A Theory of Knowledge
GA 2
XI. Thought and Perception
[ 1 ] Knowledge permeates perceived reality with the concepts apprehended and worked through by our thinking. It supplements and deepens that which is passively received by means of what our mind through its own activity has lifted out of the darkness of the merely potential into the light of reality. This presupposes that perception needs to be supplemented by the mind; that perception is not in itself something definitive, final, conclusive.
[ 2 ] The fundamental fallacy of modern science consists in the fact that it looks upon sense-perception as something conclusive, complete. For this reason it sets itself the task simply to photograph this existence, complete in itself. The only view which is logical in this respect is positivism, which simply rejects every advance beyond perception. Yet one observes nowadays in almost all branches of science an endeavor to look upon this point of view as being correct. In the true sense of the word, such a demand would be adequate only for such a science as merely enumerates and describes things as they exist beside one another in space, and occurrences as they follow one another in time. Natural history of the older type comes closest to meeting this requirement. The newer type makes the same demand, to be sure, and sets forth a complete theory of experience—only, however, to transgress this at once the moment it undertakes the first step into real knowledge.
[ 3 ] If we should wish to lay hold upon pure experience, we should have to empty ourselves completely of our thinking. To deny to thinking the capacity for perceiving in itself entities which are inaccessible to the senses is a degradation of thought. Apart from the factor of sensible qualities, there must be within reality a factor which is apprehended by thought. Thinking is an organ of man ordained to observe something higher than is afforded by the senses. To thinking is accessible that side of reality of which a mere sense-being could never become aware. What thought exists for is not merely to repeat the sensible, but to penetrate into what is concealed from the senses. The sense-percept gives us only one side of reality. The other side is the apprehending of the world through thinking. At first appearance, thought seems to us something quite alien to perception; for perception enters into us from without, while thinking works from within outward. The content of thought appears to us as an inwardly complete organism; all is in the closest interrelationship. The individual members of the thought system mutually determine one another; each single concept has its ultimate roots in the totality of our thought structure.
[ 4 ] At first glance, it seems as if the inner freedom from contradiction which characterizes thought, its self-sufficiency, rendered any transition to the percept an impossibility. Were the thought-characterizations such that they could be satisfied in one way alone, thinking would really be confined within itself; we could not emerge from within it. But this is not the case. These characterizations are such that they may be satisfied in a variety of different ways; only the element which produces this multifarious-ness must not be sought within thinking itself. Let us take the thought-characterization: “The earth attracts every other body.” We shall observe at once that the thought admits of the possibility of being fulfilled in the most diverse ways. But these are variations which can no longer be reached by thinking. There is room for another element. This element is the sense-percept. This percept affords such a form of specialization of thought-characterizations, which is left open by thought itself.
[ 5 ] It is in this specialization that the world meets us when we make use of mere experience. Psychologically, that comes first which in point of fact is the derivative.
[ 6 ] In all working over of reality through cognition, the process is as follows: We meet with a concrete percept. It confronts us as a riddle. Within us the impulse manifests itself to investigate its “What?”—its real nature—which the percept itself does not express. This impulse is nothing but the upward working of a concept out of the darkness of our consciousness. We then hold this concept firmly while the sense percept moves on a parallel line with this thought-process. The mute percept suddenly speaks a language intelligible to us; we know that the concept which we have taken hold of is that real nature of the percept for which we have been seeking.
[ 7 ] What has here come about is a judgment. It is different from that form of judgment which unites two concepts without reference to percepts. When I say: “Freedom is the determination of a being from within itself,” I have here also formed a judgment. The constituents of this judgment are concepts not given to me in perception. Upon such judgments rests that inner unity of our thought which we discussed in the preceding chapter.
[ 8 ] The judgment which we now consider has for its subject a percept and for predicate a concept. “This animal before me is a dog.” In such a judgment, a percept is injected into my thought system at a determinate place. Let us call such a judgment a perceptual judgment.
