Goethean Science
GA 1
15. Goethe and Natural-scientific Illusionism
[ 1 ] The reason for writing this chapter does not lie in the fact that the Colour Theory, accompanied by an introduction, must also be included in a Goethe edition. It stems from a deep, spiritual need of the editor of this edition. The latter took his start from the study of mathematics and physics and with inner necessity was led, by the many contradictions pervading the system of our modern view of nature, to a critical investigation of the methodological basis of these sciences. His initial studies led him to the principle of strict knowledge through experience; his insight into those contradictions led him to a strict scientific epistemology. He was protected by his positive starting point from any reversion to purely Hegelian conceptual constructs. With the help of his epistemological studies, he finally found the reason for many of the errors of modern natural science to lie in the completely incorrect standing that science had assigned to the simple sense impression. Our science transfers all sense qualities (sound, colour, warmth, etc.) into the subject and is of the opinion that “outside” the subject there is nothing corresponding to these qualities except processes of motion of matter. These processes of motion, which are supposedly all that exists within the “realm of nature,” can of course no longer be perceived. They are inferred on the basis of subjective qualities.
[ 2 ] But this inference must appear to consistent thinking as fragmentary. Motion is, to begin with, only a concept that we have borrowed from the sense world; i.e., it confronts us only in things with sense-perceptible qualities. We do not know of any motion other than that connected with sense objects. If one now transfers this attribute onto entities that are not sense-perceptible—such as the elements of discontinuous matter (atoms) are supposed to be—then one must after all be clear about the fact that through this transference, an attribute perceived by the senses is ascribed to a form of existence essentially different from what is conceived of as sense-perceptible. One falls into the same contradiction when one wants to arrive at a real content for the initially completely empty concept of the atom. Sense qualities, in fact, even though ever so sublimated, must be added to this concept. One person ascribes impenetrability, exertion of force, to the atom; another ascribes extension in space, and so on; in short, each one ascribes certain characteristics or other that are borrowed from the sense world. If one does not do this, one remains in a complete void.
[ 3 ] That is why the above inference is only fragmentary. One draws a line through the middle of what is sense-perceptible and declares the one part to be objective and the other to be subjective. The only consistent statement would be: If there are atoms, then these are simple parts of matter, with the characteristics of matter, and are not perceptible only because their small size makes them inaccessible to our senses.
[ 4 ] But with this there disappears any possibility of seeking anything in the motion of atoms that could be held up as something objective in contrast to the subjective qualities of sound, colour, etc. And the possibility also ceases of seeking anything more, for example, in the connection between motion and the sensation “red” than a connection between two processes that both belong entirely to the sense world.
[ 5 ] It was therefore clear to the editor that motion of ether, position of atoms, etc., belong in the same category as the sense impressions themselves. Declaring the latter to be subjective is only the result of unclear reflection. If one declares sense qualities to be subjective, then one must do exactly the same with the motion of ether. It is not for any principle reason that we do not perceive the latter, but only because our sense organs are not organized finely enough. But that is a purely coincidental state of affairs. It could be the case that someday mankind, by increasing refinement of our sense organs, would arrive at the point of also perceiving the motion of ether directly. If then a person of that distant future accepted our subjectivistic theory of sense impressions, then he would have to declare these motions of ether to be just as subjective as we declare colour, sound, etc., to be today.
[ 6 ] It is clear that this theory of physics leads to a contradiction that cannot be resolved.
[ 7 ] This subjectivistic view has a second support in physiological considerations.
[ 8 ] Physiology shows that a sensation appears only as the final result of a mechanical process that first communicates itself, from that part of the corporeal world lying outside the substance of our body, to the periphery of our nervous system, into our sense organs; from here, the process is transmitted to our highest center, in order to be released there for the first time as sensation. The contradictions of this physiological theory are presented in the chapter on “The Archetypal Phenomenon.” One can, after all, label only the brain substance's form of motion as subjective here. No matter how far one might go in investigating the processes within the subject, one must always remain, on this path, within what is mechanical. And one will nowhere discover the sensation in the central organ.
[ 9 ] Therefore only philosophical consideration remains as a way of gaining information about the subjectivity and objectivity of sensation. And this provides us with the following.
