The Science of Knowing
GA 2
I. The Point of Departure
[ 1 ] When we trace any one of the major streams of present-day spiritual life back to its sources, we always encounter one of the spirits of our classical period. Goethe or Schiller, Herder or Lessing has given an impulse, and from it one or another spiritual movement has taken its start and still continues on today. Our whole German cultural life is so fully based on our classical writers that many a person who thinks himself completely original actually manages nothing more than to express what Goethe or Schiller indicated long ago. We have lived so fully into the world they created that hardly anyone who leaves the path they indicated could expect our understanding. Our way of looking at the world and at life is so influenced by them that no one can rouse our interest who does not seek points of reference with this world.
[ 2 ] There is only one branch of our spiritual-cultural life that, we must admit, has not yet found any such point of reference. It is that branch of science which goes beyond merely collecting observations, beyond information about individual phenomena, in order to provide a satisfying overview of the world and of life. It is what one usually calls philosophy. For philosophy, our classical period does not seem to exist at all. It seeks its salvation in an artificial seclusion and noble isolation from the rest of spiritual life. This statement is not refuted by the fact that a considerable number of older and more recent philosophers and natural scientists have occupied themselves with Goethe and Schiller. For they have not arrived at their scientific standpoint by bringing to fruition the seeds contained in the scientific achievements of those heroes of the spirit. They arrived at their scientific standpoint outside of the world view put forward by Schiller and Goethe and then afterwards compared the two. They did not make this comparison for the purpose of gaining something for their own cause from the scientific views of the classical thinkers, but rather in order to test these thinkers to see how they stood up in the light of their own cause. We will come back to this in more detail. But first we would like just to indicate the consequences for this realm of science that arise out of the stance it takes toward the highest level of cultural development in modern times.
[ 3 ] A great number of educated readers today will immediately reject unread any literary or scientific book that appears with a claim to being philosophical. There has hardly ever been a time when philosophy has enjoyed less favor than now. Leaving aside the writings of Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann, which take up questions concerning life and the world, questions of the most general interest, and which therefore have been widely read, one does not go too far in saying that philosophical works are read today only by people in the profession. Nobody bothers except them. An educated person not in the profession has the vague feeling: This literature a1The attitude lying behind this assessment of the nature of philosophical literature and of the interest shown it arose out of the intellectual approach of scientific endeavor around the middle of the 1880's. Since then phenomena have come to light in the face of which this assessment no longer seems valid. One need think only of the brilliant insights that Nietzsche's thoughts and feelings have given into broad areas of life. And in the battles that took place and are taking place even today between materialistically thinking monists and the defenders of a spiritually oriented world view, there live both a striving of philosophical thinking for a life-filled content, and also a deep general interest in the riddles of existence. Paths of thought, such as those of Einstein springing from the world view of physics, have almost become the subject of universal conversation and literary expression.
But in spite of this the motives out of which this assessment was made back then are also still valid today. If one were to put this assessment into words today, one would have to formulate it differently. Since it appears again today almost as something ancient, it is quite appropriate to say how much this assessment is still valid.
Goethe's world view, the epistemology of which is to be sketched in this book, takes its start from what the whole human being experiences. With respect to this experience, thinkingone side. Out of the fullness of human existence thought-configurations rise, as it were, to the surface of soul life. One part of these thought-pictures constituted an answer to the question: What is the knowing activity of man? And this answer turns out to be such that one sees: Human existence reaches its potential only when it becomes active in knowing. Soul life without knowledge would be like a human organism without a head; i.e., it would not be at all. Within the inner life of the soul there grows a content which, just as the hungering organism demands nourishment, demands perception from outside; and, in the outer world, there is a content of perception which does not bear its essential being within itself, but which first reveals this essential being when the cognitive process connects this perceptual content with the soul content. In this way the cognitive process becomes a part in the formation of world reality. The human being works along creatively with this world reality through his knowing activity. And if a plant root is unthinkable without the fulfillment of its potential in the fruit, so by no means only man but the world itself would not be complete unless knowing activity took place. In his activity of knowing man does not do something for himself alone; rather he works along with the world in the revelation of real existence. What is in man is ideal semblance; what is in the world of perception is sense semblance; the inter-working of the two in knowing activity first constitutes reality.
Seen in this way epistemology becomes a part of life. And it must be seen in this way when it is joined to the breadth of life of Goethean soul experience. But even Nietzsche's thinking and feeling do not connect themselves with this breadth of life. And still less so does that which otherwise has arisen as philosophically oriented views of life and of the world since the writing of what was characterized in this book as “The Point of Departure.” All these views, after all, presuppose that reality is present somewhere outside of the activity of knowing, and that in the activity of knowing, a human, copied representation of this reality is to result, or perhaps cannot result. The fact that this reality cannot be found by knowing activity—because it is first made into reality in the activity of knowing—is experienced hardly anywhere. Those who think philosophically seek life and real existence outside of knowing activity; Goethe stands within creative life and real existence by engaging in the activity of knowing. Therefore even the more recent attempts at a world view stand outside the Goethean creation of ideas. Our epistemology wants to stand inside of it, because philosophy becomes a content of life thereby, and an interest in philosophy becomes necessary for life. contains nothing that meets my spiritual needs; the things dealt with there do not concern me; they are not connected in any way with what is necessary for the satisfaction of my spirit. Only the fact we have indicated can bear the guilt for this lack of interest in all philosophy, for, in contrast to this lack of interest, there stands an ever-growing need for a satisfying view of the world and of life. What for a long time was a substitute for so many people, i.e., religious dogma, is losing more and more of its power to convince. The urge is increasing all the time to achieve by the work of thinking what was once owed to faith in revelation: satisfaction of spirit. The involvement of educated people could therefore not fail to exist if the sphere of science about which we are speaking really went hand in hand with the whole development of culture, if its representatives took a stand on the big questions that move humanity.
