Philosophy of Spiritual Activity
GA 4
XV. The Consequences of Monism
[ 1 ] An explanation of nature on a single principle (Monism) derives from human experience all the material which it requires for the explanation of the world. In the same way, it looks for the sources of action also within the world of observation, i.e., in that part of human nature which is accessible to our self-observation, and more particularly in the moral imagination. Monism declines to seek through abstract inferences the ultimate causes of the world which is given to our perception and thinking, in a sphere outside this world. For Monism, the unity which the experienced thoughtful observation brings to the manifold multiplicity of percepts, is identical with the unity which the human desire for knowledge demands, and through which this desire seeks entrance into the physical and spiritual realms. Whoever looks for another unity behind this one, only shows that he fails to perceive the coincidence of what is found by thinking with the demands of the desire for knowledge. A particular human individual is not actually cut off from the universe. He is a part of the universe, and his connection with the cosmic whole is broken, not in reality, but only for our perception. At first we apprehend this part of the universe as a self-existing thing, because we are unable to perceive the cords and ropes by which the fundamental forces of the cosmos keep turning the wheel of our life.
All who remain at this standpoint see the part of the whole as if it were a truly independent, self-existing thing, a monad which gains all its knowledge of the rest of the world in some way from without. But the Monism described in this book shows that we can believe in this independence only so long as thinking does not gather our percepts into the network of the conceptual world. As soon as this happens, all partial existence in the universe reveals itself as a mere appearance due to perception. Man can find his existence as a self-contained whole in the universe only through the experience of intuitive thought. Thinking destroys the mere appearance due to perception and assigns to our individual existence a place in the life of the cosmos. The unity of the conceptual world which contains all objective percepts, has room also within itself for the content of our subjective personality. Thinking gives us the true shape of reality as a self-contained unity, whereas the multiplicity of percepts is but an appearance conditioned by our organization (cp. p. 63 ff.). The recognition of the true reality as against the appearance of perception, has at all times been the goal of human thinking. Science has striven to recognize percepts as reality by tracing their inter-relations according to natural law. But, owing to the view than an inter-relation discovered by human thinking has only a subjective validity, thinkers have sought the true ground of unity in some object transcending the world of our experience (inferred God, will, absolute spirit, etc.). Further, basing themselves on this opinion, men have tried to gain, in addition to their knowledge of inter-relations within experience, a second kind of knowledge transcending experience which should reveal the connection between empirical inter-relations and those realities which lie beyond the limits of experience (Metaphysics gained not by experience, but by inference). The reason why, by correct thinking, we understand the nexus of the world, was thought to be that an original creator has built up the world according to logical laws, and, similarly, the ground of our actions was thought to lie in the will of this original being. It was overlooked that thinking embraces in one grasp the subjective and the objective, and that it communicates to us the whole of reality in the union which it effects between percept and concept. Only so long as we contemplate the laws which pervade and determine all percepts, in the abstract form of concepts, do we indeed deal only with something purely subjective. But this subjectivity does not belong to the content of the concept which, by means of thinking, is added to the percept. This content is taken, not from the subject but from reality. It is that part of reality which is inaccessible to perception. It is experience, but not the kind of experience which comes from perception. Those who cannot understand that the concept is something real, have in mind only the abstract form, in which we grasp it in our spirit. But the concept exists in this abstract form solely because of our organization, just as the percept does. The tree which I perceive, taken in isolation by itself, has no existence; it exists only as a member in the immense organism of nature, and it is possible only in real connection with nature. An abstract concept, taken by itself, has as little reality as a percept taken by itself. The percept is that part of reality which is given objectively, the concept that part which is given subjectively (by intuition; cp. p. 70 ff.). Our spiritual organization breaks up reality into these two factors. The one factor appears to perception, the other to intuition. Only the union of the two, which consists of the percept fitted according to law into its place in the universe, is reality in its full character. If we take mere percepts by themselves, we have no reality but only a disconnected chaos. If we take by themselves the laws which permeate percepts we have nothing but abstract concepts. Reality is not contained in the abstract concept. It is revealed to thoughtful observation which considers neither the concept by itself nor the percept by itself, but the union of both.
[ 2 ] Even the most orthodox Subjective Idealist will not deny that we live in the real world (that, as real beings, we are rooted in it); but he will deny that our knowledge, by means of its Ideas, is able to grasp reality as we live it. As against this view, Monism shows that thinking is neither subjective nor objective, but a principle which holds together both sides of reality. The thoughtful observation is a process which belongs itself to the sequence of real events. By thinking we overcome, within the limits of experience itself, the one-sidedness of mere perception. We are not able by means of abstract conceptual hypotheses (purely conceptual reflection) to puzzle out the essence of the real, but in so far as we find the Ideas for our percepts we live in the real. Monism does not seek to supplement experience by something unknowable (transcending experience), but finds reality in concept and percept. It does not manufacture a metaphysical system out of mere abstract concepts, because it looks upon the concept as only one side of reality, viz., the side which remains hidden from perception, but is meaningless except in union with percepts. But Monism gives man the conviction that he lives in the world of reality, and has no need to seek beyond his world for a higher reality which cannot be experienced. It restrains man from looking for Absolute Reality anywhere but in experience, because it recognizes reality in the very content of experience. Monism is satisfied with this reality, because it knows that our thinking is able to guarantee it. What Dualism seeks first behind the world of observation, that Monism finds in this world itself. Monism shows that our knowledge grasps reality in its true shape, not in a subjective image which inserts itself between man and reality. It holds the conceptual content of the world to be identical for all human individuals (cp. p. 64 ff.). According to Monistic principles, every human individual regards every other as akin to himself, because it is the same world-content which expresses itself in all. In the single conceptual world there are not as many concepts of “lion” as there are individuals who form the thought of “lion,” but only one. And the concept which A adds to the percept of “lion” is identical with B's concept, except that in each case, it is apprehended by a different perceiving subject (cp. p. 66). Thinking leads all perceiving subjects back to the ideal unity in all multiplicity, which is common to them all. There is but one world of Ideas, but it lives in all human beings as in a multiplicity of individuals. So long as man apprehends himself merely by self-perception he looks upon himself as this particular being, but so soon as he becomes conscious of the world of Ideas which flashes up within him, and which embraces all particulars, he sees that the Absolute Reality lives and shines forth within him. Dualism fixes upon the Divine Being as that which permeates all men and lives in them all. Monism finds this universal Divine Life in Reality itself. The ideal content of another human being is also my content, and I regard it as a different content only so long as I perceive, but no longer when I think. Every man embraces in his thinking only a part of the total world of Ideas, and to that extent, individuals are distinguished one from another also by the actual contents of their thinking. But all these contents belong to a self-contained whole, which comprises within itself the thought-contents of all men. Hence every man, in his thinking, lays hold of the common primary being which pervades all men. To fill one's life with the content of thought is to live in Reality, and at the same time to live in God. A Beyond that is merely inferred and cannot be experienced owes its origin to the misconception of those who believe that this world cannot have the ground of its existence in itself. They do not understand that, by thinking, they discover just what they demand for the explanation of the perceptual world. This is the reason why no speculation has ever produced any content which has not been borrowed from reality as it is given to us. A God inferred by abstract reasoning is nothing but a human being transplanted into the Beyond. Schopenhauer's will is the human will made absolute. Hartmann's Unconscious, made up of Idea and will, is but a compound of two abstractions drawn from experience. Exactly the same is true of all other transcendent principles which are not based on the experience of thinking.
