Goethean Science
GA 1
1. Introduction
[ 1 ] On August 18, 1787, Goethe wrote to Knebel from Italy: “To judge by the plants and fish I have seen in Naples and Sicily, I would, if I were ten years younger, be very tempted to make a trip to India, not in order to discover something new, but in order to contemplate in my own way what has already been discovered.” In these words is to be found the point of view from which we have to look at Goethe's scientific works. With him it is never a matter of discovering new facts, but rather of opening up a new point of view, of looking at nature in a particular way. It is true that Goethe made a number of great single discoveries, such as the intermaxillary bone, the vertebral theory of the skull in osteology, the common identity of all plant organs with the leaf in botany, etc. But we have to regard as the life and soul of all these individual cases the magnificent view of nature by which they are carried; in the study of organisms we have to fix our attention above all on a magnificent discovery that overshadows everything else: that of the being or nature of the organism itself. Goethe has set forth the principle by which an organism is what it presents itself to be; he sets forth the causes whose results appear to us in the manifestations of life; he sets forth, in fact, everything we can ask about the manifestations of life from a point of view concerned with principles.1Whoever declares from the very beginning that such a goal is unattainable will never arrive at an understanding of the Goethean views of nature; on the other hand, whoever undertakes to study them without preconceptions, and leaves this question open, will certainly answer it affirmatively at the end. Doubts could very well arise for many a person through several remarks Goethe himself made, such as the following one, for example: “... without presuming to want to discover the primal mainsprings of nature's workings, we would have directed our attention to the manifestation of the forces by which the plant gradually transforms one and the same organ” But with Goethe such statements never direct themselves against the possibility, in principle, of knowing the being of things; he is only cautious enough about the physical-mechanical conditions underlying the organism not to draw any conclusions too quickly, since he knew very well that such questions can only be resolved in the course of time.
From the beginning, this is the goal of all his striving with respect to the organic natural sciences; in his pursuit of this goal, those particular discoveries arose for him as though of themselves. He had to find them if he did not want to be hindered in his further striving. Natural science before him—which, did not know the essential being of life phenomena, and which simply investigated organisms as compositions of parts, according to outer characteristics, just as one does with inorganic things—often had, along its way, to give these particulars an incorrect interpretation, to present them in a false light. One cannot of course see any such error in the particulars themselves. But we will recognize this only after we have first understood the organism, since the particulars in themselves, considered separately, do not bear within themselves the principle that explains them. They can be explained only by the nature of the whole, because it is the whole that gives them being and significance. Only after Goethe had discovered precisely this nature of the whole did these erroneous interpretations become evident to him; they could not be reconciled with his theory of living beings; they contradicted it. If he wanted to go further on his way, he would have to clear away such preconceptions. This was the case with the intermaxillary bone. Certain facts that are of value and interest only if one possesses just such a theory as that of the vertebral nature of the skull bone were unknown to that older natural science. All these hindrances had to be cleared away by means of individual discoveries. These, therefore, never appear in Goethe's case as ends in themselves; they must always be made in order to confirm a great thought, to confirm that central discovery. The fact cannot be denied that Goethe's contemporaries came to the same observations sooner or later, and that all of them would perhaps be known today even without Goethe's efforts; but even less can the fact be denied that no one until now has expressed his great discovery, encompassing all organic nature, independently of him in such an exemplary way 2We do not mean in any way to say that Goethe has never been understood at all in this regard. On the contrary, we repeatedly take occasion in this very edition to point to a number of men who seem to us to carry on and elaborate Goethean ideas. Belonging among them are such names as: Voigt, Nees von Esenbeck, d'Alton (senior and junior), Schelver, C.G. Carus, and Martius, among others. But these men in fact built up their systems upon the foundation of the views laid down in the writings of Goethe, and, precisely about them, one cannot say that they would have arrived at their concepts even without Goethe, whereas to be sure, contemporaries of Goethe—Josephi in Göttingen, for example—did come independently upon the intermaxillary bone, and Oken upon the vertebral theory.—in fact, we still lack an even partially satisfactory appreciation of his discovery. Basically it does not matter whether Goethe was the first to discover a certain fact or only rediscovered it; the fact first gains its true significance through the way he fits it into his view of nature. This is what has been overlooked until now. The particular facts have been overly emphasized and this has led to polemics. One has indeed often pointed to Goethe's conviction about the consistency of nature, but one did not recognize that the main thing, in organic science for example, is to show what the nature is of that which maintains this consistency. If one calls it the typus, then one must say in what the being of the typus consists in Goethe's sense of the word.