[ 9 ] By means of the perceptual judgment we cognize that a determinate sensible object corresponds by nature with a determinate concept.
[ 10 ] If, then, we are to comprehend what we perceive, the percept must have been formed within us beforehand as a determinate concept. Any object of which this were not true we should pass by without its being intelligible to us.
[ 11 ] That such is the case is best shown by the fact that persons who have lived a rich mental life also penetrate far deeper into the world of experience than do others of whom this is not true. Much that passes over others without leaving a trace makes a deep impression upon these persons. (‘If the eye were not sun-like, it could never see the sun.') But, if may be asked, do we not meet in our lives innumerable things of which we have not previously had the slightest conception?—and do we not on the spot form concepts of these? Undoubtedly. But is the sum of all potential concepts identical with the sum of those which I have already formed in the previous part of my life? Is not my conceptual system capable of evolving? In the presence of a reality which is unintelligible to me, can I not set my thinking in action in order that it may evolve on the spot the concept with which I must match the object? I need only possess the capacity of drawing a determinate concept out of the store of the thought-world. It is not that a determinate concept was already consciously known to me in the previous part of my life but that this concept can be drawn forth from the world of thoughts accessible to me. Where and when I grasp the concept is not essential to its content. Indeed, I bring forth thought-characterizations out of the thought-world. Nothing whatever flows from the sensible object into this content. I simply recognize in the sensible object the thought which I draw forth from within myself. This object induces me, to be sure, to call forth at a certain moment from the unity of all potential thoughts just this one thought-content, but it does not by any means furnish me the material for constructing the thought. This I must draw from within myself.
[ 12 ] When we cause our thinking to become active, only then does reality attain to true characterizations. Previously mute, it now speaks a clear language.
[ 13 ] Our thinking is the interpreter that explains the dumb show of experience.
[ 14 ] Men are so accustomed to look upon the world of concepts as void of content, and to contrast with this world the percept as being filled with content and thoroughly determinate, that it will be difficult for the true facts of the case to win the place belonging to them. The truth is entirely overlooked that mere beholding is the emptiest thing imaginable and that it receives content only from thinking. The sole truth in regard to the object is that it holds the constant flux of thought in a determinate form without our having to cooperate actively in thus holding it. When one who has a rich mental life sees a thousand things which are nothing to the mentally poor, this shows as clearly as sunlight that the content of reality is only the reflection of the content of our minds and that we receive from without merely the empty form. Of course, we must possess the inner power to recognize ourselves as the creator of this content; otherwise we shall forever see only the reflection and never our own mind which is reflected. Indeed, one who perceives himself in an actual mirror must know himself as a personality in order to recognize himself in the reflected image.
[ 15 ] All sense-perception finally resolves itself, as to its essential nature, into ideal content. Only then does it appear to us transparent and clear. The sciences are to a large extent wholly unaffected by the consciousness of this truth. Thought-characterizations are considered the attributes of objects, like colors, odors, etc. Thus it is supposed that all bodies are characterized by the definition that they remain in the state wherein they are—of rest or motion—until an influence from without alters their state. It is in this form that the law of inertia plays its role in natural science. But the actual fact is something quite different. In my conceptual system the concept body exists in many modifications. One of these is the concept of a thing which can of itself set itself in motion or come to rest; another is the concept of a body which alters its state only under an external influence. These latter bodies we designate as inorganic. If, then, I meet a certain body which reflects in the percept the above conceptual definition, I designate it as inorganic and unite with it all characterizations which follow from the concept of an inorganic body.
[ 16 ] All sciences should be permeated by the conviction that their content is solely a thought-content and that they sustain no other relationship to perception than that they see in the perceptual object a specialized form of the concept.
