Goethean Science
GA 1
5. Concluding Remarks on Goethe's Morphological Views
[ 1 ] When, at the end of this consideration of Goethe's thoughts on metamorphosis, I look back over the views that I felt compelled to express, I cannot conceal from myself the fact that a very great number of outstanding adherents of the various tendencies in scientific thought are of a different view than I. Their position with respect to Goethe is completely clear to me; and the judgment they will pronounce on my attempt to present the standpoint of our great thinker and poet is quite predictable.
[ 2 ] The views about Goethe's strivings in the realm of natural science are separated into two opposing camps.
[ 3 ] The adherents of modern monism with Professor Haeckel at their head, recognize in Goethe the prophet of Darwinism who conceives of the organic completely in the Darwinian sense: as governed by the laws that are also at work in inorganic nature. The only thing Goethe lacked, they believe, was the theory of natural selection by which Darwin first founded the monistic world view and which raised the theory of evolution into a scientific conviction.
[ 4 ] Opposing this standpoint there stands another, which assumes that Goethe's idea of the typus is nothing more than a general concept, an idea in the sense of Platonic philosophy. According to this view, Goethe did indeed make individual statements that remind one of the theory of evolution at which he arrived through the pantheism inherent in his nature; however, he did not feel any need to go all the way to the ultimate mechanical foundations. Thus there can be no question of finding the theory of evolution in the modern sense in Goethe.
[ 5 ] As I was attempting to explain Goethe's views, without taking any definite standpoint beforehand, purely out of Goethe's nature, out of the whole of his spirit, it became clear to me that neither the one nor the other of these two camps—extraordinarily significant as their contributions have been toward an assessment of Goethe—has interpreted his view of nature altogether correctly.
[ 6 ] The first of the two views characterized above is entirely right in asserting that Goethe, in striving to explain organic nature, combats the dualism that assumes insuperable barriers to exist between organic nature and the inorganic world. But Goethe asserted the possibility of this explanation not because he conceived of the forms and phenomena of organic nature in a mechanistic context, but rather because he saw that the higher context in which they do stand is in no way closed to our knowledge. He did indeed conceive of the universe in a monistic way as an undivided unity—from which he by no means excluded the human being—but he also therefore recognized that within this unity levels are to be discerned that have their own laws. Already from his youth up, he reacted negatively to efforts to picture unity as uniformity, and to conceive of the organic world, as well as everything that appears as higher nature in nature, as being governed by the laws at work in the inorganic world (see History of my Botanical Studies). It was also this rejection that later compelled him to assume the existence of a power to judge in beholding, by which we grasp organic nature, in contrast to the discursive intellect, by which we know inorganic nature. Goethe conceives of the world as a circle of circles, each of which has its own principle of explanation. Modern monists know only one single circle: that of inorganic natural laws.
[ 7 ] The second of the two opinions about Goethe described above recognizes that with him it is a matter of something different than with modern monism. But since the adherents of this second view consider it a postulate of science that organic nature is explained in the same way as inorganic nature, and since from the very start they reject with abhorrence a view like Goethe's, they regard it as altogether useless to go more deeply into his strivings.
[ 8 ] Thus Goethe's high principles could gain full validity in neither camp. And it is precisely these principles that are so outstanding in his work, which, for someone who has recognized them in all their depth, do not lose in significance even when he sees that many a detail of Goethean research needs to be corrected.
[ 9 ] This fact now requires of a person who is attempting to present Goethe's views that he direct his attention away from the critical assessment of each individual thing Goethe discovered in one or another chapter of natural science, and toward what is central to the Goethean view of nature.
[ 10 ] By seeking to meet this requirement, one comes close to possibly being misunderstood by precisely those by whom it would be most painful for me to be misunderstood: by the pure empiricists. I mean those who pursue in every direction the factually demonstrable relationships of organisms, the empirically given materials, and who regard the question as to the primal principles of the organic realm as one that is still open today. What I bring cannot be directed against them, because it does not touch on them. On the contrary: I build a part of my hopes precisely on them, because their hands are still free in every respect. They are also the ones who will still have to correct many an assertion of Goethe, for he did sometimes err in the factual realm; here, of course, even the genius cannot overcome the limitations of his time.
[ 11 ] In the realm of principles, however, he arrived at fundamental views that have the same significance for organic science that Galileo's basic laws have for mechanics.
[ 12 ] To establish this fact was the task I set myself.
[ 13 ] I hope that those whom my words cannot convince will at least see the good will with which I strove, without respect to persons, attentive only to the subject at hand, to solve the problem I have indicated—explaining Goethe's scientific writings out of the whole of his nature—and to express a conviction that for me is uplifting.
