The Science of Knowing
GA 2
VII. Calling upon the Experience of Every Single Reader
[ 1 ] We wish to avoid the error of attributing any characteristic beforehand to the directly “given,” to the first form in which the outer and inner world appear, and of thus presenting our argument on the basis of any presupposition. In fact, we are characterizing experience as precisely that in which our thinking plays no part at all. There can be no question, therefore, of any error in thinking at the beginning of our argument.
[ 2 ] The basic error of many scientific endeavours, especially those of the present day, consists precisely of the fact that they believe they present pure experience, whereas in fact they only gather up the concepts again that they themselves have inserted into it. Someone could object that we have also assigned a whole number of attributes to pure experience. We called it an endless manifoldness, an aggregate of unconnected particulars, etc. Are those then not conceptual characterizations also? In the sense in which we use them, certainly not. We have only made use of these concepts in order to direct the reader's eye to reality free of thoughts. We do not wish to ascribe these concepts to experience; we make use of them only in order to direct attention to that form of reality which is devoid of any concept.
[ 3 ] All scientific investigations must, in fact, be conducted in the medium of language, and it can only express concepts. But there is, after all, an essential difference between using certain words in order to attribute this or that characteristic directly to a thing, and making use of words only in order to direct the attention of the reader or listener to an object. To use a comparison, we could say: It is one thing for \(A\) to say to \(B\), “Observe that man in the circle of his family and you will gain a very different impression of him than if you get to know him only through the way he is at work”; it is another if \(A\) says, “That man is an excellent father.” In the first case, \(B\)'s attention is directed in a certain sense; he is called upon to judge a personality under certain circumstances. In the second case a particular characteristic is simply ascribed to this personality; an assertion is there fore made. Just as the first case relates to the second, so we believe the starting point of our book relates to the starting point of other books on this subject. If, because of necessities of style or possibilities of expression, the matter appears at any point to be other than this, let us state here expressly that our discussions have only the intention just described and are far from any claim to having asserted any thing pertaining to the things themselves.
[ 4 ] If we now wished to have a name for the first form in which we observe reality, we believe that the expression that fits the matter the very best is: manifestation to the senses.a5In this discussion there is already an allusion to the contemplation of the spiritual of which my later writings tell, in the sense of what is said in note number a3 in Chapter 4. By sense we do not mean merely the outer senses, the mediators of the outer world, but rather all bodily and spiritual organs whatsoever that sense the perception of immediate facts. It is, indeed, quite usual in psychology to use the expression inner sense for the ability to perceive inner experiences.
[ 5 ] Let us use the word manifestation, however, simply to designate a thing perceptible to us or a perceptible process insofar as these appear in space or in time.
[ 6 ] We must still raise a question here that is to lead us to the second factor we have to consider with respect to a science of knowledge: to thinking.
[ 7 ] Must we regard the form of experience we have described thus far as how things actually are? Is it a characteristic of reality? A very great deal depends upon answering this question. If this form of experience is an essential characteristic of the things of experience, if it is something which, in the truest sense of the word, belongs to them by their very nature, then one could not imagine how one is ever to transcend this stage of knowing at all. One would then simply have to resort to writing down everything we perceive, in disconnected notes, and our science would be a collection of such notes. For what would be the purpose of any investigation into the interconnection of things if the complete isolation we ascribe to them in the form of experience were truly characteristic of them?
[ 8 ] The situation would be entirely different a6This discussion does not contradict contemplation of the spiritual; rather it points to the fact that for sense perception one can attain its essential being not, so to speak, by piercing the perception and penetrating to an existence behind it into its essential being, but rather by going back to the thought-element that manifests within man. if, in this form of reality, we had to do not with reality's essential being but only with its inessential outer aspect, if we had only the shell of the true being of the world before us which hides this being and challenges us to search further for it. We would then have to strive to penetrate this shell. We would have to take our start from this first form of the world in order then to possess ourselves of its true (essential) characteristics. We would then have to overcome its manifestation to the senses in order to develop out of it a higher form of manifestation.—The answer to this question is given in the following investigations.
7. Berufung auf die Erfahrung jedes einzelnen Lesers
[ 1 ] Wir wollen den Fehler vermeiden, dem unmittelbar Gegebenen, der ersten Form des Auftretens der Außen- und Innenwelt, von vornherein eine Eigenschaft beizulegen und so auf Grund einer Voraussetzung unsere Ausführungen zur Geltung zu bringen. Ja, wir bestimmen die Erfahrung geradezu als dasjenige, an dem unser Denken gar keinen Anteil hat. Von einem gedanklichen Irrtum kann also am Anfange unserer Ausführungen nicht die Rede sein.