11. Denken und Wahrnehmung
[ 1 ] Die Wissenschaft durchtränkt die wahrgenommene Wirklichkeit mit den von unserm Denken erfaßten und durchge-arbeiteten Begriffen. Sie ergänzt und vertieft das passiv Aufgenommene durch das, was unser Geist selbst durch seine Tätigkeit aus dem Dunkel der bloßen Möglichkeit in das Licht der Wirklichkeit emporgehoben hat. Das setzt voraus, daß die Wahrnehmung der Ergänzung durch den Geist bedarf, daß sie überhaupt kein Endgültiges, Letztes, Abgeschlossenes ist.
[ 2 ] Es ist der Grundirrtum der modernen Wissenschaft, daß sie die Wahrnehmung der Sinne schon für etwas Abgeschlossenes, Fertiges ansieht. Deshalb stellt sie sich die Aufgabe, dieses in sich vollendete Sein einfach zu photographieren. Konsequent ist in dieser Hinsicht wohl nur der Positivismus, der jedes Hinausgehen über die Wahrnehmung einfach ablehnt. Doch sieht man heute fast in allen Wissenschaften das Bestreben, diesen Standpunkt als den richtigen anzusehen. Im wahren Sinne des Wortes würde dieser Forderung nur eine solche Wissenschaft genügen, welche einfach die Dinge, wie sie nebeneinander im Raume vorhanden sind, und die Ereignisse, wie sie zeitlich aufeinander folgen, aufzählt und beschreibt. Die Naturgeschichte alten Stiles kommt dieser Forderung noch am nächsten. Die neuere verlangt zwar dasselbe, stellt eine vollständige Theorie der Erfahrung auf, um sie - sogleich zu übertreten, wenn sie den ersten Schritt in der wirklichen Wissenschaft unternimmt.
[ 3 ] Wir müßten uns unseres Denkens vollkommen entäußern, wollten wir an der reinen Erfahrung festhalten. Man setzt das Denken herab, wenn man ihm die Möglichkeit entzieht, in sich selbst Wesenheiten wahrzunehmen, die den Sinnen unzugänglich sind. Es muß in der Wirklichkeit außer den Sinnesqualitäten noch einen Faktor geben, der vom Denken erfaßt wird. Das Denken ist ein Organ des Menschen, das bestimmt ist, Höheres zu beobachten als die Sinne bieten. Dem Denken ist jene Seite der Wirklichkeit zugänglich, von der ein bloßes Sinnenwesen nie etwas erfahren würde. Nicht die Sinnlichkeit wiederzukäuen ist es da, sondern das zu durchdringen, was dieser verborgen ist. Die Wahrnehmung der Sinne liefert nur eine Seite der Wirklichkeit. Die andere Seite ist die denkende Erfassung der Welt. Nun tritt uns aber im ersten Augenblick das Denken als etwas der Wahrnehmung ganz Fremdes entgegen. Die Wahrnehmung dringt von außen auf uns ein; das Denken arbeitet sich aus unserm Inneren heraus. Der Inhalt dieses Denkens erscheint uns als innerlich vollkommener Organismus; alles ist im strengsten Zusammenhange. Die einzelnen Glieder des Gedankensystems bestimmen einander; jeder einzelne Begriff hat zuletzt seine Wurzel in der Allheit unseres Gedankengebäudes.
[ 4 ] Auf den ersten Blick erscheint es, als ob die innere Widerspruchslosigkeit des Denkens, seine Selbstgenügsamkeit jeden Übergang zur Wahrnehmung unmöglich mache. Wären die Bestimmungen des Denkens solche, daß man ihnen nur auf eine Art genügen könnte, dann wäre es wirklich in sich selbst abgeschlossen; wir könnten aus demselben nicht heraus. Das ist aber nicht der Fall. Diese Bestimmungen sind solche, daß ihnen auf mannigfache Weise Genüge geschehen kann. Nur darf dann dasjenige Element, welches diese Mannigfaltigkeit bewirkt, nicht selbst innerhalb des Denkens gesucht werden. Nehmen wir die Gedankenbestimmung: Die Erde zieht jeden Körper an, so werden wir alsbald bemerken, daß der Gedanke die Möglichkeit offen läßt, in der verschiedensten Weise erfüllt zu werden. Das sind aber Verschiedenheiten, die mit dem Denken nicht mehr erreichbar sind. Da ist Platz für ein anderes Element. Dieses Element ist die Sinneswahrnehmung. Die Wahrnehmung bietet eine solche Art der Spezialisierung der Gedankenbestimmungen, die von den letzteren selbst offen gelassen ist.
