The Science of Knowing
GA 2
V. An Indication as to the Content of Experience
[ 1 ] Let us now take a look at pure experience. What does it contain, as it sweeps across our consciousness, without our working upon it in thinking? It is mere juxtaposition in space and succession in time; an aggregate of utterly disconnected particulars. None of the objects that come and go there has anything to do with any other. At this stage, the facts that we perceive, that we experience inwardly, are of no consequence to each other.
[ 2 ] This world is a manifoldness of things of equal value. No thing or event can claim to play a greater role in the functioning of the world than any other part of the world of experience. If it is to become clear to us that this or that fact has greater significance than another one, we must then not merely observe the things, but must already bring them into thought-relationships. The rudimentary organ of an animal, which perhaps does not have the least importance for its organic functioning, is for experience of exactly the same value as the most essential organ of the animal's body. This greater or lesser importance will in fact become clear to us only when we begin to reflect upon the relationships of the individual parts of observation, that is, when we work upon experience.
[ 3 ] For experience, the snail, which stands at a low level of organization, is the equal of the most highly developed animal. The difference in the perfection of organization appears to us only when we grasp the given manifoldness conceptually and work it through. The culture of the Eskimo, in this respect, is also equal to that of the educated European; Caesar's significance for the historical development of humanity appears to mere experience as being no greater than that of one of his soldiers. In the history of literature, Goethe does not stand out above Gottsched, if it is a matter of merely experienceable factuality.
[ 4 ] At this level of contemplation, the world is a completely smooth surface for us with respect to thought. No part of this surface rises above another; none manifests any kind of conceptual difference from another. It is only when the spark of thought strikes into this surface that heights and depths appear, that one thing appears to stand out more or less than another, that everything takes form in a definite way, that threads weave from one configuration to another, that everything becomes a harmony complete within itself.
[ 5 ] We believe that these examples suffice to show what we mean by the greater or lesser significance of the objects of perception (here considered to be synonymous with the things of experience), and what we mean by that knowing activity which first arises when we contemplate these objects in their interconnection. At the same time, we believe that in this we are safe from the objection that our world of experience in fact shows endless differences in its objects even before thinking approaches it. After all, a red surface differs from a green one even if we do not exercise any thinking. This is correct. If someone wanted to refute us by this, however, he would have misunderstood our argument totally. This is precisely our argument, that an endless number of particulars is what experience offers us. These particulars must of course differ from one another; otherwise they would not in fact confront us as an endless, disconnected manifoldness. It is not at all a question of perceived things being undifferentiated, but rather of their complete unrelatedness, and of the absolute insignificance of the individual sense-perceptible facts for the totality of our picture of reality. It is precisely because we recognize this endless qualitative differentiation that we are driven to our conclusions.
[ 6 ] If we were confronted by a self-contained, harmoniously organized unity, we could not then say, in fact, that the individual parts of this unity are of no significance to one another.
[ 7 ] If, for this reason, someone does not find the comparison we used above to be apt, he has not grasped it at the actual point of comparison. It would be incorrect, of course, for us to want to compare the world of perception, in all its in finitely diverse configuration, to the uniform regularity of a plane. But our plane is definitely not meant to represent the diverse world of phenomena, but rather the homogeneous total picture we have of this world as long as thinking has not approached it. After the activation of our thinking, each particular of this total picture no longer appears in the way our senses alone communicate it, but al ready with the significance it has for the whole of reality. It appears then with characteristics totally lacking to it in the form of experience.
