The Philosophy of Freedom
GA 4
Appendix
[ 1 ] Objections which were made from the philosophical side immediately upon the publication of this book induce me to add the following brief discussion to this new edition.
I can well understand that there are readers who are interested in the rest of the book, but who will look upon what follows as a remote and unnecessary tissue of abstract concepts. They can leave this short statement unread. But in philosophy problems arise which have their origin more in certain prejudices on the thinkers' part than in the natural course of human thinking itself. Otherwise it seems to me that this book deals with a task that concerns everyone who is trying to get clear about the nature of man and his relationship to the world. What follows is rather a problem which certain philosophers insist should be discussed as part of the subject matter of such a book, because, by their whole way of thinking, they have created certain difficulties which do not otherwise occur. If one were to pass by such problems altogether, certain people would be quick to accuse one of dilettantism and the like. And the impression would arise that the author of the views set down in this book has not come to terms with those points of view he has not discussed in the book itself.
[ 2 ] The problem to which I refer is this: there are thinkers who believe that a special difficulty arises when one tries to understand how another person's soul life can affect one's own. They say: my conscious world is enclosed within me; in the same way, any other conscious world is enclosed within itself. I cannot see into the world of consciousness of another person. How, then, do I know that he and I are both in the same world? The theory which believes it possible to infer from the conscious world an unconscious world which can never enter consciousness, tries to solve this difficulty in the following way. It says: the world I have in my consciousness is the representative in me of a real world to which I have no conscious access. In this real world lie the unknown causes of my conscious world. In it also lies my own real being, of which I have only a representative in my consciousness. In it also, however, lies the being of my fellow man. Now whatever is experienced in the consciousness of my fellow man corresponds to a reality in his being which is independent of his consciousness. This reality acts, in the realm which cannot become conscious, upon my own real being which is said to be unconscious; and in this way something is created in my consciousness representing what is present in a consciousness that is quite independent of my own conscious experience. It is clear that to the world accessible to my consciousness an inaccessible one is here being added hypothetically, since one believes that otherwise one is forced to the conclusion that the whole external world, which I think is there in front of me, is nothing but the world of my consciousness, and to the further—solipsistic—absurdity that other people, too, exist only within my consciousness.
[ 3 ] This problem, which has been created by several recent tendencies in epistemology, can be clarified if one tries to survey the matter from the point of view of the spiritually oriented observation adopted in this book. What is it, in the first instance, that I have before me when I confront another person? The most immediate thing is the bodily appearance of the other person as given to me in sense perception; then, perhaps, the auditory perception of what he is saying, and so on. I do not merely stare at all this, but it sets my thinking activity in motion. Through the thinking with which I confront the other person, the percept of him becomes, as it were, transparent to the mind. I am bound to admit that when I grasp the percept with my thinking, it is not at all the same thing as appeared to the outer senses. In what is a direct appearance to the senses, something else is indirectly revealed. The mere sense appearance extinguishes itself at the same time as it confronts me. But what it reveals through this extinguishing compels me as a thinking being to extinguish my own thinking as long as I am under its influence, and to put its thinking in the place of mine. I then grasp its thinking in my thinking as an experience like my own. I have really perceived another person's thinking. The immediate percept, extinguishing itself as sense appearance, is grasped by my thinking, and this is a process lying wholly within my consciousness and consisting in this, that the other person's thinking takes the place of mine. Through the self-extinction of the sense appearance, the separation between the two spheres of consciousness is actually overcome. This expresses itself in my consciousness through the fact that while experiencing the content of another person's consciousness I experience my own consciousness as little as I experience it in dreamless sleep. Just as in dreamless sleep my waking consciousness is eliminated, so in my perceiving of the content of another person's consciousness the content of my own is eliminated. The illusion that it is not so only comes about because in perceiving the other person, firstly, the extinction of the content of one's own consciousness gives place not to unconsciousness, as it does in sleep, but to the content of the other person's consciousness, and secondly, the alternations between extinguishing and lighting up again of my own self-consciousness follow too rapidly to be generally noticed.
This whole problem is to be solved, not through artificial conceptual structures with inferences from the conscious to things that can never become conscious, but rather through genuine experience of what results from combining thinking with the percept. This applies to a great many problems which appear in philosophical literature. Thinkers should seek the path to open-minded, spiritually oriented observation; instead of which they insert an artificial conceptual structure between themselves and the reality.
[ 4 ] In a treatise by Eduard von Hartmann entitled The Ultimate Problems of Epistemology and Metaphysics,1“Die letzten Fragen der Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik”, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, Vol. 108, p. 55. my Philosophy of Freedom has been classed with the philosophical tendency which would base itself upon an “epistemological monism”. Eduard von Hartmann rejects such a position as untenable. This is explained as follows. According to the way of thinking expressed in his treatise, there are only three possible positions in the theory of knowledge.