[ 5 ] Diese Spezialisierung ist es, in der uns die Welt gegenübertritt, wenn wir uns bloß der Erfahrung bedienen. Psychologisch ist das das erste, was sachlich genommen das Abgeleitete ist.
[ 6 ] Bei aller wissenschaftlichen Bearbeitung der Wirklichkeit ist der Vorgang dieser: Wir treten der konkreten Wahrnehmung gegenüber. Sie steht wie ein Rätsel vor uns. In uns macht sich der Drang geltend, ihr eigentliches Was, ihr Wesen, das sie nicht selbst ausspricht, zu erforschen. Dieser Drang ist nichts anderes als das Emporarbeiten eines Begriffes aus dem Dunkel unseres Bewußtseins. Diesen Begriff halten wir dann fest, während die sinnenfällige Wahrnehmung mit diesem Denkprozesse parallel geht. Die stumme Wahrnehmung spricht plötzlich eine uns verständliche Sprache; wir erkennen, daß der Begriff, den wir gefaßt haben, jenes gesuchte Wesen der Wahrnehmung ist.
[ 7 ] Was sich da vollzogen hat, ist ein Urteil. Es ist verschieden von jener Gestalt des Urteils, die zwei Begriffe verbindet, ohne auf die Wahrnehmung Rücksicht zu nehmen. Wenn ich sage: Die Freiheit ist die Bestimmung eines Wesens aus sich selbst heraus, so habe ich auch ein Urteil gefällt. Die Glieder dieses Urteils sind Begriffe, die ich nicht in der Wahrnehmung gegeben habe. Auf solchen Urteilen beruht die innere Einheitlichkeit unseres Denkens, die wir im vorigen Kapitel behandelt haben.
[ 8 ] Das Urteil, welches hier in Betracht kommt, hat zum Subjekte eine Wahrnehmung, zum Prädikate einen Begriff. Dieses bestimmte Tier, das ich vor mir habe, ist ein Hund. In einem solchen Urteile wird eine Wahrnehmung in mein Gedankensystem an einem bestimmten Orte eingefügt. Nennen wir ein solches Urteil ein Wahrnehmungsurteil.
[ 9 ] Durch das Wahrnehmungsurteil wird erkannt, daß ein bestimmter sinnenfälliger Gegenstand seiner Wesenheit nach mit einem bestimmten Begriffe zusammenfällt.
[ 1 ] Wollen wir also begreifen, was wir wahrnehmen, dann muß die Wahrnehmung als bestimmter Begriff in uns vorgebildet sein. An einem Gegenstande, bei dem das nicht der Fall wäre, gingen wir, ohne daß er uns verständlich wäre, vorüber.
