The Life, Nature, and Cultivation of Anthroposophy
GA 260a
Member Newsletter, 10 February 1924
4. The Relation of the Members to the Society
It is natural that different points of view exist among the members about their own relation to the Anthroposophical Society. A person may enter the Society with the idea that he will find in it what he is seeking out of the inmost needs of his soul. In his search and in the finding of what the Society can give him, such a member will then see the meaning of his membership. I have already indicated that no objection can properly be made to this point of view.
From the very essence of Anthroposophy, it cannot be for the Society to bring together a circle of human beings, and impose upon them when they enter it obligations which they did not recognise before, but are expected to take on simply on account of the Society. If we are to speak of obligations in the proper sense, it can only be of those of the Society towards its members.
This truth (it should indeed go without saying) involves another which is not always rightly understood, nay, is sometimes not even considered.
As soon as a member begins to be active in any way in the Society and for it, he takes upon himself a great responsibility, a very solemn sphere of duty. Those who do not intend to be thus active should not be disturbed in the quiet spheres of their work; but if a member undertakes any activity in the Society, he must thenceforth make the concerns of the Society his own, and this he must on no account forget.
It is natural for one who wishes to be a quiet member to say, for example, ‘I cannot concern myself with the statements of opponents about the Society’. But this is changed the moment he goes outside the sphere of silent participation. Then at once it becomes his duty to pay attention to the opponents and to defend all that is worthy of defence in Anthroposophy and the Anthroposophical Society.
It was bad for the Society that this most necessary fact was not always observed. Members have the fullest right to expect that the Society will give them in the first place what it promises to give. It must surely seem strange to them to be called upon at once to undertake the same obligations as those who hold out these promises.
If, then, we speak of the duties of members to the Society, we can only be referring to those members who desire to be active. This question must not of course be confused with that of the duties which belong to man as such. Anthroposophy does indeed speak of duties. But these will always be of a purely human character; they will only extend the horizons of human responsibility in a way that results from insight into the spiritual world. When Anthroposophy speaks in this way, it can never mean obligations that apply only in the Anthroposophical Society. It will mean duties arising out of human nature rightly understood.
Once more, then, for the members who are active in it, the Anthroposophical Society by its very nature involves definite responsibilities, and these — for the same reason — must be taken most seriously. A member, for example, may wish to communicate to others the knowledge and perceptions of Anthroposophy. The moment his instruction extends beyond the smallest and most quiet circle, he enters into these responsibilities. He must then have a clear conception of the spiritual and intellectual position of mankind today. He must be clear in his own mind about the real task of Anthroposophy. To the very best of his ability he must keep in close contact with other active members of the Society; and it must be far from him to say, ‘I am not interested when Anthroposophy and those who represent it are placed in a false light, or even slandered by opponents’.
The Executive formed at the Christmas gathering understands its task in this sense. It will seek to realise in the Society what has here been expressed, and it can do no other than ask every member intending to be active to make himself a helper and co-operator in these matters.
Only so shall we achieve our purpose, and the Society will be equal to the promise which it holds out to all its members — and thereby to the world at large.
To take one example, it is distressing to have the following experience. It sometimes happens that the members in a certain place, who desire to be active, meet from time to time to discuss the affairs of the Society. In conversation with individuals who take part in these meetings, it will afterwards emerge that they hold certain opinions about each other, each other's activities for the Society, and the like — opinions which are not voiced at all in the meetings. A member, one will find, has no idea what those who are often associated with him think of his work.
It is essential for these matters to be guided into better channels, and this should follow from the impulse which the Christmas gathering has given. Those above all who claim and desire to be active members, should seek to understand this impulse. How often does one hear such members say: I really have the good-will but I do not know what is the right line to take. We should not hold an all too comfortable view upon this subject of ‘good-will’, but ask ourselves again and again, have we really explored all channels which the Society provides to find the right line in co-operation, on the strength of our good-will, with other members?
4. Die Stellung der Mitglieder zur Gesellschaft
Es ist begreiflich, daß unter den Mitgliedern der Anthroposophischen Gesellschaft eine verschiedene Auffassung herrscht über ihre Stellung zu dieser Gesellschaft. Wer in diese eintritt, kann die Auffassung haben, in ihr zu finden, was er aus den innersten Bedürfnissen seiner Seele heraus sucht. Und in diesem Suchen und dem Finden dessen, was ihm die Gesellschaft geben kann, findet dann ein solches Mitglied den Sinn seiner Mitgliedschaft. Ich habe schon angedeutet, daß gegen eine solche Auffassung im Grunde nichts eingewendet werden kann.
