Truth and Science
GA 3
I. Preliminary Comments
[ 1 ] A theory of knowing should be a scientific investigation of what all other sciences assume unexamined, namely knowing itself. This means that it must have the character of basic philosophical science from the outset. Only in this manner can we experience the value and significance of insights gained through the other sciences. In this respect, it forms the basis for all scientific endeavors. Obviously, it can fulfill its proper function only by assuming no presuppositions (insofar as possible given the possibilities of humankind’s ability to know things). This is probably generally admitted. Nevertheless, when examining the well-known systems of knowing in detail, one finds that a whole series of presuppositions are made at the starting point of each investigation, which then significantly impair further explanations convincing anybody. Particularly noticeable are hidden assumptions, usually made when the basic epistemological problems (erkenntnistheoretischen Grundprobleme) are posed. If the questions posed by a science are misguided, then one must doubt from the outset that a correct solution has been found.
The history of science teaches us that countless errors, plaguing entire ages, can be traced back solely to the fact that certain problems were posed incorrectly. We do not need to go back to Aristotle's Physics or Llull’s Ars Magna 21t/n Ramon Llull 1232–1315 was a visionary who wrote in Catalan, Latin, and Arabic in Majorca. His Ars Magna was lost in the Nazi’s library purges and the destruction of WWII, but was rediscovered in 2001. to substantiate this statement, for we can find enough examples in modern times. The numerous questions about the significance of rudimentary organs in certain organisms could only be properly asked when the conditions for this had been created, through the discovery of basic laws of biogenesis. So long as biology was under the influence of teleological 22t/n Explaining phenomena on their end purpose rather than on some theoretical cause. views, it was impossible to raise the relevant problems in such a way that a satisfactory answer would be possible. People certainly had fanciful ideas about the function of the pineal gland in the human brain, if they were even asking about its function! Only when people sought clarification of the matter through comparative anatomy and asked themselves whether this organ was not just a remnant of lower forms of human development was the goal approached. To give another example, what fanciful modifications certain questions in physics went through in discovering the mechanics of heat and conservation of energy! In short, the success of scientific investigations depends largely on whether the problems are posed correctly.
Even though the study of knowing (Erkenntnistheorie, epistemology) occupies a very special position as a prerequisite for all other sciences, it can still be foreseen that successful progress in its investigation will only be possible if the basic questions are raised in the correct form.
[ 2 ] The following discussions primarily aim at a formulation of the problem of knowing that does strict justice to the character of the theory of knowing (Erkenntnistheorie, epistemology) as a completely presupposition-free science. This will also shed light on the relationship between J. G. Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre 23t/n Wissenschaftslehre was Fichte’s name for his 1794 Principles of Science. Science at that time included the liberal arts and philosophy. Fichte stated that a person’s experiencing or knowing must include knowing oneself as the knower. This came to be known as transcendental idealism, understanding the world not based on religious beliefs, but resting solely on perceptions and concepts that involve the observer, the knower. Fichte was a full professor with enthusiastic student attendance at his lectures, but was dismissed from the University of Jena in 1799 for supposedly being an atheist. He left for Berlin, the only German state that did not raise an outcry at his philosophy and at his adherence to Freemasonry. (Principles of Science) and my own basic study of scientific knowing (Grundwissenschaft) presented here. Fichte's attempt to create a reliable foundation for science in general is related to the task of this work, as will become clear as this investigation proceeds.
I. Vorbemerkungen
[ 1 ] Die Erkenntnistheorie soll eine wissenschaftliche Untersuchung desjenigen sein, was alle übrigen Wissenschaften ungeprüft voraussetzen: des Erkennens selbst. Damit ist ihr von vornherein der Charakter der philosophischen Fundamentalwissenschaft zugesprochen. Denn erst durch sie können wir erfahren, welchen Wert und welche Bedeutung die durch die anderen Wissenschaften gewonnenen Einsichten haben. Sie bildet in dieser Hinsicht die Grundlage für alles wissenschaftliche Streben. Es ist aber klar, daß sie dieser ihrer Aufgabe nur dann gerecht werden kann, wenn sie selbst, soweit das bei der Natur des menschlichen Erkenntnisvermögens möglich ist, voraussetzungslos ist. Dies wird wohl allgemein zugestanden. Dennoch findet man bei eingehender Prüfung der bekannteren erkenntnistheoretischen Systeme, daß schon in den Ausgangspunkten der Untersuchung eine ganze Reihe von Voraussetzungen gemacht werden, die dann die überzeugende Wirkung der weiteren Darlegungen wesentlich beeinträchtigen. Namentlich wird man bemerken, daß gewöhnlich schon bei Aufstellung der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundprobleme gewisse versteckte Annahmen gemacht werden. Wenn aber die Fragestellungen einer Wissenschaft verfehlte sind, dann muß man wohl an einer richtigen Lösung von vornherein zweifeln. Die Geschichte der