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The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas
GA 74

23 May 1920, Dornach

II. The Essence of Thomism

The point I tried yesterday particularly to emphasize was that in the spiritual development of the West, which found its expression ultimately in the Schoolmen, not only is a part played by what we can grasp in abstract concepts, and what happened, as it were, in abstract concepts, and in a development of abstract thoughts, but rather that behind it all, there stands a real development of the impulses of Western mankind. What I mean is this: we can first of all, as happens mostly in the history of philosophy, direct our eyes on to what we find in each philosopher; we can follow how the ideas, which we find in a philosopher of the sixth, seventh, eighth or ninth century are further developed by philosophers of the tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries; and from such a review we can get the impression that one thinker has taken over the ideas from another, and that we are in the presence of a certain evolution of ideas. This is an historical review of spiritual life which had gradually to be abandoned. For what takes place there, what so to speak is revealed by the individual human souls, is merely a symptom of something deeper which lies behind the scenes of the outer events; and this something which was going on already a few centuries before Christianity was founded, and continued in the first centuries a.d. up to the time of the Schoolmen, is an entirely organic process in the development of Western humanity. And unless we take this organic process into account, it is as impossible to get an explanation of it, as we could of the period of human development between the ages of twelve to twenty, if we do not consider the important influence of those forces which are connected with adolescence, and which at this time rise to the surface from the deeps of human nature. In the same way out of the depth of the whole great organism of European humanity there surges up something which can be defined—there are other ways of definition,—but which I will define by saying: Those ancient poets spoke honestly and sincerely, who, like Homer, for instance, began their epic poems: “Sing to me, Goddess, of the wrath of Achilles,” or “Sing to me, O Muse, of the much-travelled man.” These people did not wish to make a phrase, they found as an inner fact of their consciousness, that it was not a single, individual Ego that wanted to express itself, but what in fact they felt to be a higher spiritual-psychic force which plays a part in the ordinary conscious condition of man. And again—I mentioned it yesterday—Klopstock was right and saw this fact to a certain extent, even if only unconsciously, when he began his “Messiah Poem” not “Sing, O Muse,” or “Sing, O Goddess, of man's redemption,” but when he said “Sing, immortal Soul. ...” In other words, “Sing, thou individual being, that livest in each man as an individuality.” When Klopstock wrote his “Messiah,” this feeling of individuality in each soul was, it is true, fairly widespread. But this inner urge, to bring out the individuality, to shape an individual life, grew up most pronouncedly in the age between the foundation of Christianity and the higher Scholasticism. We can see only the merest surface-reflection in the thoughts of the philosophers of what was taking place in the depths of all human beings—the individualization of the consciousness of European people. And an important thing in the spread of Christianity throughout these centuries is the fact that the leaders of its propagation had to address themselves to a humanity which strove more and more, from the depth of its being, towards an inner feeling of human individuality.

We can understand the separate events that occurred in this epoch only by keeping this point of view before us. And only thus can we understand what battles took place in the souls of such people who, in the profundity of the human soul, wanted to dispute with Christianity on the one side and philosophy on the other, like Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. The authors of the usual histories of philosophy to-day have understood so little of the true form of these soul-battles which had their culmination in Albertus and Thomas, that this epoch is only approximately clearly depicted in their histories. There are many things to consider in the soul-life of Albertus and Thomas.

Superficially it looks as if Albertus Magnus, who lived from the twelfth into the thirteenth century, and Thomas, who lived in the thirteenth, had wished only to harmonize dialectically Augustinism, of which we spoke yesterday, on the one hand, and Aristotelianism on the other. One was the bearer of the church ideas, the other of the modified philosophical ideas. The attempt to find assonance between them runs, it is true, like a thread through everything either wrote. But there was in everything which thus became fixed in thoughts as in a flowering of Western feeling and will, a great deal which did not survive into the period which stretches from the fifteenth century into our own day, a period from which we have drawn our customary ideas for all sciences and for the whole of our daily life.