[ 4 ] One must always keep one's eye on the fact that it can never be a question of first creating artificially a spiritual need, but only of seeking out the need that exists and satisfying it. a2Questions of knowing activity arise through the human soul organization in contemplation of the outer world. Within the soul impulse of the question there lies the power to press forward into the contemplation in such a way that this contemplation, together with the soul activity, brings the reality of what is contemplated to manifestation. The task of science e1Wissenschaft: “science” in the broader sense, from scire, to know. –Ed. is not to pose questions, (see Note 2) but rather to consider questions carefully when they are raised by human nature and by the particular level of culture, and then to answer them. Our modern philosophers set themselves tasks that are in no way a natural outgrowth of the level of culture at which we stand; therefore no one is asking for their findings. But this science passes over the questions that our culture must pose by virtue of the vantage point to which our classical writers have raised it. We therefore have a science [present-day philosophy] that no one is seeking, and a scientific need that is not being satisfied by anyone.
[ 5 ] Our central science—the science that should solve the actual riddles of the world for us cannot be an exception among all the other branches of spiritual life. It must seek its sources where they have found theirs. It must not just come to terms with our classical thinkers; it must also seek in them the seeds for its own development; the same impulse must sweep through it as through the rest of our culture. This necessity resides in the very nature of the matter. It is also due to this necessity that modern researchers have occupied themselves with the classical writers in the way already described above. But this shows nothing more than that one had a vague feeling of the impermissibility of passing over the convictions of these thinkers and simply proceeding with the order of the day. But this also shows that one did not really manage to develop their views any further. The way one approached Lessing, Herder, Goethe, and Schiller shows this. Despite all the excellence of many of the books about these thinkers, one must still say, regarding almost everything written about Goethe's and Schiller's scientific e2Again: “scientific” in the broader sense –Ed. works, that it did not develop organically out of their views but was rather brought afterwards into relationship to them. Nothing demonstrates this better than the fact that the most contrary scientific theories have regarded Goethe as the thinker who had earlier “inklings” of their views. World views having absolutely nothing in common with each other point to Goethe with seemingly equal justification when they feel the need to see their standpoints recognized as being at the height of human development. One cannot imagine a sharper antithesis than between the teachings of Hegel and Schopenhauer. The latter calls Hegel a charlatan and his philosophy vapid word-rubbish, pure nonsense, barbaric word-combinations. These two men actually have absolutely nothing in common with each other except an unlimited reverence for Goethe and the belief that he adhered to their world view.
[ 6 ] And it is no different with more recent scientific theories. Haeckel, who has elaborated Darwinism brilliantly and with iron consistency, and whom we must regard as by far the most significant follower of the English scientist, sees his own view prefigured in the Goethean one. Another natural scientist of the present day, C.F.W. Jessen, writes of Darwin's theory: “The stir caused among many specialists and laymen by this theory—which had often been set forth earlier and just as often refuted by thorough research, but which is now propped up by many seeming supports—shows, unfortunately, how little people know and understand the results of natural-scientific research.” The same researcher says of Goethe that he “rose to comprehensive investigations into inorganic as well as organic nature” by finding, “through intelligent, deeply penetrating contemplation of nature, the basic law of all plant formation.” Each of these researchers can bring, in utterly overwhelming numbers, proofs of the agreement of his scientific theory with the “intelligent observations of Goethe.” It would put the unity of Goethe's thought in a very dubious light if both of these standpoints could justifiably cite it as their authority. The reason for this phenomenon, however, lies precisely in the fact that not one of these views, after all, has really grown out of the Goethean world view, but rather each has its roots outside it. The reason lies in the fact that one seeks an outer agreement of one's view with details torn out of the wholeness of Goethe's thinking, which thereby lose their meaning; one does not want to attribute to this wholeness itself the inner worthiness to found a scientific direction. Goethe's views were never the starting point of scientific investigations but always only an object of comparison. Those who concerned themselves with him were rarely students, devoting themselves to his ideas without preconceptions, but rather critics, sitting in judgment over him.
[ 7 ] One says, in fact, that Goethe had far too little scientific sense; the worse a philosopher, the better a poet he was. Therefore it would be impossible to base a scientific standpoint on him. This is a total misconception about Goethe's nature. To be sure, Goethe was no philosopher in the usual sense of the word; but it should not be forgotten that the wonderful harmony of his personality led Schiller to say: “The poet is the only true human being.” What Schiller understood here by “true human being” was Goethe. There was not lacking in his personality any element that belongs to the highest expression of the universally human. But all these elements united in him into a totality that works as such. This is how it comes about that a deep philosophical sense underlies his views about nature, even though this philosophical sense does not come to consciousness in him in the form of definite scientific principles. Anyone who enters more deeply into that totality will be able, if he also brings along a philosophical disposition, to separate out that philosophical sense and to present it as Goethean science. But he must take his start from Goethe and not approach him with an already fixed view. Goethe's spiritual powers always work in a way that accords with the strictest philosophy, even though he did not leave behind any systematic presentation of them.
[ 8 ] Goethe's world view e3See also Rudolf Steiner's Goethe's World View, Mercury Press, 1985. –Ed. is the most many-sided imaginable. It issues from a center resting within the unified nature of the poet, and it always turns outward the side corresponding to the nature of the object being considered. The unity of the spiritual forces being exercised lies in Goethe's nature; the way these forces are exercised at any given moment is determined by the object under consideration. Goethe takes his way of looking at things from the outer world and does not force any particular way upon it. These days, however, the thinking of many people is active in only one particular way; it is useful for only one category of objects; it is not, like that of Goethe, unified but rather uniform. Let us express this even more precisely: There are people whose intellect is especially able to think purely mechanical interdependencies and effects; they picture the whole universe as a mechanism. Other people have an urge to perceive everywhere the mysterious mystical element in the outer world; they become adherents of mysticism. All error arises when a way of thinking like this which is valid for one category of objects is declared to be universal. In this way the conflict between the many world views is explained. If such a one-sided conception approaches the Goethean one, which is not limited—because it does not in any way take its way of looking at things from the spirit of the beholder but rather from the nature of what is beheld—then it is comprehensible that the one-sided conception fastens onto those elements of thought in the Goethean conception that are in accord with itself. Goethe's world view encompasses many directions of thought in the sense just indicated and cannot, in fact, ever be imbued with any single, one-sided conception.