Firstly, one remains at the naïve point of view, which regards perceived phenomena as real things existing outside human consciousness. This implies a lack of critical knowledge. One fails to realize that with the content of one's consciousness one remains, after all, only within one's own consciousness. One fails to perceive that one is dealing, not with a “table-in-itself”, but only with an object in one's own consciousness. Whoever remains at this point of view, or for whatever reason returns to it, is a naïve realist. But this whole position is untenable for it fails to recognize that consciousness has no other objects than its own contents.
Secondly, one appreciates this situation and admits it fully to oneself. One would then be a transcendental idealist. But then one would have to deny that anything of a “thing-in-itself” could ever appear in human consciousness. In this way, however, provided one is consistent enough, one will not avoid absolute illusionism. For the world which confronts one now transforms itself into a mere sum of objects of consciousness, and, moreover, only of objects of one's own consciousness. One is then compelled—absurdly enough—to regard other people too as being present solely in the content of one's own consciousness.
The only possible standpoint is the third, transcendental realism. This assumes that there are “things-in-themselves”, but that the consciousness can have no kind of dealings with them in immediate experience. Beyond the sphere of human consciousness, and in a way that does not enter it, they cause the objects of our consciousness to arise in it. One can arrive at these “things-in-themselves” only by inference from the content of consciousness, which is all that is actually experienced but is nevertheless merely pictured in the mind.
Eduard von Hartmann maintains in the article mentioned above that “epistemological monism”—for such he takes my point of view to be—must in reality accept one of these three positions; and it fails to do so only because it does not draw the logical conclusions from its postulates. The article goes on to say:
If one wants to find out which theoretical position a supposed epistemological monist occupies, one need only put certain questions to him and compel him to answer them. For such a person will never willingly commit himself to an expression of opinion on these points, and will, moreover, seek by all means to evade answering direct questions, because every answer would show that epistemological monism cannot claim to be different from one or other of the three positions. These questions are as follows:
(1) Are things continuous or intermittent in their existence? If the answer is “continuous”, then one is dealing with some form of naïve realism. If the answer is “intermittent”, then one has transcendental idealism. But if the answer is that they are, on the one hand, continuous (as contents of the absolute consciousness, or as unconscious mental pictures, or as possibilities of perception), but on the other hand, intermittent (as contents of limited consciousness), then transcendental realism is established.
(2) When three people are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables are there: Whoever answers “one” is a naïve realist; whoever answers “three” is a transcendental idealist; but whoever answers “four” is a transcendental realist. Here, of course, it is assumed that it is legitimate to embrace such different things as the one table as a thing-in-itself and the three tables as perceptual objects in the three consciousnesses under the common designation of “a table”. If this seems too great a liberty to anyone, he will have to answer “one and three” instead of “four”.
(3) When two people are alone together in a room, how many distinct persons are there: Whoever answers “two” is a naïve realist. Whoever answers “four” (namely, one self and one other person in each of the two consciousnesses) is a transcendental idealist. Whoever answers “six” (namely, two persons as “things-in-themselves” and four persons as mentally pictured objects in the two consciousnesses) is a transcendental realist.
If anyone wants to show that epistemological monism is different from any of these three positions, he would have to give a different answer to each of these three questions; but I would not know what this could be.
The answers of the Philosophy of Freedom would have to be:
(1) Whoever grasps only the perceptual contents of things and takes these for reality, is a naïve realist, and he does not realize that, strictly, he ought to regard these perceptual contents as existing only as long as he is looking at the things, so that he ought to think of the things before him as intermittent. As soon, however, as it becomes clear to him that reality is present only in the percepts that are permeated by thought, he will see that the perceptual contents which appear as intermittent reveal themselves as continuous as soon as they are permeated with the results of thinking. Hence we must count as continuous the perceptual content that has been grasped through the experience of thinking, of which only that part that is merely perceived could be regarded as intermittent, if—which is not the case—it were real.
(2) When three people are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables are there? There is only one table present; but as long as the three people went no further than their perceptual images, they would have to say, “These perceptual images are not a reality at all.” As soon as they pass on to the table as grasped by their thinking, the one reality of the table reveals itself to them; then, with their three contents of consciousness, they are united in this reality.
(3) When two people are alone together in a room, how many distinct persons are there? There are most certainly not six—not even in the sense of the transcendental realists—but only two. All one can say is that, at the first moment, each person has nothing but the unreal perceptual image of himself and of the other person. There are four of these images, and through their presence in the thinking activity of the two people, reality is grasped. In this activity of thinking each person transcends his own sphere of consciousness; in it the consciousness of the other person as well as of himself comes to life. In these moments of coming to life the two people are as little enclosed within their own consciousnesses as they are in sleep. But at other moments the awareness of the absorption in the other person appears again, so that the consciousness of each person, in the experience of thinking, apprehends both himself and the other. I know that a transcendental realist describes this as a relapse into naïve realism. But then, I have already pointed out in this book that naïve realism retains its justification for the thinking that is experienced.