The man of to-day finds it really paradoxical when he hears what we heard yesterday of Augustine's beliefs; that Augustine actually believed that a part of mankind was from the beginning destined to receive God's grace without earning it—for really after original sin all must perish—to receive God's grace and be spiritually saved; and that another part of mankind must be spiritually lost—no matter what it does. To a modern man this paradox appears perhaps meaningless. But if you can get the feeling of that age in which Augustine lived, in which he absorbed all those ideas and influences I described yesterday, you will think differently. You will feel that it is possible to understand that Augustine wanted to hold on to the thoughts which, as contained in the ancient philosophies, did not take the individual man into consideration; for they, under the influence of such ideas as those of Plotinus, which I outlined yesterday, had in their minds nothing but the idea of universal mankind. And you must remember that Augustine was a man who stood in the midst of the battle between the thought which regarded mankind as a unity, and the thought which was trying to crystallize the individuality of man out of this unified mankind. But in Augustine's soul there also surged the impulse towards individuality. For this reason, these ideas take on such significant aspects—significant of soul and heart; for this reason they are so full of human experience, and Augustine becomes the intensely sympathetic figure which makes so great an impression if we turn our eyes back to the centuries which preceded Scholasticism.

After Augustine, therefore, there survived for many—but only in his ideas—those links which held together the individual man as Christian with his Church. But these ideas, as I explained them to you yesterday, could not be accepted by those Western people who rejected the idea of taking the whole of humanity as one unity, and feeling themselves as it were only a member in it, moreover a member which belongs to that part of humanity whose lot is destruction and annihilation.

And so the Church saw itself compelled to snatch at a way out. Augustine still conducted his gigantic fight against Pelagius, the man who was already filled with the individuality-impulse of the West. This was the person in whom, as a contemporary of Augustine, we can see how the sense of individuality such as later centuries had it, appears in advance. So he can only say: There is no question but that man must remain entirely without participation in his destiny in the material-spiritual world. The power by which the soul finds the connection with that which raises it from the entanglements of the flesh to the serene spiritual regions, where it can find its release and return to freedom and immortality—this power must be born of man's individuality itself. This was the point which Augustine's opponents stressed, that each man must find for himself the power to overcome inherited sin. The Church stood half-way between the two opponents, and sought a solution. There was much discussion concerning this solution—all the pros and cons, as it were—and then they took the middle way—and I can leave it to you to judge if in this case it was the golden or the copper mean—at any rate they took the middle way: semi-Pelagianism. A formula was found which was really neither black nor white, to this effect: It is as Augustine has said, but not quite as Augustine has said; nor is it quite as Pelagius has said, though in a certain sense, it is as he has said. And so one might say, that it is not through a wise divine judgment, that some are condemned to sin and others to grace, but that the matter is this, that it is a case not of a divine pre-judgment, but of a divine prescience. The divine being knows beforehand if one man is to be a sinner or the other filled with grace. At the same time no further attention was paid, when this dogma was agreed, to the fact that at bottom it is in no way a question of prescience but rather a question of taking a definite stand, whether individual man is able to join with those powers in his individual soul-life which raise him up out of his separation from the divine-spiritual being of the world and which can lead him back to it.

In this way the question really remains unsolved. And I might say that, compelled on one side to recognize the dogmas of the Church but on the other filled from deepest sensibility with profound respect for the greatness of Augustine, Albertus and Thomas stood face to face with what came to be the Western development of the spirit within the Christian movement. And yet several things from earlier times left their influence. One can see them, for instance, when one looks carefully at the souls of Albertus and of Thomas, but one realizes also that they themselves were not quite conscious of it; that they enter into their thoughts, but that they themselves cannot bring them to a precise expression. We must consider this, ladies and gentlemen, more in respect of this time of the high Scholasticism of Albertus and Thomas, we must consider it more than we would have to consider a similar phenomenon, for instance, in our day. I have permitted myself to stress the “Why?” in my Welt-und Lebensanschauung des 19 Jahrhundert,—and it was further developed in my book Die Rätzee der Philosophie, where the proposition was put in another way so that the particular passage was not repeated, if I may be allowed to say so. This means—and it will occupy us in detail tomorrow, I will only mention it now—this means that from this upward-striving of individuality among the thinkers who studied philosophically that in these thinkers we get the highest flowering of logical judgment; we might say the highest flowering of logical technique.