[ 9 ] The philosophical sense that is an essential element in the organism of Goethe's genius has significance also for his literary works. Even though it was far from Goethe's way to present in a conceptually clear form what this sense communicated to him, as Schiller could, it was nevertheless still a factor contributing to his artistic work, as it was with Schiller. The literary productions of Goethe and Schiller are unthinkable without the world view that stands in the background. With Schiller this is expressed more in the basic principles he actually formulated, with Goethe more in the way he looked at things. Yet the fact that the greatest poets of our nation, at the height of their creative work, could not do without that philosophical element proves more than anything else that this element is a necessary part of the history of humanity's development. Precisely this dependence on Goethe and Schiller will make it possible to wrest our central science [philosophy] out of its academic isolation and to incorporate it into the rest of cultural development. The scientific convictions of our classical writers are connected by a thousand threads to their other strivings and are of a sort demanded by the cultural epoch that created them.
1. Ausgangspunkt
[ 1 ] Wenn wir irgendeine der Hauptströmungen des geistigen Lebens der Gegenwart nach rückwärts bis zu ihren Quellen verfolgen, so treffen wir wohl stets auf einen der Geister unserer klassischen Epoche. Goethe oder Schiller, Herder oder Lessing haben einen Impuls gegeben; und davon ist diese oder jene geistige Bewegung ausgegangen, die heute noch fortdauert. Unsere ganze deutsche Bildung fußt so sehr auf unseren Klassikern, daß wohl mancher, der sich vollkommen originell zu sein dünkt, nichts weiter vollbringt, als daß er ausspricht, was Goethe oder Schiller längst angedeutet haben. Wir haben uns in die durch sie geschaffene Welt so hineingelebt, daß kaum irgend jemand auf unser Verständnis rechnen darf, der sich außerhalb der von ihnen vorgezeichneten Bahn bewegen wollte. Unsere Art, die Welt und das Leben anzusehen, ist so sehr durch sie bestimmt, daß niemand unsere Teilnahme erregen kann, der nicht Berührungspunkte mit dieser Welt sucht.
[ 2 ] Nur von einem Zweig unserer geistigen Kultur müssen wir gestehen, daß er einen solchen Berührungspunkt noch nicht gefunden hat. Es ist jener Zweig der Wissenschaft, der über das bloße Sammeln von Beobachtungen, über die Kenntnisnahme einzelner Erfahrungen hinausgeht, um eine befriedigende Gesamtanschauung von Welt und Leben zu liefern. Es ist das, was man gewöhnlich Philosophie nennt. Für sie scheint unsere klassische Zeit geradezu nicht vorhanden zu sein. Sie sucht ihr Heil in einer künstlichen Abgeschlossenheit und vornehmen Isolierung von allem übrigen Geistesleben. Dieser Satz wird dadurch nicht widerlegt, daß sich eine stattliche Anzahl älterer und neuerer Philosophen und Naturforscher mit Goethe und Schiller auseinandergesetzt hat. Denn diese haben ihren wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt nicht dadurch gewonnen, daß sie die Keime in den wissenschaftlichen Leistungen jener Geistesheroen zur Entwicklung gebracht haben. Sie haben ihren wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt außerhalb jener Weltanschauung, die Schiller und Goethe vertreten haben, gewonnen und ihn nachträglich mit derselben verglichen. Sie haben das auch nicht in der Absicht getan, um aus den wissenschaftlichen Ansichten der Klassiker etwas für ihre Richtung zu gewinnen, sondern um dieselben zu prüfen, ob sie vor dieser ihrer eigenen Richtung bestehen können. Wir werden darauf noch näher zurückkommen. Vorerst möchten wir nur auf die Folgen verweisen, die sich aus dieser Haltung gegenüber der höchsten Entwickelungsstufe der Kultur der Neuzeit für das in Betracht kommende Wissenschaftsgebiet ergeben.
[ 3 ] Ein großer Teil des gebildeten Lesepublikums wird heute eine literarischwissenschaftliche Arbeit sogleich ungelesen von sich weisen, wenn sie mit dem Anspruche auftritt, eine philosophische zu sein. Kaum in irgendeiner Zeit hat sich die Philosophie eines geringeren Maßes von Beliebtheit erfreut als gegenwärtig. Sieht man von den Schriften Schopenhauers und Eduard von Hartmanns ab, die Lebens- und Weltprobleme von allgemeinstem Interesse behandeln und deshalb weite Verbreitung gefunden haben, so wird man nicht zu weit gehen, wenn man sagt: philosophische Arbeiten werden heute nur von Fachphilosophen gelesen. Niemand außer diesen kümmert sich darum. Der Gebildete, der nicht Fachmann ist, hat das unbestimmte Gefühl: «Diese Literatur a1Die Stimmung, die hinter diesem Urteil über die Art des philosophischen Schrifttums und das Interesse, das diesem entgegengebracht wird, liegt, ist aus der Geistesverfassung des wissenschaftlichen Strebens um die Mitte der achtziger Jahre des vorigen Jahrhunderts entstanden. Seit dieser Zeit sind Erscheinungen zutage getreten, denen gegenüber dieses Urteil nicht mehr berechtigt erscheint. Man braucht nur an die blendenden Beleuchtungen zu denken, welche weite Lebensgebiete durch Nietzsches Gedanken und Empfindungen erfahren haben. Und in den Kämpfen, die sich zwischen den materialistisch denkenden Monisten und den Verteidigern einer geistgemäßen Weltanschauung abspielten und bis heute abspielen, lebt sowohl das Streben des philosophischen Denkens nach lebenerfülltem Gehalt wie auch ein weitgehendes allgemeines Interesse an den Rätselfragen des Daseins. Gedankenwege wie die aus der physikalischen Weltanschauung entsprungenen Einsteins sind fast zum Gegenstande allgemeiner Gespräche und literarischer Auslassungen geworden.
