The Science of Knowing
GA 2
VI. Correcting an Erroneous Conception of Experience as a Whole
[ 1 ] At this point we must indicate a preconception, existing since Kant, which has already taken root so strongly in certain circles that it is considered axiomatic. If anyone were to question it, he would be described as a dilettante, as one who has not risen above the most elementary concepts of modern science. The preconception I mean is the view: It is already established from the very beginning that the whole world of perception, this endless manifoldness of colors and shapes, of sounds and warmth differentiations, etc., is nothing more than our subjective world of mental pictures (Vorstellungen), which exists only as long as we keep our senses open to what works in upon them from a world unknown to us. This view declares the entire world of phenomena to be a mental picture inside our individual consciousness, and on the foundation of this presupposition one then erects further assertions about the nature of our activity of knowing. Even Volkelt adhered to this view and founded upon it his epistemology, which is masterful with respect to its scientific execution. Even so, this preconception is not a fundamental truth and is in no way qualified to stand at the forefront of the science of knowledge.
[ 2 ] But do not misunderstand us. We do not wish to raise what would certainly be a vain protest against the physiological achievements of the present day. But what is entirely justified physiologically is still far from being qualified on that basis to be placed at the portals of epistemology. One may consider it to be an irrefutable physiological truth that only through the participation of our organism does the complex of sensations and perceptions arise that we have called experience. But the fact remains, nevertheless, that any such knowledge can only be the result of many considerations and investigations. This characterization—that our phenomenal world, in a physiological sense, is of a subjective nature—is already what thinking determines it to be, and has therefore absolutely nothing to do with the initial appearance of this world. This characterization already presupposes that thinking has been applied to experience. The examination of the relationship between these two factors of knowing activity must therefore precede this characterization.
[ 3 ] By this view, people believed themselves elevated above the pre-Kantian “naïveté” that regarded things in space and time as reality, just as the naive person with no scientific education still does today.
[ 4 ] Volkelt asserts “that all acts claiming to be an objective activity of knowing are inextricably bound to the knowing individual consciousness; that all such acts occur immediately and directly only within the consciousness of the individual; and that they are utterly incapable of reaching beyond the sphere of the individual person and of grasping or entering the sphere of reality lying outside it.”
[ 5 ] It is nevertheless still the case that an unprejudiced thinking could never discover what it is about the form of reality which approaches us directly (experience) that could in any way justify us in characterizing it as mere mental picture.
[ 6 ] This simple reflection—that the naive person notices absolutely nothing about things that could bring him to this view—shows us that in the objects themselves there lies no compelling reason for this assumption. What is there about a tree or a table itself that could lead me to regard it as a mere configuration of mental pictures? At the very least this cannot therefore be presented as an obvious truth.
[ 7 ] By presenting it as an obvious truth, Volkelt entangles himself in a contradiction with his own basic principles. In our view, he had to be untrue to the truth acknowledged by him—that experience contains nothing but an unconnected chaos of pictures without any conceptual characterization—in order to be able to assert the subjective nature of that same experience. Otherwise, he would have had to see that the subject of knowing activity, the contemplator, stands just as unrelated within the world of experience as any other object in it. But if one applies to the perceived world the predicate “subjective,” this is just as much a conceptual characterization as when one regards a falling stone as the cause of the depression in the ground. But Volkelt himself, after all, does not wish to acknowledge any connection whatsoever between the things of experience. There in lies the contradiction in his view; this is where he became untrue to the principle he stated with respect to pure experience. By doing this he encloses himself within his individuality and is no longer capable of emerging from it. Indeed, he admits this without reservation. Everything remains doubtful to him that lies beyond the disconnected pictures of our perceptions. In his view, our thinking does indeed struggle to draw inferences from this world of mental pictures about an objective reality; it is just that going beyond this world cannot lead to really sure truths. According to Volkelt all knowing that we attain through thinking is not protected from doubt. In terms of certainty it cannot compare at all with direct experience. Only direct experience can provide a knowing not to be doubted. But we have seen how defective this knowing is.