[ 2 ] The significance of Goethe's view about plant metamorphosis does not lie, for example, in the discovery of the individual fact that leaf, calyx, corolla, etc., are identical organs, but rather in the magnificent building up in thought of a living whole of mutually interacting formative laws; this building up proceeds from his view of plant metamorphosis, and determines out of itself the individual details and the individual stages of plant development. The greatness of this idea, which Goethe then sought to extend to the animal world also, dawns upon one only when one tries to make it alive in one's spirit, when one undertakes to rethink it. One then becomes aware that this thought is the very nature of the plant itself translated into the idea and living in our spirit just as it lives in the object; one observes also that one makes an organism alive for oneself right into its smallest parts, that one pictures it not as a dead, finished object, but rather as something evolving, becoming, as something never at rest within itself.
[ 3 ] As we now attempt, in what follows, to present more thoroughly everything we have indicated here, there will become clear to us at the same time the true relationship of the Goethean view of nature to that of our own age, and especially to the theory of evolution in its modern form.
1. Einleitung
[ 1 ] Am 18. August des Jahres 1787 schrieb Goethe von Italien aus an Knebel: «Nach dem, was ich bei Neapel, in Sizilien von Pflanzen und Fischen gesehen habe, würde ich, wenn ich zehn Jahre jünger wäre, sehr versucht sein, eine Reise nach Indien zu machen, nicht um etwas Neues zu entdecken, sondern um das Entdeckte nach meiner Art anzusehen.» [WA 8, 250] 1Alle Stellen aus von Goethe verfaßten Briefen sind zitiert nach der sog. Weimarer Ausgabe (= WA) oder Sophien-Ausgabe von Goethes Werken, Abteilung IV: Briefe, 50 Bde., Weimar 1887-1912; die beiden Ziffern beziehen sich auf Band und Seitenzahl dieser Abteilung. - Hinzufügungen des Herausgebers sind in eckige Klammern gesetzt. In diesen Worten liegt der Gesichtspunkt, aus dem wir Goethes wissenschaftliche Arbeiten zu betrachten haben. Es handelt sich bei ihm nie um die Entdeckung neuer Tatsachen, sondern um das Eröffnen eines neuen Gesichtspunktes, um eine bestimmte Art die Natur anzusehen. Es ist wahr, daß Goethe eine Reihe großer Einzelentdeckungen gemacht hat, wie jene des Zwischenknochens und der Wirbeltheorie des Schädels in der Osteologie, der Identität aller Pflanzenorgane mit dem Stammblatte in der Botanik usf. Aber als belebende Seele aller dieser Einzelheiten haben wir eine großartige Naturanschauung zu betrachten, von der sie getragen werden, haben wir in der Lehre von den Organismen vor allem eine großartige, alles übrige in den Schatten stellende Entdeckung ins Auge zu fassen: die des Wesens des Organismus selbst. Jenes Prinzip, durch welches ein Organismus das ist, als das er sich darstellt, die Ursachen, als deren Folge uns die Äußerungen des Lebens erscheinen, und zwar alles, was wir in prinzipieller Hinsicht diesbezüglich zu fragen haben, hat er dargelegt.2Wer ein solches Ziel von vornherein für unerreichbar erklärt, der wird zum Verständnis Goethescher Naturanschauungen nie kommen; wer dagegen vorurteilslos, diese Frage offenlassend, an das Studium derselben geht, der wird sie nach Beendigung desselben gewiß bejahend beantworten. Es könnten wohl manchem durch einige Bemerkungen Goethes selbst Bedenken aufsteigen, wie z. B. folgende ist: Wir hätten.. ohne Anmaßung, die ersten Triebfedern der Naturwirkungen entdecken zu wollen, auf Äußerung der Kräfte, durch welche die Pflanze ein und dasselbe Organ nach und nach umbildet, unsere Aufmerksamkeit gerichtet.» Allein solche Aussprüche richten sich bei Goethe nie gegen die prinzipielle Möglichkeit, die Wesenheit der Dinge zu erkennen, sondern er ist nur vorsichtig genug über die physikalisch-mechanischen Bedingungen, welche dem