[ 3 ] The truth is that the human spirit never transcends the reality in which it lives. Indeed, it has no need to transcend it, seeing that this world contains everything that is required for its own explanation. If philosophers declare themselves eventually content when they have deduced the world from principles which they borrow from experience and then transplant into an hypothetical Beyond, the same satisfaction ought to be possible, if these same principles are allowed to remain in this world to which they belong as experienced by thinking. All attempts to transcend the world are purely illusory, and the principles transplanted into the Beyond do not explain the world any better than the principles which are immanent in it. When thinking understands itself, it does not demand any such transcendence at all, for every thought-content must find within the world, not outside it, a perceptual content, in union with which it can form a real object. The objects of imagination, too, are contents which have validity only when transformed into representations that refer to a perceptual content. Through this perceptual content they have their place in reality. A concept the content of which is supposed to lie beyond the world given to us, is an abstraction to which no reality corresponds. We can think out only the concepts of reality; in order to find reality itself, we need also perception. An Absolute Being for which we invent a content, is a hypothesis which thinking finds impossible to entertain if it understands itself. Monism does not deny ideal elements; indeed, it refuses to recognize as fully real a perceptual content which has no ideal counterpart; but it finds nothing within the whole range of thinking which could oblige us, by denying the objective spiritual reality of thinking, to transcend the sphere of experience accessible to thinking. A science which restricts itself to a description of percepts, without advancing to their ideal complements is, for Monism, but a fragment. But Monism regards as equally fragmentary all abstract concepts which do not find their complement in percepts, and which fit nowhere into the conceptual net that embraces the whole perceptual world. Hence it knows no Ideas referring to objective factors lying beyond our experience and supposed to form the content of purely hypothetical Metaphysics. Whatever mankind has produced in the way of such Ideas Monism regards as abstractions from experience, whose origin in experience has been overlooked by their authors.
[ 4 ] Just as little, according to Monistic principles, are the aims of our actions capable of being derived from an extra-human Beyond. So far as we can think them, they must have their origin in human intuition. Man does not adopt the purposes of an objective (transcendent) primary being as his own individual purposes, but he pursues the aims which his own moral imagination sets before him. The Idea which realizes itself in an action is selected by the agent from the single world of Ideas and made the basis of his will. Consequently his action is not a realization of commands which have been implanted into this world from the Beyond, but of human intuitions which belong to this world. For Monism there is no ruler of the world standing outside us and determining the aim and direction of our actions. There is for man no transcendent ground of existence, the counsels of which he might discover, in order thence to learn the aims to which he ought to direct his action. Man is thrown back upon himself. He himself must give a content to his action. It is in vain that he seeks outside the world in which he lives for any motive forces of his will. If he is to go at all beyond the satisfaction of the natural instincts for which Mother Nature has provided, he must look for those motive forces which are in his own moral imagination, unless he finds it more convenient to let himself be determined by the moral imagination of others. In other words, he must either cease acting altogether, or else act from motives which he puts before himself from the world of his Ideas, or which others select for him from that same world. If he develops at all beyond a life absorbed in sensuous instincts and in the execution of the commands of others, then there is nothing that can determine him except himself. He has to act from an impulse which he gives to himself and which nothing else can determine for him except himself. It is true that this impulse is ideally determined in the single world of Ideas; but in actual fact it is only by man that it can be selected from that world and translated into reality. Monism can find the ground for the actual translation of an Idea through human action only in the human being himself. For an Idea to pass into action it must be willed by man before it can happen. Such a will consequently has its ground only in man himself. Man, then, is the ultimate determinant of his action. He is free.
Additions to the Revised Edition, 1918
[ 5 ] I. In the second part of this book the attempt has been made to justify the conviction that freedom is to be found in the reality of human conduct. For this purpose it was necessary to sort out, from the whole sphere of human conduct, those actions with respect to which unprejudiced self-observation may appropriately speak of freedom. These are the actions which appear as realizations of ideal intuitions. No other actions will be called free by an unprejudiced observer. However, open-minded self-observation compels man to regard himself as endowed with the capacity for progress on the road towards ethical intuitions and their realization. Yet this open-minded observation of the ethical nature of man is, by itself, insufficient to constitute the final court of appeal for the question of freedom. For suppose intuitive thinking had itself sprung from some other essence; suppose its essence were not grounded in itself, then the consciousness of freedom, which issues from the moral sphere, would prove to be a mere illusion. But the second part of this book finds its natural support in the first part, which presents intuitive thinking as an inward spiritual activity which man experiences as such. To appreciate through experience this essence of thinking is equivalent to recognizing the freedom of intuitive thinking. And once we know that this thinking is free, we know also the sphere within which will may be called free. We shall regard man as a free agent, if on the basis of inner experience we may attribute to the life of intuitive thinking a self-sustaining essence. Whoever cannot do this will be unable to discover any wholly unassailable road to the acceptance of freedom. The experience to which we here refer discovers in consciousness intuitive thinking, the reality of which is not confined to consciousness. Freedom, too, is thereby discovered as the characteristic of all actions which proceed from the intuitions of consciousness.
[ 6 ] II. The argument of this book is built up on the fact of intuitive thinking, which may be experienced in a purely spiritual way, and which, in an act of knowledge, assigns to every percept its place in reality. All that this book aimed at presenting was the result of a survey from the basis of our experience of intuitive thinking. However, the intention also was to emphasize what is required of us as regards experiencing this way of forming thoughts. It demands that we shall not deny its presence in cognition as a self-sustaining experience. It demands that we acknowledge its capacity for experiencing reality in cooperation with perception, and that we do not seek reality in a world outside experience and accessible only to inference, in the face of which human thinking would be only a subjective activity.