[ 2 ] Gerade darin besteht der Grundfehler vieler wissenschaftlicher Bestrebungen, namentlich der Gegenwart, daß sie glauben die reine Erfahrung wiederzugeben, während sie nur die von ihnen selbst in dieselbe hineingelegten Begriffe wieder herauslesen. Nun kann man uns ja einwenden, daß auch wir der reinen Erfahrung eine Menge von Attributen beigelegt haben. Wir bezeichneten sie als unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit, als ein Aggregat zusammenhangloser Einzelheiten usw. Sind das denn nicht auch gedankliche Bestimmungen? In dem Sinne, wie wir sie gebrauchten, gewiß nicht. Wir haben uns dieser Begriffe nur bedient, um den Blick des Lesers auf die gedankenfreie Wirklichkeit zu lenken. Wir wollen diese Begriffe der Erfahrung nicht beilegen; wir bedienen uns ihrer nur, um die Aufmerksamkeit auf jene Form der Wirklichkeit zu lenken, die jedes Begriffes bar ist.
[ 3 ] Alle wissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen müssen ja mittels der Sprache vollführt werden, und die kann wieder nur Begriffe ausdrücken. Aber es ist doch etwas wesentlich anderes, ob man gewisse Worte braucht, um diese oder jene Eigenschaft einem Dinge direkt zuzusprechen, oder ob man sich ihrer nur bedient, um den Blick des Lesers oder Zuhörers auf einen Gegenstand zu lenken. Wenn wir uns eines Vergleiches bedienen dürften, so würden wir etwa sagen: Ein anderes ist es, wenn A zu B sagt: «Betrachte jenen Menschen im Kreise seiner Familie und du wirst ein wesentlich anderes Urteil über ihn gewinnen, als wenn du ihn nur in seiner Amtsgebarung kennen lernst»; ein anderes ist es, wenn er sagt: «Jener Mensch ist ein vortrefflicher Familienvater.» Im ersten Falle wird die Aufmerksamkeit des B in einem gewissen Sinne gelenkt; er wird darauf hingewiesen, eine Persönlichkeit unter gewissen Umständen zu beurteilen. Im zweiten Falle wird dieser Persönlichkeit einfach eine bestimmte Eigenschaft beigelegt, also eine Behauptung aufgestellt. So wie hier der erste Fall zum zweiten, so soll sich unser Anfang in dieser Schrift zu dem ähnlicher Erscheinungen der Literatur verhalten. Wenn irgendwo durch die notwendige Stilisierung oder um der Möglichkeit, sich auszudrücken, willen die Sache scheinbar anders ist, so bemerken wir hier ausdrücklich, daß unsere Ausführungen nur den hier auseinandergesetzten Sinn haben und weit entfernt sind von dem Anspruche, irgendwelche von den Dingen selbst geltende Behauptung vorgebracht zu haben.
[ 4 ] Wenn wir nun für die erste Form, in der wir die Wirklichkeit beobachten, einen Namen haben wollten, so glauben wir wohl den der Sache am angemessensten in dem Ausdrucke: Erscheinung für die Sinne zu finden. a5In diesen Ausführungen liegt schon die Andeutung auf die Anschauung des Geistigen, von der meine späteren Schriften reden, im Sinne dessen, was in der obigen Anmerkung zu Kapitel 4 gesagt worden ist. Wir verstehen da unter Sinn nicht bloß die äußeren Sinne, die Vermittler der Außenwelt, sondern überhaupt alle leiblichen und geistigen Organe, die der Wahrnehmung der unmittelbaren Tatsachen dienen. Es ist ja eine in der Psychologie ganz gebräuchliche Benennung: innerer Sinn für das Wahrnehmungsvermögen der inneren Erlebnisse.
[ 5 ] Mit dem Worte Erscheinung aber wollen wir einfach ein für uns wahrnehmbares Ding oder einen wahrnehmbaren Vorgang bezeichnen, insofern dieselben im Raume oder in der Zeit auftreten.
[ 6] Wir müssen hier nun noch eine Frage anregen, die uns zu dem zweiten Faktor, den wir behufs der Erkenntniswissenschaft zu betrachten haben, führen soll, zu dem Denken.
[ 7 ] Ist die Art, wie uns die Erfahrung bisher bekannt geworden ist, als etwas im Wesen der Sache Begründetes anzusehen? Ist sie eine Eigenschaft der Wirklichkeit?
[ 8 ] Von der Beantwortung dieser Frage hängt sehr viel ab. Ist nämlich diese Art eine wesentliche Eigenschaft der Erfahrungsdinge, etwas, was ihnen im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes ihrer Natur nach zukommt, dann ist nicht abzusehen, wie man überhaupt je diese Stufe des Erkennens überschreiten soll. Man mußte sich einfach darauf verlegen, alles, was wir wahrnehmen, in zusammenhanglosen Notizen aufzuzeichnen, und eine solche Notizensammlung wäre unsere Wissenschaft. Denn, was sollte alles Forschen nach dem Zusammenhange der Dinge, wenn die, ihnen in der Form der Erfahrung zukommende, vollständige Isoliertheit ihre wahre Eigenschaft wäre?