Organismus zugrunde liegen, nicht vorschnell abzuurteilen, da er wohl wußte, daß solche Fragen nur im Laufe der Zeit gelöst werden können. Es ist dies vom Anfange an das Ziel alles seines Strebens in bezug auf die organischen Naturwissenschaften; bei Verfolgung desselben drängen sich ihm jene Einzelheiten wie von selbst auf. Er mußte sie finden, wenn er im weiteren Streben nicht gehindert sein wollte. Die Naturwissenschaft vor ihm, die das Wesen der Lebenserscheinungen nicht kannte und die Organismen einfach nach der Zusammensetzung aus Teilen, nach deren äußerlichen Merkmalen untersuchte, so wie man dieses bei unorganischen Dingen auch macht, mußte auf ihrem Wege oft den Einzelheiten eine falsche Deutung geben, sie in ein falsches Licht setzen. An den Einzelheiten als solchen kann man natürlich einen solchen Irrtum nicht bemerken. Das erkennen wir eben erst, wenn wir den Organismus verstehen, da die Einzelheiten für sich, abgesondert betrachtet, das Prinzip ihrer Erklärung nicht in sich tragen. Sie sind nur durch die Natur des Ganzen zu erklären, weil es das Ganze ist, das ihnen Wesen und Bedeutung gibt. Erst nachdem Goethe eben diese Natur des Ganzen enthüllt hatte, wurden ihm jene irrtümlichen Auslegungen sichtbar; sie waren mit seiner Theorie der Lebewesen nicht zu vereinigen, sie widersprachen derselben. Wollte er auf seinem Wege weiter gehen, so mußte er dergleichen Vorurteile wegschaffen. Dies war beim Zwischenknochen der Fall. Tatsachen, die nur dann von Wert und Interesse sind, wenn man eben jene Theorie besitzt, wie die Wirbelnatur der Schädelknochen, waren jener älteren Naturlehre unbekannt. Alle diese Hindernisse mußten durch Einzelerfahrungen aus dem Wege geräumt werden. So erscheinen uns denn die letzteren bei Goethe nie als Selbstzweck; sie müssen immer gemacht werden, um einen großen Gedanken, um jene zentrale Entdeckung zu bestätigen. Es ist nicht zu leugnen, daß Goethes Zeitgenossen früher oder später zu denselben Beobachtungen kamen, und daß heute vielleicht alle auch ohne Goethes Bestrebungen bekannt wären; aber noch viel weniger ist zu leugnen, daß seine große, die ganze organische Natur umspannende Entdeckung bis heute von keinem zweiten unabhängig von Goethe in gleich vortrefflicher Weise ausgesprochen worden ist, 3Damit wollen wir keineswegs sagen, Goethe sei in dieser Hinsicht überhaupt nie verstanden worden. Im Gegenteil: Wir nehmen in dieser Ausgabe selbst wiederholt Anlaß, auf eine Reihe von Männern hinzuweisen, die uns als Fortsetzer und Ausarbeiter Goethescher Ideen erscheinen. Namen wie Voigt, Nees von Esenbeck, d'Alton (der ältere und der jüngere), Schelver, C. G. Carus, Martius u. a. gehören in diese Reihe. Aber diese bauten eben auf der Grundlage der in den Goetheschen Schriften niedergelegten Anschauungen ihre Systeme auf, und man kann gerade von ihnen nicht sagen, daß sie auch ohne Goethe zu ihren Begriffen gelangt wären, wogegen aller - dings Zeitgenossen des letzteren - z. B. Josephi von Göttingen -selbständig auf den Zwischenknochen, oder Oken auf die Wirbeltheorie gekommen sind. ja es fehlt uns bis heute an einer auch nur einigermaßen befriedigenden Würdigung derselben. Es erscheint im Grunde gleichgültig, ob Goethe eine Tatsache zuerst oder nur wiederentdeckt hat; sie gewinnt durch die Art, wie er sie seiner Naturanschauung einfügt, erst ihre wahre Bedeutung. Das ist es, was man bisher übersehen hat. Man hob jene besonderen Tatsachen zu sehr hervor und forderte dadurch zur Polemik auf. Wohl wies man oft auf Goethes Überzeugung von der Konsequenz der Natur hin, allein man beachtete nicht, daß damit nur ein ganz nebensächliches, wenig bedeutsames Charakteristikon der Goetheschen Anschauungen gegeben ist und daß es beispielsweise in bezug auf die Organik die Hauptsache ist, zu zeigen, welcher Natur das ist, welches jene Konsequenz bewahrt. Nennt man da den Typus, so hat man zu sagen, worinnen die Wesenheit des Typus im Sinne Goethes besteht.
