empire it took on a special form, from which it was clear where it was heading. This should have led to a working content for this empire. It should have set tasks for its administrators. It could have proved the justification of this empire in the modern coexistence of nations if the newly founded empire had been given a working content that would have been demanded by the forces of history itself. Instead of tackling this task on a grand scale, they stopped at "social reforms" that arose from the demands of the day and were happy when the exemplary validity of these reforms was admired abroad. In addition, there was a growing desire to base the external world power of the empire on forms that were formed from the most sophisticated ideas about the power and splendor of states. An empire was formed which, like the Austro-Hungarian state structure, contradicted what was historically heralded in the forces of international life in modern times. The administrators of this empire saw nothing of these forces. The state structure that they had in mind could only rest on the power of the military. The one demanded by modern history should have rested on the realization of the impulses for a healthy social organism. With this realization, one would have placed oneself in the commonality of the modern life of nations differently than one stood in it in 1914. Due to its failure to understand the modern demands of international life, German politics had reached the zero point of its possibilities for action in 1914. In recent decades, it had noticed nothing of what should have happened; it had occupied itself with all sorts of things that were not part of the forces of modern development and which, due to their lack of content, had to "collapse like a pack of cards".

[ 8 ] A true reflection of the tragic fate of the German Reich would emerge from the course of history if one were to take the liberty of examining the events in the key places in Berlin at the end of July and August 1, 1914 and presenting them faithfully to the world. Little is known about these events at home or abroad. Those who are familiar with them know how German politics at that time behaved like a house of cards, and how all decisions as to whether and how to start the war had to pass into the judgment of the military administration. Whoever was in charge of this administration could at that time, from the military point of view, not act differently than was done, because from these points of view the situation could only be seen as it was seen. For, apart from the military sphere, they had put themselves in a position that could no longer lead to action. All of this would be a fact of world history if someone could be found who insisted on bringing to light the events in Berlin at the end of July and August 1, in particular everything that happened on August 1 and July 31. People are still under the illusion that nothing can be gained from an insight into these events if we know the preparatory events from the earlier period. If we want to talk about what is currently called the "question of guilt", we must not avoid this insight. Certainly, one can also know about the causes that existed long before through other things; but this insight shows how these causes worked.

[ 9 ] The ideas that drove Germany's leaders into war at that time continued to have a disastrous effect. They became popular sentiment. And they prevented the insight of those in power from developing during the final years of horror through the bitter experiences whose absence had previously driven them to tragedy. The writer of these remarks wanted to build on the possible receptivity that could have resulted from these experiences when he tried to bring the ideas of the healthy social organism and its consequences for political behavior to personalities within Germany and Austria at the time of the war catastrophe, which seemed to him to be the appropriate time, whose influence could still have been used to assert these impulses. Personalities who were sincere about the fate of the German people were involved in gaining access to these ideas. They spoke in vain. The habits of thought resisted such impulses, which appeared to the only military-oriented imagination as something with which one could do nothing right. At most, they thought that "separating the church from the school", yes, that would be something. The thoughts of the "statesmanlike" thinkers had been running along these lines for a long time, and they could not be moved in a direction that would lead to anything radical. Well-meaning people said that I should "publish" these thoughts. That was probably the most inappropriate advice at the time. What good could it do if, in the field of "literature", these impulses had also been spoken of among many others; by a private man. It is in the nature of these impulses that at that time they could only have attained significance through the place from which they were spoken. The peoples of Central Europe, if they had spoken from the right place in the sense of these impulses, would have seen that there could be something that would have corresponded to their more or less conscious urge. And the peoples of the Russian East would certainly have had an understanding at that time for the replacement of Tsarism by such impulses. That they would have had this understanding can only be denied by those who have no feeling for the receptivity of the still unused East European intellect to healthy social ideas. Instead of a rally in the spirit of such ideas came Brest-Litovsk.

[ 10 ] The fact that military thinking could not avert the catastrophe of Central and Eastern Europe could only be concealed by military thinking. The fact that people did not want to believe in the inevitability of the catastrophe was the cause of the German people's misfortune. No one wanted to see how, in the places where the decision lay, there was no sense of world-historical necessities. Those who knew something of these necessities were also aware of how the English-speaking peoples had personalities in their midst who saw through what was stirring in the popular forces of Central and Eastern Europe. One could know how such personalities were convinced that something was preparing itself in Central and Eastern Europe which must find expression in mighty social upheavals. Such upheavals were believed to be neither a historical necessity nor a possibility in the English-speaking regions. Their own policies were geared towards such thinking. In Central and Eastern Europe, none of this was seen, but policy was oriented in such a way that it had to "collapse like a house of cards". Only a policy based on the realization that in English-speaking territories, historical necessities were taken into account generously and quite naturally from an English point of view would have had a basis. But the suggestion of such a policy would probably have appeared to the "diplomats" in particular as something highly superfluous.

[ 11 ] Instead of pursuing such a policy, which could have led to prosperity for Central and Eastern Europe before the onset of the world war catastrophe, despite the generosity of the English-oriented policy, they continued to move along the well-worn diplomatic tracks. And during the horrors of war they did not learn from bitter experience that it had become necessary to counter the task set by America in political rallies of the world with another task from Europe, one born out of the vital forces of this Europe. An understanding would have been possible between the task that Wilson had set from the American point of view and the one that would have resounded in the thunder of the cannons as the spiritual impulse of Europe. Any other talk of understanding sounded hollow in the face of historical necessities. - But those who approached the administration of the German Reich from within the circumstances lacked a sense of setting tasks based on a grasp of the germs of modern human life. And that is why the fall of 1918 had to bring what it brought. The collapse of military power was accompanied by a spiritual capitulation. Instead of, at least at this time, trying to muster a European will to assert the spiritual impulses of the German people, there was mere submission to Wilson's fourteen points. Wilson was presented with a Germany that had nothing to say of its own accord. Whatever Wilson thought of his own fourteen points, he could only help Germany in what she herself wanted. He had to expect a manifestation of this will. In addition to the inanity of the policy at the beginning of the war, there was the other one in October 1918; there was the terrible spiritual capitulation brought about by a man on whom many in German lands placed something like a last hope.

[ 12 ] Unbelief in the insight of historically active forces; reluctance to look at such impulses arising from knowledge of spiritual connections: this is what the situation in Central Europe has produced. Now a new situation has been created by the facts resulting from the effects of the war catastrophe. It can be characterized by the idea of the social impulses of humanity, as this idea is meant in this writing. These social impulses speak a language to which the entire civilized world has a task. Should thinking about what needs to happen in relation to the social question reach the same zero point today as Central European politics had reached for its tasks in 1914? The national territories, which were able to remain aloof from the issues in question at that time, must not do so with regard to the social movement. There should be no political opponents to this question, there should be no neutrals; there should only be a united humanity that is inclined to hear the signs of the times and to act according to these signs. From the intentions expressed in this writing, one will understand why the appeal to the German people and to the world of culture reproduced in the following chapter was written some time ago by the author of these remarks and communicated to the world, above all to the peoples of Central Europe, by a committee that has come to understand it. The present circumstances are different from those at the time when its contents were communicated to a narrower circle. In those days, public communication would necessarily have turned it into "literature". Today, the public must bring it what it could not have brought it a short time ago: understanding people who want to work in its spirit, if it is worthy of understanding and realization. For what is to be created now can only be created by such people.