[ 7 ] Thus thinking is characterized as that factor in man through which he inserts himself spiritually into reality. (And, strictly, no one should confuse this kind of world-conception which is based on thinking as directly experienced, with mere Rationalism.) But, on the other hand, the whole spirit of the preceding argumentation shows that the perceptual element yields a determination of reality for human knowledge only when it is taken hold of in thinking. Outside thinking there is nothing to characterize reality for what it is. Hence we have no right to imagine that the sensual kind of perception is the only witness to reality. Whatever comes to us by way of perception on our journey through life, we cannot but expect. The only point open to question would be whether, from the exclusive point of view of thinking as we intuitively experience it, we have a right to expect that over and above sensuous perception there is also spiritual perception. This expectation is justified. For, though intuitively experienced thinking is, on the one hand, an active process taking place in the human spirit, it is, on the other hand, also a spiritual perception mediated by no physical organ. It is a perception in which the percipient is himself active, and a self-activity which is at the same time perceived. In intuitively experienced thinking man is transported into a spiritual world also as a percipient. Whatever within this world presents itself to him as percept in the same way in which the spiritual world of his own thinking presents itself, that is recognized by him as a world of spiritual perception. This world of spiritual perception we may suppose to be standing in the same relation to thinking as does, on the sensuous side, the world of sense-perception. Man cannot feel the world of spiritual perception as something alien, because he has already in his intuitive thinking an experience of purely spiritual character. With such a world of spiritual perception a number of the writings are concerned which I have published since this present book appeared. The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity lays the philosophical foundation for these later writings. For it attempts to show that in the very experience of thinking, rightly understood, we experience Spirit. This is the reason why it appears to the author that no one will stop short of entering the world of spiritual perception who has been able to adopt, in all seriousness, the point of view of the Philosophy of Spiritual Activity. True, logical deduction—by syllogisms—will not extract out of the contents of this book the contents of the author's later books. But a living understanding of what is meant in this book by “intuitive thinking” will naturally prepare the way for living entry into the world of spiritual perception.
Die Konzequenzen des Monismus
[ 1 ] Die einheitliche Welterklärung oder der hier gemeinte Monismus entnimmt der menschlichen Erfahrung die Prinzipien, die er zur Erklärung der Welt braucht. Die Quellen des Handelns sucht er ebenfalls innerhalb der Beobachtungs welt, nämlich in der unserer Selbsterkenntnis zugänglichen menschlichen Natur, und zwar in der moralischen Phantasie. Er lehnt es ab, durch abstrakte Schlußfolgerungen die letzten Gründe für die dem Wahrnehmen und Denken vorliegende Welt außerhalb derselben zu suchen. Für den Monismus ist die Einheit, welche die erlebbare denkende Beobachtung zu der mannigfaltigen Vielheit der Wahrnehmungen hinzubringt, zugleich diejenige, die das menschliche Erkenntnisbedürfnis verlangt und durch die es den Eingang in die physischen und geistigen Weltbereiche sucht. Wer hinter dieser so zu suchenden Einheit noch eine andere sucht, der beweist damit nur, daß er die Übereinstimmung des durch das Denken Gefundenen mit dem vom Erkenntnistrieb Geforderten nicht erkennt. Das einzelne menschliche Individuum ist von der Welt nicht tatsächlich abgesondert. Es ist ein Teil der Welt, und es besteht ein Zusammenhang mit dem Ganzen des Kosmos der Wirklichkeit nach, der nur für unsere Wahrnehmung unterbrochen ist. Wir sehen fürs erste diesen Teil als für sich existierendes Wesen, weil wir die Riemen und Seile nicht sehen, durch welche die Bewegung unseres Lebensrades von den Grundkräften des Kosmos bewirkt wird. Wer auf diesem Standpunkt stehen bleibt, der sieht den Teil eines Ganzen für ein wirklich selbständig existierendes Wesen, für die Monade an, welches die Kunde von der übrigen Welt auf irgendeine Weise von außen erhält. Der hier gemeinte Monismus zeigt, daß die Selbständigkeit nur so lange geglaubt werden kann, als das Wahrgenommene nicht durch das Denken in das Netz der Begriffswelt eingespannt wird. Geschieht dies, so entpuppt sich die Teilexistenz als ein bloßer Schein des Wahrnehmens. Seine in sich geschlossene Totalexistenz im Universum kann der Mensch nur finden durch intuitives Denkerlebnis. Das Denken zerstört den Schein des Wahrnehmens und gliedert unsere individuelle Existenz in das Leben des Kosmos ein. Die Einheit der Begriffswelt, welche die objektiven Wahrnehmungen enthält, nimmt auch den Inhalt unserer subjektiven Persönlichkeit in sich auf. Das Denken gibt uns von der Wirklichkeit die wahre Gestalt, als einer in sich geschlossenen Einheit, während die Mannigfaltigkeit der Wahrnehmungen nur ein durch unsere Organisation bedingter Schein ist (vgl. S. 86ff.). Die Erkenntnis des Wirklichen gegenüber dem Schein des Wahrnehmens bildete zu allen Zeiten das Ziel des menschlichen Denkens. Die Wissenschaft bemühte sich, die Wahrnehmungen durch Aufdeckung der gesetzmäßigen Zusammenhänge innerhalb derselben als Wirklichkeit zu erkennen. Wo man aber der Ansicht war, daß der von dem menschlichen Denken ermittelte Zusammenhang nur eine subjektive Bedeutung habe, suchte man den wahren Grund der Einheit in einem jenseits unserer Erfahrungswelt gelegenen Objekte (erschlossener Gott, Wille, absoluter Geist usw.). — Und, auf diese Meinung gestützt, bestrebte man sich zu dem Wissen über die innerhalb der Erfahrung erkennbaren Zusammenhänge noch ein zweites zu gewinnen, das über die Erfahrung hinausgeht, und den Zusammenhang derselben mit den nicht mehr erfahrbaren Wesenheiten aufdeckt (nicht durch Erleben, sondern durch Schlußfolgerung gewonnene Metaphysik). Den Grund, warum wir durch geregeltes Denken den Weltzusammenhang begreifen, sah man von diesem Standpunkte aus darin, daß ein Urwesen nach logischen Gesetzen die Welt aufgebaut hat, und den Grund für unser Handeln sah man in dem Wollen des Urwesens. Doch erkannte man nicht, daß das Denken Subjektives und Objektives zugleich umspannt, und daß in dem Zusammenschluß der Wahrnehmung mit dem Begriff die totale Wirklichkeit vermittelt wird. Nur solange wir die die Wahrnehmung durchdringende und bestimmende Gesetzmäßigkeit in der abstrakten Form des Begriffes betrachten, solange haben wir es In der Tat mit etwas rein Subjektivem zu tun. Subjektiv ist aber nicht der Inhalt des Be griffes, der mit Hilfe des Denkens zu der Wahrnehmung hinzugewonnen wird. Dieser Inhalt ist nicht aus dem Subjekte, sondern aus der Wirklichkeit genommen. Er ist der Teil der Wirklichkeit, den das Wahrnehmen nicht erreichen kann. Er ist Erfahrung, aber nicht durch das Wahrnehmen vermittelte Erfahrung. Wer sich nicht vorstellen kann, daß der Begriff ein Wirkliches ist, der denkt nur an die abstrakte Form, wie er denselben in seinem Geiste festhält. Aber in solcher Absonderung ist er ebenso nur durch unsere Organisation vorhanden, wie die Wahrnehmung es ist. Auch der Baum, den man wahrnimmt, hat abgesondert für sich keine Existenz. Er ist nur innerhalb des großen Räderwerkes der Natur ein Glied, und nur in realem Zusammenhang mit ihr möglich. Ein abstrakter Begriff hat für sich keine Wirklichkeit, ebensowenig wie eine Wahrnehmung für sich. Die Wahrnehmung ist der Teil der Wirklichkeit, der objektiv, der Begriff derjenige, der subjektiv (durch Intuition, vgl. Seite 95ff.) gegeben wird. Unsere geistige Organisation reißt die Wirklichkeit in diese beiden Faktoren auseinander. Der eine Faktor erscheint dem Wahrnehmen, der andere der Intuition. Erst der Zusammenhang der beiden, die gesetzmäßig sich in das Universum eingliedernde Wahrnehmung, ist volle Wirklichkeit. Betrachten wir die bloße Wahrnehmung für sich, so haben wir keine Wirklichkeit, sondern ein zusammenhangloses Chaos; betrachten wir die Gesetzmäßigkeit der Wahrnehmungen für sich, dann haben wir es bloß mit abstrakten Begriffen zu tun. Nicht der abstrakte Begriff enthält die Wirklichkeit; wohl aber die denkende Beobachtung, die weder einseitig den Begriff, noch die Wahrnehmung für sich betrachtet, sondern den Zusammenhang beider.