[ 8 ] But all this indeed stems only from the fact that Volkelt applies to sense-perceptible reality (experience) a characteristic that cannot pertain to it in any way, and then he builds up his further assumptions on this presupposition.
[ 9 ] We had to pay particular attention to Volkelt's book because it is the most significant contemporary achievement in this sphere, and also because it can be taken as the prototype for all the epistemological efforts which, in principle, stand in opposition to the direction we are presenting on the basis of the Goethean world view.
6. Berichtigung einer irrigen Auffassung der Gesamt-Erfahrung
[ 1 ] Hier ist nun der Ort, auf ein seit Kant bestehendes Vorurteil hinzuweisen, das sich bereits in gewissen Kreisen so eingelebt hat, daß es als Axiom gilt. Jeder, der es bezweifeln wollte, würde als ein Dilettant hingestellt, als ein Mensch, der nicht über die elementarsten Begriffe moderner Wissenschaft hinausgekommen Ist. Ich meine die Ansicht, als ob es von vornherein feststünde, daß die gesamte Wahrnehmungswelt, diese unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit von Farben und Formen, von Tönen und Wärmedifferenzen usw. nichts weiter sei als unsere subjektive Vorstellungswelt, die nur Bestand habe, solange wir unsere Sinne den Einwirkungen einer uns unbekannten Welt offen halten. Die ganze Erscheinungswelt wird von dieser Ansicht für eine Vorstellung innerhalb unseres individuellen Bewußtseins erklärt, und auf Grundlage dieser Voraussetzung baut man weitere Behauptungen über die Natur des Erkennens auf. Auch Volkelt hat sich dieser Ansicht angeschlossen und seine in bezug auf die wissenschaftliche Durchführung meisterhafte Erkenntnistheorie darauf gegründet. Dennoch ist das keine Grundwahrheit und am wenigsten dazu berufen, an der Spitze der Erkenntniswissenschaft zu stehen.
[ 2 ] Man mißverstehe uns nur ja nicht. Wir wollen nicht gegen die physiologischen Errungenschaften der Gegenwart einen gewiß ohnmächtigen Protest erheben. Was aber physiologisch vollkommen gerechtfertigt ist, das ist deshalb noch lange nicht berufen, an die Pforte der Erkenntnistheorie gestellt zu werden. Es mag als eine unumstößliche physiologische Wahrheit gelten, daß erst durch die Mitwirkung unseres Organismus der Komplex von Empfindungen und Anschauungen entsteht, den wir Erfahrung nannten. Es bleibt doch sicher, daß eine solche Erkenntnis erst das Resultat vieler Erwägungen und Forschungen sein kann. Dieses Charakteristikon, daß unsere Erscheinungswelt in physiologischem Sinne subjektiver Natur ist, ist schon eine gedankliche Bestimmung derselben; hat also ganz und gar nichts zu tun mit ihrem ersten Auftreten. Es setzt schon die Anwendung des Denkens auf die Erfahrung voraus. Es muß ihm daher die Untersuchung des Zusammenhanges dieser beiden Faktoren des Erkennens vorausgehen.
[ 3 ] Man glaubt sich mit jener Ansicht erhaben über die vorkantsche «Naivität», die die Dinge im Raume und in der Zeit für Wirklichkeit hielt, wie es der naive Mensch, der keine wissenschaftliche Bildung hat, heute noch tut.
[ 4 ] Volkelt behauptet: «daß alle Akte, die darauf Anspruch machen, ein objektives Erkennen zu sein, unabtrennbar an das erkennende, individuelle Bewußtsein gebunden sind, daß sie sich zunächst und unmittelbar nirgends anderswo als im Bewußtsein des Individuums vollziehen und daß sie über das Gebiet des Individuums hinauszugreifen und das Gebiet des draußenliegenden Wirklichen zu fassen oder zu betreten völlig außerstande sind.» 7Siehe Volkelt, «Erfahrung und Denken», Seite 4.
