A Theory of Knowledge
GA 2
X. The Inner Nature of Thought
[ 1 ] Let us draw one step nearer to thought. Hitherto we have been considering the place of thought in relation to the rest of the world of experience. We have reached the conclusion that it holds a unique position in that world, that it plays a central role. We shall for the present turn our attention elsewhere. We shall here restrict ourselves to a consideration of the inner nature of thinking. We shall investigate the very character of the thought-world itself, in order to perceive how one thought depends upon another; how thoughts are related to one another. From this inquiry we shall derive the means requisite for reaching a conclusion as to the question: “What is cognition in general?” Or, in other words, what is the meaning of forming thoughts about reality? What is the meaning of wishing to interpret the world by means of thinking?
[ 2 ] Here we must keep our minds free from any preconceived opinion. We should be holding such a preconception if we should assume that a concept (thought) is an image within our consciousness by means of which we reach a solution concerning an object existing outside of consciousness. Here we are not concerned with this and similar preconceptions. We take thoughts just as we find them. The question as to whether they sustain a relationship to anything else whatever and, if so, what sort of relationship is just what we shall investigate. Therefore, we must not posit such a relationship here as our point of departure. This very opinion concerning the relationship between concept and object is very widespread. Indeed, the concept is often defined as the mental counterpart of an object existing outside the mind. The concept is supposed to reproduce the object, mediating to us a true photograph of it. Very often, when thinking is the subject of discussion, what people have in mind is only this preconceived relationship. Practically never does any one consider the idea of traversing the realm of thoughts, within their own sphere, in order to discover what is to be found there.
[ 3 ] We will here investigate this realm just as if nothing whatever existed outside its boundaries, as if thought were the whole of reality. For a certain time we shall turn our attention away from all the rest of the world.
[ 4 ] The fact that this sort of research has been neglected in those investigations concerning the theory of knowledge which are based upon Kant has been ruinous to this science. This omission has given an impulse to this science in a direction which is the very opposite of our own. This scientific trend can never, by reason of its whole character, comprehend Goethe. It is, in the truest sense of the word, un-Goethean to take as point of departure an assumption which is not found through observation, but actually injected into the thing observed. But this is what actually occurs when one sets at the very culmination of scientific knowledge the preconception that the relation mentioned above does exist between thinking and reality, between the idea and the world. The only way to treat this matter after the manner of Goethe is to enter deeply into the nature of thinking itself and then observe what relation comes about when thinking, thus known according to its own nature, is brought into relationship with experience.
[ 5 ] Goethe always takes the path of experience in the strictest sense. He first takes the objects as they are, and, while banishing entirely every subjective opinion, seeks to penetrate into their nature; he then creates the conditions under which the objects can appear in reciprocal action and watches to see the results. He seeks to give Nature the opportunity to bring her laws into operation under especially characteristic circumstances, which he brings about—an opportunity, as it were, to express her own laws.
[ 6 ] How does our thinking appear to us when observed in itself? It is a multiplicity of thoughts which are woven and bound organically together in the most complicated fashion. But, when we have once penetrated this multiplicity from all directions, it becomes again a unity, a harmony. All the elements are related one to another; they exist for one another; one modifies another, restricts it, etc. The moment our mind conceives two corresponding thoughts, it observes at once that these really flow together to form a unit. It finds everywhere in its whole realm the interrelated; this concept unites with that, a third illuminates or supports a fourth, and so on. If, for example, we find in our consciousness the concept “organism,” and we then scan our conceptual world, we meet with another concept, “systematic evolution, growth.” It becomes clear that these two concepts belong together; that they represent merely two aspects of one and the same thing. But this is true of our entire thought-system. All individual thoughts are parts of a great whole which we call our conceptual world.
[ 7 ] When any single thought emerges in consciousness, I cannot rest until this is brought into harmony with the rest of my thinking. Such an isolated concept, apart from the rest of my mental world, is entirely unendurable. I am simply conscious of the fact that there exists an inwardly sustained harmony among all thoughts; that the thought-world is of the nature of a unit. Therefore, every such isolation is an abnormality, an untruth.