Und dennoch haben die Motive, aus denen damals dieses Urteil gefällt worden ist, auch heute noch Geltung. Schriebe man es heute nieder, man müßte es anders formulieren. Da es als ein nahezu altes heute wieder erscheint, ist es wohl angemessener, zu sagen, inwiefern es noch immer Geltung hat. - Goethes Weltanschauung, deren Erkenntnistheorie in der vorliegenden Schrift gezeichnet werden sollte, geht von dem Erleben des ganzen Menschen aus. Diesem Erleben gegenüber ist die denkende Weltbetrachtung nur eine Seite. Aus der Fülle des menschlichen Seins steigen gewissermaßen Gedankengestaltungen an die Oberfläche des Seelenlebens. Ein Teil dieser Gedankenbilder umfaßt eine Antwort auf die Frage: Was ist das menschliche Erkennen? Und es fällt diese Antwort so aus, daß man siebt: das menschliche Sein wird erst zu dem, worauf es veranlagt ist, wenn es sieh erkennend betätigt. Seelenleben ohne Erkenntnis wäre wie Menschenorganismus ohne Kopf; das heißt, es wäre gar nicht. Im Innenleben der Seele erwächst ein Inhalt, der wie der hungernde Organismus nach Nahrung, so nach Wahrnehmung von außen verlangt; und in der Außenwelt ist Wahrnehmungsinhalt, der sein Wesen nicht in sieh trägt, sondern es erst zeigt, wenn er mit dem Seeleninhalt vereinigt wird durch den Erkenntnisvorgang. So wird der Erkenntnisvorgang ein Glied in der Gestaltung der Welt-Wirklichkeit. Der Mensch schafft an dieser Welt-Wirklichkeit mit, indem er erkennt. Und wenn eine Pflanzenwurzel nicht denkbar ist ohne die Vollendung ihrer Anlagen in der Frucht, so ist nicht etwa nur der Mensch, sondern die Welt nicht abgeschlossen, ohne daß erkannt wird. Im Erkennen schafft der Mensch nicht für sich allein etwas, sondern er schafft mit der Welt zusammen an der Offenbarung des wirklichen Seins. Was im Menschen ist, ist ideeller Schein; was in der wahrzunehmenden Welt ist, ist Sinnenschein; das erkennende Ineinanderarbeiten der beiden ist erst Wirklichkeit.
So angesehen wird Erkenntnistheorie ein Teil des Lebens. Und so muß sie angesehen werden, wenn sie an die Lebens-Weiten des Goethesehen Seelen-Erlebens angeschlossen wird. Aber an solche Lebens-Weiten knüpft auch Nietzsches Denken und Empfinden nicht an. Noch weniger dasjenige, was sonst als philosophisch gerichtete Welt- und Lebensanschauung seit der Niederschrift des in dieser Schrift als «Ausgangspunkt» bezeichneten enstanden ist. Alles dies setzt doch voraus, daß die Wirklichkeit irgendwo außer dem Erkennen vorhanden sei, und in dem Erkennen eine menschliche, abbildliche Darstellung dieser Wirklichkeit sieh ergeben soll, oder auch, sich nicht ergeben kann. Daß diese Wirklichkeit durch das Erkennen nicht gefunden werden kann, weil sie als Wirklichkeit im Erkennen erst geschaffen wird, das wird kaum irgendwo empfunden. Die philosophisch Denkenden suchen das Leben und Sein außer dem Erkennen; Goethe steht im schaffenden Leben und Sein, indem er sieh erkennend betätigt. Deshalb stehen auch die neueren Weltanschauungsversuche außerhalb der Goetheschen Ideenschöpfung.
Diese Erkenntnistheorie möchte innerhalb derselben stehen, weil dadurch Philosophie Lebens-Inhalt und das Interesse an ihr lebensnotwendig wird. enthält nichts, was einem meiner geistigen Bedürfnisse entsprechen würde; die Dinge, die da abgehandelt werden, gehen mich nichts an; sie hängen in keiner Weise mit dem zusammen, was ich zur Befriedigung meines Geistes notwendig habe.» An diesem Mangel an Interesse für alle Philosophie kann nur der von uns angedeutete Umstand die Schuld tragen, denn es steht jener Interesselosigkeit ein stets wachsendes Bedürfnis nach einer befriedigenden Welt- und Lebensanschauung gegenüber. Was für so viele lange Zeit ein voller Ersatz war: die religiösen Dogmen verlieren immer mehr an überzeugender Kraft. Der Drang nimmt immer zu, das durch die Arbeit des Denkens zu erringen, was man einst dem Offenbarungsglauben verdankte: Befriedigung des Geistes. An Teilnahme der Gebildeten könnte es daher nicht fehlen, wenn das in Rede stehende Wissenschaftsgebiet wirklich Hand in Hand ginge mit der ganzen Kulturentwickelung, wenn seine Vertreter Stellung nehmen würden zu den großen Fragen, die die Menschheit bewegen.