[ 5 ] Nun ist es aber doch für ein unbefangenes Denken ganz unerfindlich, was die unmittelbar an uns herantretende Form der Wirklichkeit (die Erfahrung) an sich trage, das uns irgendwie berechtigen könnte, sie als bloße Vorstellung zu bezeichnen.
[ 6 ] Schon die einfache Erwägung, daß der naive Mensch gar nichts an den Dingen bemerkt, was ihn auf diese Ansicht bringen könnte, lehrt uns, daß in den Objekten selbst ein zwingender Grund zu dieser Annahme nicht liegt. Was trägt ein Baum, ein Tisch an sich, was mich dazu veranlassen könnte, ihn als bloßes Vorstellungsgebilde anzusehen? Zum mindesten darf das also nicht wie eine selbstverständliche Wahrheit hingestellt werden.
[ 7 ] Indem Volkelt das letztere tut, verwickelt er sich in einen Widerspruch mit seinen eigenen Grundprinzipien. Nach unserer Überzeugung mußte er der von ihm erkannten Wahrheit, daß die Erfahrung nichts enthalte als ein zusammenhangloses Chaos von Bildern ohne jegliche gedankliche Bestimmung, untreu werden, um die subjektive Natur derselben Erfahrung behaupten zu können. Er hätte sonst einsehen müssen, daß das Subjekt des Erkennens, der Betrachter, ebenso beziehungslos innerhalb der Erfahrungswelt dasteht wie ein beliebiger anderer Gegenstand derselben. Legt man aber der wahrgenommenen Welt das Prädikat subjektiv bei, so ist das ebenso eine gedankliche Bestimmung, wie wenn man den fallenden Stein für die Ursache des Eindruckes im Boden ansieht. Volkelt selbst will doch aber keinerlei Zusammenhang der Erfahrungsdinge gelten lassen. Da liegt der Widerspruch seiner Anschauung, da wurde er seinem Prinzipe, das er von der reinen Erfahrung ausspricht, untreu. Er schließt sich dadurch in seine Individualität ein und ist nicht mehr imstande, aus derselben herauszukommen. Ja, er gibt das rücksichtslos zu. Es bleibt für ihn alles zweifelhaft, was über die abgerissenen Bilder der Wahrnehmungen hinaus liegt. Zwar bemüht sich, nach seiner Ansicht, unser Denken, von dieser Vorstellungswelt aus auf eine obektive Wirklichkeit zu schließen; allein alles Hinausgehen über dieselbe kann uns nicht zu wirklich gewissen Wahrheiten führen. Alles Wissen, das wir durch das Denken gewinnen, ist nach Volkelt vor dem Zweifel nicht geschützt. Es kommt in keiner Weise an Gewißheit der unmittelbaren Erfahrung gleich. Diese allein liefert ein nicht zu bezweifelndes Wissen. Wir haben gesehen, was für ein mangelhaftes.
[ 8 ] Doch das alles kommt nur daher, daß Volkelt der sinnenfälligen Wirklichkeit (Erfahrung) eine Eigenschaft beilegt, die ihr in keiner Weise zukommen kann, und dann auf dieser Voraussetzung seine weiteren Annahmen aufbaut.
[ 9 ] Wir mußten auf die Schrift von Volkelt besondere Rücksicht nehmen, weil sie die bedeutendste Leistung der Gegenwart auf diesem Gebiete ist, und auch deshalb, weil sie als Typus für alle erkenntnistheoretischen Bemühungen gelten kann, die der von uns auf Grundlage der Goetheschen Weltanschauung vertretenen Richtung prinzipiell gegenüberstehen.