Denn die Gesellschaft kann wegen des Wesens der Anthroposophie _ nicht die Aufgabe haben, einen Kreis von Menschen zu vereinigen, denen sie bei ihrem Eintritte Pflichten auferlegt, die sie nicht schon vorher anerkannt haben, sondern nur um der Gesellschaft willen ausüben sollen. Pflichten kann im eigentlichen Sinne nur die Gesellschaft gegenüber den Mitgliedern haben. .
Aber gerade dieses Selbstverständliche bewirkt ein anderes, das nicht immer in der richtigen Art angesehen, oft überhaupt nicht einmal
bedacht wird. Es erwächst nämlich sogleich für dasjenige Mitglied, das in irgendeiner Art tätig in der Gesellschaft für diese wird, eine große Verantwortlichkeit und ein ernster Pflichtenkreis. Wer zu einer solchen Tätigkeit nicht überzugehen die Absicht hat, dem sollte man seine stillen Kreise nicht stören. Wer aber in der Gesellschaft irgend etwas tun will, der darf nicht außer acht lassen, daß er die Angelegenheiten der Gesellschaft zu seinen eigenen machen muß.
Will jemand ein stilles Mitglied sein, dann muß es an ihm begreiflich sein, wenn er zum Beispiel sagt: ich kann mich nicht darum bekümmern, was die Gegner der Gesellschaft über diese sagen. Das hört sogleich auf, wenn er über den Kreis der stillen Anteilnahme hinausgeht. Dann erwächst ihm sogleich die Aufgabe, auf die Gegnerschaft hinzusehen und an der Anthroposophie und Gesellschaft das zu verteidigen, was an ihr in berechtigter Art zu verteidigen ist.
Daß dieser ganz notwendigen Tatsache nicht immer Rechnung getragen worden ist, war der Gesellschaft nicht förderlich. Es muß die Mitglieder, die von der Gesellschaft mit allem guten Recht fordern können, daß sie ihnen zunächst gibt, was sie ihnen verspricht, sonderbar berühren, wenn man sogleich von ihnen denselben Pflichtenkreis verlangt, den diejenigen sich auferlegen müssen, welche diese Versprechungen machen.
Wenn man von Pflichten der Mitglieder im Hinblick auf die Gesellschaft redet, so kann sich dieses also nur auf die tätig sein wollenden Mitglieder beziehen. Das soll natürlich nicht verwechselt werden mit dem Sprechen von Verpflichtungen der Menschen als solchen, das aus der Anthroposophie selbst heraus sich ergibt. Diese Dinge werden aber immer den ganz allgemeinen menschlichen Charakter tragen und nur den Anschauungskreis darüber so erweitern, wie sich das aus der Einsicht in die geistige Welt ergibt. Redet die Anthroposophie von solchen Verpflichtungen, so kann sie damit nie meinen, daß man damit etwas nur für die Anthroposophische Gesellschaft Verbindliches sagt, sondern etwas, das sich aus der recht verstandenen Menschenwesenheit als solcher ergibt.
Aber gerade deswegen, weil aus dem Wesen der Anthroposophischen Gesellschaft für die in ihr tätigen Mitglieder der Pflichtenkreis erwächst, sollte dieser so ernst wie möglich genommen werden. Wer zum Beispiele als Mitglied der Gesellschaft anderen die Einsichten der Anthroposophie überliefern will, dem erwachsen sogleich diese Pflichten, wenn er über den allerengsten stillen Kreis einer solchen Belehrung hinausgeht. Ein solcher wird sich klar sein müssen über die allgemeine geistige Lage der Menschen in der gegenwärtigen Zeit. Er wird von der Aufgabe der Anthroposophie eine deutliche Vorstellung haben müssen. Er wird, soviel ihm dies auch nur möglich ist, sich in Zusammenhang halten müssen mit den andern tätigen Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft. Eine solche Persönlichkeit wird weit davon entfernt sein müssen, zu sagen: es erregt mein Interesse nicht, wenn die Anthroposophie und ihre Träger von Gegnern in einem falschen Lichte dargestellt oder sogar verleumdet werden.
Der Vorstand, der bei der Weihnachtstagung gebildet worden ist, faßt seine Aufgabe so auf, daß er dem hier Ausgesprochenen innerhalb der Gesellschaft zur Verwirklichung verhelfen will. Und er kann nicht anders, als alle tätig sein wollenden Mitglieder darum zu bitten, sich zu Mithelfern dieser seiner Absichten zu machen.
Nur dadurch kann erreicht werden, daß die Gesellschaft ihrer gesamten Mitgliedschaft und damit auch der Welt das halten kann, was sie verspricht.