[ 2 ] Daß wir in der Wirklichkeit leben (mit unserer realen Existenz in derselben wurzeln), wird selbst der orthodoxeste subjektive Idealist nicht leugnen. Er wird nur bestreiten, daß wir ideell mit unserem Erkennen auch das erreichen, was wir real durchleben. Demgegenüber zeigt der Monismus, daß das Denken weder subjektiv, noch objektiv, sondern ein beide Seiten der Wirklichkeit umspannendes Prinzip ist. Wenn wir denkend beobachten, vollziehen wir einen Prozeß, der selbst in die Reihe des wirklichen Geschehens gehört. Wir überwinden durch das Denken innerhalb der Erfahrung selbst die Einseitigkeit des bloßen Wahrnehmens. Wir können durch abstrakte, begriffliche Hypothesen (durch rein begriffliches Nachdenken) das Wesen des Wirklichen nicht erklügeln, aber wir leben, indem wir zu den Wahrnehmungen die Ideen finden, in dem Wirklichen. Der Monismus sucht zu der Erfahrung kein Unerfahrbares (Jenseitiges), sondern sieht in Begriff und Wahrnehmung das Wirkliche. Er spinnt aus bloßen abstrakten Begriffen keine Metaphysik, weil er in dem Begriffe an sich nur die eine Seite der Wirklichkeit sieht, die dem Wahrnehmen verborgen bleibt und nur im Zusammenhang mit der Wahrnehmung einen Sinn hat. Er ruft aber in dem Menschen die Überzeugung hervor, daß er in der Welt der Wirklichkeit lebt und nicht außerhalb seiner Welt eine unerlebbare höhere Wirklichkeit zu suchen hat. Er hält davon ab, das Absolut-Wirkliche anderswo als in der Erfahrung zu suchen, weil er den Inhalt der Erfahrung selbst als das Wirkliche erkennt. Und er ist befriedigt durch diese Wirklichkeit, weil er weiß, daß das Denken die Kraft hat, sie zu verbürgen. Was der Dualismus erst hinter der Beobachtungswelt sucht, das findet der Monismus in dieser selbst. Der Monismus zeigt, daß wir mit unserem Erkennen die Wirklichkeit in ihrer wahren Gestalt ergreifen, nicht in einem subjektiven Bilde, das sich zwischen den Menschen und die Wirklichkeit einschöbe. Für den Monismus ist der Begriffsinhalt der Welt für alle menschlichen Individuen derselbe (vgl. S. 89ff.). Nach monistischen Prinzipien betrachtet ein menschliches Individuum ein anderes als seinesgleichen, weil es derselbe Weltinhalt ist, der sich in ihm auslebt. Es gibt in der einigen Begriffswelt nicht etwa so viele Begriffe des Löwen, wie es Individuen gibt, die einen Löwen denken, sondern nur einen. Und der Begriff, den A zu der Wahrnehmung des Löwen hinzufügt, ist derselbe, wie der des B, nur durch ein anderes Wahrnehmungssubjekt aufgefaßt (vgl. S. 90f.). Das Denken führt alle Wahrnehmungssubjekte auf die gemeinsame ideelle Einheit aller Mannigfaltigkeit. Die einige Ideenwelt lebt sich in ihnen als in einer Vielheit von Individuen aus. Solange sich der Mensch bloß durch Selbstwahrnehmung erfaßt, sieht er sich als diesen besonderen Menschen an; sobald er auf die in ihm aufleuchtende, alles Besondere umspannende Ideenwelt blickt, sieht er in sich das absolut Wirkliche lebendig aufleuchten. Der Dualismus bestimmt das göttliche Urwesen als dasjenige, was alle Menschen durchdringt und in ihnen allen lebt. Der Monismus findet dieses gemeinsame göttliche Leben in der Wirklichkeit selbst. Der ideelle Inhalt eines andern Menschen ist auch der meinige, und ich sehe ihn nur so lange als einen andern an, als ich wahrnehme, nicht mehr aber, sobald ich denke. Jeder Mensch umspannt mit seinem Denken nur einen Teil der gesamten Ideenwelt, und insofern unterscheiden sich die Individuen auch durch den tatsächlichen Inhalt ihres Denkens. Aber diese Inhalte sind in einem in sich geschlossenen Ganzen, das die Denkinhalte aller Menschen umfaßt. Das gemeinsame Urwesen, das alle Menschen durchdringt, ergreift somit der Mensch in seinem Denken. Das mit dem Gedankeninhalt erfüllte Leben in der Wirklichkeit ist zugleich das Leben in Gott. Das bloß erschlossene, nicht zu erlebende Jenseits beruht auf einem Mißverständnis derer, die glauben, daß das Diesseits den Grund seines Bestandes nicht in sich hat. Sie sehen nicht ein, daß sie durch das Denken das finden, was sie zur Erklärung der Wahrnehmung verlangen. Deshalb hat aber auch noch keine Spekulation einen Inhalt zutage gefördert, der nicht aus der uns gegebenen Wirklichkeit entlehnt wäre. Der durch abstrakte Schlußfolgerung angenommene Gott ist nur der in ein Jenseits versetzte Mensch; der Wille Schopenhauers die verabsolutierte menschliche Willenskraft; das aus Idee und Wille zusammengesetzte unbewußte Urwesen Hartmanns eine Zusammensetzung zweier Abstraktionen aus der Erfahrung. Genau dasselbe ist von allen anderen auf nicht erlebtem Denken ruhenden jenseitigen Prinzipien zu sagen.