[ 8 ] When we have arrived at that state of mind in which our whole thought-world bears the character of a complete inner harmony, we gain thereby the satisfaction for which our mind is striving. We feel that we are in possession of truth.
[ 9 ] Since we perceive truth in the thorough-going agreement of all concepts in our possession, the question at once forces itself upon us: “Has thought, apart from all perceptible reality of the phenomenal world of the senses, a content of its own? When we have removed all sense-content, is not the remainder an utter emptiness, a mere phantasm?”
[ 10 ] It might well be a widespread opinion that this is true; hence we must consider this opinion a little more closely. As we have already remarked above, it is very frequently assumed that the whole system of concepts is merely a photograph of the external world. It is firmly maintained that knowledge evolves in the form of thought; but it is demanded of “strictly scientific knowledge” that it shall receive its content from without. According to this view, the world must provide the substance which flows into our concepts; without that, these are mere empty forms void of content. If the external world should vanish, then concepts and ideas would no longer have any meaning, for they exist by reason of that world.
[ 11 ] This point of view might be called the negation of the concept; for there it no longer possesses any significance in relation to objectivity. It is something added to the latter. The world would thus exist in all completeness even were there no concepts whatever, for these contribute nothing new to the world. They contain nothing which would not be there without them. They are there only because the cognizing subject wills to use them in order to possess in a form suitable to him what is otherwise already there. They are mere mediators to the subject of a content which is of a non-conceptual character. Such is the point of view under discussion.
[ 12 ] If it were well founded, one of the following assumptions would necessarily be true.
[ 1 ] That the conceptual world stands in such a relationship to the external world that it merely repeats the whole content of this in another form. (Here the term “external world” means the sense-world). If such were the case, one could not perceive any necessity for lifting oneself at all above the sense-world. In this latter everything relating and pertaining to knowledge would already be given.
[ 13 ] That the conceptual world takes as its content merely a part of the “appearance for the senses.” We may imagine the thing somewhat like this. We make a series of observations. We meet in these the most diverse objects. We discover in the process that certain characteristics which we observe in a certain object have already been observed by us. A series of objects pass in survey before our eyes: A, B, C, D, etc. Suppose A had the characteristics p q a r; B shows i m b n; C, k h c g; D, p u a v. Here in the case of D we meet again the characteristics a and p previously observed in connection with A. We designate these characteristics as essential. And, in so far as A and D possess essential characteristics in common, we say they are of the same kind. Thus we unite A and D in that we lay hold of their essential characteristics in our thinking. Here we have a thought which does not entirely coincide with the sense-world and to which the charge of superfluity mentioned above cannot be applied, and yet it is far from bringing anything new to the sense-world. Against this, we may say, first of all, that to determine which characteristics of a thing are essential requires, to begin with, a certain norm which will enable us to distinguish between essential and unessential. This norm cannot exist in the object itself for this includes both the essential and the unessential in inseparable unity. This norm must belong to the very content of our thinking.
[ 14 ] But this objection does not wholly refute this point of view. One holding this view might meet the objection thus. He might admit that we have no justification for classifying any characteristic as essential or unessential, but might declare that this need not disturb us; that we simply classify things together when we observe similar characteristics in them without any regard to the essential or unessential nature of these characteristics.
This view, however, requires a presupposition which by no means squares with the facts. So long as we confine ourselves to sense-experience, there is nothing really in common between two things of the same class. An example will make this clear. The simplest is the best because it can best be surveyed.
[ 15 ] Let us observe the two triangles above. What is there really in common between them when we confine ourselves to sense-experience? Nothing whatever. That which they possess in common—that is, the principle on which they are formed and which causes them to be classed under the concept triangle—is attained only when we cross over the boundary of the sense-experience. The concept triangle comprises all triangles. We do not attain to it by merely observing all individual triangles. This concept always remains the same, however frequently I may conceive it, whereas it will scarcely ever happen that I shall see two identical triangles. That by reason of which a single triangle is “this” triangle and no other has nothing to do with the concept. A specific triangle is this specific one, not because it corresponds to the concept, but because of elements which lie entirely outside the concept:—the length of its sides, the measurements of its angles, its position, etc. Yet it is quite incorrect to maintain that the content of the concept is borrowed from the external sense-world, since it is evident that its content is not to be found in any sense-phenomenon.