Ladies and gentlemen, one can quarrel as one will about this or that party-standpoint on the question of Scholasticism—all this quarrelling is as a rule grounded on very little real understanding of the matter. For whoever has a sense of the manner quite apart from the subjective content in which the accuracy of the thought is revealed in the course of a scientific explanation—or anything else; whoever has a sense of appreciating how things that hang together are thought out together, which must be thought out together if life is to have any meaning; whoever has a sense of all this, and of several other things, realizes that thought was never so exact, so logically scientific, either before or afterwards as in the age of high Scholasticism. This is just the important thing, that pure thought so runs with mathematical certainty from idea to idea, from judgment to judgment, from conclusion to conclusion, that these thinkers account to themselves for the smallest, even the tiniest, step. We have only to remember in what surroundings this thinking took place. It was not a thinking that took place as it now takes place in the noisy world; rather its place was in the quiet cloister cell or otherwise far from the busy world. It was a thinking that absorbed a thought-life, and which could also, through other circumstances, formulate a pure thought-technique. It is to-day as a matter of fact difficult to do this; for scarcely do we seek to give publicity to such a thought-activity which has no other object than to array thought upon thought according to their content, than the stupid people come, and the illogical people raise all sorts of questions, interject their violent partisanship, and, seeing that one is after all a human being among human beings, we have to make the best of these things which are, in fact, no other than brutal interruptions, which often have nothing whatever to do with the subject in question. In these circumstances that inner quiet is very soon lost to which the thinkers of the twelfth or thirteenth centuries could devote themselves, who did not have to yield so much to the opposition of the uneducated in their social life.

This and other things called forth in this epoch that wonderfully plastic but also finely-outlined thought-activity which distinguishes Scholasticism and for which people like Augustine and Thomas consciously strove.

But now think of this: on the one side are demands of life which appear as if one had to do with dogmas that have not been made clear, which in a great number of cases resembled the semi-Pelagianism already described; and as if one fought in order to uphold what one believed ought to be upheld, because the Church justifiably had set it up; and as if one wanted to maintain this with the most subtle thought. Just imagine what it means to light up with the most subtle thought something of the nature of what I have described to you as Augustinism. One must look closely into the inside of scholastic effort and not only attempt to characterize this continuity from the Patristic age to the age of the Schoolmen from the threads of concepts which one has picked up. These spirits of High Scholasticism did a great deal half unconsciously and we can really only understand it, if we consider, looking beyond what I already described yesterday, such a figure as that which entered half mysteriously from the sixth century into European spiritual life and which became known under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite. To-day, because time is too short I cannot enter into all the disputes on the question of whether there is any truth in the view that these writings were first made in the sixth century, or whether the other view is right which ascribes at any rate the traditional element of these writings to a much earlier time. All that is after all not important, but the important thing is, that the philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite was available for the thinkers of the seventh and eighth centuries right up to the time of Thomas Aquinas, and that these writings throughout have a Christian tinge and contain in a special form that which I yesterday defined as Plotinism, as the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus. And it had become particularly important for the Christian thinkers of the outgoing old world and the beginning of the Middle Ages up to the time of High Scholasticism, what attitude the author of the Dionysius writings took to the uprising of the human soul till it achieved a view of the divine. This Dionysius is generally described as if he had two paths to the divine; and as a matter of fact there are two. One path requires the following: if man wishes to raise himself from the external things which surround him in the world to the divine, he must attempt to extract from all those things their perfections, their nature; he must attempt to go back to absolute perfection, and must be able to give a name to absolute perfection in such a way that he has a content for this divine perfection which in its turn can reveal itself and can bring forth the separate things of the world by means of individualization and differentiation. So I would say, for Dionysius divinity is that being which must be given names to the greatest extent, which must be labelled with the most superlative terms which one can possibly find amongst all the perfections of the world; take all those, give them names and then apply them to the divinity and then you reach some idea of the divinity. That is one path which Dionysius recommends.