[ 3 ] Der menschliche Geist kommt in Wahrheit nie über die Wirklichkeit hinaus, in der wir leben, und er hat es auch nicht nötig, da alles in dieser Welt liegt, was er zu ihrer Erklärung braucht. Wenn sich die Philosophen zuletzt befriedigt erklären mit der Herleitung der Welt aus Prinzipien, die sie der Erfahrung entlehnen und in ein hypothetisches Jenseits versetzen, so muß eine solche Befriedigung auch möglich sein, wenn der gleiche Inhalt im Diesseits belassen wird, wohin er für das erlebbare Denken gehört. Alles Hinausgehen über die Welt ist nur ein scheinbares, und die aus der Weit hinausversetzten Prinzipien erklären die Welt nicht besser, als die in derselben liegenden. Das sich selbst verstehende Denken fordert aber auch gar nicht zu einem solchen Hinausgehen auf, da ein Gedankeninhalt nur innerhalb der Welt, nicht außerhalb derselben einen Wahrnehmungsinhalt suchen muß, mit dem zusammen er ein Wirkliches bildet. Auch die Objekte der Phantasie sind nur Inhalte, die ihre Berechtigung erst haben, wenn sie zu Vorstellungen werden, die auf einen Wahrnehmungsinhalt hinweisen. Durch diesen Wahrnehmungsinhalt gliedern sie sich der Wirklichkeit ein. Ein Begriff, der mit einem Inhalt erfüllt werden sollte, der außerhalb der uns gegebenen Welt liegen soll, ist eine Abstraktion, der keine Wirklichkeit entspricht. Ersinnen können wir nur die Begriffe der Wirklichkeit; um diese selbst zu finden, bedarf es auch noch des Wahrnehmens. Ein Urwesen der Welt, für das ein Inhalt erdacht wird, ist für ein sich selbst verstehendes Denken eine unmögliche Annahme. Der Monismus leugnet nicht das Ideelle, er sieht sogar einen Wahrnehmungsinhalt, zu dem das ideelle Gegenstück fehlt, nicht für volle Wirklichkeit an; aber er findet im ganzen Gebiet des Denkens nichts, das nötigen könnte, aus dem Erlebnisbereich des Denkens durch Verleugnung der objektiv geistigen Wirklichkeit des Denkens herauszutreten. Der Monismus sieht in einer Wissenschaft, die sich darauf beschränkt, die Wahrnehmungen zu beschreiben, ohne zu den ideellen Ergänzungen derselben vorzudringen, eine Halbheit. Aber er betrachtet ebenso als Halbheiten alle abstrakten Begriffe, die ihre Ergänzung nicht in der Wahrnehmung finden und sich nirgends in das die beobachtbare Welt umspannende Begriffsnetz einfügen. Er kennt daher keine Ideen, die auf ein jenseits unserer Erfahrung liegendes Objektives hindeuten, und die den Inhalt einer bloß hypothetischen Metaphysik bilden sollen. Alles, was die Menschheit an solchen Ideen erzeugt hat, sind ihm Abstraktionen aus der Erfahrung, deren Entlehnung aus derselben von ihren Urhebern nur übersehen wird.
[ 4 ] Ebensowenig können nach monistischen Grundsätzen die Ziele unseres Handelns aus einem außermenschlichen Jenseits entnommen werden. Sie müssen, insofern sie gedacht sind, aus der menschlichen Intuition stammen. Der Mensch macht nicht die Zwecke eines objektiven (jenseitigen) Urwesens zu seinen individuellen Zwecken, sondern er verfolgt seine eigenen, ihm von seiner moralischen Phantasie gegebenen. Die in einer Handlung sich verwirklichende Idee löst der Mensch aus der einigen Ideenwelt los und legt sie seinem Wollen zugrunde. In seinem Handeln leben sich also nicht die aus dem Jenseits dem Diesseits eingeimpften Gebote aus, sondern die der diesseitigen Welt angehörigen menschlichen Intuitionen. Der Monismus kennt keinen solchen Weltenlenker, der außerhalb unserer selbst unseren Handlungen Ziel und Richtung setzte. Der Mensch findet keinen solchen jenseitigen Urgrund des Daseins, dessen Ratschlüsse er erforschen könnte, um von ihm die Ziele zu erfahren, nach denen er mit seinen Handlungen hinzusteuern hat. Er ist auf sich selbst zurückgewiesen. Er selbst muß seinem Handeln einen Inhalt geben. Wenn er außerhalb der Welt, in der er lebt, nach Bestimmungsgründen seines Wollens sucht, so forscht er vergebens. Er muß sie, wenn er über die Befriedigung seiner natürlichen Triebe, für die Mutter Natur vorgesorgt hat, hinausgeht, in seiner eigenen moralischen Phantasie suchen, wenn es nicht seine Bequemlichkeit vorzieht, von der moralischen Phantasie anderer sich bestimmen zu lassen, das heißt: er muß alles Handeln unterlassen oder nach Bestimmungsgründen handeln, die er sich selbst aus der Welt seiner Ideen heraus gibt, oder die ihm andere aus derselben heraus geben. Er wird, wenn er über sein sinnliches Triebleben und über die Ausführung der Befehle anderer Menschen hinauskommt, durch nichts, als durch sich selbst bestimmt. Er muß aus einem von ihm selbst gesetzten, durch nichts anderes bestimmten Antrieb handeln. Ideell ist dieser Antrieb allerdings in der einigen Ideenwelt bestimmt; aber faktisch kann er nur durch den Menschen aus dieser abgeleitet und in Wirklichkeit umgesetzt werden. Für die aktuelle Umsetzung einer Idee in Wirklichkeit durch den Menschen kann der Monismus nur in dem Menschen selbst den Grund finden. Daß eine Idee zur Handlung werde, muß der Mensch erst wollen, bevor es geschehen kann. Ein solches Wollen hat seinen Grund also nur in dem Menschen selbst. Der Mensch ist dann das letzte Bestimmende seiner Handlung. Er ist frei.