[ 16 ] a third view is possible. The concept may be the mediator through which to apprehend certain entities which are not perceptible to the senses but which possess a self-sustaining character. This character would be the non-conceptual content of the conceptual form of our thought. Whoever assumes such entities existing beyond the boundaries of experience, and attributes to us the possibility of a knowledge of these entities, must necessarily see in the concept the interpreter of this cognition.
[ 17 ] The inadequacy of this point of view we shall later make especially clear. For the moment we need only remark that, in any case, it does not run counter to the contentual character of the conceptual world. For, if the object about which we think really lay beyond the boundaries of experience and of thinking, thought would all the more have to contain within itself the content upon which it rests. It could still not think about objects of which no trace could be found within the thought-world.
[ 18 ] In any case it is clear that thought is no empty vessel, but that in and of itself it is possessed of content and that its content does not square with that of any other form of phenomenon.
10. Innere Natur des Denkens
[ 1 ] Wir treten dem Denken noch um einen Schritt näher. Bisher haben wir bloß die Stellung desselben zu der übrigen Erfahrungswelt betrachtet. Wir sind zu der Ansicht gekommen, daß es innerhalb derselben eine ganz bevorzugte Stellung einnimmt, daß es eine zentrale Rolle spielt. Davon wollen wir jetzt absehen. Wir wollen uns hier nur auf die innere Natur des Denkens beschränken. Wir wollen den selbsteigenen Charakter der Gedankenwelt untersuchen, um zu erfahren, wie ein Gedanke von dem andern abhängt; wie d je Gedanken zueinander stehen. Daraus erst werden sich uns die Mittel ergeben, Aufschluß über die Frage zu gewinnen: Was ist überhaupt Erkennen? Oder mit anderen Worten: Was heißt es, sich Gedanken über die Wirklichkeit zu machen; was heißt es, sich durch Denken mit der Welt auseinandersetzen zu wollen?
[ 2 ] Wir müssen uns da von jeder vorgefaßten Meinung frei erhalten. Eine solche aber wäre es, wenn wir voraussetzen wollten, der Begriff (Gedanke) sei das Bild innerhalb unseres Bewußtseins, durch das wir Aufschluß über einen außerhalb desselben liegenden Gegenstand gewinnen. Von dieser und ähnlichen Voraussetzungen ist an diesem Orte nicht die Rede. Wir nehmen die Gedanken, wie wir sie vorfinden. Ob sie zu irgend etwas anderem eine Beziehung haben und was für eine, das wollen wir eben untersuchen. Wir dürfen es daher nicht hier als Ausgangspunkt hinstellen. Gerade die angedeutete Ansicht über das Verhältnis von Begriff und Gegenstand ist sehr häufig. Man definiert ja oft den Begriff als das geistige Gegenbild eines außerhalb des Geistes liegenden Gegenstandes. Die Begriffe sollen die Dinge abbilden, uns eine getreue Photographie derselben vermitteln. Man denkt oft, wenn man vom Denken spricht, überhaupt nur an dieses vorausgesetzte Verhältnis. Fast nie trachtet man danach, das Reich der Gedanken innerhalb seines eigenen Gebietes einmal zu durchwandern, um zu sehen, was sich hier ergibt.
[ 3 ] Wir wollen dieses Reich hier in der Weise untersuchen, als ob es außerhalb der Grenzen desselben überhaupt nichts mehr gäbe, als ob das Denken alle Wirklichkeit wäre. Wir sehen für einige Zeit von der ganzen übrigen Welt ab.