[ 11 ] Daß das so ist, dafür liefert wohl der Umstand den besten Beweis, daß Personen, welche ein reicheres Geistesleben führen, auch viel tiefer in die Erfahrungswelt eindringen, als andere, bei denen das nicht der Fall ist. Vieles, was an den letzteren spurlos vorübergeht, macht auf die ersteren einen tiefen Eindruck. («Wär' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft, die Sonne könnt' es nie erblicken.») Ja aber, wird man sagen, treten wir nicht im Leben unendlich vielen Dingen entgegen, von denen wir uns bisher nicht den leisesten Begriff gemacht haben; und bilden wir uns denn nicht an Ort und Stelle sogleich Begriffe von ihnen? Ganz wohl. Aber ist denn die Summe aller möglichen Begriffe mit der Summe derer, die ich mir in meinem bisherigen Leben gebildet habe, identisch? Ist mein Begriffssystem nicht entwicklungsfähig? Kann ich im Angesichte einer mir unverständlichen Wirklichkeit nicht sogleich mein Denken in Wirksamkeit versetzen, auf daß es eben auch an Ort und Stelle den Begriff entwickle, den ich einem Gegenstande entgegenzuhalten habe? Es ist für mich nur die Fähigkeit erforderlich, einen bestimmten Begriff aus dem Fonds der Gedankenwelt hervorgehen zu lassen. Nicht darum handelt es sich, daß mir ein bestimmter Gedanke im Laufe meines Lebens schon bewußt war, sondern darum, daß er sich aus der Welt der mir erreichbaren Gedanken ableiten läßt. Das ist ja für seinen Inhalt unwesentlich, wo und wann ich ihn erfasse., Ich entnehme ja alle Bestimmungen des Gedankens aus der Gedankenwelt. Von dem Sinnesobjekte fließt in diesen Inhalt ja doch nichts ein. Ich erkenne in dem Sinnesobjekt den Gedanken, den ich aus meinem Inneren herausgeholt, nur wieder. Dieses Objekt veranlaßt mich zwar, in einem bestimmten Augenblicke gerade diesen Gedankeninhalt aus der Einheit aller möglichen Gedanken herauszutreiben, aber es liefert mir keineswegs die Bausteine zu denselben. Die muß ich aus mir selbst herausholen.
[ 12 ] Wenn wir unser Denken wirken lassen, bekommt die Wirklichkeit erst wahrhafte Bestimmungen. Sie, die vorher stumm war, redet eine deutliche Sprache.
[ 13 ] Unser Denken ist der Dolmetsch, der die Gebärden der Erfahrung deutet.
[ 14 ] Man ist so gewohnt, die Welt der Begriffe für eine leere, inhaltslose anzusehen, und ihr die Wahrnehmung als das Inhaltsvolle, durch und durch Bestimmte gegenüberzustellen, daß es für den wahren Sachverhalt schwer sein wird, sich die ihm gebührende Stellung zu erringen. Man übersieht vollständig, daß die bloße Anschauung das Leerste ist, was sich nur denken läßt, und daß sie allen Inhalt erst aus dem Denken erhält. Das einzige Wahre an der Sache ist, daß sie den immer flüssigen Gedanken in einer bestimmten Form festhält, ohne daß wir nötig haben, zu diesem Festhalten tätig mitzuwirken. Wenn der eine, der ein reiches Seelenleben hat, tausend Dinge sieht, die für den geistig Armen eine Null sind, so beweist das sonnenklar, daß der Inhalt der Wirklichkeit nur das Spiegelbild des Inhaltes unseres Geistes ist und daß wir von außen nur die leere Form empfangen. Freilich müssen wir die Kraft in uns haben, uns als die Erzeuger dieses Inhaltes zu erkennen, sonst sehen wir ewig nur das Spiegelbild, nie unseren Geist, der sich spiegelt. Auch der sich in einem faktischen Spiegel sieht, muß sich ja selbst als Persönlichkeit erkennen, um sich im Bilde wieder zu erkennen.
[ 15 ] Alle Sinnenwahrnehmung löst sich, was das Wesen betrifft, zuletzt in ideellen Inhalt auf. Dann erst erscheint sie uns als durchsichtig und klar. Die Wissenschaften sind vielfach von dem Bewußtsein dieser Wahrheit nicht einmal berührt. Man hält die Gedankenbestimmung für Merkmale der Gegenstände, wie Farbe, Geruch usw. So glaubt man, die Bestimmung sei eine Eigenschaft aller Körper, daß sie in dem Zustande der Bewegung oder Ruhe, in dem sie sich befinden, so lange verharren, bis ein äußerer Einfluß denselben ändert. In dieser Form figuriert das Gesetz vom Beharrungsvermögen in der Naturlehre. Der wahre Tatbestand ist aber ein ganz anderer. In meinem Begriffssystem besteht der Gedanke Körper in vielen Modifikationen. Die eine ist der Gedanke eines Dinges, das sich aus sich selbst heraus in Ruhe oder Bewegung setzen kann, eine andere der Begriff eines Körpers, der nur infolge äußeren Einflusses seinen Zustand verändert. Letztere Körper bezeichne ich als unorganische. Tritt mir dann ein bestimmter Körper entgegen, der mir in der Wahrnehmung meine obige Begriffsbestimmung widerspiegelt, so bezeichne ich ihn als unorganisch und verbinde mit ihm alle Bestimmungen, die aus dem Begriffe des unorganischen Körpers folgen.