[ 4 ] Man muß sich dabei immer vor Augen halten, daß es sich nie darum handeln kann, erst künstlich ein geistiges Bedürfnis zu erzeugen, sondern allein darum, das bestehende aufzusuchen und ihm Befriedigung zu gewähren.a2Fragen des Erkennens entstehen an der Anschauung der Außenwelt durch die menschliche Seelenorganisation. In dem Seelenimpuls der Frage liegt die Kraft, an die Anschauung so heranzudringen, daß diese mit der Seelenbetätigung zusammen die Wirklichkeit des Angeschauten zur Offenbarung bringt. Nicht das Aufwerfen von Fragen ist die Aufgabe der Wissenschaft, sondern das sorgfältige Beobachten derselben, wenn sie von der Menschennatur und der jeweiligen Kulturstufe gestellt werden, und ihre Beantwortung. Unsere modernen Philosophen stellen sich Aufgaben, die durchaus kein natürlicher Ausfluß der Bildungsstufe sind, auf der wir stehen, und nach deren Beantwortung daher niemand frägt. An jenen Fragen aber, die unsere Bildung vermöge jenes Standortes, auf den sie unsere Klassiker gehoben haben, stellen muß, geht die Wissenschaft vorüber. So haben wir eine Wissenschaft, nach der niemand sucht, und ein wissenschaftliches Bedürfnis, das von niemandem befriedigt wird.
[ 5 ] Unsere zentrale Wissenschaft, jene Wissenschaft, die uns die eigentlichen Welträtsel lösen soll, darf keine Ausnahme machen gegenüber allen anderen Zweigen des Geisteslebens. Sie muß ihre Quellen dort suchen,wo sie die letzteren gefunden haben. Sie muß sich mit unseren Klassikern nicht nur auseinandersetzen; sie muß bei ihnen auch die Keime zu ihrer Entwickelung suchen; es muß sie der gleiche Zug wie unsere übrige Kultur durchwehen. Das ist eine in der Natur der Sache liegende Notwendigkeit. Ihr ist es auch zuzuschreiben, daß die oben bereits berührten Auseinandersetzungen moderner Forscher mit den Klassikern stattgefunden haben. Sie zeigen aber nichts weiter, als daß man ein dunkles Gefühl hat von der Unstatthaftigkeit, über die Überzeugungen jener Geister einfach zur Tagesordnung überzugehen. Sie zeigen aber auch, daß man es zur wirklichen Weiterentwickelung ihrer Ansichten nicht gebracht hat. Dafür spricht die Art, wie man an Lessing, Herder, Goethe, Schiller herangetreten ist. Bei aller Vortrefflichkeit vieler hierher gehöriger Schriften muß man doch fast von allem, was über Goethes und Schillers wissenschaftliche Arbeiten geschrieben worden ist, sagen, daß es sich nicht organisch aus deren Anschauungen herausgebildet, sondern sich in ein nachträgliches Verhältnis zu denselben gesetzt hat. Keine Tatsache kann das mehr erhärten als die, daß die entgegengesetztesten wissenschaftlichen Richtungen in Goethe den Geist gesehen haben, der ihre Ansichten «vorausgeahnt» hat. Weltanschauungen, die gar nichts miteinander gemein haben, weisen mit scheinbar gleichem Recht auf Goethe hin, wenn sie das Bedürfnis empfinden, ihren Standpunkt auf den Höhen der Menschheit anerkannt zu sehen. Man kann sich keine schärferen Gegensätze denken als die Lehre Hegels und Schopenhauers. Dieser nennt Hegel einen Scharlatan, seine Philosophie seichten Wortkram, baren Unsinn, barbarische Wortzusammenstellungen. Beide Männer haben eigentlich gar nichts miteinander gemein als eine unbegrenzte Verehrung für Goethe und den Glauben, daß der letztere sich zu ihrer Weltansicht bekannt habe.
[ 6 ] Mit neueren wissenschaftlichen Richtungen ist es nicht anders. Haeckel, der mit eiserner Konsequenz und in genialischer Weise den Darwinismus ausgebaut hat, den wir als den weitaus bedeutendsten Anhänger des englischen Forschers ansehen müssen, sieht in der Goetheschen Ansicht die seinige vorgebildet. Ein anderer Naturforscher der Gegenwart, C. F. W. Jessen, schreibt von der Theorie Darwins: «Das Aufsehen, welches diese früher schon oft vorgebrachte und von gründlicher Forschung ebenso oft widerlegte, jetzt aber mit vielen Scheingründen unterstützte Theorie bei manchen Spezialforschern und vielen Laien gefunden hat, zeigt, wie wenig leider noch immer die Ergebnisse der Naturforschung von den Völkern erkannt und begriffen sind.» 3C. F. W. Jessen, Botanik der Gegenwart und Vorzeit in Kulturhistorischer Entwicklung, Leipzig 1864, Seite 459. Von Goethe sagt derselbe Forscher, daß er sich «zu umfassenden Forschungen in der leblosen wie in der belebten Natur aufgeschwungen» 4ebenda, Seite 343. habe, indem er «in sinniger, tiefdringender Naturbetrachtung das Grundgesetz aller Pflanzenbildung» 5ebenda, Seite 332. fand. Jeder der genannten Forscher weiß in schier erdrückender Zahl Belege für die Übereinstimmung seiner wissenschaftlichen Richtung mit den «sinnigen Beobachtungen Goethes» zu erbringen. Es müßte denn doch wohl ein bedenkliches Licht auf die Einheitlichkeit Goetheschen Denkens werfen, wenn sich jeder dieser Standpunkte mit Recht auf dasselbe berufen könnte. Der Grund dieser Erscheinung liegt aber eben darinnen, daß doch keine dieser Ansichten wirklich aus der Goetheschen Weltanschauung herausgewachsen ist, sondern daß jede ihre Wurzeln außerhalb derselben hat. Er liegt darinnen, daß man zwar nach äußerer Übereinstimmung mit Einzelheiten, die, aus dem ganzen Goetheschen Denken herausgerissen, ihren Sinn verlieren, sucht, daß man aber diesem Ganzen selbst nicht die innere Gediegenheit zugestehen will, eine wissenschaftliche Richtung zu begründen. Goethes Ansichten waren nie Ausgangspunkt wissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen, sondern stets nur Vergleichungsobjekt. Die sich mit ihm beschäftigten, waren selten Schüler, die sich unbefangenen Sinnes seinen Ideen hingaben, sondern zumeist Kritiker, die über ihn zu Gericht saßen.