[ 9 ] Ganz anders verhielte es sich, a6Mit dieser Ausführung ist der Anschauung des Geistigen nicht widersprochen, sondern es wird darauf hingedeutet, daß für die Sinnes-Wahrnehmung, um zu deren Wesen zu gelangen, nicht gewissermaßen durch ein Durchstoßen derselben und ein Vordringen zu einem Sein hinter ihr zu deren Wesen zu gelangen ist, sondern durch ein Zurückgehen zu dem Gedanklichen, das im Menschen sich offenbart. wenn wir es in dieser Form der Wirklichkeit nicht mit deren Wesen, sondern nur mit ihrer ganz unwesentlichen Außenseite zu tun hätten, wenn wir nur eine Hülle von dem wahren Wesen der Welt vor uns hätten, die uns das letztere verbirgt und uns auffordert, weiter nach demselben zu forschen. Wir müßten dann danach trachten, diese Hülle zu durchdringen. Wir müßten von dieser ersten Form der Welt ausgehen, um uns ihrer wahren (wesentlichen) Eigenschaften zu bemächtigen. Wir müßten die Erscheinung für die Sinne überwinden, um daraus eine höhere Erscheinungsform zu entwickeln. - Die Antwort auf diese Frage ist in den folgenden Untersuchungen gegeben.
7. appeal to the experience of each individual reader
[ 1 ] We want to avoid the mistake of attributing a property from the outset to the immediately given, the first form of the appearance of the external and internal world, and thus to bring our explanations to bear on the basis of a presupposition. Indeed, we actually define experience as that in which our thinking has no part at all. There can therefore be no question of an intellectual error at the beginning of our explanations.
[ 2 ] This is precisely the fundamental error of many scientific endeavors, especially of the present day, that they believe they are reproducing pure experience, while they are only reading out the concepts that they themselves put into it. Now it may be objected to us that we too have attached a number of attributes to pure experience. We have described it as an infinite multiplicity, as an aggregate of incoherent details, and so on. Are these not also mental determinations? Certainly not in the sense in which we used them. We have only used these terms to direct the reader's gaze to thought-free reality. We do not want to attach these concepts to experience; we only use them to draw attention to that form of reality which is devoid of any concept.
[ 3 ] All scientific investigations must be carried out by means of language, and language can only express concepts. But it is something essentially different whether one needs certain words to directly ascribe this or that property to a thing, or whether one only uses them to direct the reader's or listener's gaze to an object. If we could make use of a comparison, we would say, for example: It is another thing for A to say to B: "Look at that man in the circle of his family and you will gain a substantially different judgment of him than if you only get to know him in his official capacity"; it is another thing for him to say: "That man is an excellent family man." In the first case, the B's attention is directed in a certain sense; he is being instructed to judge a personality under certain circumstances. In the second case, a certain quality is simply attributed to this personality, i.e. an assertion is made. As here the first case relates to the second, so shall our beginning in this writing relate to that of similar phenomena in literature. If anywhere, through the necessary stylization or for the sake of the possibility of expression, the matter is apparently different, we here expressly remark that our remarks have only the meaning here set forth and are far removed from the claim to have put forward any assertion valid of the things themselves.
[ 4 ] If we now wanted to have a name for the first form in which we observe reality, we believe that we find it most appropriate to the matter in the expression: appearance for the senses. a5In these remarks already lies the allusion to the perception of the spiritual, of which my later writings speak, in the sense of what has been said in note a3 in Chapter 4. We understand by sense not merely the external senses, the mediators of the external world, but in general all physical and mental organs which serve the perception of immediate facts. It is a common term in psychology: inner sense for the perceptive faculty of inner experiences.
[ 5 ] But with the word appearance we simply want to designate a perceptible thing or a perceptible process, insofar as they occur in space or in time.
[ 6] We must now raise another question that should lead us to the second factor that we have to consider for the sake of cognitive science, to thought.
[ 7 ] Is the way in which experience has become known to us so far to be regarded as something founded in the essence of the thing? Is it a property of reality?
[ 8 ] A great deal depends on the answer to this question. For if this kind is an essential property of experiential things, something that is inherent in them in the truest sense of the word, then it is impossible to see how one could ever go beyond this level of cognition. One would simply have to resort to recording everything we perceive in incoherent notes, and such a collection of notes would be our science. For what would be the point of all research into the coherence of things if their true quality were their complete isolation in the form of experience?
[ 9 ] It would be quite different if a6this explanation does not contradict the view of the spiritual, but indicates that for sense-perception, to arrive at its essence is not, as it were, to arrive at its essence by penetrating it and advancing to a being behind it, but by going back to the mental, which reveals itself in man. if in this form of reality we were not dealing with its essence, but only with its quite insignificant outside, if we had only a shell of the true essence of the world before us, which hides the latter from us and invites us to search further for it. We would then have to strive to penetrate this shell. We would have to start from this first form of the world in order to take possession of its true (essential) qualities. We would have to overcome the appearance to the senses in order to develop a higher form of appearance from it. - The answer to this question is given in the following investigations.