Es ist zum Beispiel wirklich betrüblich, wenn man die folgende Erfahrung macht: Es kommt innerhalb der Gesellschaft vor, daß sich an einem Orte tätig sein wollende Mitglieder von Zeit zu Zeit über die Angelegenheiten der Gesellschaft besprechen. Sie halten zu diesem Zwecke Versammlungen ab. Wenn man dann mit den einzelnen Persönlichkeiten, die bei diesen Versammlungen sitzen, spricht, so bemerkt man, daß sie in Wirklichkeit übereinander, über ihre Tätigkeiten für die Gesellschaft und so weiter Ansichten haben, die bei den Versammlungen gar nicht zur Sprache kommen. Man kann erfahren, daß irgend jemand gar keine Ahnung hat, wie die oft mit ihm Vereinten über seine Tätigkeit denken. Dergleichen in bessere Bahnen zu bringen, müßte ganz unbedingt aus dem Impuls folgen, den die Weihnachtstagung gegeben hat. Die tätig sein wollenden Mitglieder vor allen müßten diesen Impuls zu verstehen versuchen. Man hört von solchen tätig sein wollenden Mitgliedern gar oft sagen: ich habe ja den guten Willen; aber ich weiß eben nicht, was das Richtige ist. Man sollte über diesen «guten Willen» doch nicht eine allzu bequeme Ansicht haben. Man sollte sich doch immer wieder fragen: habe ich denn auch wirklich alle Wege gesucht, die sich in der Gesellschaft bieten, um das «Richtige» in der gutwilligen Zusammenarbeit mit andern zu finden?
4. The position of members in relation to the Society
It is understandable that members of the Anthroposophical Society have different views on their position in relation to this Society. Those who join may believe that they will find within it what they seek from the innermost needs of their soul. And in this seeking and finding what the Society can give them, such members then find the meaning of their membership. I have already indicated that there is basically nothing to be objected to in such a view.
For, because of the nature of anthroposophy, the Society cannot have the task of uniting a circle of people on whom it imposes duties upon joining that they have not already recognized, but are to perform solely for the sake of the Society. In the true sense, only the Society can have duties toward its members. .
But it is precisely this self-evident fact that has another effect, which is not always viewed in the right way, and often not even considered at all.
For the member who becomes active in the society in any way immediately assumes a great responsibility and a serious set of duties. Those who have no intention of taking on such a role should not have their quiet lives disturbed. However, those who want to do something in the society must not forget that they must make the affairs of the society their own.
If someone wants to be a silent member, then it must be understandable to them when, for example, they say: I cannot concern myself with what the opponents of the Society say about it. This ceases immediately when they go beyond the circle of quiet sympathy. Then the task immediately arises for them to look at the opposition and defend what can be justifiably defended in anthroposophy and the Society.
The fact that this absolutely necessary consideration has not always been taken into account has not been conducive to the Society. It must strike the members, who can quite rightly demand that the Society first give them what it promises, as strange when they are immediately required to fulfill the same duties as those who make these promises.
When we speak of the duties of members with regard to the Society, this can therefore only refer to those members who wish to be active. This should not, of course, be confused with speaking of the obligations of human beings as such, which arise from anthroposophy itself. However, these things will always have a very general human character and will only broaden the scope of understanding as it arises from insight into the spiritual world. When anthroposophy speaks of such obligations, it can never mean that it is saying something that is binding only for the Anthroposophical Society, but rather something that arises from a correct understanding of human nature as such.
But precisely because the nature of the Anthroposophical Society gives rise to a circle of duties for its active members, these duties should be taken as seriously as possible. For example, anyone who, as a member of the Society, wishes to pass on the insights of anthroposophy to others immediately has these duties when they go beyond the very narrow, quiet circle of such teaching. Such a person will need to be clear about the general spiritual situation of people in the present time. They will need to have a clear idea of the task of anthroposophy. They will need to maintain contact with the other active members of the Society as much as possible. Such a person must be far from saying: it does not interest me when anthroposophy and its proponents are portrayed in a false light or even slandered by opponents.
The Executive Council, which was formed at the Christmas Conference, understands its task to be to help bring about the realization of what has been said here within the Society. And it cannot but ask all members who wish to be active to become co-workers in its intentions.
Only in this way can the Society fulfill its promises to its entire membership and thus also to the world.
It is truly saddening, for example, to have the following experience: It happens within the Society that members who want to be active in a particular place discuss the affairs of the Society from time to time. They hold meetings for this purpose. When one then talks to the individual personalities who sit at these meetings, one notices that they actually have opinions about each other, about their activities for the society, and so on, which are not discussed at all at the meetings. One may learn that someone has no idea what those who often associate with him think about his activities. To put such things on a better track, it would be absolutely necessary to follow the impulse given by the Christmas conference. The members who want to be active should try to understand this impulse above all. One often hears such active members say: I have the good will, but I just don't know what is right. One should not take too complacent a view of this “good will.” One should always ask oneself: Have I really sought out all the avenues available in society to find the “right thing” in good-will cooperation with others?