The other path is different. Here he says: you will never attain the divinity if you give it only a single name, for the whole soul-process which you employ to find perfections in things and to seek their essences, to combine them in order to apply the whole to divinity, all this never leads to what one can call knowledge of a divinity. You must reach a state in which you are free from all that you have known of things. You must purify your consciousness completely of all that you have experienced through things. You must no longer know anything of what the world says to you. You must forget all the names which you are accustomed to give to things and translate yourself into a condition of soul in which you know nothing of the whole world. If you can experience this in your soul-condition, then you experience the nameless which is immediately misunderstood if one attaches any name to it. Then you will know God, the Super-God in His super-beauty. But the names Super-God and super-beauty are already disturbing. They can only serve to point towards something which you must experience as nameless, and how can one deal with a character who gives us not one theology but two theologies, one positive, one negative, one rationalistic and one mystic? A man who can put himself into the spirituality of the time out of which Christianity was born can understand it quite well. If one pictures the course of human evolution even in the first Christian centuries as the materialists of to-day do, anything like the writings of the Areopagite appears more or less foolishness or madness. In this case they are usually simply rejected. If, however, one can put oneself into the experience and feeling of that time, then one realizes what a man like the Areopagite really wanted—at bottom only to express what countless people were striving for. Because for them the divinity was an unknowable being if one took only one path to it. For him the divinity was a being which had to be approached by a rational path through the finding and giving of names. But if one takes this one way one loses the path. One loses oneself in what is as it were universal space void of God. And then one does not attain to God. But one must take this way, for otherwise one can also not reach God. Moreover, one must take yet another way, namely, the one that strives towards the nameless one. By either road alone the divinity cannot be found, but by taking both one finds the divinity at the point where they cross. It is not enough to dispute which of the roads is the right one. Both are right, but each taken alone leads to nothing. Both roads when the human soul finds itself at the crossing lead to the goal. I can understand how some people of to-day who are accustomed to what is called polemics recoil from what is here advanced concerning the Areopagite. But what I am advancing here was alive in those men who were the leading spiritual personalities in the first Christian centuries, and continued traditionally in the Christian-philosophical movement of the West to the time of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. For instance, it was kept alive through that individual whose name I mentioned yesterday, Scotus Erigena, who lived at the court of Charles the Bald. This Scotus Erigena reminds one forcibly of what I said yesterday. I told you: I have never known such a meek man as Vincenz Knauer, the historian of philosophy. Vincenz Knauer was always meek, but he began to lose his temper when there was mention of Plotinus or anything connected with him; and Franz Brentano, the able philosopher, who was always conventional became quite unconventional and abusive in his book Philosophies that Create a Stir—referring to Plotinus. Those who, with all their discernment and ability, lean more or less towards rationalism, will be angry when they are faced with what so to speak poured forth from the Areopagite to find a final significant revelation in this Scotus Erigena. In the last years of his life he was a Benedictine Prior, but his own monks, as the legend goes—I do not say it is literally true, but it is near enough—tortured him with pins till he died, because he introduced Plotinism even in the ninth century. But his ideas survived him and they were at the same time the continuation of the ideas of the Areopagite. His writings more or less disappeared till later days; then ultimately they reappeared. In the twelfth century Scotus Erigena was declared a heretic. But that did not mean as much then as it did later or does to-day. All the same, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas were deeply influenced by the ideas of Scotus Erigena. That is the one thing which we must recognize as a heritage from former times when we wish to speak of the essence of Thomism.

But there is another thing. In Plotinism, which I tried to describe to you yesterday with regard to its Cosmology, there is a very important presentation of human nature which is derived from a material/super-material view. One really regains respect for these things if one discovers them again on a background of spiritual science. Then one admits at once the following: one says, if one reads something like Plotinus or what has come down to us of him, unprepared, it looks rather chaotic and intricate. But if one discovers the corresponding truths oneself, his views take on a quite special appearance, even if the method of their expression in those times was different from what it would have to be to-day. Thus, one can find in Plotinus a general view which I should describe as follows:

Plotinus considers human nature with its physical and psychic and spiritual characteristics. Then he considers it from two points of view, first from that of the soul's work on the body. If I spoke in modern terms, I should have to say: Plotinus says first of all to himself; if one considers a child that grows up in the world, one sees how that which is formed as human body out of the spiritual-psychic attains maturity. For Plotinus everything material in man is, if I may use an expression to which I trust you will not object, a “sweating out” of the spiritual-physic, a “crustation” as it were of the spiritual-psychic. But then, when a human being has grown to a certain point, the spiritual-psychic forces cease to have any influence on the body. We could, therefore, say: at first we are concerned with such a spiritual-psychic activity that the bodily form is created or organized out of it. The human organization is the product of the spiritual-psychic. When a certain condition of maturity has been reached by some part of the organic activity, let us say, for example, the activity on which the forces are employed which later appear as the forces of the memory, then these forces which formerly have worked on the body, make their appearance in a spiritual-psychic metamorphosis. In other words, that part of the spiritual-psychic element which had functioned materially, now liberates itself, when its work is finished, and appears as an independent entity: a mirror of the soul, one would have to call it if one were to speak in Plotinus' sense. It is extraordinarily difficult with our modern conceptions to describe these things. You get near it, if you think as follows: you realize that a human being, after his memory has attained a certain stage of maturity, has the power of remembering. As a small child he has not. Where is this power of remembering? First it is at work in the organism, and forms it. After that it is liberated as purely spiritual-psychic power, and continues still, though always spiritual-psychically, to work on the organism. Then inside this soul-mirror inhabits the real vessel, the Ego. In characteristics, in an idea-content which is extraordinarily pictorial, these views are worked out from that which is spiritually active, and from that which then remains over, and becomes, as it were, passive towards the outer world—so that it takes up, like the memory, the impressions of the outer world and retains them. This two-fold work of the soul, this division of the soul into an active part, which practically builds up the body, and a passive part, derived from an older stratum of human growth and human attitude to the world, which found in Plotinus its best expression and then was taken up by Augustine and his successors, was described in an extraordinarily pictorial manner.

We find this view in Aristotelianism, but rationalized and translated into more physical conceptions. And Aristotle had it in his turn from Plato and again from the same sources as Plato. But when we read Aristotle we must say: Aristotle strives to put into abstract conceptions what he found in the old philosophies. And so we see in the Aristotelian system which continued to flourish, and which was the rationalistic form of what Plotinus had said in the other form, we see in this Aristotelianism which continued as far as Albertus and Thomas a rationalized mysticism, as it were, a rationalized description of the spiritual secret of the human being. And Albertus and Thomas are conscious of the fact that Aristotle has brought down to abstract conceptions something which the others had had in visions. And therefore they do not stand in the same relation to Aristotle as the present day philosopher-philologists, who have developed strange controversies over two conceptions which originate with Aristotle; but as the writings of Aristotle have not survived complete, we find both these conceptions in them without having their connection—which is after all a fact which affords ground for different opinions in many learned disputes. We find two ideas in Aristotle. Aristotle sees in human nature something which brings together into a unity the vegetative principle, the animal principle, the lower human principle, then the higher human principle, that Aristotle calls the nous, and the Scholiasts call the intellect. But Aristotle differentiates between the nous poieticos, and the nous patheticos, between the active and the passive spirit of man. The expressions are no longer as descriptive as the Greek; but one can say that Aristotle differentiates between the active understanding, the active spirit of man, and the passive. What does he mean? We do not understand what he means unless we revert to the origin of these concepts. Just like the other forces of the soul the two points of understanding are active in another metamorphosis in building up the human soul:—the understanding, in so far as it is actively engaged in building up the man, but still the understanding, not like the memory which comes to an end at a certain point and then liberates itself as memory—but working throughout life as understanding. That is the nous poieticos; the factor which in Aristotle's sense, becoming individualized out of the universe, builds up the body. It is no other than the active, bodybuilding soul of Plotinus. On the other hand, that which liberates itself, existing only in order to receive the outer world, and to form the impressions of the outer world dialectically, is the nous patheticos—the passive intellect—the intellectus possibilis. These things, presented to us in Scholasticism in keen dialectics and in precise logic, refer back to the old heritage. And we cannot properly understand the working of the Schoolmen's souls without taking into consideration this intermixture of age-old traditions.

Because all this had such an influence on the souls of the Scholiasts, they were faced with the great question which one usually feels to be the real problem of Scholasticism. At a time when men still had a vision which produced such a thing as Platonism or a rationalized version of it such as Aristotelianism, at a time when the sense of individuality had not yet reached its highest, these problems could not have existed; for what we to-day call understanding, what we call intellect, which had its origin in the terminology of Scholasticism, is the product of the individual man. If we all think alike, it is only because we are all individually constituted alike, and because the understanding is bound up with the individual which is constituted alike in all men. It is true that in so far as we are different beings we think differently; but that is a shade of difference with which logic as such is not concerned. Logical and dialectical thought is the product of the general human, but individually differentiated organization.