Wissenschaften lehrt uns doch, daß unzählige Irrtümer, an denen ganze Zeitalter krankten, einzig und allein darauf zurückzuführen sind, daß gewisse Probleme falsch gestellt worden sind. Wir brauchen nicht bis auf die Physik des Aristoteles oder die Ars magna Lulliana zurückzugehen, um diesen Satz zu erhärten, sondern wir können in der neueren Zeit Beispiele genug finden. Die zahlreichen Fragen nach der Bedeutung rudimentärer Organe bei gewissen Organismen konnten erst dann in richtiger Weise gestellt werden, als durch die Auffindung des biogenetischen Grundgesetzes die Bedingungen hierzu geschaffen waren. Solange die Biologie unter dem Einflusse teleologischer Anschauungen stand, war es unmöglich, die entsprechenden Probleme so aufzuwerfen, daß eine befriedigende Antwort möglich geworden wäre. Welche abenteuerlichen Vorstellungen hatte man z. B. über die Aufgabe der sogenannten Zirbeldrüse im menschlichen Gehirne, solange man nach einer solchen Aufgabe überhaupt fragte! Erst als man auf dem Wege der vergleichenden Anatomie die Klarstellung der Sache suchte und sich fragte, ob dieses Organ nicht bloß ein beim Menschen stehengebliebener Rest aus niederen Entwickelungsformen sei, gelangte man zu einem Ziele. Oder, um noch ein Beispiel anzuführen, welche Modifikationen erfuhren gewisse Fragestellungen in der Physik durch die Entdeckung des mechanischen Wärmeäquivalentes und des Gesetzes von der Erhaltung der Kraft! Kurz, der Erfolg wissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen ist ganz wesentlich davon abhängig, ob man die Probleme richtig zu stellen imstande ist. Wenn auch die Erkenntnistheorie als Voraussetzung aller übrigen Wissenschaften eine ganz besondere Stellung einnimmt, so ist dennoch vorauszusehen, daß auch in ihr ein erfolgreiches Fortschreiten in der Untersuchung nur dann möglich sein wird, wenn die Grundfragen in richtiger Form aufgeworfen werden.
[ 2 ] Die folgenden Auseinandersetzungen streben nun in erster Linie eine solche Formulierung des Erkenntnisproblems an, die dem Charakter der Erkenntnistheorie als vollständig voraussetzungsloser Wissenschaft strenge gerecht wird. Sie wollen dann auch das Verhältnis von J. G. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre zu einer solchen philosophischen Grundwissenschaft beleuchten. Warum wir gerade Fichtes Versuch, den Wissenschaften eine unbedingt gewisse Grundlage zu schaffen, mit dieser Aufgabe in nähere Verbindung bringen, wird sich im Verlaufe der Untersuchung von selbst ergeben.
[ 1 ] Theory of knowledge should be a scientific investigation of that which all other sciences presuppose without examination: knowledge itself. This gives it the character of a fundamental philosophical science from the outset. For only through it can we experience the value and significance of the insights gained through the other sciences. In this respect, it forms the basis for all scientific endeavor. It is clear, however, that it can only fulfill its task if it is itself, as far as is possible given the nature of the human cognitive faculty, unconditional. This is generally conceded. Nevertheless, a close examination of the better-known epistemological systems reveals that a whole series of presuppositions are already made in the starting points of the investigation, which then substantially impair the convincing effect of the further explanations. In particular, one will notice that certain hidden assumptions are usually already made when the basic epistemological problems are set up. But if the questions of a science are misguided, then one must doubt a correct solution from the outset. The history of science teaches us that countless errors that have plagued entire ages can be attributed solely to the fact that certain problems were posed incorrectly. We need not go as far as Aristotle's Physics or the Ars magna Lulliana to go back to substantiate this sentence, but we can find enough examples in more recent times. The numerous questions about the significance of rudimentary organs in certain organisms could only be asked in the right way when the conditions for this were created by the discovery of the basic biogenetic law. As long as biology was under the influence of teleological views, it was impossible to pose the relevant problems in such a way that a satisfactory answer would have been possible. What adventurous ideas were held, for example, about the function of the so-called pineal gland in the human brain as long as such a function was even asked for! It was only when comparative anatomy was used to clarify the matter and to ask whether this organ was not merely a remnant of lower forms of development that a goal was reached. Or, to cite another example, what modifications were made to certain questions in physics by the discovery of the mechanical equivalent of heat and the law of the conservation of force! In short, the success of scientific investigations is essentially dependent on whether one is able to pose the problems correctly. Even if epistemology occupies a very special position as a prerequisite for all other sciences, it is nevertheless foreseeable that successful progress in its investigation will only be possible if the basic questions are posed in the correct form.
[ 2 ] The following disputes now primarily strive for a formulation of the problem of knowledge that does strict justice to the character of epistemology as a completely presuppositionless science. They also aim to shed light on the relationship of J. G. Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre to such a basic philosophical science. Why we bring Fichte's attempt to create an absolutely certain foundation for the sciences into closer connection with this task will become clear in the course of the investigation.