[ 8 ] In our estimation, Johannes Volkelt has succeeded admirably in sketching the clear outlines of what we are justified in calling pure experience. He already gave a fine characterization of it five years ago in his book on Kant's Epistemology, and has then carried the subject further in his most recent work, Experience and Thinking. Now he did this, to be sure, in support of a view that is utterly different from our own, and for an essentially different purpose than ours is at the moment. But this need not prevent us from introducing here his excellent characterization of pure experience. He presents us, simply, with the pictures which, in a limited period of time, pass before our consciousness in a completely unconnected way. Volkelt says: “Now, for example, my consciousness has as its content the mental picture of having worked hard today; immediately joining itself to this is the content of a mental picture of being able, with good conscience, to take a walk; but suddenly there appears the perceptual picture of the door opening and of the mailman entering; the mailman appears, now sticking out his hand, now opening his mouth, now doing the reverse; at the same time, there join in with this content of perception of the mouth opening, all kinds of auditory impressions, among which comes the impression that it is starting to rain outside. The mailman disappears from my consciousness, and the mental pictures that now arise have as their content the sequence: picking up scissors, opening the letter, criticism of illegible writing, visible images of the most diverse written figures, diverse imaginings and thoughts connected with them; scarcely is this sequence at an end than again there appears the mental picture of having worked hard and the perception, accompanied by ill humor, of the rain continuing; but both disappear from my consciousness, and there arises a mental picture with the content that a difficulty believed to have been resolved in the course of today's work was not resolved; entering at the same time are the mental pictures: freedom of will, empirical necessity, responsibility, value of virtue, absolute chance, incomprehensibility, etc.; these all join together with each other in the most varied and complicated way; and so it continues.”
[ 9 ] Here we have depicted, within a certain limited period of time, what we really experience, the form of reality in which thinking plays no part at all.
[ 10 ] Now one definitely should not believe that one would have arrived at a different result if, instead of this everyday experience, one had depicted, say, the experience we have of a scientific experiment or of a particular phenomenon of nature. Here, as there, it is individual unconnected pictures that pass before our consciousness. Thinking first establishes the connections.
[ 11 ] We must also recognize the service rendered by Dr. Richard Wahle's little book, Brain and Consciousness (Vienna, 1884), in showing us in clear contours what is actually given by experience divested of everything of a thought-nature, with only one reservation: that what Wahle presents as the characteristics applying absolutely to the phenomena of the outer and inner world actually applies only to the first stage of the world contemplation we have characterized. According to Wahle we know only a juxtaposition in space and a succession in time. For him there can be absolutely no question of a relationship between the things that exist in this juxtaposition and succession. For example, there may after all be an inner connection somewhere between the warm rays of the sun and the warming up of a stone; but we know nothing of any causal connection; all that becomes clear to us is that a second fact follows upon the first. There may also be somewhere, in a world unaccessible to us, an inner connection between our brain mechanism and our spiritual activity; we only know that both are events running their courses parallel to each other; we are absolutely not justified, for example, in assuming a causal connection between these two phenomena.
[ 12 ] Of course, when Wahle also presents this assertion as an ultimate truth of science, we must dispute this broader application; his assertion is completely valid, however, with respect to the first form in which we become aware of reality.
[ 13 ] It is not only the things of the outer world and the processes of the inner world that stand there, at this stage of our knowing, without interconnection; our own personality is also an isolated entity with respect to the rest of the world. We find ourselves as one of innumerable perceptions without connection to the objects that surround us.
5. Hinweis auf den Inhalt der Erfahrung
[ 1 ] Sehen wir uns nun die reine Erfahrung einmal an. Was enthält sie, wie sie an unserem Bewußtsein vorüberzieht, ohne daß wir sie denkend bearbeiten? Sie ist bloßes Nebeneinander im Raume und Nacheinander in der Zeit; ein Aggregat aus lauter zusammenhanglosen Einzelheiten. Keiner der Gegenstände, die da kommen und gehen, hat mit dem anderen etwas zu tun. Auf dieser Stufe sind die Tatsachen, die wir wahrnehmen, die wir innerlich durchleben, absolut gleichgültig füreinander.
[ 2 ] Die Welt ist da eine Mannigfaltigkeit von ganz gleichwertigen Dingen. Kein Ding, kein Ereignis darf den Anspruch erheben, eine größere Rolle in dem Getriebe der Welt zu spielen als ein anderes Glied der Erfahrungswelt. Soll uns klar werden, daß diese oder jene Tatsache größere Bedeutung hat als eine andere, so müssen wir die Dinge nicht bloß beobachten, sondern schon in gedankliche Beziehung setzen. Das rudimentäre Organ eines Tieres, das vielleicht nicht die geringste Bedeutung für dessen organische Funktionen hat, ist für die Erfahrung ganz gleichwertig mit dem wichtigsten Organe des Tierkörpers. Jene größere oder geringere Wichtigkeit wird uns eben erst klar, wenn wir über die Beziehungen der einzelnen Glieder der Beobachtung nachdenken, das heißt, wenn wir die Erfahrung bearbeiten.