[ 16 ] Die Überzeugung sollte alle Wissenschaften durchdringen, daß ihr Inhalt lediglich Gedankeninhalt ist und daß sie mit der Wahrnehmung in keiner anderen Verbindung stehen, als daß sie im Wahrnehmungsobjekte eine besondere Form des Begriffes sehen.
11 Thinking and perception
[ 1 ] Science imbues the perceived reality with the concepts grasped and worked through by our thinking. It supplements and deepens what is passively perceived with what our mind itself has raised through its activity from the darkness of mere possibility into the light of reality. This presupposes that perception needs to be supplemented by the mind, that it is not at all a final, ultimate, completed thing.
[ 2 ] It is the fundamental error of modern science that it already regards the perception of the senses as something completed, finished. That is why it sets itself the task of simply photographing this completed being. In this respect, only positivism, which simply rejects any going beyond perception, is consistent. However, today we see in almost all sciences the endeavor to regard this point of view as the correct one. In the true sense of the word, only a science that simply enumerates and describes things as they exist side by side in space and events as they follow one another in time would satisfy this demand. The old-style natural history comes closest to this requirement. The newer one demands the same, but sets up a complete theory of experience, only to transgress it as soon as it takes the first step into real science.
[ 3 ] We would have to completely divest ourselves of our thinking if we wanted to hold on to pure experience. Thinking is degraded when it is deprived of the possibility of perceiving entities within itself that are inaccessible to the senses. There must be another factor in reality, apart from the qualities of the senses, which is grasped by thinking. Thinking is an organ of man that is destined to observe higher things than the senses offer. Thinking has access to that side of reality which a mere sensory being would never experience. It is not there to regurgitate sensuality, but to penetrate that which is hidden from it. The perception of the senses provides only one side of reality. The other side is the thinking perception of the world. At first, however, thinking confronts us as something completely alien to perception. Perception penetrates us from the outside; thinking works its way out from within us. The content of this thinking appears to us as an inwardly perfect organism; everything is in the strictest coherence. The individual members of the thought system determine each other; every single concept ultimately has its root in the universality of our thought structure.
[ 4 ] At first glance, it appears as if the inner lack of contradiction of thought, its self-sufficiency, makes any transition to perception impossible. If the determinations of thought were such that they could only be satisfied in one way, then it would really be self-contained; we could not escape from it. But this is not the case. These determinations are such that they can be satisfied in many ways. But then the element which brings about this multiplicity must not itself be sought within thought. If we take the thought definition: The earth attracts every body, we will immediately notice that the thought leaves open the possibility of being fulfilled in the most diverse ways. But these are diversities that are no longer attainable by thinking. There is room for another element. This element is sense perception. Perception offers such a kind of specialization of thought determinations that is left open by the latter themselves.
[ 5 ] It is this specialization in which the world confronts us when we merely make use of experience. Psychologically, this is the first thing that is factually derived.
[ 6 ] In all scientific treatment of reality, the process is this: We confront concrete perception. It stands before us like a riddle. We feel the urge to explore its actual what, its being, which it does not express itself. This urge is nothing other than the working up of a concept from the darkness of our consciousness. We then hold on to this concept while the sensory perception goes parallel to this thought process. The silent perception suddenly speaks a language we can understand; we recognize that the concept we have grasped is the being of perception we are seeking.