The transcendental realist will have nothing whatever to do with the true state of affairs regarding the process of knowledge; he cuts himself off from the facts by a tissue of thoughts and entangles himself in it. Moreover, the monism which appears in The Philosophy of Freedom ought not to be labeled “epistemological”, but, if an epithet is wanted, then a “monism of thought”. All this has been misunderstood by Eduard von Hartmann. He has ignored all that is specific in the argumentation of The Philosophy of Freedom, and has stated that I have attempted to combine Hegel's universalistic panlogism with Hume's individualistic phenomenalism,2Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Vol. 108, p. 71, note. whereas in fact The Philosophy of Freedom has nothing whatever to do with the two positions it is allegedly trying to combine. (This, too, is the reason why I could not feel inclined, for example, to go into the “epistemological monism” of Johannes Rehmke. The point of view of The Philosophy of Freedom is simply quite different from what Eduard von Hartmann and others call epistemological monism.)
Erster Anhang
[ 1 ] Einwendungen, die mir gleich nach dem Erscheinen dieses Buches von philosophischer Seite her gemacht worden sind, veranlassen mich, die folgende kurze Ausführung dieser Neuausgabe hinzuzufügen. Ich kann mir gut denken, daß es Leser gibt, die für den übrigen Inhalt dieses Buches Interesse haben, die aber das Folgende als ein ihnen überflüssiges und fernliegendes abstraktes Begriffsgespinst ansehen. Sie können diese kurze Darstellung ungelesen lassen. Allein innerhalb der philosophischen Weltbetrachtung tauchen Probleme auf, die mehr in gewissen Vorurteilen der Denker als im naturgemäßen Gang jedes menschlichen Denkens selbst ihren Ursprung haben. Was sonst in diesem Buche behandelt ist, das scheint mir eine Aufgabe zu sein, die jeden Menschen angeht, der nach Klarheit ringt in bezug auf das Wesen des Menschen und dessen Verhältnis zur Welt. Das Folgende aber ist mehr ein Problem, von dem gewisse Philosophen fordern, daß es behandelt werde, wenn von den in diesem Buche dargestellten Dingen die Rede ist, weil diese Philosophen sich durch ihre Vorstellungsart gewisse nicht allgemein vorhandene Schwierigkeiten geschaffen haben. Geht man ganz an solchen Problemen vorbei, so sind dann gewisse Persönlichkeiten schnell mit dem Vorwurf des Dilettantismus und dergleichen bei der Hand. Und es entsteht die Meinung, als ob der Verfasser einer Darstellung wie der in diesem Buche gegebenen mit Ansichten sich nicht auseinandergesetzt hätte, die er in dem Buche selbst nicht besprochen hat.
[ 2 ] Das Problem, das ich hier meine, ist dieses: Es gibt Denker, welche der Meinung sind, daß sich eine besondere Schwierigkeit ergäbe, wenn man begreifen will, wie ein anderes menschliches Seelenleben auf das eigene (des Betrachters) wirken könne. Sie sagen: meine bewußte Welt ist in mir abgeschlossen; eine andere bewußte Welt ebenso in sich. Ich kann in die Bewußtseinswelt eines andern nicht hineinsehen. Wie komme ich dazu, mich mit ihm in einer gemeinsamen Welt zu wissen? Diejenige Weltansicht, welche es für möglich hält, von der bewußten Welt aus auf eine unbewußte zu schließen, die nie bewußt werden kann, versucht diese Schwierigkeit in der folgenden Art zu lösen. Sie sagt: die Welt, die ich in meinem Bewußtsein habe, ist die in mir repräsentierte Welt einer von mir bewußt nicht zu erreichenden Wirklichkeitswelt. In dieser liegen die mir unbekannten Veranlasser meiner Bewußtseinswelt. In dieser liegt auch meine wirkliche Wesenheit, von der ich ebenfalls nur einen Repräsentanten in meinem Bewußtsein habe. In dieser liegt aber auch die Wesenheit des andern Menschen, der mir gegenüber tritt. Was nun im Bewußtsein dieses andern Menschen erlebt wird, das hat seine von diesem Bewußtsein unabhängige entsprechende Wirklichkeit in seiner Wesenheit. Diese wirkt in dem Gebiet, das nicht bewußt werden kann, auf meine prinzipielle unbewußte Wesenheit, und dadurch wird in meinem Bewußtsein eine Repräsentanz geschaffen für das, was in einem von meinem bewußten Erleben ganz unabhängigen Bewußtsein gegenwärtig ist. Man sieht: es wird hier zu der von meinem Bewußtsein erreichbaren Welt eine für dieses im Erleben unerreichbare hypothetisch hinzugedacht, weil man sonst sich zu der Behauptung gedrängt glaubt, alle Außenwelt, die ich meine vor mir zu haben, sei nur meine Bewußtseinswelt, und das ergäbe die — solipsistische — Absurdität, auch die andern Personen lebten nur innerhalb meines Bewußtseins.