[ 2 ] Das Bedeutsame der Pflanzenmetamorphose liegt z. B. nicht in der Entdeckung der einzelnen Tatsache, daß Blatt, Kelch, Krone usw. identische Organe seien, sondern in dem großartigen gedanklichen Aufbau eines lebendigen Ganzen durcheinander wirkender Bildungsgesetze, welcher daraus hervorgeht und der die Einzelheiten, die einzelnen Stufen der Entwicklung, aus sich heraus bestimmt. Die Größe dieses Gedankens, den Goethe dann auch auf die Tierwelt auszudehnen suchte, geht einem nur dann auf, wenn man versucht, sich denselben im Geiste lebendig zu machen, wenn man es unternimmt ihn nachzudenken. Man wird dann gewahr, daß er die in die Idee übersetzte Natur der Pflanze selbst ist, die in unserem Geiste ebenso lebt wie im Objekte; man bemerkt auch, daß man sich einen Organismus bis in die kleinsten Teile hinein belebt, nicht als toten, abgeschlossenen Gegenstand, sondern als sich Entwickelndes, Werdendes, als die stetige Unruhe in sich selbst vorstellt.
[ 3 ] Indem wir nun im folgenden versuchen, alles hier Angedeutete eingehend darzulegen, wird sich uns zugleich das wahre Verhältnis der Goetheschen Naturanschauung zu jener unserer Zeit offenbaren, namentlich zur Entwicklungstheorie in moderner Gestalt.
1. Introduction
[ 1 ] On August 18, 1787, Goethe wrote to Knebel from Italy: "After what I have seen of plants and fish near Naples and in Sicily, if I were ten years younger, I would be very tempted to make a journey to India, not to discover something new, but to see what I have discovered in my own way. " [WA 8, 250] 1All passages from letters written by Goethe are quoted from the so-called Weimar Edition (= WA) or Sophien Edition of Goethe's works, Division IV: Letters, 50 vols, Weimar 1887-1912; the two numbers refer to the volume and page number of this section. - Additions by the editor are placed in square brackets. In these words lies the point of view from which we have to consider Goethe's scientific works. It is never a question of discovering new facts, but of opening up a new point of view, a certain way of looking at nature. It is true that Goethe made a number of great individual discoveries, such as that of the interosseous bone and the vertebral theory of the skull in osteology, the identity of all plant organs with the stem leaf in botany, and so on. But as the animating soul of all these details we have to consider a magnificent view of nature, by which they are supported, and in the doctrine of organisms we have above all to consider a magnificent discovery which overshadows all the rest: that of the nature of the organism itself. He has set forth the principle by which an organism is what it presents itself to be, the causes as the result of which the manifestations of life appear to us, and indeed all that we have to ask in principle in this respect. 2Whoever declares such a goal to be unattainable from the outset will never come to an understanding of Goethe's views of nature; whoever, on the other hand, approaches the study of them without prejudice, leaving this question open, will certainly answer it affirmatively after completing it. Some of Goethe's own remarks may well give rise to misgivings, such as the following: "We would... without presuming to want to discover the first motive forces of the effects of nature, have directed our attention to the expression of the forces by which the plant gradually transforms one and the same organ." However, such statements by Goethe are never directed against the fundamental possibility of recognizing the essence of things, but he is only careful enough not to make hasty judgments about the physical-mechanical conditions that underlie the organism, since he knew well that such questions can only be solved in the course of time. From the very beginning, this is the goal of all his endeavours with regard to the organic natural sciences; in pursuing it, those details force themselves upon him as if of their own accord. He had to find them if he did not want to be hindered in his further endeavors. Natural science before him, which did not know the essence of the phenomena of life and simply examined organisms according to their composition of parts, according to their external characteristics, just as one