[ 10 ] What can be designated as “subjective” about a perception? Without having an exact analysis of the concept “subjective,” one cannot go forward at all. Subjectivity, of course, cannot be determined by anything other than itself. Everything that cannot be shown to be conditional upon the subject may not be designated as “subjective.” Now we must ask ourselves: What can we designate as the human subject's own? That which it can experience about itself through outer or inner perception. Through outer perception we grasp our bodily constitution; through inner experience, we grasp our own thinking, feeling, and willing. Now what is to be designated as subjective in the first case? The constitution of the whole organism, and therefore also the sense organs and brain, which will probably appear in each human being in somewhat different modifications. But everything that can be indicated here in this way is only a particular formation in the arrangement and function of substances by which a sensation is transmitted. Only the path, therefore, is actually subjective that the sensation has to take before it can become my sensation. Our organization transmits the sensation and these paths of transmission are subjective; the sensation itself, however, is not subjective.
[ 11 ] Now there still remains the path of inner experience for us consider. What do I experience within myself when I designate a sensation as my own? I experience that in my thinking I effect a connection to my individuality, that I extend my sphere of knowing out over this sensation; but I am not conscious of creating any content for the sensation. I only register its connection to myself; the quality of the sensation is a fact founded within itself.
[ 12 ] No matter where we begin, whether within or without, we do not arrive at a place where we could say that here the subjective character of the sensation is given. The concept “subjective” is not applicable to the content of sensation.
[ 13 ] It is these considerations that compelled me to reject as impossible any theory of nature that in a principle way goes beyond the realm of the perceived world, and to seek the sole object of natural science exclusively within the sense world. But then I had to seek, within the mutual interdependencies of the facts of precisely this sense world, that which we designate as the laws of nature.
[ 14 ] And in this way, I was forced to that view of the natural-scientific method which underlies the Goethean colour theory. Whoever finds these considerations to be correct will read this colour theory with very different eyes than modern natural scientists can. Such a person will see that what we have here is not Goethe's hypothesis confronting that of Newton, but rather at issue here is the question: Is today's theoretical physics acceptable or not? If not, however, then neither is the light that this physics casts upon colour theory. May the reader experience from the following chapters what our principle foundation is for physics, in order then, from this foundation, to see Goethe's undertakings in the right light.
15. Goethe und der naturwissenschaftliche Illusionismus
[ 1 ] Diese Darstellung ist nicht aus dem Grunde geschrieben worden, weil in eine Goethe-Ausgabe (in Kürschners Deutscher National-Literatur) eben auch die Farbenlehre, mit einer begleitenden Einleitung versehen, aufgenommen werden muß. Sie entstammt einem tiefen Geistesbedürfnisse des Herausgebers dieser Ausgabe. Derselbe ist von dem Studium der Mathematik und Physik ausgegangen und wurde durch die vielen Widersprüche, die das System unserer modernen Naturanschauung durchsetzen, mit innerer Notwendigkeit zur kritischen Untersuchung über die methodologische Grundlage derselben geführt. Auf das Prinzip des strengen Erfahrungswissens wiesen ihn seine anfänglichen Studien, auf eine streng wissenschaftliche Erkenntnistheorie die Einsicht in jene Widersprüche. Gegen ein Umschlagen in rein Hegelsche Begriffskonstruktionen war er durch seinen positiven Ausgangspunkt geschützt. Er fand endlich mit Hilfe seiner erkenntnistheoretischen Studien den Grund vieler Irrtümer der modernen Naturwissenschaft in der ganz falschen Stellung, welche die letztere der einfachen Sinnesempfindung angewiesen hat. Unsere Wissenschaft verlegt alle sinnlichen Qualitäten (Ton, Farbe, Wärme usw..) in das Subjekt und ist der Meinung, daß «außerhalb» des Subjektes diesen Qualitäten nichts entspreche als Bewegungsvorgänge der Materie. Diese Bewegungsvorgänge, die das einzige im «Reiche der Natur» Existierende sein sollen, können natürlich nicht mehr wahrgenommen werden. Sie sind auf Grund der subjektiven Qualitäten erschlossen..
[ 2 ] Nun kann aber diese Erschließung konsequentem Denken gegenüber nicht anders denn als eine Halbheit erscheinen. Bewegung ist zunächst nur ein Begriff, den wir aus der Sinnenwelt entlehnt haben, d. h. der uns nur an Dingen mit jenen sinnlichen Qualitäten entgegentritt. Wir kennen keine Bewegung außer einer solchen an Sinnesobjekten. Überträgt man nun dieses Prädikat auf nichtsinnliche Wesen, wie es die Elemente der diskontinuierlichen Materie (Atome) sein sollen, so muß man sich doch dessen klar bewußt sein, daß durch diese Übertragung einem sinnlich wahrgenommenen Attribut eine wesentlich anders als sinnlich gedachte Daseinsform beigelegt wird. Demselben Widerspruch verfällt man, wenn man zu einem wirklichen Inhalte für den zunächst ganz leeren Atombegriff kommen will. Es müssen ihm eben sinnliche Qualitäten, wenn auch noch so sublimiert, beigelegt werden. Der eine legt dem Atome Undurchdringlichkeit, Kraftwirkung, der andere Ausdehnung u. dgl. bei, kurz ein jeder irgendwelche aus der Sinnenwelt entlehnte Eigenschaften. Wenn man das nicht tut, bleibt man vollständig im Leeren..