[ 3 ] Klarheit über diese durch manche erkenntnistheoretische Strömungen der neueren Zeit geschaffene Frage kann man gewinnen, wenn man vom Gesichtspunkte der geistgemäßen Beobachtung, der in der Darstellung dieses Buches eingenommen ist, die Sache zu überschauen trachtet. Was habe ich denn zunächst vor mir, wenn ich einer andern Persönlichkeit gegenüberstehe? Ich sehe auf das nächste. Es ist die mir als Wahrnehmung gegebene sinnliche Leibeserscheinung der andern Person; dann noch etwa die Gehörwahrnehmung dessen, was sie sagt, und so weiter. Alles dies starre ich nicht bloß an, sondern es setzt meine denkende Tätigkeit in Bewegung. Indem ich denkend vor der andern Persönlichkeit stehe, kennzeichnet sich mir die Wahrnehmung gewissermaßen als seelisch durchsichtig. Ich bin genötigt, im denkenden Ergreifen der Wahrnehmung mir zu sagen, daß sie dasjenige gar nicht ist, als was sie den äußeren Sinnen erscheint. DieSinneserscheinung offenbart in dem, was sie unmittelbar ist, ein anderes, was sie mittelbar ist. Ihr Sich-vor-mich Hinstellen ist zugleich ihr Auslöschen als bloße Sinneserscheinung. Aber was sie in diesem Auslöschen zur Erscheinung bringt, das zwingt mich als denkendes Wesen, mein Denken für die Zeit ihres Wirkens auszulöschen und an dessen Stelle ihr Denken zu setzen. Dieses ihr Denken aber ergreife ich in meinem Denken als Erlebnis wie mein eigenes. Ich habe das Denken des andern wirklich wahrgenommen. Denn die als Sinneserscheinung sich auslöschende unmittelbare Wahrnehmung wird von meinem Denken ergriffen, und es ist ein vollkommen in meinem Bewußtsein liegender Vorgang, der darin besteht, daß sich an die Stelle meines Denkens das andere Denken setzt. Durch das Sich-Auslöschen der Sinneserscheinung wird die Trennung zwischen den beiden Bewußtseinssphären tatsächlich aufgehoben. Das repräsentiert sich in meinem Bewußtsein dadurch, daß ich im Erleben des andern Bewußtseinsinhaltes mein eigenes Bewußtsein ebensowenig erlebe, wie ich es im traumlosen Schlafe erlebe. Wie in diesem mein Tagesbewußtsein ausgeschaltet ist, so im Wahrnehmen des fremden Bewußtseinsinhaltes der eigene. Die Täuschung, als ob dies nicht so sei, rührt nur davon her, daß im Wahrnehmen der andern Person erstens an die Stelle der Auslöschung des eigenen Bewußtseinsinhaltes nichtBewußtlosigkeit tritt wie im Schlafe, sondern der andere Bewußtseinsinhalt, und zweitens, daß die Wechselzustände zwischen Auslöschen und Wieder-Aufleuchten des Bewußtseins von mir selbst zu schnell aufeinander folgen, um für gewöhnlich bemerkt zu werden. — Das ganze hier vorliegende Problem löst man nicht durch künstliche Begriffskonstruktionen, die von Bewußtem auf solches schließen, das nie bewußt werden kann, sondern durch wahres Erleben dessen, was sich in der Verbindung von Denken und Wahrnehmung ergibt. Es ist dies bei sehr vielen Fragen der Fall, die in der philosophischen Literatur auftreten. Die Denker sollten den Weg suchen zu unbefangener geistgemäßerBeobachtung;statt dessen schieben sie vor dieWirklichkeit eine künstliche Begriffskonstruktion hin.