So man, feeling that he is an individual says to himself: in man arise the thoughts through which the outer world is inwardly represented; and here the thoughts are put together which in turn are to give a picture of the world; there, inside man, emerge on the one hand representations which are connected with individual things, with a particular book, let us say, or a particular man, for instance, Augustine. But then man arrives at the inner experiences, such as dreams, for which he cannot straightway find such an objective representation. The next step is the experience of pure chimaeras, which he creates for himself, just as here the centaur and similar things were chimaeras for Scholasticism. But, on the other hand, are the concepts and ideas which as a matter of fact reflect on to both sides: humanity, the lion-type, the wolf-type, etc.; these are general concepts which the Schoolmen according to ancient usage called the universals. Yes, as the situation for mankind was such as I described to you yesterday, as one rose, as it were, to these universals and perceived them to be the lowest border of the spiritual world which was being revealed through vision to mankind, these universals, humanity, animality, lion-hood, etc., were simply the means whereby the spiritual world, the intelligible world, revealed itself, and simply the soul's experience of an emanation from the supernatural world.

In order to have this experience it was essential not to have acquired that feeling of individuality which afterward developed in the centuries I have named. This sense of individuality led one to say: we rise from the things of the senses up to that border where are the more or less abstract things, which are, however, still within our experience—the universals such as humanity, lion-hood, etc. “Scholasticism” realized perfectly that one cannot simply say: these are pure conceptions, pure comprehensions of the external world:—rather, it became a problem for Scholasticism, with which it grappled. We have to create such general and universal conceptions out of our individuality. But when we look out upon the world, we do not have “humanity,” we have individual man, not “wolf-hood” but individual wolves. But, on the other hand, we cannot only see what we formulate as “wolf-hood” and “lamb-hood” as it were in such a way as if at one time we have formulated the matter as “agnine” and at another as “lupine,” and as if “lamb-hood” and “wolf-hood” were only a kind of composition and the material which is in these connected ideas were the only reality: we cannot simply assume this; for if we did we should have to assume this also:—If we caged a wolf and saw to it that for a certain period he ate nothing but lambs he is filled with nothing but lamb-matter; but he doesn't become a lamb; the matter doesn't affect it, he remains a wolf. “Wolf-hood” therefore is after all not something which is thus merely brought into contact with the material, for materially the whole wolf is lamb, but he remains a wolf.

There is to-day everywhere a problem which people do not take seriously enough. It was a problem with which the soul in its greatest development grappled with all its fibre. And this problem stood in direct connection with the Church's interests. How this was we can picture to ourselves if we consider the following:—

Before Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas appeared with their special exposition of philosophy, there had already been people, like Roscelin, for example, who had put forward the theory, and believed it implicitly, that these general concepts, these universals are really nothing else but the comprehension of external individual objects; they are really only words and names. And a Nominalism grew up which saw only words in general things, in universals. But Roscelin took Nominalism with dogmatic earnestness and applied it to the Trinity, saying: if something which is an association of ideas is only a word, then the Trinity is only a word, and the individuals are the sole reality—the Father, Son and Holy Ghost; then only the human understanding grasps these Three through a name. Mediaeval Churchmen stretched such points to the ultimate conclusions; the Church was compelled, at the Synod of Soissons, to declare this view of Roscelin partial polytheism and its teaching heretical. Thus one was in a certain difficult position towards Nominalism; it was a dogmatic interest which was linked with a philosophic one.