[ 3 ] Darin liegt die Halbheit. Man macht mitten durch das Sinnlich-Wahrnehmbare einen Strich und erklärt den einen Teil für objektiv, den anderen für subjektiv. Nur das eine ist konsequent: Wenn es Atome gibt, so sind diese einfach Teile der Materie mit den Eigenschaften der Materie und nur wegen ihrer für unsere Sinne unzugänglichen Kleinheit nicht wahrnehmbar..
[ 4 ] Damit aber verschwindet die Möglichkeit, in der Bewegung der Atome etwas zu suchen, was als ein Objektives den subjektiven Qualitäten des Tones, der Farbe usw. gegenübergestellt werden dürfte. Und es hört auch die Möglichkeit auf, in dem Zusammenhang zwischen der Bewegung und der Empfindung des «Rot» z. B. mehr zu suchen als zwischen zwei Vorgängen, die ganz der Sinnenwelt angehören..
[ 5 ] Für den Herausgeber war es also klar: Ätherbewegung, Atomlagerung usw. gehören auf dasselbe Blatt wie die Sinnesempfindungen selbst. Die letzteren für subjektiv zu erklären, ist nur das Ergebnis einer unklaren Reflexion. Erklärt man die sinnliche Qualität für subjektiv, so muß man es mit der Ätherbewegung geradeso tun. Wir nehmen die letztere nicht aus einem prinzipiellen Grunde nicht wahr, sondern nur deswegen, weil unsere Sinnesorgane nicht fein genug organisiert sind. Das ist aber ein rein zufälliger Umstand. Es könnte sein, daß dann die Menschheit bei zunehmender Verfeinerung der Sinnesorgane dereinst dazu käme, auch Ätherbewegungen unmittelbar wahrzunehmen. Wenn dann ein Mensch jener fernen Zukunft unsere subjektivische Theorie der Sinnesempfindungen akzeptierte, so müßte er diese Ätherbewegungen ebenso für subjektiv erklären, wie wir heute Farbe, Ton usw..
[ 6 ] Man sieht, diese physikalische Theorie führt auf einen Widerspruch, der nicht zu beheben ist.
[ 7 ] Eine zweite Stütze hat nun diese subjektivische Ansicht an physiologischen Erwägungen.
[ 8 ] Die Physiologie weist nach, daß die Empfindung erst als das letzte Resultat eines mechanischen Vorgangs auftritt, der sich zuerst von dem außerhalb unserer Leibessubstanz liegenden Teil der Körperwelt den Endorganen unseres Nervensystems in den Sinnesorganen mitteilt, von hier aus bis zum obersten Zentrum vermittelt wird, um dann erst als Empfindung ausgelöst zu werden. Die Widersprüche dieser physiologischen Theorie findet man in dem Kapitel «Das ˂Urphänomen˃» [s. S. 266ff. dieser Schrift] dargelegt. Als subjektiv kann man doch hier nur die Bewegungsform der Hirnsubstanz bezeichnen. Wie weit man auch in der Untersuchung der Vorgänge am Subjekte gehen mag, stets muß man auf diesem Wege im Mechanischen bleiben. Und die Empfindung wird man nirgends im Zentrum entdecken..
[ 9 ] Es bleibt also nur die philosophische Erwägung übrig, um über die Subjektivität und Objektivität der Empfindung Aufschluß zu bekommen. Und diese liefert folgendes:
[ 10 ] Was kann als «subjektiv» an der Wahrnehmung bezeichnet werden? Ohne eine genaue Analyse des Begriffes «subjektiv» zu haben, kann man überhaupt gar nicht vorwärtsschreiten. Die Subjektivität kann natürlich durch nichts anderes als durch sich selbst bestimmt werden. Alles, was nicht durch das Subjekt bedingt nachgewiesen werden kann, darf nicht als «subjektiv» bezeichnet werden. Nun müssen wir uns fragen: Was können wir als dem menschlichen Subjekte eigen bezeichnen? Das, was es an sich selbst durch äußere oder innere Wahrnehmung erfahren kann. Durch äußere Wahrnehmung erfassen wir die körperliche Konstitution, durch innere Erfahrung unser eigenes Denken, Fühlen und Wollen. Was ist nun in ersterer Hinsicht als subjektiv zu bezeichnen? Die Konstitution des ganzen Organismus, also auch der Sinnesorgane und des Gehirnes, die wahrscheinlich bei jedem Menschen in etwas anderer Modifikation erscheinen werden. Alles aber, was hier auf diesem Wege nachgewiesen werden kann, ist nur eine bestimmte Gestaltung in der Anordnung und Funktion der Substanzen, wodurch die Empfindung vermittelt wird. Subjektiv ist also eigentlich nur der Weg, den die Empfindung durchzumachen hat, bevor sie meine Empfindung genannt werden kann. Unsere Organisation vermittelt die Empfindung und diese Vermittlungswege sind subjektiv; die Empfindung selbst aber ist es nicht..