[ 14 ] Since one has made a fortunate and successful beginning at explaining Goethe's literary works in that way, there already lies in that the challenge to bring all the works of his spirit under this kind of study. This cannot remain unaccomplished forever, and I will not be the last among those who will heartily rejoice if my successor succeeds better than I. May youthful and striving thinkers and researchers—especially those who are not merely interested in breadth of vision, but who rather look directly at what is central to our knowing activity—grant my reflections some attention, and follow in great numbers to set forth more perfectly what I was striving to present.
5. Abschluss über Goethes morphologische Anschauungen
[ 1 ] Wenn ich am Schlusse der Betrachtung über Goethes Metamorphosen-Gedanken auf die Anschauungen zurückblicke, die ich mich auszusprechen gedrungen fühlte, so kann ich mir nicht verhehlen, eine wie große Zahl hervorragender Vertreter verschiedener Richtungen der Wissenschaft anderer Ansicht sind. Ihre Stellung zu Goethe steht mir deutlich vor Augen; und das Urteil, das sie über meinen Versuch, den Standpunkt unseres großen Denkers und Dichters zu vertreten, aussprechen werden, dürfte im voraus zu ermessen sein.
[ 2 ] In zwei Heerlager geteilt stehen sich die Ansichten über Goethes Bestrebungen auf naturwissenschaftlichem Gebiete geenüber.
[ 3 ] Die Vertreter des modernen Monismus mit dem Professor Haeckel an der Spitze erkennen in Goethe den Propheten des Darwinismus, der sich das Organische ganz in ihrem Sinne von den Gesetzen beherrscht denkt, die auch in der unorganischen Natur wirksam sind. Was Goethe fehlte, sei nur die Selektionstheorie gewesen, durch welche erst Darwin die monistische Weltanschauung begründet und die Entwicklungstheorie zur wissenschaftlichen Überzeugung erhoben habe.
[ 4 ] Diesem Standpunkte steht ein anderer gegenüber, welcher annimmt, die Typusidee bei Goethe sei weiter nichts als ein allgemeiner Begriff, eine Idee im Sinne der platonischen Philosophie. Goethe hätte zwar einzelne Behauptungen getan, die an die Entwicklungstheorie erinnern, wozu er durch den in seiner Natur gelegenen Pantheismus gekommen sei; bis zum letzten mechanischen Grunde fortzuschreiten hätte er aber kein Bedürfnis gefühlt. Von Entwicklungstheorie im modernen Sinne des Wortes könne daher bei ihm nicht die Rede sein.
[ 5 ] Indem ich versuchte, Goethes Anschauungen ohne Voraussetzung irgendeines positiven Standpunktes, rein aus Goethes Wesen, aus dem Ganzen seines Geistes zu erklären, wurde klar, daß weder die eine noch die andere der erwähnten Richtungen - so außerordentlich bedeutend auch dasjenige ist, was sie beide zu einer Beurteilung Goethes geliefert haben - seine Naturanschauung vollkommen richtig interpretiert hat.
[ 6 ] Die erste der charakterisierten Ansichten hat ganz recht, wenn sie behauptet, Goethe habe dadurch, daß er die Erklärung der organischen Natur anstrebte, den Dualismus bekämpft, der zwischen dieser und der unorganischen Welt unübersteigliche Schranken annimmt. Aber Goethe behauptete die Möglichkeit dieser Erklärung nicht deshalb, weil er sich die Formen und Erscheinungen der organischen Natur in einem mechanischen Zusammenhange dachte, sondern weil er einsah, daß der höhere Zusammenhang, in dem dieselben stehen, unserer Erkenntnis keineswegs verschlossen ist. Er dachte sich das Universum zwar in monistischer Weise als unentzweite Einheit - von der er den Menschen durchaus nicht ausschloß [siehe den Brief Goethes an F. H. Jacobi vom 23. Nov. 1801; WA 15, 280f.] -, aber deshalb erkannte er doch an, daß innerhalb dieser Einheit Stufen zu unterscheiden sind, die ihre eigenen Gesetze haben. Er verhielt sich schon seit seiner Jugend ab- lehnend gegenüber Bestrebungen, welche sich die Einheit als Einförmigkeit vorstellen und die organische Welt, wie überhaupt das, was innerhalb der Natur als höhere Natur erscheint, von den in der unorganischen Welt wirksamen Gesetzen beherrscht denken (siehe «Geschichte meines botanischen Studiums» in Natw. Schr., 1. Bd., S. 61ff.). Diese Ablehnung war es auch, welche ihn später zur Annahme einer anschauenden Urteilskraft nötigte, durch welche wir die organische Natur erfassen im Gegensatze zum diskursiven Verstande, durch den wir die unorganische Natur erkennen. Goethe denkt sich die Welt als einen Kreis von Kreisen, von denen jeder einzelne sein eigenes Erklärungsprinzip hat. Die modernen Monisten kennen nur einen einzigen Kreis, den der unorganischen Naturgesetze.