[ 4 ] In einer Abhandlung Eduard von Hartmanns «Die letzten Fragen der Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik» (in der Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 108. Bd. 5. 55 ff.) wird meine «Philosophie der Freiheit» in die philosophische Gedankenrichtung eingereiht, die sich auf einen «erkenntnistheoretischen Monismus» stützen will. Ein solcher Standpunkt wird von Eduard von Hartmann als ein unmöglicher abgelehnt.Dem liegt folgendes zugrunde. Gemäß der Vorstellungsart, welche sich in dem genannten Aufsatze zum Ausdruck bringt, gibt es nur drei mögliche erkenntnistheoretische Standpunkte. Entweder man bleibt auf dem naiven Standpunkt stehen, welcher die wahrgenommenenErscheinungen als wirkliche Dinge außer dem menschlichen Bewußtsein nimmt. Dann fehlte es einem an kritischer Erkenntnis. Man sehe nicht ein, daß man mit seinem Bewußtseinsinhalt doch nur in dem eigenen Bewußtsein sei. Man durchschaue nicht, daß man es nicht mit einem «Tische an sich» zu tun habe, sondern nur mit dem eigenen Bewußtseinsobjekte. Wer auf diesem Standpunkte bleibe oder durch irgendwelche Erwägungen zu ihm wieder zurückkehre, der sei naiver Realist. Allein dieser Standpunkt sei eben unmöglich, denn er verkenne, daß das Bewußtsein nur seine eigenen Bewußtseinsobjekte habe. Oder man durchschaue diesen Sachverhalt und gestehe sich ihn voll ein. Dann werde man zunächst transzendentaler Idealist. Man müsse dann aber ablehnen, daß von einem «Dinge an sich» jemals etwas im menschlichen Bewußtsein auftreten könne. Dadurch entgehe man aber nicht dem absoluten Illusionismus, wenn man nur konsequent genug dazu sei. Denn es verwandelt sich einem die Welt, der man gegenübersteht, in eine bloße Summe von Bewußtseinsobjekten, und zwar nur von Objekten des eigenen Bewußtseins. Auch die anderer Menschen sei man dann — absurderweise — gezwungen, nur als im eigenen Bewußtseinsinhalt allein anwesend zu denken. Ein möglicherStandpunkt sei nur der dritte, der transzendentale Realismus. Dieser nimmt an, es gibt «Dinge an sich», aber das Bewußtsein kann in keiner Weise im unmittelbaren Erleben mit ihnen zu tun haben. Sie bewirken jenseits des menschlichen Bewußtseins auf eine Art, die nicht ins Bewußtsein fällt, daß in diesem die Bewußtseinsobjekte auftreten. Man kann auf diese «Dinge an sich» nur durch Schlußfolgerung aus dem allein erlebten, aber eben bloß vorgestellten Bewußtseinsinhalt kommen. Eduard von Hartmann behauptet nun in dem genannten Aufsatze, ein « erkenntnistheoretischer Monismus», als den er meinen Standpunkt auffaßt, müsse sich in Wirklichkeit zu einem der drei Standpunkte bekennen; er tue es nur nicht, weil er die tatsächlichen Konsequenzen seiner Voraussetzungen nicht ziehe. Und dann wird in dem Aufsatz gesagt: «Wenn man herausbekommen will, welchem erkenntnistheoretischen Standpunkt ein angeblicher erkenntnistheoretischer Monist angehört, so braucht man ihm nur einige Fragen vorzulegen und ihn zur Beantwortung derselben zu zwingen. Denn von selbst läßt sich kein solcher zur Äußerung über diese Punkte herbei, und auch derBeantwortung direkter Fragen wird er auf alle Weise auszuweichen suchen, weil jede Antwort den Anspruch auf erkenntnistheoretische Monismus als einen von den drei anderen verschiedenen Standpunkt aufhebt. Diese Fragen sind folgende: 1. Sind die Dinge in ihrem Bestande kontinuierlich oder intermittierend? Wenn die Antwort lautet: sie sind kontinuierlich, so hat man es mit irgendeiner Form des naiven Realismus zu tun. Wenn sie lautet: sie sind intermittierend, so liegt transzendentaler Idealismus vor. Wenn sie aber lautet: sie sind einerseits (als Inhalte des absoluten Bewußtseins, oder als unbewußte Vorstellungen oder als Wahrnehmungsmöglichkeiten) kontinuierlich, andererseits (als Inhalte des beschränkten Bewußtseins) intermittierend, so ist transzendentaler Realismus konstatiert. — 2. Wenn drei Personen an einem Tisch sitzen, wieviele Exemplare des Tisches sind vorhanden? Wer antwortet: eines, ist naiver Realist; wer antwortet: drei, ist transzendentaler Idealist; wer aber antwortet: vier, der ist transzendentaler Realist. Es ist dabei allerdings vorausgesetzt, daß man so ungleichartiges wie den einenTisch als Ding an sich und die drei Tische als Wahrnehmungsobjekte in den drei Bewußtseinen unter die gemeinsame Bezeichnung «Exemplare des Tisches» zus ammen-fassen dürfe. Wem dies als eine zu große Freiheit erscheint, der wird die Antwort «einer und drei» geben müssen, anstatt «vier». — 3. Wenn zwei Personen allein in einem Zimmer zusammen sind, wieviel Exemplare dieser Personen sind vorhanden? Wer antwortet: zwei, ist naiver Realist; wer antwortet: vier (nämlich in jedem der beiden Bewußtseine ein Ich und ein anderer), der ist transzendentaler Idealist; wer aber antwortet: sechs (nämlich zwei Personen als Dinge an sich und vier Vorstellungsobjekte von Personen in den zwei Bewußtseinen), der ist transzendentaler Realist. Wer den erkenntnistheoretischen Monismus als einen von diesen drei Standpunkten verschiedenen erweisen wollte, der müßte auf jede dieser drei Fragen eine andere Antwort geben; ich wüßte aber nicht wie diese lauten könnte.» Die Antworten der «Philosophie der Freiheit» müßten so lauten: 1. Wer von den Dingen nur die Wahrnehmungsinhalte erfaßt und diese für Wirklichkeit nimmt, ist naiver Realist, und er macht sich nicht klar, daß er eigentlich diese Wahrnehmungsinhalte nur so lange für bestehend ansehen dürfte, als er auf die Dinge hinsieht, daß er also, was er vor sich hat, als intermittierend denken müßte. Sobald er sich aber klar darüber wird, daß Wirklichkeit nur im gedankendurchsetzten Wahrnehmbaren vorhanden ist, gelangt er zu der Einsicht, daß der als intermittierend auftretende Wahrnehmungsinhalt durchsetzt von dem im Denken Erarbeiteten sich als kontinuierlich offenbart. Als kontinuierlich muß also gelten: der von dem erlebten Denken erfaßte Wahrnehmungsgehalt, von dem das, was nur wahrgenommen wird, als intermittierend zu denken wäre, wenn es — was nicht der Fall ist — wirklich wäre. — 2. Wenn drei Personen an einem Tisch sitzen, wieviel Exemplare des Tisches sind vorhanden? Es ist nur ein Tisch vorhanden; aber so lange die drei Personen bei ihren Wahrnehmungsbildern stehen bleiben wollten, müßten sie sagen: diese Wahrnehmungsbilder sind überhaupt keine Wirklichkeit. Sobald sie zu dem in ihrem Denken erfaßten Tisch übergehen, offenbart sich ihnen die eine Wirklichkeit des Tisches; sie sind mit ihren drei Bewußtseinsinhalten in dieser Wirklichkeit vereinigt. — 3. Wenn zwei Personen allein in einem Zimmer zusammen sind, wieviel Exemplare dieser Personen sind vorhanden? Es sind ganz gewiß nicht sechs — auch nicht im Sinne des transzendentalen Realisten — Exemplare vorhanden, sondern nur zwei. Nur hat jede der Personen zunächst sowohl von sich wie von der anderen Person nur das unwirkliche Wahrnehmungsbild. Von diesen Bildern sind vier vorhanden, bei deren Anwesenheit in den Denktätigkeiten der zwei Personen sich die Ergreifung der Wirklichkeit abspielt. In dieser Denktätigkeit übergreift eine jede der Personen ihre Bewußtseinssphäre; die der anderen und der eigenen Person lebt in ihr auf. In den Augenblicken dieses Auflebens sind die Personen ebensowenig in ihrem Bewußtsein beschlossen wie im Schlafe. Nur tritt in den anderen Augenblicken das Bewußtsein von diesem Aufgehen in dem andern wieder auf, so daß das Bewußtsein einer jeden der Personen im denkenden Erleben sich und den andern ergreift. Ich weiß, daß der transzendentale Realist dieses als einen Rückfall in den naiven Realismus bezeichnet. Doch habe ich bereits in dieser Schrift darauf hingewiesen, daß der naive Realismus für das erlebte Denken seine Berechtigung behält. Der transzendentale Realist läßt sich auf den wahren Sachverhalt im Erkenntnisvorgang gar nicht ein; er schließt sich von diesem durch ein Gedankengespinst ab und verstrickt sich in diesem. Es sollte der in der «Philosophie der Freiheit» auftretende Monismus auch nicht «erkenntnistheoretischer» genannt werden, sondern, wenn man einen Beinamen will, Gedanken-Monismus. Das alles wurde durch Eduard von Hartmann verkannt. Er ging auf das Spezifische der Darstellung in der «Philosophie der Freiheit» nicht ein, sondern behauptete: ich hätte den Versuch gemacht, den Hegelschen universalistischen Panlogismus mit Humes individualistischem Phänomenalismus zu verbinden (S. 71 der Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 108. Bd., Anmerkung), während in der Tat die «Philosophie der Freiheit» als solche gar nichts mit diesen zwei Standpunkten, die sie angeblich zu vereinigen bestrebt ist, zu tun hat. (Hier liegt auch der Grund, warum es mir nicht naheliegen konnte, mich zum Beispiel mit dem «erkenntnis theoretischen Monismus» Johannes Rehmkes auseinanderzusetzen. Es ist eben der Gesichtspunkt der «Philosophie der Freiheit» ein ganz anderer, als was Eduard von Hartmann und andere erkenntnistheoretischen Monismus nennen.)