[ 3 ] Für die Erfahrung ist die auf einer niedrigen Stufe der Organisation stehende Schnecke gleichwertig mit dem höchst entwickelten Tiere. Der Unterschied in der Vollkommenheit der Organisation erscheint uns erst, wenn wir die gegebene Mannigfaltigkeit begrifflich erfassen und durcharbeiten. Gleichwertig in dieser Hinsicht sind auch die Kultur des Eskimo und jene des gebildeten Europäers; Cäsars Bedeutung für die geschichtliche Entwickelung der Menschheit erscheint der bloßen Erfahrung nicht größer als die eines seiner Soldaten. In der Literaturgeschichte ragt Goethe nicht über Gottsched empor, wenn es sich um die bloße erfahrungsmäßige Tatsächlichkeit handelt.
[ 4 ] Die Welt ist uns auf dieser Stufe der Betrachtung gedanklich eine vollkommen ebene Fläche. Kein Teil dieser Fläche ragt über den anderen empor; keiner zeigt irgendeinen gedanklichen Unterschied von dem anderen. Erst wenn der Funke des Gedankens in diese Fläche einschlägt, treten Erhöhungen und Vertiefungen ein, erscheint das eine mehr oder minder weit über das andere emporragend, formt sich alles in bestimmter Weise, schlingen sich Fäden von einem Gebilde zum anderen; wird alles zu einer in sich vollkommenen Harmonie.
[ 5 ] Wir glauben durch unsere Beispiele wohl hinlänglich gezeigt zu haben, was wir unter jener größeren oder geringeren Bedeutung der Wahrnehmungsgegenstände (hier gleichbedeutend genommen mit Dingen der Erfahrung) verstehen, was wir uns unter jenem Wissen denken, das erst entsteht, wenn wir diese Gegenstände im Zusammenhange betrachten. Damit glauben wir zugleich vor dem Einwande gesichert zu sein, daß unsere Erfahrungswelt ja auch schon unendliche Unterschiede in ihren Objekten zeigt, bevor das Denken an sie herantritt. Eine rote Fläche unterscheide sich doch auch ohne Betätigung des Denkens von einer grünen. Das ist richtig. Wer uns aber damit widerlegen wollte, hat unsere Behauptung vollständig mißverstanden. Das gerade behaupten wir ja, daß es eine unendliche Menge von Einzelheiten ist, die uns in der Erfahrung geboten wird. Diese Einzelheiten müssen natürlich voneinander verschieden sein, sonst würden sie uns eben nicht als unendliche, zusammenhanglose Mannigfaltigkeit gegenübertreten. Von einer Unterschiedlosigkeit der wahrgenommenen Dinge ist gar nicht die Rede, sondern von ihrer vollständigen Beziehungslosigkeit, von der unbedingten Bedeutungslosigkeit der einzelnen sinnenfälligen Tatsache für das Gaze unseres Wirklichkeitsbildes. Gerade weil wir diese unendliche qualitative Verschiedenheit anerkennen, werden wir zu unseren Behauptungen gedrängt.
[ 6 ] Träte uns eine in sich geschlossene, harmonisch gegliederte Einheit gegenüber, so könnten wir doch nicht von einer Gleichgültigkeit der einzelnen Glieder dieser Einheit in bezug aufeinander sprechen.
[ 7 ] Wer unser oben gebrauchtes Gleichnis deswegen nicht entsprechend fände, hätte es nicht beim eigentlichen Vergleichungspunkte gefaßt. Es wäre freilich falsch, wenn wir die unendlich verschieden gestaltete Wahrnehmungswelt mit der einförmigen Gleichmäßigkeit einer Ebene vergleichen wollten. Aber unsere Ebene soll durchaus nicht die mannigfaltige Erscheinungswelt versinnlichen, sondern das einheitliche Gesamtbild, das wir von dieser Welt haben, solange das Denken nicht an sie herangetreten ist. Auf diesem Gesamtbilde erscheint nach der Betätigung des Denkens jede Einzelheit nicht so, wie sie die bloßen Sinne vermitteln, sondern schon mit der Bedeutung, die sie für das Ganze der Wirklichkeit hat. Sie erscheint somit mit Eigenschaften, die ihr in der Form der Erfahrung vollständig fehlen.