[ 7] Man sagt eben, Goethe habe viel zu wenig wissenschaftlichen Sinn gehabt; er war ein um so schlechterer Philosoph, als er besserer Dichter war. Deshalb wäre es unmöglich, einen wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt auf ihn zu stützen. Das ist eine vollständige Verkennung der Natur Goethes. Goethe war allerdings kein Philosoph im gewöhnlichen Sinne des Wortes; aber es darf nicht vergessen werden, daß die wunderbare Harmonie seiner Persönlichkeit Schiller zu dem Ausspruche führte: «Der Dichter ist der einzige wahre Mensch.» Das, was Schiller hier unter dem «wahren Menschen» versteht, das war Goethe. In seiner Persönlichkeit fehlte kein Element, das zur höchsten Ausprägung des Allgemein-Menschlichen gehört. Aber alle diese Elemente vereinigten sich in ihm zu einer Totalität, die als solche wirksam ist. So kommt es, daß seinen Ansichten über die Natur ein tiefer philosophischer Sinn zugrunde liegt, wenngleich dieser philosophische Sinn nicht in Form bestimmter wissenschaftlicher Sätze zu seinem Bewußtsein kommt. Wer sich in jene Totalität vertieft, der wird, wenn er philosophische Anlagen mitbringt, jenen philosophischen Sinn loslösen und ihn als Goethesche Wissenschaft darlegen können. Er muß aber von Goethe ausgehen und nicht mit einer fertigen Ansicht an ihn herantreten. Goethes Geisteskräfte sind immer in einer Weise wirksam, wie sie der strengsten Philosophie gemäß ist, wenn er auch kein systematisches Ganze derselben hinterlassen hat.
[ 8 ] Goethes Weltansicht ist die denkbar vielseitigste. Sie geht von einem Zentrum aus, das in der einheitlichen Natur des Dichters gelegen ist, und kehrt immer jene Seite hervor, die der Natur des betrachteten Gegenstandes entspricht. Die Einheitlichkeit der Betätigung der Geisteskräfte liegt in der Natur Goethes, die jeweilige Art dieser Betätigung wird durch das betreffende Objekt bestimmt. Goethe entlehnt die Betrachtungsweise der Außenwelt und zwingt sie ihr nicht auf. Nun ist aber das Denken vieler Menschen nur in einer bestimmten Weise wirksam; es ist nur für eine Gattung von Objekten dienlich; es ist nicht wie das Goethesche einheitlich, sondern einförmig Wir wollen uns genauer ausdrücken: Es gibt Menschen, deren Verstand vornehmlich geeignet ist, rein mechanische Abhängigkeiten und Wirkungen zu denken; sie stellen sich das ganze Universum als einen Mechanismus vor. Andere haben einen Drang, das geheimnisvolle, mystische Element der Außenwelt überall wahrzunehmen; sie werden Anhänger des Mystizismus. Aller Irrtum entsteht dadurch, daß eine solche Denkweise, die ja für eine Gattung von Objekten volle Geltung hat, für universell erklärt wird. So erklärt sich der Widerstreit der vielen Weltanschauungen. Tritt nun eine solche einseitige Auffassung der Goetheschen gegenüber, die unbeschränkt ist, weil sie die Betrachtungsweise überhaupt nicht aus dem Geiste des Betrachters, sondern aus der Natur des Betrachteten entnimmt, so ist es begreiflich, daß sie sich an jene Gedankenelemente derselben anklammert, die ihr gemäß sind. Goethes Weltansicht schließt eben in dem angedeuteten Sinne viele Denkrichtungen in sich, während sie von keiner einseitigen Auffassung je durchdrungen werden kann.
[ 9 ] Der philosophische Sinn, der ein wesentliches Element in dem Organismus des Goetheschen Genius ist, hat auch für seine Dichtungen Bedeutung. Wenn es Goethe auch ferne lag, das, was dieser Sinn ihm vermittelte, in begrifflich klarer Form sich vorzulegen, wie dies Schiller imstande war, so ist es doch wie bei Schiller ein Faktor, der bei seinem künstlerischen Schaffen mitwirkt. Goethes und Schillers dichterische Produktionen sind ohne ihre im Hintergrunde derselben stehende Weltanschauung nicht denkbar. Dabei kommt es bei Schiller mehr auf seine wirklich ausgebildeten Grundsätze, bei Goethe auf die Art seines Anschauens an. Daß aber die größten Dichter unserer Nation auf der Höhe ihres Schaffens jenes philosophischen Elementes nicht entraten konnten, bürgt mehr als alles andere dafür, daß dasselbe in der Entwickelungsgeschichte der Menschheit ein notwendiges Glied ist. Gerade die Anlehnung an Goethe und Schiller wird es ermöglichen, unsere zentrale Wissenschaft ihrer Kathedereinsamkeit zu entreißen und der übrigen Kulturentwickelung einzuverleiben. Die wissenschaftlichen Überzeugungen unserer Klassiker hängen mit tausend Fäden an ihren übrigen Bestrebungen, sie sind solche,welche von der Kulturepoche, die sie geschaffen, gefordert werden.
1. Starting Point
[ 1 ] If we trace any of the main currents of contemporary intellectual life backwards to their sources, we will probably always encounter one of the spirits of our classical epoch. Goethe or Schiller, Herder or Lessing have given an impulse; and from this or that intellectual movement has proceeded, which still continues today. Our whole German education is based so much on our classics that many a man who thinks himself completely original accomplishes nothing more than to express what Goethe or Schiller have long since indicated. We have lived ourselves into the world created by them in such a way that hardly anyone can count on our understanding who wants to move outside the path they have laid out. Our way of viewing the world and life is so determined by them that no one can arouse our participation who does not seek points of contact with this world.
