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The Science of Knowing
GA 2

II. The Science of Goethe According to the Method of Schiller

[ 1 ] With the foregoing we have determined the direction the following investigations will take. They are meant to develop what manifested in Goethe as a scientific sense and to interpret his way of looking at the world.

[ 2 ] The objection could be made that this is not the way to present a view scientifically. Under no circumstances should a scientific view be based on an authority; it must always rest upon principles. Let us forestall this objection at once. We regard a view founded in the Goethean world conception as true, not because it can be traced back to this world conception, but because we believe that we can support the Goethean world view upon sound, basic principles and present it as one well founded in itself. The fact that we take Goethe as our starting point should not prevent us from being just as serious about establishing the views we present as are the proponents of any science supposedly free of all presuppositions. We are presenting the Goethean world view, but we will establish it in accordance with the demands of science.

[ 3 ] Schiller has already indicated the direction of the path such investigations must take. No one perceived the greatness of Goethe's genius more clearly than he did. In his letters to Goethe, Schiller held up to him a mirror image of Goethe's being; in his letters On the Aesthetic Education of Man, he traces his ideal of the artist back to the way he recognized it in Goethe; and in his essay On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, he portrays the being of true art in the form in which he found it in Goethe's poetry. At the same time, this justifies the statement that our considerations are built on the foundation of Goethe's and Schiller's world view. We wish to look at Goethe's scientific thinking by that method for which Schiller provided the model. Goethe's gaze is directed upon nature and upon life, and his way of looking at things in doing so will be the object (the content) of our discussion; Schiller's gaze is directed upon Goethe's spirit, and his way of looking at things in doing so will be the ideal for our method.

[ 4 ] In this way we believe Goethe's and Schiller's scientific strivings are made fruitful for the present day.

[ 5 ] In accordance with current scientific terminology, our work must be considered to be epistemology. To be sure, the questions with which it deals will in many ways be of a different nature from those usually raised by this science. We have seen why this is the case. Wherever similar investigations arise today, they take their start almost entirely from Kant. In scientific circles the fact has been completely overlooked that in addition to the science of knowledge founded by the great thinker of Königsberg, there is yet another direction, at least potentially, that is no less capable than the Kantian one of being deepened in an objective manner. In the early 1880's Otto Liebmann made the statement that we must go back to Kant if we wish to arrive at a world view free of contradiction. This is why today we have a literature on Kant almost too vast to encompass.

[ 6 ] But this Kantian path will not help the science of philosophy. Philosophy will play a part in cultural life again only when, instead of going back to Kant, it immerses itself in the scientific conception of Goethe and Schiller.

[ 7 ] And now let us approach the basic questions of a science of knowledge corresponding to these introductory remarks.

2. Die Wissenschaft Goethes nach der Methode Schillers

[ 1 ] Mit dem Bisherigen haben wir die Richtung bestimmt, die die folgenden Untersuchungen nehmen werden. Sie sollen eine Entwicklung dessen sein, was sich in Goethe als wissenschaftlicher Sinn geltend machte, eine Interpretation seiner Art, die Welt zu betrachten.

[ 2 ] Dagegen kann man einwenden, das sei nicht die Art, eine Ansicht wissenschaftlich zu vertreten. Eine wissenschaftliche Ansicht dürfe unter keinerlei Umständen auf einer Autorität, sondern müsse stets auf Prinzipien beruhen. Wir wollen diesen Einwand sogleich vorwegnehmen. Uns gilt nicht deshalb eine in der Goetheschen Weltauffassung begründete Ansicht für wahr, weil sie sich aus dieser ableiten läßt, sondern weil wir glauben, die Goethesche Weltansicht auf haltbare Grundsätze stützen und sie als eine in sich beründete vertreten zu können. Daß wir unseren Ausgangspunkt von Goethe nehmen, soll uns nicht hindern, es mit der Begründung der von uns vertretenen Ansichten ebenso ernst zunehmen,wie die Vertreter einer angeblich voraussetzungslosen Wissenschaft. Wir vertreten die Goethesche Weltansicht, aber wir begründen sie den Forderungen der Wissenschaft gemäß.

[ 3 ] Für den Weg, den solche Untersuchungen einzuschlagen haben, hat Schiller die Richtung vorgezeichnet. Keiner hat wie er die Größe des Goetheschen Genius geschaut. In seinen Briefen an Goethe hat er dem letzteren ein Spiegelbild seines Wesens vorgehalten; in seinen Briefen «Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen» leitet er das Ideal des Künstlers ab, wie er es an Goethe erkannt hat; und in seinem Aufsatze «Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung» schildert er das Wesen der echten Kunst, wie er es an der Dichtung Goethes gewonnen hat. Damit ist zugleich gerechtfertigt, warum wir unsere Ausführungen als auf Grundlage der Goethe-Schillerschen Weltanschauung erbaut bezeichnen. Sie wollen das wissenschaftliche Denken Goethes nach jener Methode betrachten, für die Schiller das Vorbild geliefert hat. Goethes Blick ist auf die Natur und das Leben gerichtet; und die Betrachtungsweise, die er dabei befolgt, soll der Vorwurf (der Inhalt) für unsere Abhandlung sein; Schillers Blick ist auf Goethes Geist gerichtet; und die Betrachtungsweise, die er dabei befolgt, soll das Ideal unserer Methode sein.