[ 4 ] Daß man das in den erkenntnistheoretischen Versuchen, die sich auf Kant stützen, unterlassen hat, ist verhängnisvoll für die Wissenschaft geworden. Diese Unterlassung hat den Anstoß zu einer Richtung in dieser Wissenschaft gegeben, die der unsrigen völlig entgegengesetzt ist. Diese Wissenschaftsrichtung kann ihrer ganzen Natur nach Goethe nie begreifen. Es ist im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes ungoethisch, von einer Behauptung auszugehen, die man nicht in der Beobachtung vorfindet, sondern selbst in das Beobachtete hineinlegt. Das geschieht aber, wenn man die Ansicht an die Spitze der Wissenschaft stellt: Zwischen Denken und Wirklichkeit, Idee und Welt besteht das angedeutete Verhältnis. Im Sinne Goethes handelt man nur, wenn man sich in die eigene Natur des Denkens selbst vertieft und dann zusieht, welche Beziehung sich ergibt, wenn dann dieses seiner Wesenheit nach erkannte Denken zu der Erfahrung in ein Verhältnis gebracht wird.
[ 5 ] Goethe geht überall den Weg der Erfahrung im strengsten Sinne. Er nimmt zuerst die Objekte, wie sie sind, sucht mit völliger Fernhaltung aller subjektiven Meinung ihre Natur zu durchdringen; dann stellt er die Bedingungen her, unter denen die Objekte in Wechselwirkung treten können und wartet ab, was sich hieraus ergibt. Goethe sucht der Natur Gelegenheit zu geben, ihre Gesetzmäßigkeit unter besonders charakteristischen Umständen, die er herbeiführt, zur Geltung zu bringen, gleichsam ihre Gesetze selbst auszusprechen.
[ 6 ] Wie erscheint uns unser Denken für sich betrachtet? Es ist eine Vielheit von Gedanken, die in der mannigfachsten Weise miteinander verwoben und organisch verbunden sind. Diese Vielheit macht aber, wenn wir sie nach allen Seiten hinreichend durchdrungen haben, doch wieder nur eine Einheit, eine Harmonie aus. Alle Glieder haben Bezug aufeinander, sie sind füreinander da; das eine modifiziert das andere, schränkt es ein und so weiter. Sobald sich unser Geist zwei entsprechende Gedanken vorstellt, merkt er alsogleich, daß sie eigentlich in eins miteinander verfließen. Er findet überall Zusammengehöriges in seinem Gedankenbereiche; dieser Begriff schließt sich an jenen, ein dritter erläutert oder stützt einen vierten und so fort. So zum Beispiel finden wir in unserm Bewußtsein den Gedankeninhalt «Organismus» vor; durchmustern wir unsere Vorstellungswelt, so treffen wir auf einen zweiten: «gesetzmäßige Entwicklung, Wachstum». Sogleich wird klar, daß diese beiden Gedankeninhalte zusammengehören, daß sie bloß zwei Seiten eines und desselben Dinges vorstellen. So aber ist es mit unserm ganzen Gedankensystem. Alle Einzelgedanken sind Teile eines großen Ganzen, das wir unsere Begriffswelt nennen.
[ 7 ] Tritt irgendein einzelner Gedanke im Bewußtsein auf, so ruhe ich nicht eher, bis er mit meinem übrigen Denken in Einklang gebracht ist. Ein solcher Sonderbegriff, abseits von meiner übrigen geistigen Welt, ist mir ganz und gar unerträglich. Ich bin mir eben dessen bewußt, daß eine innerlich begründete Harmonie aller Gedanken besteht, daß die Gedankenwelt eine einheitliche ist. Deshalb ist uns jede solche Absonderung eine Unnatürlichkeit, eine Unwahrheit.
[ 8 ] Haben wir uns bis dahin durchgerungen, daß unsere ganze Gedankenwelt den Charakter einer vollkommenen, inneren Übereinstimmung trägt, dann wird uns durch sie jene Befriedigung, nach der unser Geist verlangt. Dann fühlen wir uns im Besitze der Wahrheit.
[ 9 ] Indem wir die Wahrheit in der durchgängigen Zusammenstimmung aller Begriffe, über die wir verfügen, sehen, drängt sich die Frage auf: Ja, hat denn das Denken, abgesehen von aller anschaulichen Wirklichkeit, von der sinnenfälligen Erscheinungswelt, auch einen Inhalt? Bleibt nicht die vollständige Leere, ein reines Phantasma zurück, wenn wir allen sinnlichen Inhalt beseitigt denken?