6. Correction of an Erroneous View of Total Experience
[ 1 ] This is the place to point out a prejudice that has existed since Kant and has already become so ingrained in certain circles that it is considered an axiom. Anyone who wanted to doubt it would be portrayed as a dilettante, as a person who has not progressed beyond the most elementary concepts of modern science. I mean the view as if it were a foregone conclusion that the entire world of perception, this infinite variety of colors and forms, of sounds and differences in warmth, etc., is nothing more than our subjective world of imagination, which only exists as long as we keep our senses open to the influences of a world unknown to us. The whole world of appearances is declared by this view to be a conception within our individual consciousness, and further assertions about the nature of cognition are based on this premise. Volkelt also subscribed to this view and based his epistemology, which is masterful in terms of its scientific implementation, on it. Nevertheless, this is not a fundamental truth and least of all called upon to stand at the pinnacle of epistemology.
[ 2 ] Just don't misunderstand us. We do not want to raise a protest against the physiological achievements of the present, which is certainly impotent. But what is perfectly justified physiologically is by no means called upon to be placed at the gates of epistemology. It may be regarded as an incontrovertible physiological truth that it is only through the cooperation of our organism that the complex of sensations and perceptions which we call experience arises. It remains certain, however, that such a realization can only be the result of many considerations and researches. This characteristic, that our phenomenal world is of a physiological subjective nature, is already a mental determination of it; thus it has nothing at all to do with its first appearance. It already presupposes the application of thought to experience. It must therefore be preceded by the investigation of the connection between these two factors of cognition.
[ 3 ] With this view, one believes oneself to be superior to the pre-Kantian "naivety" that took things in space and time for reality, as the naive person who has no scientific education still does today.
[ 4 ] Volkelt claims: "that all acts that claim to be objective cognition are inseparably bound to the cognizing, individual consciousness, that they do not take place initially and directly anywhere other than in the consciousness of the individual and that they are completely incapable of reaching beyond the realm of the individual and grasping or entering the realm of the external real." 7See Volkelt, "Experience and Thought", page 4.
[ 5 ] Now, however, it is quite unfathomable to an unbiased mind what the form of reality (experience) that immediately approaches us has in itself that could somehow entitle us to call it mere imagination.
[ 6 ] The simple consideration that the naive person does not notice anything about things that could lead him to this view teaches us that there is no compelling reason for this assumption in the objects themselves. What is there about a tree, a table, that could lead me to regard it as a mere figment of the imagination? At the very least, this should not be taken as a self-evident truth.
[ 7 ] In doing the latter, Volkelt entangles himself in a contradiction with his own basic principles. According to our conviction, he had to be unfaithful to the truth he recognized, that experience contains nothing but an incoherent chaos of images without any mental determination, in order to be able to assert the subjective nature of the same experience. Otherwise he would have had to recognize that the subject of cognition, the observer, is just as unrelated within the world of experience as any other object in it. But if one attaches the predicate subjective to the perceived world, then this is just as much a conceptual determination as if one regards the falling stone as the cause of the impression in the ground. Volkelt himself, however, does not want to accept any connection between the things of experience. There lies the contradiction of his view, there he has been unfaithful to the principle he expresses of pure experience. He thereby locks himself into his individuality and is no longer able to get out of it. Indeed, he admits this ruthlessly. Everything that lies beyond the torn-off images of perception remains doubtful for him. It is true, in his view, that our thinking endeavors to deduce an objective reality from this imaginary world; but all going beyond it cannot lead us to really certain truths. According to Volkelt, all knowledge that we gain through thinking is not protected from doubt. It is in no way equal in certainty to direct experience. This alone provides knowledge that cannot be doubted. We have seen what a deficient one.
[ 8 ] But all this is only because Volkelt ascribes to sensible reality (experience) a quality that cannot be attributed to it in any way, and then builds his further assumptions on this presupposition.
[ 9 ] We had to take Volkelt's work into particular consideration because it is the most significant contemporary achievement in this field, and also because it can be regarded as a type for all epistemological efforts that are opposed in principle to the direction we advocate on the basis of Goethe's worldview.