[ 8 ] Nach unserer Überzeugung ist es Johannes Volkelt vorzüglich gelungen, das in scharfen Umrissen zu zeichnen, was wir reine Erfahrung zu nennen berechtigt sind. Schon vor fünf Jahren in seinem Buche über «Kants Erkenntnistheorie» 4«Immanuel Kants Erkenntnistheorie [nach ihren Grundprincipien analysirt]», Hamburg 1879. ist sie vortrefflich charakterisiert und in seiner neuesten Veröffentlichung: «Erfahrung und Denken» 5«Erfahrung und Denken. Kritische Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie», Hamburg und Leipzig 1886. hat er die Sache dann weiter ausgeführt. Er hat das nun freilich zur Unterstützung einet Ansicht getan, die von der unsrigen grundverschieden ist und in einer wesentlich anderen Absicht, als die unsere gegenwärtig ist. Das kann uns aber nicht hindern, seine vorzügliche Charakterisierung der reinen Erfahrung hierher zu setzen. Sie schildert uns einfach die Bilder, die in einem beschränkten Zeitabschnitte in völlig zusammenhangloser Weise vor unserem Bewußtsein vorüberziehen. Volkelt sagt: «Jetzt hat zum Beispiel mein Bewußtsein die Vorstellung, heute fleißig gearbeitet zu haben, zum Inhalte; unmittelbar daran knüpft sich der Vorstellungsinhalt, mit gutem Gewissen spazieren gehen zu können; doch plötzlich tritt das Wahrnehmungsbild der sich öffnenden Türe und des hereintretenden Briefträgers ein; das Briefträgerbild erscheint bald handausstreckend, bald mundöffnend, bald das Gegenteil tuend; zugleich verbinden sich mit dem Wahrnehmungsinhalte des Mundöffnens allerhand Gehörseindrücke, unter anderen auch einer, daß es draußen zu regnen anfange. Das Briefträgerbild verschwindet aus meinem Bewußtsein, und die Vorstellungen, die nun eintreten, haben der Reihe nach zu ihrem Inhalte: Ergreifen der Schere, Öffnen des Briefes, Vorwurf unleserlichen Schreibens, Gesichtsbilder mannigfachster Schriftzeichen, mannigfache sich daran knüpfende Phantasiebilder und Gedanken; kaum ist diese Reihe vollendet, als wiederum die Vorstellung, fleißig gearbeitet zu haben, und die mit Mißmut begleitete Wahrnehmung des fortfahrenden Regens eintreten; doch beide verschwinden aus meinem Bewußtsein, und es taucht eine Vorstellung auf mit dem Inhalte, daß eine während des heutigen Arbeitens gelöst geglaubte Schwierigkeit nicht gelöst sei; damit zugleich sind die Vorstellungen: Willensfreiheit, empirische Notwendigkeit, Verantwortlichkeit, Wert der Tugend, absoluter Zufall, Unbegreiflichkeit usw. eingetreten und verbinden sich miteinander in der verschiedenartigsten, kompliziertesten Weise; und ähnlich geht es weiter.» 6Kants Erkenntnistheorie, Seite 168 f.
[ 9 ] Da haben wir für einen gewissen, beschränkten Zeitabschnitt das geschildert, was wir wirklich erfahren, diejenige Form der Wirklichkeit, an der das Denken gar keinen Anteil hat.
[ 10 ] Man darf nun durchaus nicht glauben, daß man zu einem anderen Resultate gekommen wäre, wenn man statt dieser alltäglichen Erfahrung etwa die geschildert hätte, die wir an einem wissenschaftlichen Versuche oder an einem besonderen Naturphänomen machen. Hier wie dort sind es einzelne zusammenhanglose Bilder, die vor unserem Bewußtsein vorüberziehen. Erst das Denken stellt den Zusammenhang her.