[ 10 ] Daß das letztere der Fall sei, dürfte wohl eine weit verbreitete Meinung sein, so daß wir sie ein wenig näher betrachten müssen. Wie wir bereits oben bemerkten, denkt man sich ja so vielfach das ganze Begriffssystem nur als eine Photographie der Außenwelt. Man hält zwar daran fest, daß sich unser Wissen in der Form des Denkens entwickelt; fordert aber von einer «streng objektiven Wissenschaft», daß sie ihren Inhalt nur von außen nehme. Die Außenwelt müsse den Stoff liefern, welcher in unsere Begriffe einfließt.9J. H. von Kirchmann sagt sogar in seiner «Lehre vom Wissen [als Einleitung in das Studium philosophischer Werke]» (Leipzig 1873, 3 verbesserte Auflage), daß das Erkennen ein Einfließen der Außenwelt in unser Bewußtsein sei. Ohne jene seien diese leere Schemen ohne allen Inhalt. Fiele die Außenwelt weg, so hätten Begriffe und Ideen keinen Sinn mehr, denn sie sind um ihrer willen da. Man könnte diese Ansicht die Verneinung des Begriffs nennen. Denn er hat für die Objektivität dann gar keine Bedeutung mehr. Er ist ein zu letzterer Hinzugekommenes. Die Welt stünde in aller Vollkommenheit auch da, wenn es keine Begriffe gäbe. Denn sie bringen ja nichts Neues zu derselben hinzu. Sie enthalten nichts, was ohne sie nicht da wäre. Sie sind nur da, weil sich das erkennende Subjekt ihrer bedienen will, um in einer ihm angemessenen Form das zu haben, was anderweitig schon da ist. Sie sind für dasselbe nur Vermittler eines Inhaltes, der nichtbegrifflicher Natur ist. So die angezogene Ansicht.
[ 11 ] Wenn sie begründet wäre, müßte eine von den folgenden drei Voraussetzungen richtig sein.
[ 12 ] 1. Die Begriffswelt stehe in einem solchen Verhältnisse zur Außenwelt, daß sie nur den ganzen Inhalt derselben in anderer Form wiedergibt. Hier ist unter Außenwelt die Sinnenwelt verstanden. Wenn das der Fall wäre, dann könnte man wahrlich nicht einsehen, welche Notwendigkeit bestände, sich überhaupt über die Sinnenwelt zu erheben. Man hat ja das ganze Um und Auf des Erkennens schon mit der letzteren gegeben.
[ 13 ] 2. Die Begriffswelt nehme nur einen Teil der «Erscheinung für die Sinne» als ihren Inhalt auf. Man denke sich die Sache etwa so. Wir machen eine Reihe von Beobachtungen. Wir treffen da auf die verschiedensten Objekte. Wir bemerken dabei, daß gewisse Merkmale, die wir an einem Gegenstande entdecken, schon einmal von uns beobachtet worden sind. Es durchmustere unser Auge eine Reihe von Gegenständen A, B, C, D usw. A hätte die Merkmale q a r; B: 1mb n; C: k h cg und D:p na v. Da treffen wir bei D wieder auf die Merkmale a und p, die wir schon bei A angetroffen haben. Wir bezeichnen diese Merkmale als wesentliche. Und insoferne A und D die wesentlichen Merkmale gleich haben, nennen wir sie gleichartig. So fassen wir A und D dann zusammen, indem wir ihre wesentlichen Merkmale im Denken festhalten. Da haben wir ein Denken, das sich mit der Sinnenwelt nicht ganz deckt, auf das also die oben gerügte Überflüssigkeit nicht anzuwenden und das doch ebenso weit entfernt ist, Neues zu der Sinnenwelt hinzuzubringen. Dagegen läßt sich vor allem sagen: um zu erkennen, welche Eigenschaften einem Dinge wesentlich sind, dazu gehöre schon eine gewisse Norm, die es uns möglich macht, Wesentliches von Unwesentlichem zu unterscheiden. Diese Norm kann in dem Objekte nicht liegen, denn dieses enthält ja das Wesentliche und Unwesentliche in ungetrennter Einheit. Diese Norm müsse also doch selbsteigener Inhalt unseres Denkens sein.