Zusatz zur Neuausgabe (1918)
[ 5 ] I. Im zweiten Teile dieses Buches wurde versucht, eine Begründung dafür zu geben, daß die Freiheit in der Wirklichkeit des menschlichen Handelns zu finden ist. Dazu war notwendig, aus dem Gesamtgebiete des menschlichen Handelns diejenigen Teile auszusondern, denen gegenüber bei unbefangener Selbstbeobachtung von Freiheit gesprochen werden kann. Es sind diejenigen Handlungen, die sich als Verwirklichungen ideeller Intuitionen darstellen. Andere Handlungen wird kein unbefangenes Betrachten als freie ansprechen. Aber der Mensch wird eben bei unbefangener Selbstbeobachtung sich für veranlagt halten müssen zum Fortschreiten auf der Bahn nach ethischen Intuitionen und deren Verwirklichung. Diese unbefangene Beobachtung des ethischen Wesens des Menschen kann aber für sich keine letzte Entscheidung über die Freiheit bringen. Denn wäre das intuitive Denken selbst aus irgendeiner andern Wesenheit entspringend, wäre seine Wesenheit nicht eine auf sich selbst ruhende, so erwiese sich das aus dem Ethischen fließende Freiheitsbewußtsein als ein Scheingebilde. Aber der zweite Teil dieses Buches findet seine naturgemäße Stütze in dem ersten. Dieser stellt das intuitive Denken als erlebte innere Geistbetätigung des Menschen hin. Diese Wesenheit des Denkens erlebend verstehen, kommt aber der Erkenntnis von der Freiheit des intuitiven Denkens gleich. Und weiß man, daß dieses Denken frei ist, dann sieht man auch den Umkreis des Wollens, dem die Freiheit zuzusprechen ist. Den handelnden Menschen wird für frei halten derjenige, welcher dem intuitiven Denkerleben eine in sich ruhende Wesenheit auf Grund der inneren Erfahrung zuschreiben darf. Wer solches nicht vermag, der wird wohl keinen irgendwie unanfechtbaren Weg zur Annahme der Freiheit finden können. Die hier geltend gemachte Erfahrung findet im Bewußtsein das intuitive Denken, das nicht bloß im Bewußtsein Wirklichkeit hat. Und sie findet damit die Freiheit als Kennzeichen der aus den Intuitionen des Bewußtseins fließenden Handlungen.
[ 6 ] II. Die Darstellung dieses Buches ist aufgebaut auf dem rein geistig erlebbaren intuitiven Denken, durch das eine jegliche Wahrnehmung in die Wirklichkeit erkennend hineingestellt wird. Es sollte in dem Buche mehr nicht dargestellt werden, als sich von dem Erlebnis des intuitiven Denkens aus überschauen läßt. Aber es sollte auch geltend gemacht werden, welche Gedankengestaltung dieses erlebte Denken erfordert. Und es fordert, daß es im Erkenntnisvorgang als in sich ruhendes Erlebnis nicht verleugnet werde. Daß ihm die Fähigkeit nicht abgesprochen werde, zusammen mit der Wahrnehmung die Wirklichkeit zu erleben, statt diese erst zu suchen in einer außerhalb dieses Erlebens liegenden, zu erschließendenWelt, der gegenüber die menschliche Denkbetätigung nur ein Subjektives sei. —
[ 7 ] Damit ist in dem Denken das Element gekennzeichnet, durch das der Mensch in die Wirklichkeit sich geistig hineinlebt. (Und niemand sollte eigentlich diese auf das erlebte Denken gebaute Weltanschauung mit einem bloßen Rationalismus verwechseln.) Aber andrerseits geht doch wohl aus dem ganzen Geiste dieser Darlegungen hervor, daß das Wahrnehmungselement für die menschliche Erkenntnis eine Wirklichkeitsbestimmung erst erhält, wenn es im Denken ergriffen wird. Außer dem Denken kann die Kennzeichnung als Wirklichkeit nicht liegen. Also darf nicht etwa vorgestellt werden, daß die sinnliche Art des Wahrnehmens die einzige Wirklichkeit verbürge. Was als Wahrnehmung auftritt, das muß der Mensch auf seinem Lebenswege schlechterdings erwarten. Es könnte sich nur fragen: darf aus dem Gesichtspunkte, der sich bloß aus dem intuitiv erlebten Denken ergibt, berechtigt erwartet werden, daß der Mensch außer dem Sinnlichen auch Geistiges wahrnehmen könne? Dies darf erwartet werden. Denn, wenn auch einerseits das intuitiv erlebte Denken ein im Menschengeiste sich vollziehender tätiger Vorgang ist, so ist es andererseits zugleich eine geistige, ohne sinnliches Organ erfaßte Wahrnehmung. Es ist eine Wahrnehmung, in der der Wahrnehmende selbst tätig ist, und es ist eine Selbstbetätigung, die zugleich wahrgenommen wird. Im intuitiv erlebten Denken ist derMensch in eine geistige Welt auch als Wahrnehmender versetzt. Was ihm innerhalb dieser Welt als Wahrnehmung so entgegentritt wie die geistige Welt seines eigenen Denkens, das erkennt der Mensch als geistige Wahrnehmungswelt. Zu dem Denken hätte diese Wahrnehmungswelt dasselbe Verhältnis wie nach der Sinnenseite hin die sinnliche Wahrnehmungswelt. Die geistige Wahrnehmungswelt kann dem Menschen, sobald er sie erlebt, nichts Fremdes sein, weil er im intuitiven Denken schon ein Erlebnis hat, das rein geistigen Charakter trägt. Von einer solchen geistigen Wahrnehmungswelt spre chen eine Anzahl der von mir nach diesem Buche veröffentlichten Schriften. Diese «Philosophie der Freiheit» ist die philosophische Grundlegung für diese späteren Schriften. Denn in diesem Buche wird versucht, zu zeigen, daß richtig verstandenes Denk-Erleben schon Geist-Erleben ist. Deshalb scheint es dem Verfasser, daß derjenige nicht vor dem Betreten der geistigen Wahrnehmungswelt haltmachen wird, der in vollem Ernste den Gesichtspunkt des Verfassers dieser «Philosophie der Freiheit» einnehmen kann. Logisch ableiten — durch Schlußfolgerungen — läßt sich aus dem Inhalte dieses Buches allerdings nicht, was in des Verfassers späteren Büchern dargestellt ist. Vom lebendigen Ergreifen des in diesem Buche gemeinten intuitiven Denkens wird sich aber naturgemäß der weitere lebendige Eintritt in die geistige Wahrnehmungswelt ergeben.