[ 11 ] Das Verdienst, in scharfen Konturen gezeigt zu haben, was uns eigentlich die von allem Gedanklichen entblößte Erfahrung gibt, müssen wir auch dem Schriftchen: «Gehirn und Bewußtsein» von Dr. Richard Wahle (Wien 1884) zuerkennen; nur mit der Einschränkung, daß, was Wahle als unbedingt gültige Eigenschaften der Erscheinungen der Außen- und Innenwelt hinstellt, nur von der ersten Stuft der Weltbetrachtung gilt, die wir charakterisiert haben. Wir wissen nach Wahle nur von einem Nebeneinander im Raume und einem Nacheinander in der Zeit. Von einem Verhältnisse der nebenoder nacheinander bestehenden Dinge kann nach ihm gar keine Rede sein. Es mag zum Beispiel immerhin irgendwo ein innerer Zusammenhang zwischen dem warmen Sonnenstrahl und dem Erwärmen des Steines bestehen; wir wissen nichts von einem ursächlichen Zusammenhange; uns wird allein klar, daß auf die erste Tatsache die zweite folgt. Es mag auch irgendwo, in einer uns unzugänglichen Welt-, ein innerer Zusammenhang zwischen unserem Gehirnmechanismus und unserer geistigen Tätigkeit bestehen; wir wissen nur, daß beides parallel verlaufende Vorkommnisse sind; wir sind durchaus nicht berechtigt, zum Beispiel einen Kausalzusammenhang beider Erscheinungen anzunehmen.
[ 12 ] Wenn freilich Wahle diese Behauptung zugleich als letzte Wahrheit der Wissenschaft hinstellt, so bestreiten wir diese Ausdehnung derselben; sie gilt aber vollkommen für die erste Form, in der wir die Wirklichkeit gewahr werden.
[ 13 ] Nicht nur die Dinge der Außen- und die Vorgänge der Innenwelt stehen auf dieser Stufe unseres Wissens zusammenhanglos da, sondern auch unsere eigene Persönlichkeit ist eine isolierte Einzelheit gegenüber der übrigen Welt. Wir finden uns als eine der unzähligen Wahrnehmungen ohne Beziehung zu den Gegenständen, die uns umgeben.
5. reference to the content of the experience
[ 1 ] Let us now take a look at pure experience. What does it contain as it passes by our consciousness without us thinking about it? It is mere juxtaposition in space and succession in time; an aggregate of nothing but incoherent details. None of the objects that come and go has anything to do with the other. At this level, the facts that we perceive, that we experience inwardly, are absolutely indifferent to one another.
[ 2 ] The world is a multiplicity of completely equal things. No thing, no event may claim to play a greater role in the workings of the world than another member of the world of experience. If we are to realize that this or that fact is of greater significance than another, we must not merely observe things, but relate them intellectually. The rudimentary organ of an animal, which perhaps has not the slightest importance for its organic functions, is for experience quite equivalent to the most important organ of the animal body. This greater or lesser importance only becomes clear to us when we think about the relationships between the individual elements of observation, that is, when we work on experience.
[ 3 ] For experience, the snail standing on a low level of organization is equivalent to the most highly developed animal. The difference in the perfection of organization only appears to us when we grasp and work through the given diversity conceptually. The culture of the Eskimo and that of the educated European are also equal in this respect; Caesar's significance for the historical development of mankind appears to mere experience no greater than that of one of his soldiers. In the history of literature, Goethe does not rise above Gottsched when it comes to mere experiential factuality.
[ 4 ] At this level of contemplation, the world is a perfectly flat surface in our minds. No part of this surface rises above the other; none shows any mental difference from the other. Only when the spark of thought strikes this surface do elevations and depressions occur, does one appear to rise more or less far above the other, does everything form itself in a certain way, do threads wind themselves from one structure to another; does everything become a perfect harmony in itself.
[ 5 ] We believe that our examples have sufficiently shown what we understand by the greater or lesser significance of the objects of perception (here taken as synonymous with things of experience), what we think of as the knowledge that only arises when we consider these objects in context. In this way we also believe that we are protected against the objection that our world of experience already shows infinite differences in its objects before thinking approaches them. A red surface differs from a green one even without the activity of thought. That is correct. But anyone who wanted to refute us with this has completely misunderstood our assertion. That is precisely what we claim, that there is an infinite number of details offered to us in experience. These particulars must of course be different from one another, otherwise they would not confront us as an infinite, incoherent multiplicity. We are not talking about the indistinguishability of perceived things, but about their complete lack of relationship, about the unconditional insignificance of the individual sensory fact for the gazes of our image of reality. It is precisely because we recognize this infinite qualitative difference that we are forced to make our assertions.