[ 11 ] Nun bliebe also der Weg der inneren Erfahrung. Was erfahre ich in meinem Innern, wenn ich eine Empfindung als die meinige bezeichne? Ich erfahre, daß ich die Beziehung auf meine Individualität in meinem Denken vollziehe, daß ich mein Wissensgebiet auf diese Empfindung erstrecke; aber ich bin mir dessen nicht bewußt, daß ich den Inhalt der Empfindung erzeuge. Nur den Bezug zu mir stelle ich fest, die Qualität der Empfindung ist eine in sich begründete Tatsache..
[ 12 ] Wo wir auch anfangen, innen oder außen, wir kommen nicht bis zur Stelle, wo wir sagen könnten: Hier ist der subjektive Charakter der Empfindung gegeben. Auf den Inhalt der Empfindung ist der Begriff «subjektiv» nicht anwendbar.
[ 13 ] Diese Erwägungen sind es, die mich dazu zwangen, jede Theorie der Natur, die prinzipiell über das Gebiet der wahrgenommenen Welt hinausgeht, als unmöglich abzulehnen und lediglich in der Sinnenwelt das einzige Objekt der Naturwissenschaft zu suchen. Dann aber mußte ich in der gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit der Tatsachen eben dieser Sinnenwelt das suchen, was wir mit Naturgesetzen aussprechen..
[ 14 ] Und damit war ich zu jener Ansicht von der naturwissenschaftlichen Methode gedrängt, die der Goetheschen Farbenlehre zugrunde liegt. Wer diese Erwägungen für richtig findet, der wird diese Farbenlehre mit ganz anderen Augen lesen, als die modernen Naturforscher dies tun können. Er wird sehen, daß hier nicht Goethes Hypothese der Newtons gegenübersteht, sondern daß es sich hier um die Frage handelt: Ist die heutige theoretische Physik zu akzeptieren oder nicht? Wenn nicht, dann aber muß sich auch das Licht verlieren, das diese Physik über die Farbenlehre verbreitet. Welches unsere theoretische Grundlage der Physik ist, mag der Leser aus den folgenden Kapiteln erfahren, um dann von dieser Grundlage aus Goethes Auseinandersetzungen im rechten Lichte zu sehen..*
15 Goethe and scientific illusionism
[ 1 ] This account was not written for the reason that an edition of Goethe (in Kürschner's German National Literature) must also include the Theory of Colors, with an accompanying introduction. It stems from a deep spiritual need of the editor of this edition. He started out from the study of mathematics and physics and was led by the many contradictions that pervade the system of our modern view of nature to a critical examination of its methodological basis. His initial studies pointed him towards the principle of strict empirical knowledge, and his insight into those contradictions pointed him towards a strictly scientific theory of knowledge. His positive starting point protected him from turning to purely Hegelian conceptual constructions. With the help of his epistemological studies, he finally found the reason for many of the errors of modern natural science in the completely false position that the latter has assigned to simple sensory perception. Our science places all sensory qualities (sound, color, warmth, etc.) in the subject and is of the opinion that "outside" the subject these qualities correspond to nothing but processes of motion of matter. These processes of movement, which are supposed to be the only thing that exists in the "realm of nature", can of course no longer be perceived. They are closed on the basis of subjective qualities.
[ 2 ] Now, however, this development cannot appear to consistent thinking as anything other than a half-measure. Motion is initially only a concept that we have borrowed from the world of the senses, i.e. that we only encounter in things with those sensory qualities. We know of no movement other than that of sensory objects. If we now transfer this predicate to non-sensuous beings, as the elements of discontinuous matter (atoms) are supposed to be, we must be clearly aware that through this transfer an attribute perceived by the senses is given a form of existence that is essentially different from that conceived by the senses. One falls into the same contradiction if one wants to arrive at a real content for the initially completely empty concept of the atom. Sensual qualities, however sublimated, must be attached to it. Some attribute to the atom impenetrability, the effect of force, others expansion and the like, in short, each attribute some properties borrowed from the sensory world. If one does not do this, one remains completely in the void.