To-day we no longer take, of course, such a situation as something vital. But in those days it was regarded as most vital, and Thomas and Albertus grappled with just this question of the relationship of the universals to individual things; for them it was the supreme problem. Fundamentally, everything else is only a consequence, that is, a consequence in so far as everything else has taken its colour from the attitude they adopted towards this problem. But this attitude was influenced by all the forces which I have described to you, all the forces which remained as tradition from the Areopagite, which remained from Plotinus, which had passed through the soul of Augustine, through Scotus Erigena and many others—all this influenced the manner of thought which was now first revealed in Albertus and then, on a wide-reaching philosophic basis, in Thomas. And one knew also that there were people then who looked up beyond concepts to the spiritual world, to the intellectual world, to that world of which Thomism speaks as of a reality, in which he sees the immaterial intellectual beings which he calls angels. These are not just abstractions, they are real beings, but without bodies. It is these beings which Thomas puts in the tenth sphere. He looks upon the earth as encircled by the sphere of the Moon, of Mercury, of Venus, of the Sun, and so on, and so comes through the eighth and ninth spheres to the tenth, which was the Empyreum. He imagines all this pervaded by intelligences and the intelligences nearest are those which, as it were, let their lowest margins shine down upon the earth so that the human soul can get into touch with them.

But in this form in which I have just now expressed it, a form more inclined to Plotinism, this idea is not the result of pure individual feeling to which Scholasticism had just fought its way, but for Albertus and Thomas a belief remained that above abstract concepts there was up there a revelation of those abstract concepts. And the question faced them: What reality have, then, these abstract concepts? Now Albertus as well as Thomas had an idea of the influence of the psychic-spiritual on the physical body and the subsequent self-reflection of the psychic-spiritual when its work on the physical body was sufficiently performed: they had an idea of all this. Also they had an idea of what man becomes in his own individual life, how he develops from year to year, from decade to decade precisely through the impressions he receives and digests from the external world. Thus the thought came that though, of course, we have the external world all round us, this world is a revelation of something super-worldly, something spiritual. And while we look at the world and turn our attention to the separate minerals, plants, and animals, we surmise all the same that there lies behind them a revelation from higher spiritual worlds. And if we look at the natural world with logical analysis, with everything of which our soul makes us capable, with all the power of thought we possess, we arrive at those things which the spiritual world has implanted in the natural world. But then we must get clear on this point: we turn our eyes and all the other senses on to this world, and so are in definite relationship with the world. We then go away from it and retain, as it were, as a memory what we have absorbed from it. We look back once more into memory; and then there first appears to us really the universal, the generality of things, such as humanity, and so on; that appears to us first in the inner conceptual form. So that Albertus and Thomas say: if you look back, and if your soul reflects its experiences of the external world, then you have the universals preserved in it. Then you have universals. From all the human beings whom you have met, you form the concept of humanity. If you remembered only individual things you could, in any case, live only in earthly names. But as you do not live only in earthly names, you must experience the universals. There you have the universalia post res—the universals which live in the soul after the things have been experienced. While a man's soul concentrates on things, its contents are not the same as afterwards when it remembers them, when they are, as it were, reflected from inside, but rather he stands in a real relationship to the things. He experiences true spirituality of the things and translates them only into the form of universals post rem.

Albertus and Thomas assume that at the moment when man through his power of thought stands in real relationship with his surroundings, that is, not only with what is “wolf” because the eye sees and the ear hears it, but because he can meditate on it and formulate the type “wolf,” at this moment he experiences something which, though invisible, in the objects, is comprehended in thought independently of the senses. He experiences the universalia in rebus—the universals in things.

Now the difference is not quite easy to define, because we usually think that what we have in the soul as a reflection is the same in the things. But it is not the same in the sense of Thomas Aquinas. That which man experiences as an idea in his soul and explains with his understanding, is the same thing with which he experiences the real, and the universal. So that according to their form, the universals in the things are different from those after them, which remain then in the soul: but inwardly they are the same. There you have one of the scholastic concepts which one does not generally put to the soul in all its subtlety. The universals in things and the universals after things are, as far as content is concerned the same, and differ only in form. But then we must not forget that that which is distributed and individualized in things points in its turn to what I described yesterday as being inherent in Plotinism, and called the actually intelligible world: there again the same contents which are in things and in the human soul after things are, as far as content goes, alike, but different in form; they are contained in another form, but of similar content. These are the universalia ante res, before things. These are the universals as contained in the divine mind, and in the mind of the divine servants—the angelic beings. Thus what was for a former age a direct spiritual-sensory/super-sensory vision becomes a vision which was represented only in sense-images, because what one sees with the super-senses cannot, according to the Areopagite, be even given a name, if one wished to deal with it in its true form: one can only point to it and say: it is not anything such as external things are. Thus what was for the ancient's vision and appeared as a reality of the spiritual world, became for Scholasticism something to be decided by all that acuteness of thought, all that suppleness and nice logic of which I have spoken to you to-day. The problem which formerly was solved by vision, is brought down into the sphere of thought and of reason. That is the essence of Thomism, the essence of Albertinism, the essence of Scholasticism. It realized, above all, that in its epoch, the sense of human individuality has reached its culmination. It sees, above all, all problems in their rational and logical form, in the form, in fact, in which the thinker must comprehend them. Scholasticism grapples chiefly with this form of world-problems, this form of thinking, and thus stands in the midst of the life of the Church, which I illumined for you yesterday and to-day in many ways, if only with a few rays of light. There is the belief of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries; it is to be attained with thinking, with the most subtle logic; on the other side, are the traditional Church dogmas, the content of Faith.