[ 7 ] Die zweite der angeführten Meinungen über Goethe sieht ein, daß es sich bei ihm um etwas anderes handelt als beim modernen Monismus. Da aber ihre Vertreter es als ein Postulat der Wissenschaft ansehen, daß die organische Natur gerade so wie die unorganische erklärt werde und eine Anschauung wie die Goethes von vornherein perhorreszieren, so sehen sie es überhaupt als nutzlos an, auf seine Bestrebungen näher einzugehen.
[ 8 ] So konnten Goethes hohe Prinzipien weder da noch dort zur vollen Geltung kommen. Und gerade diese sind das Hervorragende seiner Bestrebungen, sind das, was für denjenigen, der sich ihre ganze Tiefe vergegenwärtigt hat, auch dann an Bedeutung nicht verliert, wenn er einsieht, daß manches von den Einzelheiten Goethescher Forschung der Berichtigung bedarf.
[ 9 ] Hieraus erwächst nun für denjenigen, der Goethes Anschauungen darzulegen versucht, die Forderung, über die kritische Beurteilung des einzelnen, was Goethe in diesem oder jenem Kapitel der Naturwissenschaft gefunden, hinweg den Blick auf das Zentrale Goethescher Naturanschauung zu lenken.
[ 10 ] Indem ich dieser Forderung zu entsprechen suchte, liegt die Möglichkeit nahe, gerade von denjenigen mißverstanden zu werden, bei denen es mir am meisten leid tun würde, von den reinen Empirikern. Ich meine jene, welche den als tatsächlich nachzuweisenden Zusammenhängen der Organismen, dem empirisch gebotenen Stoffe nach allen Seiten nachgehen und die Frage nach den ursprünglichen Prinzipien der Organik als eine heute noch offene betrachten. Gegen sie können meine Ausführungen nicht gerichtet sein, denn sie berühren sie nicht. Im Gegenteile: Ich baue gerade auf sie einen Teil meiner Hoffnungen, weil sie die Hände nach allen Seiten noch frei haben. Sie sind es auch, die manches von Goethe Behauptete noch zu berichtigen haben werden, denn im Tatsächlichen irrte er zuweilen; hier kann natürlich auch das Genie die Schranken seiner Zeit nicht überwinden.
[ 11 ] Im Prinzipiellen kam er aber zu Grundanschauungen, die für die Wissenschaft vom Organischen dieselbe Bedeutung haben wie Galileis Grundgesetze für die Mechanik.
[ 12 ] Dies zu begründen, machte ich mir zur Aufgabe.
[ 13 ] Mögen jene, die meine Worte nicht zu überzeugen vermögen, mindestens den redlichen Willen sehen, mit dem ich bemüht war, ohne Rücksicht auf Personen, nur der Sache zugewandt, das angedeutete Problem, Goethes wissenschaftliche Schriften aus dem Ganzen seiner Natur zu erklären, zu lösen und eine für mich erhebende Überzeugung auszusprechen.
[ 14 ] Hat man in derselben Weise glücklich und erfolgreich begonnen, Goethes Dichtungen zu erklären, so liegt hierin schon die Forderung, alle Werke seines Geistes in diese Art der Betrachtung hereinzuziehen. Dies kann nicht für immer ausbleiben und ich werde nicht der letzte sein von denen, die sich herzlich freuen werden, wenn es meinem Nachfolger besser gelingt als mir. Möchten jugendlich strebende Denker und Forscher, namentlich jene, die mit ihren Ansichten nicht bloß in die Breite gehen, sondern direkt dem Zentralen unseres Erkennens ins Auge schauen, meinen Ausführungen einige Aufmerksamkeit schenken und in Scharen nachfolgen, um vollkommener auszuführen, was ich darzulegen bestrebt war.
5. Conclusion on Goethe's Morphological views
[ 1 ] When I look back at the views that I felt compelled to express at the end of my consideration of Goethe's ideas on metamorphosis, I cannot conceal from myself how many outstanding representatives of different schools of science have a different opinion. Their position on Goethe is clearly before my eyes; and the judgment they will pronounce on my attempt to represent the point of view of our great thinker and poet can probably be estimated in advance.