First appendix
[ 1 ] Objections made to me by philosophers immediately after the publication of this book have prompted me to add the following brief explanation to this new edition. I can well imagine that there are readers who are interested in the rest of the contents of this book, but who regard the following as a superfluous and remote abstract conceptual conglomeration. They can leave this brief account unread. Only within the philosophical view of the world do problems arise which have their origin more in certain prejudices of thinkers than in the natural course of every human thought itself. What else is dealt with in this book seems to me to be a task that concerns every person who struggles for clarity with regard to the nature of man and his relationship to the world. The following, however, is more a problem which certain philosophers demand to be dealt with when speaking of the things presented in this book, because these philosophers have created certain difficulties for themselves through their way of thinking which are not generally present. If such problems are completely ignored, certain personalities are quick to accuse them of dilettantism and the like. And the opinion arises as if the author of an account such as the one given in this book had not dealt with views that he did not discuss in the book itself.
[ 2 ] The problem I am referring to here is this: There are thinkers who are of the opinion that a particular difficulty arises when one wants to understand how another human soul life can have an effect on one's own (the observer's). They say: my conscious world is closed in me; another conscious world is also closed in itself. I cannot see into the conscious world of another. How do I come to know that I am in a common world with him? The world view that considers it possible to deduce from the conscious world to an unconscious world that can never become conscious tries to solve this difficulty in the following way. It says: the world that I have in my consciousness is the world represented in me of a world of reality that I cannot consciously reach. In this world lie the unknown causes of my world of consciousness. In this also lies my real entity, of which I also have only one representative in my consciousness. But in this also lies the entity of the other person who confronts me. What is now experienced in the consciousness of this other person has its corresponding reality in his entity, independent of this consciousness. In the area that cannot become conscious, this has an effect on my principle unconscious entity, and thereby a representation is created in my consciousness for that which is present in a consciousness that is completely independent of my conscious experience. As you can see, a hypothetical world that is inaccessible to my consciousness is added to the world that is accessible to it in my experience, because otherwise I would feel compelled to assert that all the external world that I think I have before me is only my conscious world, and that would result in the - solipsistic - absurdity that the other persons also only live within my consciousness.
[ 3 ] Clarity about this question, created by some epistemological currents of recent times, can be gained if one seeks to survey the matter from the point of view of spiritual observation, which is adopted in the presentation of this book. What do I first have before me when I face another personality? I look at the next thing. It is the sensory physical appearance of the other person given to me as perception; then, for instance, the auditory perception of what he says, and so on. I do not merely stare at all this, but it sets my thinking activity in motion. As I stand thinking before the other personality, the perception marks itself out to me, as it were, as psychically transparent. I am compelled to say to myself in my thinking grasp of perception that it is not at all what it appears to the outer senses. In what it is directly, the sense-appearance reveals something else that it is indirectly. Its placing itself before me is at the same time its obliteration as a mere sense appearance. But what it makes manifest in this erasure forces me as a thinking being to erase my thinking for the time of its working and to put its thinking in its place. This their thinking, however, I grasp in my thinking as an experience like my own. I have really perceived the thinking of the other. For the immediate perception that extinguishes itself as a sensory phenomenon is seized by my thinking, and it is a process that lies completely within my consciousness, which consists in the fact that the other thinking takes the place of my thinking. The separation between the two spheres of consciousness is actually abolished through the obliteration of the sensory phenomenon. This is represented in my consciousness by the fact that in the experience of the other content of consciousness I experience my own consciousness just as little as I experience it in dreamless sleep. Just as my day consciousness is switched off in the latter, so my own is switched off in the perception of the other consciousness. The illusion, as if this were not so, arises only from the fact that in the perception of the other person, firstly, the extinction of my own consciousness is not replaced by unconsciousness as in sleep, but by the other consciousness, and secondly, that the alternating states between extinction and re-illumination of my own consciousness follow each other too quickly to be usually noticed. - The whole problem at hand is not solved by artificial conceptual constructions that infer from what is conscious to what can never become conscious, but by truly experiencing what arises in the connection between thinking and perception. This is the case with many questions that arise in philosophical literature. Thinkers should seek the path to unbiased, spiritually appropriate observation; instead, they push an artificial conceptual construction in front of reality.