[ 14 ] Dieser Einwand stößt aber die Ansicht noch nicht ganz um. Man kann nämlich sagen: Das sei eben eine ungerecht-fertigte Annahme, daß dies oder jenes wesentlicher oder unwesentlicher für ein Ding sei. Das kümmere uns auch nicht. Es handle sich bloß darum, daß wir gewisse gleiche Eigenschaften bei mehreren Dingen antreffen, und die letzteren nennen wir dann gleichartig. Davon sei gar nicht die Rede, daß diese gleichen Eigenschaften auch wesentlich seien. Diese Anschauung setzt aber etwas voraus, was durchaus nicht zutrifft. Es ist in zwei Dingen gleicher Gattung gar nichts wirklich Gemeinschaftliches, wenn man bei der Sinnenerfahrung stehen bleibt. Ein Beispiel wird das klarlegen. Das einfachste ist das beste, weil es sich am besten überschauen läßt. Betrachten wir folgende zwei Dreiecke.
[ 15 ] Was haben die wirklich gleich, wenn man bei der Sinnenerfahrung stehen bleibt? Gar nichts. Was sie gleich haben, nämlich das Gesetz, nach dem sie gebildet sind und welches bewirkt, daß sie beide unter den Begriff «Dreieck» fallen, das wird von uns erst gewonnen, wenn wir die Sinnenerfahrung überschreiten. Der Begriff «Dreieck» umfaßt alle Dreiecke. Wir kommen nicht durch die bloße Betrachtung aller einzelnen Dreiecke zu ihm. Dieser Begriff bleibt immer derselbe, so oft ich ihn auch vorstellen mag, während es mir wohl kaum gelingen wird, zweimal dasselbe «Dreieck» anzuschauen. Das, wodurch das Einzeldreieck das vollbestimmte «dieses» und kein anderes ist, hat mit dem Begriffe gar nichts zu tun. Ein bestimmtes Dreieck ist dieses bestimmte nicht dadurch, daß es jenem Begriffe entspricht, sondern durch Elemente, die ganz außerhalb des Begriffes liegen: Länge der Seiten, Größe der Winkel, Lage usw. Es ist aber doch ganz unstatthaft zu behaupten, daß der Inhalt des Begriffes «Dreieck» aus der objektiven Sinnenwelt entlehnt sei, wenn man sieht, daß dieser sein Inhalt überhaupt in keiner sinnenfälligen Erscheinung enthalten ist.
[ 16 ] 3. Es ist nun noch ein Drittes möglich. Der Begriff könnte ja der Vermittler für das Erfassen von Wesenheiten sein, die nicht sinnlichwahrnehmbar sind, die aber doch einen auf sich selbst beruhenden Charakter haben. Der letztere wäre dann der unbegriffliche Inhalt der begrifflichen Form unseres Denkens. Wer solche jenseits der Erfahrung bestehende Wesenheiten annimmt und uns die Möglichkeit eines Wissens von denselben zuspricht, muß doch notwendig auch in dem Begriffe den Dolmetsch dieses Wissens sehen.
[ 17 ] Wir werden das Unzulängliche dieser Ansicht noch besonders darlegen. Hier wollen wir nur darauf aufmerksam machen, daß sie jedenfalls nicht gegen die Inhaltlichkeit der Begriffswelt spricht. Denn lägen die Gegenstände, über die gedacht wird, jenseits aller Erfahrung und jenseits des Denkens, dann müßte das letztere doch um so mehr innerhalb seiner selbst den Inhalt haben, auf den es sich stützt. Es könnte doch nicht über Gegenstände denken, von denen innerhalb der Gedankenwelt keine Spur anzutreffen wäre.
[ 18 ] Jedenfalls ist also klar, daß das Denken kein inhaltsleeres Gefäß ist, sondern daß es rein für sich selbst genommen inhaltsvoll ist und daß sich sein Inhalt nicht mit dem einer andern Erscheinungsform deckt.
10. inner nature of thinking
[ 1 ] We are taking another step closer to thinking. So far we have only considered its position in relation to the rest of the world of experience. We have come to the conclusion that it occupies a very privileged position within it, that it plays a central role. We will refrain from this now. We shall confine ourselves here only to the internal nature of thought. We want to examine the self-inherent character of the world of thought in order to find out how one thought depends on the other ; how thoughts relate to each other. Only this will give us the means to gain insight into the question: What is knowledge at all? Or in other words: What does it mean to think about reality; what does it mean to want to come to terms with the world through thinking?