The consequences of monism
[ 1 ] The unified explanation of the world, or the monism meant here, takes from human experience the principles it needs to explain the world. It also seeks the sources of action within the world of observation, namely in the human nature accessible to our self-knowledge, namely in the moral imagination. It refuses to seek the ultimate reasons for the world outside of perception and thought through abstract conclusions. For monism, the unity that tangible thinking observation brings to the manifold multiplicity of perceptions is at the same time the unity that the human need for knowledge demands and through which it seeks entry into the physical and spiritual realms of the world. Whoever seeks another unity behind this unity to be sought in this way only proves that he does not recognize the correspondence of what is found through thinking with what is demanded by the instinct of knowledge. The single human individual is not actually separated from the world. It is a part of the world, and there is a connection with the whole of the cosmos according to reality, which is only interrupted for our perception. For the time being, we see this part as an entity existing on its own, because we do not see the belts and ropes through which the movement of our wheel of life is brought about by the basic forces of the cosmos. Whoever remains on this standpoint sees the part of a whole as a truly independently existing being, as the monad, which receives the information from the rest of the world in some way from outside. The monism meant here shows that independence can only be believed as long as what is perceived is not drawn into the net of the conceptual world through thinking. If this happens, the partial existence turns out to be a mere appearance of perception. Man can only find his self-contained total existence in the universe through intuitive thought experience. Thinking destroys the appearance of perception and integrates our individual existence into the life of the cosmos. The unity of the conceptual world, which contains the objective perceptions, also incorporates the content of our subjective personality. Thinking gives us the true form of reality as a self-contained unity, while the diversity of perceptions is only an appearance conditioned by our organization (cf. p. 86ff.). Recognizing the real as opposed to the appearance of perception has always been the goal of human thought. Science endeavoured to recognize perceptions as reality by uncovering the lawful connections within them. Where, however, it was held that the connection established by human thought had only a subjective meaning, the true ground of unity was sought in an object located beyond our world of experience (a revealed God, will, absolute spirit, etc.). - And, based on this opinion, they endeavored to gain, in addition to the knowledge of the connections recognizable within experience, a second one that goes beyond experience and reveals the connection of the same with the entities that can no longer be experienced (metaphysics gained not through experience but through inference). From this point of view, the reason why we understand the context of the world through regulated thinking was seen in the fact that a primordial being had constructed the world according to logical laws, and the reason for our actions was seen in the will of the primordial being. But it was not recognized that thinking encompasses the subjective and the objective at the same time, and that total reality is conveyed in the union of perception with the concept. Only as long as we consider the lawfulness that permeates and determines perception in the abstract form of the concept are we in fact dealing with something purely subjective. What is subjective, however, is not the content of the concept that is added to the perception with the help of thinking. This content is not taken from the subject, but from reality. It is the part of reality that perception cannot reach. It is experience, but not experience mediated by perception. He who cannot imagine that the concept is a real thing, thinks only of the abstract form in which he holds it in his mind. But in such a separation it is present only through our organization, just as perception is. Even the tree that we perceive has no existence in isolation. It is only a link within the great machinery of nature, and only possible in real connection with it. An abstract concept has no reality in itself, just as little as a perception in itself. Perception is that part of reality which is given objectively, the concept that which is given subjectively (through intuition, cf. page 95ff.). Our mental organization tears reality apart into these two factors. One factor appears to perception, the other to intuition. Only the connection between the two, the perception that integrates itself lawfully into the universe, is full reality. If we consider mere perception on its own, then we have no reality, but an incoherent chaos; if we consider the lawfulness of perceptions on their own, then we are merely dealing with abstract concepts. It is not the abstract concept that contains reality, but thinking observation, which considers neither the concept nor the perception in isolation, but the connection between the two.
[ 2 ] Even the most orthodox subjective idealist will not deny that we live in reality (that our real existence is rooted in it). He will only deny that with our cognition we also achieve ideally what we experience in reality. Monism, on the other hand, shows that thinking is neither subjective nor objective, but a principle that encompasses both sides of reality. When we observe by thinking, we carry out a process that itself belongs to the series of real events. By thinking within experience itself, we overcome the one-sidedness of mere perception. Through abstract, conceptual hypotheses (through purely conceptual reflection) we cannot fathom the essence of the real, but we live in the real by finding the ideas for the perceptions. Monism does not seek something inexperient (something beyond) in experience, but sees the real in concept and perception. It does not spin metaphysics out of mere abstract concepts, because it sees in the concept itself only the one side of reality, which remains hidden from perception and only has meaning in connection with perception. However, it evokes in man the conviction that he lives in the world of reality and does not have to seek a higher reality outside his world that cannot be experienced. It prevents him from seeking the absolutely real elsewhere than in experience, because he recognizes the content of experience itself as the real. And he is satisfied by this reality because he knows that thinking has the power to vouch for it. What dualism seeks only behind the world of observation, monism finds in the world itself. Monism shows that with our cognition we grasp reality in its true form, not in a subjective image that interposes itself between man and reality. For monism, the conceptual content of the world is the same for all human individuals (cf. pp. 89ff.). According to monistic principles, one human individual regards another as his equal because it is the same world content that lives itself out in him. In some conceptual world there are not as many concepts of the lion as there are individuals who think a lion, but only one. And the concept that A adds to the perception of the lion is the same as that of B, only conceived by a different subject of perception (cf. p. 90f.). Thinking leads all subjects of perception to the common ideal unity of all multiplicity. The single world of ideas lives itself out in them as a multiplicity of individuals. As long as man grasps himself merely through self-perception, he sees himself as this particular human being; as soon as he looks at the world of ideas that lights up within him and encompasses everything particular, he sees the absolutely real shining vividly within himself. Dualism defines the divine primordial being as that which permeates all human beings and lives in all of them. Monism finds this common divine life in reality itself. The ideal content of another person is also mine, and I only see him as another as long as I perceive, but no longer as soon as I think. Each person's thinking encompasses only a part of the entire world of ideas, and in this respect individuals also differ in the actual content of their thinking. But these contents are in a self-contained whole that encompasses the thought contents of all people. The common primordial being that permeates all human beings is thus grasped by man in his thinking. Life in reality that is filled with the content of thought is at the same time life in God. The merely accessible, not to be experienced beyond is based on a misunderstanding of those who believe that this world does not have the reason for its existence in itself. They do not realize that through thinking they can find what they require to explain perception. For this reason, however, no speculation has yet brought to light any content that has not been borrowed from the reality given to us. The God assumed by abstract inference is only man transferred to a beyond; Schopenhauer's will is the absolutized human will-power; Hartmann's unconscious primordial being, composed of idea and will, is a composition of two abstractions from experience. Exactly the same can be said of all other otherworldly principles based on non-experienced thinking.