[ 4 ] In a treatise by Eduard von Hartmann entitled "Die letzten Fragen der Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik" (in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 108. Bd. 5. 55 ff.), my "Philosophy of Freedom" is classified in the philosophical school of thought that seeks to base itself on an "epistemological monism". Eduard von Hartmann rejects such a standpoint as impossible, which is based on the following. According to the way of thinking expressed in the above-mentioned essay, there are only three possible epistemological standpoints. Either one remains on the naive standpoint, which takes the perceived appearances as real things apart from human consciousness. Then one lacks critical insight. One does not realize that the content of one's consciousness is only in one's own consciousness. One does not realize that one is not dealing with a "table in itself", but only with one's own object of consciousness. Whoever remains on this standpoint or returns to it through any considerations is a naive realist. But this point of view is impossible, for it fails to recognize that consciousness has only its own objects of consciousness. Or one sees through this fact and fully admits it. Then one first becomes a transcendental idealist. But then one would have to reject that anything of a "thing in itself" could ever appear in human consciousness. But this does not mean that one escapes absolute illusionism, if one is only consistent enough to do so. For the world one is confronted with is transformed into a mere sum of objects of consciousness, and only of objects of one's own consciousness. One is then also - absurdly - forced to think of other people as being present only in the content of one's own consciousness. A possible point of view is only the third, transcendental realism. This assumes that there are "things in themselves", but that consciousness cannot have anything to do with them in direct experience. They cause the objects of consciousness to appear beyond human consciousness in a way that does not fall into consciousness. One can only arrive at these "things in themselves" by inference from the solely experienced, but merely imagined content of consciousness. Eduard von Hartmann now claims in the above-mentioned essay that an "epistemological monism", as which he understands my point of view, must in reality commit itself to one of the three points of view; it only does not do so because it does not draw the actual consequences of its presuppositions. And then the essay says: "If one wants to find out which epistemological standpoint an alleged epistemological monist belongs to, one only needs to put some questions to him and force him to answer them. For no such person will allow himself to express himself on these points, and he will also try in every way to avoid answering direct questions, because every answer invalidates the claim to epistemological monism as a standpoint different from the other three. These questions are the following: 1. are things continuous or intermittent in their existence? If the answer is: they are continuous, then we are dealing with some form of naive realism. If the answer is: they are intermittent, then we are dealing with transcendental idealism. But if it is: they are continuous on the one hand (as contents of absolute consciousness, or as unconscious ideas, or as perceptual possibilities), and intermittent on the other (as contents of limited consciousness), then transcendental realism is established. - 2. if three people are sitting at a table, how many copies of the table are there? Whoever answers: one, is a naive realist; whoever answers: three, is a transcendental idealist; but whoever answers: four, is a transcendental realist. It is presupposed, however, that such dissimilar things as the one table as a thing in itself and the three tables as objects of perception in the three consciousnesses may be subsumed under the common designation "specimens of the table". To whom this seems too great a liberty, he will have to give the answer "one and three" instead of "four". - 3. if two people are alone together in a room, how many copies of these people are there? He who answers: two, is a naive realist; he who answers: four (namely, in each of the two consciousnesses an I and another), is a transcendental idealist; but he who answers: six (namely, two persons as things in themselves and four objects of conception of persons in the two consciousnesses), is a transcendental realist. Whoever wanted to prove epistemological monism to be different from these three standpoints would have to give a different answer to each of these three questions; but I would not know what this answer could be." The answers of the "philosophy of freedom" would have to be as follows: 1. he who only grasps the perceptual contents of things and takes these for reality is a naive realist, and he does not realize that he may actually regard these perceptual contents as existing only as long as he looks at the things, that he must therefore think what he has before him as intermittent. But as soon as he realizes that reality is only present in the perceptible interspersed with thought, he arrives at the insight that the perceptual content that appears as intermittent interspersed with what has been worked out in thought reveals itself as continuous. The following must therefore be regarded as continuous: the perceptual content grasped by experienced thinking, of which that which is only perceived would have to be thought as intermittent if it were real - which is not the case. - (2) If three people are sitting at a table, how many copies of the table are there? There is only one table; but as long as the three persons wanted to remain with their perceptual images, they would have to say: these perceptual images are no reality at all. As soon as they pass over to the table they have grasped in their thinking, the one reality of the table reveals itself to them; they are united with their three contents of consciousness in this reality. - (3) If two persons are alone together in a room, how many copies of these persons are there? There are certainly not six - not even in the sense of the transcendental realist - but only two. But each of the persons initially has only the unreal perceptual image of himself as well as of the other person. There are four of these images, in the presence of which the apprehension of reality takes place in the mental activity of the two persons. In this mental activity, each of the persons overlaps their own sphere of consciousness; that of the other and of their own person comes to life in them. In the moments of this coming to life the persons are just as little resolved in their consciousness as in sleep. Only in the other moments the consciousness of this resurrection arises again in the other, so that the consciousness of each of the persons takes hold of itself and the other in the thinking experience. I know that the transcendental realist calls this a relapse into naive realism. But I have already pointed out in this paper that naive realism retains its justification for experienced thinking. The transcendental realist does not engage with the true facts of the cognitive process at all; he closes himself off from them through a web of thought and becomes entangled in it. The monism that appears in the "Philosophy of Freedom" should also not be called "epistemological", but, if one wants an epithet, thought-monism. All this was misjudged by Eduard von Hartmann. He did not go into the specifics of the presentation in the "Philosophy of Freedom", but claimed: I would have made the attempt to combine Hegel's universalistic panlogism with Hume's individualistic phenomenalism (p. 71 of the Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 108th vol., note), while in fact the "Philosophy of Freedom" as such has nothing at all to do with these two points of view, which it supposedly endeavors to unite. (This is also the reason why it was not obvious for me to deal with Johannes Rehmke's "epistemological monism", for example. The point of view of the "philosophy of freedom" is quite different from what Eduard von Hartmann and others call epistemological monism.