[ 2 ] We must keep ourselves free of any preconceived opinion. But it would be such an opinion if we wanted to presuppose that the concept (thought) is the image within our consciousness, through which we gain information about an object lying outside it. This and similar presuppositions are not discussed here. We take the thoughts as we find them. Whether they have a relation to anything else, and what kind of relation, is what we want to investigate. We must therefore not take it here as a starting point. The above-mentioned view of the relationship between concept and object is very common. The concept is often defined as the mental counter-image of an object lying outside the mind. Concepts are supposed to depict things, to give us a faithful photograph of them. When one speaks of thinking, one often thinks only of this presupposed relationship. One almost never seeks to wander through the realm of thought within one's own area in order to see what arises here.
[ 3 ] We want to examine this realm here as if there were nothing at all outside its boundaries, as if thought were all reality. We look away from the rest of the world for a while.
[ 4 ] The fact that this has been omitted in the epistemological attempts based on Kant has been disastrous for science. This omission has given the impetus to a direction in this science that is completely opposed to ours. By its very nature, this direction of science can never comprehend Goethe. It is in the truest sense of the word unGoethean to proceed from an assertion which one does not find in observation, but which one places in what is observed. But this is what happens when you place the view at the forefront of science: The indicated relationship exists between thought and reality, idea and world. One only acts in Goethe's sense if one immerses oneself in the nature of thinking itself and then observes what relationship arises when this thinking recognized according to its essence is brought into a relationship with experience.
[ 5 ] Goethe follows the path of experience in the strictest sense everywhere. He first takes the objects as they are, seeks to penetrate their nature with complete detachment from all subjective opinion; then he establishes the conditions under which the objects can interact and waits to see what results from this. Goethe seeks to give nature the opportunity to bring its laws to bear under particularly characteristic circumstances, which he brings about, to express its laws himself, as it were.
[ 6 ] How does our thinking appear to us when viewed by itself? It is a multitude of thoughts that are interwoven and organically connected in the most diverse ways. But this multiplicity, once we have penetrated it sufficiently on all sides, only constitutes a unity, a harmony. All the links relate to each other, they are there for each other; one modifies the other, restricts it and so on. As soon as our mind imagines two corresponding thoughts, it immediately realizes that they actually merge into one. It finds everywhere what belongs together in its realm of thought; this concept joins that, a third explains or supports a fourth, and so on. Thus, for example, we find in our consciousness the thought content "organism"; if we look through our imaginary world, we encounter a second one: "lawful development, growth". It immediately becomes clear that these two thought contents belong together, that they merely represent two sides of one and the same thing. But so it is with our whole system of thought. All individual thoughts are parts of a large whole that we call our conceptual world.
[ 7 ] If any individual thought appears in my consciousness, I do not rest until it has been harmonized with the rest of my thinking. Such a special concept, apart from the rest of my spiritual world, is completely intolerable to me. I am aware of the fact that there is an inner harmony of all thoughts, that the world of thought is a unified one. Therefore, any such separation is an unnaturalness, an untruth.
[ 8 ] Once we have come to the conclusion that our entire world of thought has the character of a perfect, inner harmony, then it will give us the satisfaction that our spirit longs for. Then we feel that we are in possession of the truth.
[ 9 ] Since we see truth in the consistent coherence of all the concepts at our disposal, the question arises: Yes, does thinking, apart from all vivid reality, from the sensory world of appearances, also have a content? Doesn't complete emptiness, a pure phantasm, remain when we think all sensory content has been eliminated?