[ 3 ] In truth, the human mind never goes beyond the reality in which we live, nor does it need to, since everything it needs to explain it lies in this world. If philosophers ultimately declare themselves satisfied with the derivation of the world from principles that they borrow from experience and transfer to a hypothetical beyond, then such satisfaction must also be possible if the same content is left in this world, where it belongs for experiential thinking. All going beyond the world is only an apparent one, and the principles transferred out of the world do not explain the world better than those lying within it. Self-understanding thought, however, does not even call for such a going out, since a thought content must only seek a perceptual content within the world, not outside it, with which it forms a real thing. Even the objects of the imagination are only contents that only have their justification when they become ideas that point to a perceptual content. Through this perceptual content they integrate themselves into reality. A concept that should be filled with a content that is supposed to lie outside the world given to us is an abstraction that does not correspond to reality. We can only conceive the concepts of reality; in order to find these ourselves, we also need to perceive them. A primordial being of the world, for which a content is conceived, is an impossible assumption for self-understanding thinking. Monism does not deny the ideal, it does not even regard a perceptual content for which the ideal counterpart is lacking as full reality; but it finds nothing in the whole field of thinking that could compel it to step out of the experiential realm of thinking by denying the objectively spiritual reality of thinking. Monism regards a science that confines itself to describing perceptions without penetrating to their ideal complements as a half-measure. But it also regards as half-measures all abstract concepts that do not find their complement in perception and do not fit anywhere into the network of concepts spanning the observable world. He therefore does not recognize any ideas that point to an objective that lies beyond our experience and that are supposed to form the content of a merely hypothetical metaphysics. All that mankind has produced of such ideas are for him abstractions from experience, whose borrowing from the same is only overlooked by their originators.
[ 4 ] Neither can the goals of our actions be taken from an extra-human beyond according to monistic principles. Insofar as they are conceived, they must come from human intuition. Man does not make the purposes of an objective (otherworldly) primordial being his individual purposes, but pursues his own, given to him by his moral imagination. Man detaches the idea that is realized in an action from the unified world of ideas and bases his will on it. In his actions, therefore, it is not the commandments implanted in this world from the hereafter that are lived out, but the human intuitions belonging to the world of this world. Monism knows of no such world ruler who sets the goal and direction of our actions outside of ourselves. Man finds no such otherworldly source of existence whose counsel he could explore in order to learn from it the goals towards which he must steer his actions. He is rejected by himself. He himself must give content to his actions. If he looks outside the world in which he lives for the reasons for his will, he searches in vain. If he goes beyond the satisfaction of his natural instincts, for which Mother Nature has provided, he must seek them in his own moral imagination, unless his comfort prefers to be determined by the moral imagination of others, that is to say, he must refrain from all action or act according to reasons which he gives himself out of the world of his ideas, or which others give him out of the same. When he gets beyond his sensual instincts and the execution of other people's orders, he is determined by nothing but himself. He must act from a drive determined by himself and by nothing else. Ideally, however, this drive is determined in the world of ideas; but factually it can only be derived from it by man and realized in reality. Monism can only find the reason for the actual realization of an idea into reality by man in man himself. Man must first want an idea to become an action before it can happen. Such a will therefore has its reason only in man himself. Man is then the ultimate determinant of his action. He is free.
Addition to the new edition (1918)
[ 5 ] I. In the second part of this book an attempt was made to justify the fact that freedom is to be found in the reality of human action. For this purpose it was necessary to separate out from the whole field of human action those parts which can be spoken of as freedom in the case of unbiased self-observation. These are the actions that present themselves as realizations of ideal intuitions. No impartial observation will address other actions as free. But with impartial self-observation, man will have to consider himself predisposed to progress along the path of ethical intuitions and their realization. This impartial observation of man's ethical nature cannot, however, in itself bring about a final decision about freedom. For if intuitive thinking itself were to spring from some other entity, if its essence were not one resting on itself, the consciousness of freedom flowing from the ethical would prove to be an illusion. But the second part of this book finds its natural support in the first. The latter presents intuitive thinking as the experienced inner activity of the human spirit. Understanding this essence of thinking experientially, however, is tantamount to recognizing the freedom of intuitive thinking. And if one knows that this thinking is free, then one can also see the scope of the will to which freedom is to be attributed. The acting man will be considered free by him who can ascribe to the intuitive experience of thinking a being at rest in itself on the basis of inner experience. Those who are not able to do so will probably not be able to find any kind of incontestable way to accept freedom. The experience asserted here finds in consciousness the intuitive thinking that does not have reality merely in consciousness. And it thus finds freedom as a characteristic of the actions flowing from the intuitions of consciousness.
[ 6 ] II. The presentation of this book is based on the purely spiritually perceptible intuitive thinking, through which every perception is placed in reality in a recognizing way. More should not be presented in the book than can be seen from the experience of intuitive thinking. But it should also assert what kind of thought formation this experienced thinking requires. And it demands that it should not be denied in the process of cognition as an experience at rest in itself. That it should not be denied the ability to experience reality together with perception, instead of first seeking it in a world that lies outside of this experience and is to be opened up, towards which the human activity of thinking is only a subjective one. -
[ 7 ] This characterizes the element in thinking through which man lives himself spiritually into reality. (And no one should actually confuse this world view based on experienced thinking with mere rationalism). But on the other hand, it is clear from the whole spirit of these explanations that the perceptual element only acquires a definition of reality for human cognition when it is grasped in thinking. Outside of thinking the designation as reality cannot lie. Therefore, it must not be imagined that the sensory way of perceiving guarantees the only reality. What appears as perception is something that man must absolutely expect on his path through life. It could only be asked: can it be legitimately expected from the point of view that arises merely from intuitively experienced thinking that man can also perceive the spiritual in addition to the sensual? This can be expected. For, even if on the one hand intuitively experienced thinking is an active process taking place in the human spirit, on the other hand it is at the same time a spiritual perception grasped without a sensory organ. It is a perception in which the perceiver himself is active, and it is a self-activity that is perceived at the same time. In intuitively experienced thinking, man is also placed in a spiritual world as a perceiver. What he encounters within this world as perception, such as the spiritual world of his own thinking, is recognized by man as a spiritual world of perception. This world of perception would have the same relationship to thinking as the sensory world of perception on the sense side. The spiritual world of perception cannot be something alien to man as soon as he experiences it, because in intuitive thinking he already has an experience that is purely spiritual in character. A number of the writings published by me after this book speak of such a spiritual world of perception. This "Philosophy of Freedom" is the philosophical foundation for these later writings. For in this book an attempt is made to show that correctly understood thought-experience is already spirit-experience. Therefore, it seems to the author that he who can take the point of view of the author of this "Philosophy of Freedom" in all seriousness will not stop at entering the world of spiritual perception. However, it is not possible to deduce logically - by means of conclusions - from the contents of this book what is presented in the author's later books. From the living grasp of the intuitive thinking meant in this book, however, the further living entry into the spiritual world of perception will naturally result.