[ 2 ] Only of one branch of our spiritual culture must we confess that it has not yet found such a point of contact. It is that branch of science which goes beyond the mere collection of observations, beyond the knowledge of individual experiences, in order to provide a satisfactory overall view of the world and life. It is what is usually called philosophy. Our classical age seems to be virtually non-existent for it. It seeks its salvation in an artificial seclusion and noble isolation from all other intellectual life. This proposition is not refuted by the fact that a considerable number of older and newer philosophers and naturalists have discussed Goethe and Schiller. For they did not gain their scientific standpoint by developing the germs of the scientific achievements of those intellectual heroes. They gained their scientific point of view outside the world view that Schiller and Goethe represented and subsequently compared it with it. Nor did they do this with the intention of gaining something for their own direction from the scientific views of the classics, but rather to test whether they could stand up to their own direction. We will come back to this in more detail. For now, we would just like to point out the consequences that arise from this attitude towards the highest stage of development of modern culture for the field of science under consideration.
[ 3 ] A large part of the educated reading public today will immediately reject a literary-scientific work without reading it if it claims to be philosophical. There has hardly been a time when philosophy has enjoyed less popularity than it does today. Leaving aside the writings of Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann, which deal with problems of life and the world that are of the most general interest and have therefore been widely disseminated, it would not be going too far to say that philosophical works are only read by specialist philosophers today. No one except them cares. The educated person who is not a specialist has the vague feeling: "This literature a1The mood that lies behind this judgment about the nature of philosophical writing and the interest shown in it has arisen from the state of mind of scientific endeavor around the middle of the eighties of the last century. Since then, phenomena have come to light that no longer seem to justify this judgment. One need only think of the dazzling illumination that wide areas of life have experienced through Nietzsche's thoughts and feelings. And in the battles that took place and continue to take place today between the materialistically thinking monists and the defenders of a spiritual world view, both the striving of philosophical thought for life-fulfilling content and a broad general interest in the mysteries of existence are alive. Paths of thought such as Einstein's, which arose from the physical world view, have almost become the subject of general conversations and literary omissions.
And yet the motifs from which this judgment was made back then are still valid today. If it were written down today, it would have to be formulated differently. Since it appears as an almost old one again today, it is probably more appropriate to say to what extent it is still valid. - Goethe's world view, the epistemology of which was to be outlined in this essay, is based on the experience of the whole human being. Compared to this experience, the thinking view of the world is only one side. From the fullness of human existence, thought-forms rise to the surface of the soul's life. A part of these thought-images comprises an answer to the question: What is human cognition? And this answer turns out in such a way that one sifts: human existence only becomes what it is predisposed to be when it is cognitively active. Soul life without cognition would be like the human organism without a head; that is, it would not be at all. In the inner life of the soul grows a content which, like the starving organism, demands nourishment, so it demands perception from outside; and in the outer world there is perceptual content which does not carry its essence within itself, but only shows it when it is united with the soul content through the process of cognition. Thus the process of cognition becomes a link in the formation of world-reality. The human being co-creates this world-reality by recognizing. And if a plant root is inconceivable without the completion of its plants in the fruit, then not only the human being, but the world is not complete without cognition. In cognizing, man does not create something for himself alone, but he creates together with the world in the revelation of real being. What is in man is ideal appearance; what is in the world to be perceived is sense appearance; the cognitive working together of the two is only reality.
Seen in this way, epistemology becomes a part of life. And this is how it must be regarded when it is connected to the life-widths of Goethean soul-experience. But Nietzsche's thinking and feeling are not linked to such life-spans either. Still less that which has otherwise emerged as a philosophically directed world- and life-view since the writing of what is called the "starting point" in this essay. All this presupposes that reality exists somewhere outside of cognition, and that a human, pictorial representation of this reality should arise in cognition, or that it cannot arise. The fact that this reality cannot be found through cognition, because it is first created as reality in cognition, is hardly felt anywhere. Those who think philosophically seek life and being apart from cognition; Goethe stands in creative life and being by being active in cognition. That is why the newer attempts at a world view also stand outside Goethe's creation of ideas. This theory of knowledge would like to stand within it, because philosophy thereby becomes the content of life and interest in it becomes vital. contains nothing that would correspond to one of my spiritual needs; the things that are dealt with there are of no concern to me; they are in no way connected with what I need to satisfy my spirit." This lack of interest in all philosophy can only be due to the circumstance we have indicated, because this lack of interest is countered by an ever-growing need for a satisfying view of the world and life. What for so many was a full substitute for a long time: religious dogmas are losing more and more of their convincing power. The urge to achieve through the work of thinking what was once owed to revelatory faith is increasing: satisfaction of the spirit. There could therefore be no lack of participation by the educated if the field of science in question really went hand in hand with the whole development of culture, if its representatives were to take a stand on the great questions that move humanity.
[ 4 ] It must always be borne in mind that it can never be a question of first artificially creating a spiritual need, but only of seeking out the existing need and granting it satisfaction.a2Questions of cognition arise from the perception of the external world through the human soul organization. In the soul impulse of the question lies the power to approach the perception in such a way that this, together with the soul activity, brings the reality of what is seen to revelation. The task of science is not to raise questions, but to carefully observe them when they are posed by human nature and the respective cultural stage, and to answer them. Our modern philosophers set themselves tasks which are by no means a natural outgrowth of the stage of education at which we stand, and the answers to which no one therefore asks. But science passes by those questions which our education must ask because of the position to which our classics have elevated it. So we have a science that no one is looking for and a scientific need that no one satisfies.