[ 2 ] The views on Goethe's endeavors in the natural sciences are divided into two camps.
[ 3 ] The representatives of modern monism, headed by Professor Haeckel, recognize in Goethe the prophet of Darwinism, who, in their view, sees the organic as governed entirely by the laws that are also effective in inorganic nature. What Goethe lacked was only the theory of selection, through which Darwin founded the monistic world view and elevated the theory of evolution to a scientific conviction.
[ 4 ] This point of view is opposed by another, which assumes that the type idea in Goethe is nothing more than a general concept, an idea in the sense of Platonic philosophy. Goethe would indeed have made individual assertions reminiscent of the theory of development, which he had arrived at through the pantheism inherent in his nature; but he would not have felt the need to go as far as the ultimate mechanical basis. There could therefore be no question of development theory in the modern sense of the word in his case.
[ 5 ] When I tried to explain Goethe's views without presupposing any positive point of view, purely from Goethe's nature, from the whole of his spirit, it became clear that neither one nor the other of the directions mentioned - as extraordinarily significant as that is which they have both provided for an assessment of Goethe - has interpreted his view of nature completely correctly.
[ 6 ] The first of the views characterized is quite right when it claims that Goethe, by striving to explain organic nature, fought against the dualism that assumes insurmountable barriers between this and the inorganic world. But Goethe did not assert the possibility of this explanation because he thought of the forms and phenomena of organic nature in a mechanical context, but because he realized that the higher context in which they stand is by no means closed to our knowledge. Although he conceived of the universe in a monistic way as an indivisible unity - from which he did not at all exclude man [see Goethe's letter to F. H. Jacobi of 23 Nov. 1801; WA 15, 280f.] - he nevertheless recognized that within this unity there are levels to be distinguished which have their own laws. From his youth onwards, he was hostile to endeavors that conceived of unity as uniformity and thought of the organic world, as in general that which appears within nature as higher nature, as governed by the laws at work in the inorganic world (see "Geschichte meines botanischen Studiums" in Natw. Schr., 1st vol., pp. 61ff.). It was also this rejection that later compelled him to assume a contemplative power of judgment through which we grasp organic nature in contrast to the discursive mind through which we recognize inorganic nature. Goethe conceives of the world as a circle of circles, each of which has its own explanatory principle. Modern monists know only one circle, that of the inorganic laws of nature.
[ 7 ] The second of the opinions cited about Goethe recognizes that he is something different from modern monism. However, since its proponents regard it as a postulate of science that organic nature is explained in exactly the same way as inorganic nature and perhorres a view such as Goethe's from the outset, they see it as useless to go into his endeavors in any detail.
[ 8 ] So Goethe's high principles could not come into full application here or there. And it is precisely these that are the outstanding feature of his endeavors, that which does not lose its significance for those who have visualized its full depth, even if they realize that some of the details of Goethe's research require correction.
[ 9 ] From this now arises the demand for those who attempt to expound Goethe's views to look beyond the critical assessment of the individual things Goethe found in this or that chapter of natural science to the central aspects of Goethe's view of nature.
[ 10 ] In trying to meet this demand, there is the possibility of being misunderstood by those for whom I would be most sorry, the pure empiricists. I mean those who pursue the interrelationships of organisms that can be proven to be real, the empirically provided material on all sides, and who regard the question of the original principles of organic science as one that is still open today. My remarks cannot be directed against them, because they do not affect them. On the contrary: I base part of my hopes on them, because they still have their hands free on all sides. They are also the ones who will have to correct some of Goethe's assertions, for he was sometimes mistaken in the facts; here, of course, even genius cannot overcome the limitations of its time.
[ 11 ] In principle, however, he arrived at basic views that have the same significance for the science of organic matter as Galileo's basic laws for mechanics.
[ 12 ] I set myself the task of substantiating this.
[ 13 ] May those who are unable to be convinced by my words at least see the honest will with which I endeavored, without regard to persons, only turned to the matter at hand, to solve the indicated problem of explaining Goethe's scientific writings from the whole of his nature, and to express a conviction that is uplifting for me.
[ 14 ] Once a happy and successful start has been made on explaining Goethe's poetry in the same way, this already implies the need to include all the works of his spirit in this kind of consideration. This cannot be avoided forever and I will not be the last of those who will be delighted if my successor succeeds better than I did. May youthful thinkers and researchers, especially those whose views are not merely broad but look directly into the centrality of our knowledge, pay some attention to my remarks and follow in droves in order to carry out more fully what I have endeavored to expound.