[ 6 ] If we were faced with a self-contained, harmoniously structured unity, we could not speak of an indifference of the individual members of this unity in relation to one another.
[ 7 ] Those who would not find our parable used above appropriate for this reason would not have grasped it at the actual point of comparison. Of course, it would be wrong if we wanted to compare the infinitely varied world of perception with the uniform uniformity of a plane. But our plane is by no means intended to make sense of the manifold world of appearances, but of the uniform overall picture that we have of this world as long as thought has not approached it. On this overall picture, after the activity of thinking, every detail does not appear as it is conveyed by the mere senses, but already with the meaning it has for the whole of reality. It thus appears with qualities that it completely lacks in the form of experience.
[ 8 ] In our opinion, Johannes Volkelt has succeeded excellently in drawing a clear outline of what we are entitled to call pure experience. Already five years ago in his book on "Kant's Epistemology" 4"Immanuel Kant's Epistemology [analyzed according to its basic principles]", Hamburg 1879, it is excellently characterized and in his latest publication: "Experience and Thought" 5"Experience and Thought. Kritische Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie", Hamburg and Leipzig 1886, he then elaborated on the matter. Admittedly, he did so in support of a view that is fundamentally different from ours and with a substantially different intention than ours at present. But this cannot prevent us from including his excellent characterization of pure experience here. It simply describes the images that pass before our consciousness in a limited period of time in a completely incoherent manner. Volkelt says: "Now, for example, my consciousness has as its content the idea of having worked diligently today; immediately attached to this is the imaginary content of being able to go for a walk with a clear conscience; but suddenly the perceptual image of the door opening and the letter carrier entering enters; the letter carrier's image appears sometimes stretching out his hand, sometimes opening his mouth, sometimes doing the opposite; at the same time all kinds of auditory impressions are connected with the perceptual content of opening his mouth, among others also one that it is beginning to rain outside. The picture of the letter carrier disappears from my consciousness, and the ideas that now enter my mind have as their content, one after the other: Grasping the scissors, opening the letter, reproach of illegible writing, facial images of manifold characters, manifold imaginary images and thoughts connected with them; hardly has this series been completed when again the idea of having worked diligently and the perception of the continuing rain, accompanied by displeasure, enter; but both disappear from my consciousness, and an idea emerges with the content that a difficulty which I had thought solved during today's work has not been solved; at the same time the ideas: Freedom of the will, empirical necessity, responsibility, the value of virtue, absolute chance, incomprehensibility, etc., enter and combine with each other in the most various and complicated ways; and it goes on in a similar way." 6Kant's Theory of Knowledge, page 168 f.
[ 9 ] There we have described, for a certain, limited period of time, what we really experience, that form of reality in which thought has no part at all.
[ 10 ] No one should believe that we would have arrived at a different result if, instead of this everyday experience, we had described that which we make in a scientific experiment or in a particular natural phenomenon. Here, as there, it is individual incoherent images that pass before our consciousness. Only thinking establishes the context.
[ 11 ] The merit of having shown in sharp contours what experience, stripped of all thought, actually gives us, we must also give to the little book: "Brain and Consciousness" by Dr. Richard Wahle (Vienna 1884). Richard Wahle (Vienna 1884); only with the restriction that what Wahle presents as absolutely valid properties of the phenomena of the external and internal world only applies to the first level of the world view that we have characterized. According to Wahle, we only know of a juxtaposition in space and a succession in time. According to him, there can be no question of a relationship between things existing side by side or one after the other. There may, for example, be an inner connection somewhere between the warm ray of sunshine and the warming of the stone; we know nothing of a causal connection; it is only clear to us that the first fact is followed by the second. There may also be somewhere, in a world inaccessible to us, an inner connection between our brain mechanism and our mental activity; we only know that both are parallel occurrences; we are not at all entitled, for example, to assume a causal connection between the two phenomena.
[ 12 ] If, of course, Wahle simultaneously presents this assertion as the ultimate truth of science, we dispute this extension of it; but it applies entirely to the first form in which we become aware of reality.
[ 13 ] Not only are the things of the external world and the processes of the internal world incoherent at this stage of our knowledge, but our own personality is also an isolated entity in relation to the rest of the world. We find ourselves as one of the countless perceptions without any relationship to the objects that surround us.