[ 5 ] Our central science, the science that is supposed to solve the real riddles of the world, must make no exceptions to all other branches of intellectual life. It must seek its sources where the latter have found them. It must not only deal with our classics; it must also look to them for the seeds of its development; it must be imbued with the same spirit as the rest of our culture. This is a necessity in the nature of things. It is also due to this necessity that the above-mentioned disputes between modern scholars and the classics have taken place. But they show nothing more than that one has a dark feeling of the inadmissibility of simply passing over the convictions of those spirits to the order of the day. They also show, however, that no real further development of their views has been achieved. The way in which Lessing, Herder, Goethe and Schiller were approached speaks for this. For all the excellence of many of the writings belonging here, it must be said of almost everything that has been written about Goethe's and Schiller's scientific work that it has not developed organically from their views, but has been placed in a subsequent relationship to them. No fact can substantiate this more than the fact that the most opposing scientific schools saw in Goethe the spirit that "foreshadowed" their views. World views that have nothing at all in common with each other point to Goethe with seemingly equal justification when they feel the need to see their point of view recognized on the heights of humanity. No sharper contrasts can be imagined than the teachings of Hegel and Schopenhauer. The latter calls Hegel a charlatan, his philosophy shallow verbiage, barbaric nonsense, barbaric combinations of words. The two men have nothing in common except an unbounded admiration for Goethe and the belief that the latter subscribed to their world view.
[ 6 ] It is no different with more recent scientific trends. Haeckel, who developed Darwinism with iron consistency and in an ingenious manner, and whom we must regard as by far the most important follower of the English scientist, sees Goethe's view as prefiguring his own. Another contemporary naturalist, C. F. W. Jessen, writes of Darwin's theory: "The sensation which this theory, often put forward in the past and just as often refuted by thorough research, but now supported by many bogus reasons, has caused among some specialist researchers and many laymen, shows how little the results of natural research are unfortunately still recognized and understood by the people." 3C. F. W. Jessen, Botanik der Gegenwart und Vorzeit in Kulturhistorischer Entwicklung, Leipzig 1864, page 459. The same researcher says of Goethe that he "rose to comprehensive research in both inanimate and animate nature" 4ibid, page 343 by finding "the basic law of all plant formation" 5ibid, page 332 in a sensible, deeply penetrating observation of nature. Each of the aforementioned researchers knows how to provide an almost overwhelming number of proofs for the agreement of his scientific direction with Goethe's "sensible observations". It would have to cast a dubious light on the unity of Goethe's thought if each of these points of view could justifiably refer to the same thing. The reason for this phenomenon, however, lies precisely in the fact that none of these views has really grown out of Goethe's world view, but that each has its roots outside it. It lies in the fact that one seeks external agreement with details which, torn out of Goethe's thinking as a whole, lose their meaning, but that one does not want to concede to this whole itself the internal solidity to establish a scientific direction. Goethe's views were never the starting point of scientific investigations, but always only the object of comparison. Those who studied him were rarely students who devoted themselves to his ideas with an unbiased mind, but mostly critics who sat in judgment of him.
[ 7] It is said that Goethe had far too little scientific sense; he was all the worse a philosopher than he was a better poet. It would therefore be impossible to base a scientific point of view on him. That is a complete misjudgment of Goethe's nature. Goethe was certainly not a philosopher in the ordinary sense of the word; but it must not be forgotten that the wonderful harmony of his personality led Schiller to say: "The poet is the only true man." That which Schiller here understands by the "true man" was Goethe. There was no element missing in his personality that belonged to the highest expression of the universal human. But all these elements united in him to form a totality that is effective as such. So it happens that his views on nature are based on a deep philosophical meaning, even if this philosophical meaning does not come to his consciousness in the form of specific scientific propositions. Anyone who immerses himself in that totality will, if he has philosophical dispositions, be able to detach that philosophical sense and present it as a Goethean science. But he must start from Goethe and not approach him with a ready-made view. Goethe's intellectual powers are always active in a way that corresponds to the strictest philosophy, even if he did not leave behind a systematic whole of it.
[ 8 ] Goethe's view of the world is the most versatile imaginable. It proceeds from a center which is situated in the unified nature of the poet, and always brings out that side which corresponds to the nature of the object under consideration. The uniformity of the activity of the spiritual forces lies in Goethe's nature; the respective kind of this activity is determined by the object in question. Goethe borrows the way of looking at the outside world and does not impose it on it. However, the thinking of many people is only effective in one particular way; it is only useful for one kind of object; it is not uniform like Goethe's, but uniform. Let us be more precise: there are people whose minds are primarily suited to thinking purely mechanical dependencies and effects; they imagine the whole universe as a mechanism. Others have an urge to perceive the mysterious, mystical element of the outer world everywhere; they become followers of mysticism. All error arises from the fact that such a way of thinking, which is fully valid for one kind of object, is declared to be universal. This explains the conflict between the many world views. If such a one-sided view now confronts Goethe's, which is unrestricted because it takes the way of looking at things not at all from the mind of the observer but from the nature of what is observed, it is understandable that it clings to those elements of thought in it which are in accordance with it. Goethe's view of the world includes many schools of thought in the sense indicated, while it can never be penetrated by any one-sided view.
[ 9 ] The philosophical sense, which is an essential element in the organism of Goethe's genius, also has significance for his poetry. Even if Goethe was far removed from presenting what this sense conveyed to him in a conceptually clear form, as Schiller was able to do, it is nevertheless, as with Schiller, a factor that contributes to his artistic creation. Goethe's and Schiller's poetic productions are inconceivable without their underlying world view. In Schiller's case it depends more on his truly developed principles, in Goethe's on the kind of his view. But the fact that the greatest poets of our nation at the height of their creativity could not do without this philosophical element is more than anything else a guarantee that it is a necessary element in the history of human development. It is precisely the reference to Goethe and Schiller that will make it possible to wrest our central science from its cathederal isolation and incorporate it into the rest of cultural development. The scientific convictions of our classicists are linked by a thousand threads to their other endeavors, they are those that are demanded by the cultural epoch that created them.