[ 7 ] What has taken place there is a judgment. It is different from the form of judgment that connects two concepts without taking perception into account. When I say that freedom is the determination of a being out of itself, I have also made a judgment. The elements of this judgment are concepts that I have not given in perception. The inner unity of our thinking, which we discussed in the previous chapter, is based on such judgments.
[ 8 ] The judgment under consideration here has a perception as its subject and a concept as its predicate. This particular animal that I have before me is a dog. In such a judgment, a perception is inserted into my thought system at a certain place. Let us call such a judgment a perceptual judgment.
[ 9 ] Through the perceptual judgement it is recognized that a certain sensible object coincides in its essence with a certain concept.
[ 1 ] If we want to understand what we perceive, then the perception must be pre-formed in us as a certain concept. If this were not the case, we would pass by an object without being able to understand it.
[ 11 ] The fact that this is so is probably best demonstrated by the fact that people who lead a richer spiritual life also penetrate much deeper into the world of experience than others for whom this is not the case. Much that passes the latter by without a trace makes a deep impression on the former. ("If the eye were not sunny, it could never see the sun.") But, it will be said, do we not encounter an infinite number of things in life of which we have not yet formed the slightest conception; and do we not immediately form concepts of them on the spot? Quite so. But is the sum of all possible concepts identical with the sum of those that I have formed in my life so far? Is my conceptual system not capable of development? In the face of a reality that is incomprehensible to me, can I not immediately put my thinking into action so that it develops the concept that I have to hold against an object on the spot? All that is necessary for me is the ability to allow a certain concept to emerge from the fund of the world of thought. It is not a question of my having been conscious of a certain thought in the course of my life, but of its being able to be derived from the world of thoughts accessible to me. It is irrelevant to its content where and when I grasp it, for I take all the determinations of the thought from the world of thought. Nothing of the sense object flows into this content. In the sense object, I only recognize the thought that I have taken out of my inner self. This object does cause me, at a certain moment, to drive this very thought content out of the unity of all possible thoughts, but it in no way provides me with the building blocks for them. I have to get them out of myself.
[ 12 ] If we allow our thinking to take effect, reality first acquires true determinations. It, which was previously silent, speaks a clear language.
[ 13 ] Our thinking is the interpreter that interprets the gestures of experience.
[ 14 ] We are so accustomed to regard the world of concepts as empty and devoid of content, and to contrast it with perception as something substantial and thoroughly definite, that it will be difficult for the true facts to gain the position they deserve. One completely overlooks the fact that mere perception is the emptiest thing that can be thought, and that it receives all its content only from thinking. The only true thing about it is that it holds the always fluid thought in a certain form, without our having to contribute actively to this holding. If one who has a rich soul life sees a thousand things which are nothing to the spiritually poor, this proves as clear as day that the content of reality is only the reflection of the content of our spirit and that we receive from outside only the empty form. Of course, we must have the power within us to recognize ourselves as the producers of this content, otherwise we will only ever see the mirror image, never our spirit, which is reflected. Even those who see themselves in a factual mirror must recognize themselves as a personality in order to recognize themselves in the image.
[ 15 ] All sensory perception ultimately dissolves into ideal content as far as the being is concerned. Only then does it appear to us as transparent and clear. The sciences are often not even touched by the awareness of this truth. Thought-determination is taken for characteristics of objects, such as color, smell, etc. Thus it is believed that determination is a property of all bodies, that they remain in the state of motion or rest in which they find themselves until an external influence changes it. This is the form in which the law of inertia appears in the theory of nature. The true facts, however, are quite different. In my conceptual system, the idea body exists in many modifications. One is the idea of a thing that can set itself at rest or in motion of its own accord, another is the concept of a body that only changes its state as a result of external influence. I call the latter bodies inorganic. If I then encounter a certain body that reflects my above definition in perception, I call it inorganic and associate with it all the definitions that follow from the concept of the inorganic body.
[ 16 ] The conviction should permeate all sciences that their content is merely the content of thought and that they have no other connection with perception than that they see in the object of perception a particular form of the concept.