The Rudolf Steiner Archive

1. Preliminary Comments

[ 1 ] Theory of knowledge should be a scientific investigation of that which all other sciences presuppose without examination: knowledge itself. This gives it the character of a fundamental philosophical science from the outset. For only through it can we experience the value and significance of the insights gained through the other sciences. In this respect, it forms the basis for all scientific endeavor. It is clear, however, that it can only fulfill its task if it is itself, as far as is possible given the nature of the human cognitive faculty, unconditional. This is generally conceded. Nevertheless, a close examination of the better-known epistemological systems reveals that a whole series of presuppositions are already made in the starting points of the investigation, which then substantially impair the convincing effect of the further explanations. In particular, one will notice that certain hidden assumptions are usually already made when the basic epistemological problems are set up. But if the questions of a science are misguided, then one must doubt a correct solution from the outset. The history of science teaches us that countless errors that have plagued entire ages can be attributed solely to the fact that certain problems were posed incorrectly. We need not go as far as Aristotle's Physics or the Ars magna Lulliana to go back to substantiate this sentence, but we can find enough examples in more recent times. The numerous questions about the significance of rudimentary organs in certain organisms could only be asked in the right way when the conditions for this were created by the discovery of the basic biogenetic law. As long as biology was under the influence of teleological views, it was impossible to pose the relevant problems in such a way that a satisfactory answer would have been possible. What adventurous ideas were held, for example, about the function of the so-called pineal gland in the human brain as long as such a function was even asked for! It was only when comparative anatomy was used to clarify the matter and to ask whether this organ was not merely a remnant of lower forms of development that a goal was reached. Or, to cite another example, what modifications were made to certain questions in physics by the discovery of the mechanical equivalent of heat and the law of the conservation of force! In short, the success of scientific investigations is essentially dependent on whether one is able to pose the problems correctly. Even if epistemology occupies a very special position as a prerequisite for all other sciences, it is nevertheless foreseeable that successful progress in its investigation will only be possible if the basic questions are posed in the correct form.

[ 2 ] The following disputes now primarily strive for a formulation of the problem of knowledge that does strict justice to the character of epistemology as a completely presuppositionless science. They also aim to shed light on the relationship of J. G. Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre to such a basic philosophical science. Why we bring Fichte's attempt to create an absolutely certain foundation for the sciences into closer connection with this task will become clear in the course of the investigation.