does with inorganic things, often had to give the details a false interpretation in its way, put them in a false light. Of course, one cannot recognize such an error in the details as such. We only recognize this when we understand the organism, since the details, taken separately, do not carry the principle of their explanation in themselves. They can only be explained by the nature of the whole, because it is the whole that gives them essence and meaning. It was only after Goethe had revealed this very nature of the whole that those erroneous interpretations became apparent to him; they could not be reconciled with his theory of living beings, they contradicted it. If he wanted to continue on his path, he had to get rid of such prejudices. This was the case with the intermediate bone. Facts that are only of value and interest if one possesses that theory, such as the vertebral nature of the skull bones, were unknown to the older natural theory. All these obstacles had to be removed by individual experience. Thus the latter never appear to us in Goethe as an end in themselves; they must always be made in order to confirm a great thought, to confirm that central discovery. It cannot be denied that Goethe's contemporaries arrived at the same observations sooner or later, and that today they would perhaps all be known even without Goethe's endeavors; but it can be denied even less that his great discovery, which encompasses the whole of organic nature, has never been expressed in the same excellent way by anyone else, 3indeed, we by no means mean to say that Goethe was never understood at all in this respect. On the contrary, in this edition we ourselves repeatedly take the opportunity to refer to a number of men who appear to us to have continued and elaborated Goethe's ideas. Names such as Voigt, Nees von Esenbeck, d'Alton (the elder and the younger), Schelver, C. G. Carus, Martius and others belong in this series. But these built their systems on the basis of the views laid down in Goethe's writings, and it cannot be said of them in particular that they would have arrived at their concepts without Goethe, whereas contemporaries of the latter - e.g. Josephi von Göttingen - independently arrived at the interosseous, or Oken at the vertebral theory. Indeed, to this day we lack even a somewhat satisfactory appreciation of them. It seems basically irrelevant whether Goethe first or only rediscovered a fact; it only gains its true meaning through the way in which he incorporates it into his view of nature. That is what has been overlooked up to now. Those particular facts have been overemphasized, thereby inciting polemics. It is true that one often pointed to Goethe's conviction of the consistency of nature, but one did not take into account that this is only a quite secondary, less significant characteristic of Goethe's views and that, for example, in relation to organicism, the main thing is to show what nature it is that preserves that consistency. If one names the type, then one has to say what the essence of the type consists of in Goethe's sense.
[ 2 ] The significance of plant metamorphosis, for example, does not lie in the discovery of the individual fact that leaf, calyx, corolla, etc. are identical organs, but in the magnificent conceptual structure of a living whole of interdependent laws of formation which emerges from it and which determines the details, the individual stages of development, out of itself. The greatness of this thought, which Goethe then sought to extend to the animal world, only becomes apparent when one tries to bring it to life in one's mind, when one undertakes to ponder it. One then realizes that it is the nature of the plant itself translated into the idea, which lives in our spirit just as much as in the object; one also notices that one imagines an organism animated down to the smallest parts, not as a dead, closed object, but as something developing, becoming, as the constant restlessness within itself.
[ 3 ] In the following, as we attempt to explain in detail all that has been outlined here, the true relationship of Goethe's view of nature to that of our time, namely to the theory of development in its modern form, will be revealed to us.