[ 4 ] In dieser Weise denken wir uns Goethes und Schillers wissenschaftliche Bestrebungen für die Gegenwart fruchtbar gemacht.

[ 5 ] Nach der üblichen wissenschaftlichen Bezeichnungsweise wird unsere Arbeit als Erkenntnistheorie aufgefaßt werden müssen. Die Fragen, die sie behandelt, werden freilich vielfach anderer Natur sein als die, die heute von dieser Wissenschaft fast allgemein gestellt werden. Wir haben gesehen, warum das so ist. Wo ähnliche Untersuchungen heute auftreten, gehen sie fast durchgehends von Kant aus. _ Man hat in wissenschaftlichen Kreisen durchaus übersehen, daß neben der von dem großen Königsberger Denker begründeten Erkenntniswissenschaft noch eine andere Richtung wenigstens der Möglichkeit nach gegeben ist, die nicht minder einer sachlichen Vertiefung fähig ist als die Kantsche. Otto Liebmann hat am Anfange der sechziger Jahre den Ausspruch getan: Es muß auf Kant zurückgegangen werden, wenn wir zu einer widerspruchslosen Weltansicht kommen wollen. Das ist wohl die Veranlassung, daß wir heute eine fast unübersehbare Kant-Literatur haben.

[ 6 ] Aber auch dieser Weg wird der philosophischen Wissenschaft nicht aufhelfen. Sie wird erst wieder eine Rolle in dem Kulturleben spielen, wenn sie statt des Zurückgehens auf Kant sich in die wissenschaftliche Auffassung Goethes und Schillers vertieft.

[ 7 ] Und nun wollen wir an die Grundfragen einer diesen Vorbemerkungen entsprechenden Erkenntniswissenschaft herantreten.

2 Goethe's science according to Schiller's method

[ 1 ] With the foregoing, we have determined the direction that the following investigations will take. They are to be a development of what asserted itself in Goethe as a scientific sense, an interpretation of his way of looking at the world.

[ 2 ] One could object that this is not the way to represent a view scientifically. A scientific view should under no circumstances be based on authority, but must always be based on principles. We want to anticipate this objection immediately. We do not consider a view based on Goethe's view of the world to be true because it can be derived from this, but because we believe that we can base Goethe's view of the world on tenable principles and represent it as an intrinsically sound one. The fact that we take Goethe as our starting point should not prevent us from taking the foundation of the views we represent just as seriously as the representatives of an allegedly unconditional science. We represent Goethe's view of the world, but we justify it according to the requirements of science.

[ 3 ] Schiller set the course for such investigations. No one has seen the greatness of Goethe's genius like him. In his letters to Goethe, he held up a mirror image of the latter's nature; in his letters "On the Aesthetic Education of Man" he deduced the ideal of the artist as he recognized it in Goethe; and in his essay "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry" he describes the nature of genuine art as he gained it from Goethe's poetry. This also justifies why we describe our explanations as being based on the Goethe-Schiller world view. You want to look at Goethe's scientific thinking according to the method for which Schiller provided the model. Goethe's gaze is directed towards nature and life; and the way of looking at things that he follows in doing so is to be the reproach (the content) for our treatise; Schiller's gaze is directed towards Goethe's mind; and the way of looking at things that he follows in doing so is to be the ideal of our method.

[ 4 ] In this way, we think of Goethe's and Schiller's scientific endeavors as being made fruitful for the present day.

[ 5 ] According to the usual scientific terminology, our work will have to be understood as theory of knowledge. The questions it deals with will, of course, often be of a different nature than those that are almost universally posed by this science today. We have seen why this is so. Where similar investigations occur today, they are almost invariably based on Kant. In scientific circles it has been quite overlooked that, in addition to the epistemology founded by the great Königsberg thinker, there is another direction, at least in terms of possibility, which is no less capable of objective deepening than Kant's. At the beginning of the sixties, Otto Liebmann said: "We must go back to Kant if we want to arrive at an uncontradictory view of the world. This is probably the reason why we have an almost immense amount of Kant literature today.

[ 6 ] But even this path will not help philosophical science. It will only play a role in cultural life again when, instead of going back to Kant, it immerses itself in the scientific views of Goethe and Schiller.

[ 7 ] And now let us approach the basic questions of a science of knowledge corresponding to these preliminary remarks.