[ 3 ] Therein lies the half-measure. One draws a line through the middle of the sensually perceptible and declares one part to be objective and the other subjective. Only one thing is consistent: if there are atoms, then these are simply parts of matter with the properties of matter and are only imperceptible because of their smallness, which is inaccessible to our senses.
[ 4 ] This, however, eliminates the possibility of seeking something in the movement of atoms that could be contrasted with the subjective qualities of sound, color, etc. as an objective. And the possibility of looking for more in the connection between the movement and the sensation of "red", for example, than between two processes that belong entirely to the world of the senses, also disappears.
[ 5 ] It was therefore clear to the editor: ether movement, atomic storage, etc. belong on the same page as the sensory perceptions themselves. To declare the latter to be subjective is merely the result of unclear reflection. If one declares the sensory quality to be subjective, one must do the same with the ether movement. We do not perceive the latter for any reason of principle, but only because our sense organs are not organized finely enough. But this is a purely accidental circumstance. It could be that one day, with increasing refinement of the sense organs, mankind would also be able to perceive ether movements directly. If a person of that distant future then accepted our subjective theory of sensory perceptions, he would have to declare these ether movements to be subjective in the same way that we today declare color, sound, etc.
[ 6 ] As you can see, this physical theory leads to a contradiction that cannot be resolved.
[ 7 ] This subjective view now has a second support in physiological considerations.
[ 8 ] Physiology proves that sensation occurs only as the final result of a mechanical process that first communicates itself from the part of the bodily world lying outside our bodily substance to the end organs of our nervous system in the sense organs, is transmitted from here to the uppermost center, and is only then triggered as sensation. The contradictions of this physiological theory can be found in the chapter "The ˂Original Phenomenon˃" [see p. 266ff. of this publication]. Only the form of movement of the brain substance can be described as subjective. However far one may go in the investigation of the processes in the subject, one must always remain in the mechanical realm. And sensation will not be discovered anywhere in the center.
[ 9 ] There therefore remains only the philosophical consideration in order to gain insight into the subjectivity and objectivity of sensation. And this provides the following:
[ 10 ] What can be described as "subjective" about perception? Without having a precise analysis of the term "subjective", one cannot move forward at all. Subjectivity cannot, of course, be determined by anything other than itself. Anything that cannot be proven to be conditioned by the subject cannot be called "subjective". Now we must ask ourselves: What can we designate as own to the human subject? That which it can experience in itself through external or internal perception. Through external perception we grasp the physical constitution, through internal experience our own thinking, feeling and willing. What can be described as subjective in the first respect? The constitution of the whole organism, including the sensory organs and the brain, which will probably appear in slightly different modifications in every person. However, everything that can be proven in this way is only a certain configuration in the arrangement and function of the substances through which the sensation is conveyed. Subjective, therefore, is actually only the path that the sensation has to go through before it can be called my sensation. Our organization mediates the sensation and these mediation paths are subjective; the sensation itself, however, is not.
[ 11 ] This leaves us with the path of inner experience. What do I experience within myself when I describe a sensation as my own? I experience that I carry out the relation to my individuality in my thinking, that I extend my field of knowledge to this sensation; but I am not aware that I create the content of the sensation. I only establish the reference to myself, the quality of the sensation is a fact established in itself.
[ 12 ] Wherever we start, inside or outside, we do not get to the point where we could say: The subjective character of the sensation is given here. The term "subjective" is not applicable to the content of the sensation.
[ 13 ] It is these considerations that forced me to reject as impossible any theory of nature that in principle goes beyond the realm of the perceived world and to seek the sole object of natural science in the world of the senses. But then I had to seek in the interdependence of the facts of this very world of the senses that which we express with laws of nature.
[ 14 ] And thus I was forced to adopt the view of the scientific method that underlies Goethe's Theory of Colors. Whoever finds these considerations correct will read this color theory with quite different eyes than modern naturalists can do. He will see that it is not Goethe's hypothesis that is confronted here with Newton's, but that the question at issue is: Is today's theoretical physics to be accepted or not? If not, then the light that this physics sheds on the theory of color must also be lost. What our theoretical basis of physics is, the reader may learn from the following chapters, in order then to see Goethe's disputes in the right light from this basis.