[ 10 ] That the latter is the case is probably a widespread opinion, so that we must take a closer look at it. As we have already noted above, the whole conceptual system is often thought of only as a photograph of the external world. They maintain that our knowledge develops in the form of thought, but demand of a "strictly objective science" that it takes its content only from the outside. The outside world must provide the material that flows into our concepts.9J. H. von Kirchmann even says in his "Lehre vom Wissen [als Einleitung in das Studium philosophischer Werke]" (Leipzig 1873, 3rd improved edition) that cognition is an influx of the external world into our consciousness. Without it, these are empty schemas without any content. If the outside world were to disappear, concepts and ideas would no longer have any meaning, because they are there for their own sake. This view could be called the negation of the concept. For it then no longer has any meaning for objectivity. It is something added to the latter. The world would also exist in all its perfection if there were no concepts. For they add nothing new to it. They contain nothing that would not exist without them. They are only there because the cognizing subject wants to make use of them in order to have that which is already there elsewhere in a form appropriate to it. For it, they are only mediators of a content that is non-conceptual in nature. Thus the view put forward.
[ 11 ] If it were well-founded, one of the following three premises would have to be correct.
[ 12 ] 1. the conceptual world is in such a relationship to the external world that it only reproduces the entire content of the latter in a different form. Here the external world is understood to be the sense world. If this were the case, then one could truly not see what necessity there would be to rise above the sense world at all. One has already given the whole to and fro of cognition with the latter.
[ 13 ] 2. The conceptual world takes up only a part of the "appearance for the senses" as its content. Think of it like this. We make a series of observations. We encounter the most diverse objects. We notice that certain characteristics that we discover in an object have already been observed by us. Our eye scans a series of objects A, B, C, D etc. A would have the characteristics q a r; B: 1mb n; C: k h cg and D:p na v. In D we again encounter the characteristics a and p, which we have already encountered in A . We refer to these characteristics as essentials. A and D have the same essential characteristics, we call them similar. Thus we summarize A and D by holding their essential characteristics in thought. Here we have a way of thinking that does not quite coincide with the world of the senses, to which the superfluousness criticized above does not apply and which is nevertheless just as far removed from adding anything new to the world of the senses. On the other hand, it can be said above all that in order to recognize which properties are essential to a thing, a certain norm is necessary which makes it possible for us to distinguish the essential from the non-essential. This norm cannot lie in the object, because it contains the essential and the non-essential in an undivided unity. This norm must therefore be the inherent content of our thinking.
[ 14 ] However, this objection does not completely overturn the view. For one can say: This is just an unjustified assumption that this or that is more or less essential for a thing. That does not concern us either. It is merely that we find certain identical properties in several things, and we then call the latter similar. There is no question of these identical properties being essential. But this view presupposes something that is not true at all. There is nothing really common in two things of the same kind if we stop at sense experience. An example will make this clear. The simplest is the best, because it is the easiest to grasp. Let's look at the following two triangles.
[ 15 ] What do they really have in common if you stop at sensory experience? Nothing at all. What they have in common, namely the law according to which they are formed and which causes them both to fall under the term "triangle", is only gained by us when we transcend sense experience. The term "triangle" encompasses all triangles. We do not arrive at it by merely observing all the individual triangles. This concept always remains the same, however often I may imagine it, while I will hardly succeed in looking at the same "triangle" twice. The fact that the single triangle is the fully determined "this" and no other has nothing to do with the concept. A certain triangle is this determined not by the fact that it corresponds to that concept, but by elements that lie entirely outside the concept: Length of sides, size of angles, position, etc. However, it is quite inadmissible to claim that the content of the concept "triangle" is borrowed from the objective world of the senses when one sees that its content is not contained in any sensory phenomenon at all.
[ 16 ] 3. There is now a third possibility. The concept could be the mediator for the apprehension of entities that are not perceptible to the senses, but which nevertheless have a character based on themselves. The latter would then be the non-conceptual content of the conceptual form of our thinking. Whoever assumes such entities existing beyond experience and grants us the possibility of knowledge of them must necessarily also see the interpreter of this knowledge in the concept.
[ 17 ] We will explain the inadequacy of this view in more detail. Here we only want to point out that it certainly does not speak against the content of the conceptual world. For if the objects that are thought about were beyond all experience and beyond thinking, then the latter would have to have all the more within itself the content on which it is based. It could not think about objects of which no trace could be found within the world of thought.
[ 18 ] In any case, it is clear that thought is not an empty vessel, but that it is full of content purely in itself and that its content does not coincide with that of another form of manifestation.