Let us take an example of how a thinker like Thomas Aquinas stands to both. Thomas Aquinas asks: Can one prove the existence of God by logic? Yes, one can. He gives a whole series of proofs. One, for instance, is when he says: We can at first gain knowledge only by approaching the universalia in rebus, by looking into things. We cannot—it is the personal experience of this age—we cannot enter into the spiritual world through vision. We can only enter the spiritual world by using our human powers if we saturate ourselves in things, and get out of them what we can call the universalia in rebus. Then we can draw our conclusions concerning the universalia ante res. So he says: We see the world in movement; one thing always gives motion to another, because it is itself in motion. So we go from one thing in motion to another, and from this to a third thing in motion. This cannot be continued indefinitely, for we must get to a prime mover. But if this were itself in motion, we should have to proceed to another mover. We must, therefore, in the end reach a stationary mover.

And here Thomas—and Albertus comes after all to the same conclusion—reaches the Aristotelian stationary mover, the First Cause. It is inherent in logical thinking to recognize God as a necessary First Being, as a necessary first stationary mover. For the Trinity there is no such path of thought which leads to it. It is handed down. With human thought we can only reach the point of testing if the Trinity is contrary to sense. We find it is not, but we cannot prove it, we must believe it, we must accept it as a content, to which the unaided human intellect cannot rise.

This is the attitude of Scholasticism to the question which was then so important: How far can the unaided human intellect go? And in the course of time it became involved in quite a special way with this deep problem. For, you see, other thinkers had gone before. They had assumed something apparently quite absurd, they had said: it is possible for something to be true theologically and false philosophically. One could say straight out: it is possible for things to be handed down as dogma, as, for instance, the Trinity; yet if one ponders over the same question, one arrives at a contrary result. It is certainly possible for the reason to lead to other consequences than those to which the faith-content leads. And that was so, that was the other thing which faced Scholasticism—the doctrine of the double truth, and it is on this that the two thinkers Albertus and Thomas laid special stress, to bring faith and reason into harmony, to seek no contradiction between rational thought—at any rate, up to a certain point—and faith. In those days that was radicalism, for the majority of the leading Church authorities clung to the doctrine of the double truth, namely, that man must on one side think rationally, the content of his thought must be in one form, and faith could give it him in another form, and these two forms he had to keep.

I believe we can get a feeling of historical development if we consider the fact that people of so few centuries ago, as these are of whom we speak to-day, are wrapped up in such problems with their whole soul. For these things still reverberate in our time. We still live with these problems. How we do it, we shall discuss tomorrow. To-day I wanted to describe the essence of Thomism as it was in those days.

So it was, you perceive, that the main problem in front of Albertus and Thomas was this: What is the relation of the content of human reason to that of human faith? How can that which the Church ordains for belief be, first, understood, and secondly, upheld against what contradicts it? With this, people like Albertus and Thomas had much to do, for the movement I have described was not the only one in Europe; there were all sorts of others. With the spread of Islam and the Arabs other creeds made themselves felt in Europe, and something of that creed which I yesterday called the Manichaean had remained all over the continent. But there was also, for instance, what we know as “Representation” through the doctrine of Averroës from the twelfth century, who said: The product of a man's pure intellect belongs, not specially to him, but to all humanity. Averroës says: We have not each a mind; we each have a body, but not each a mind. A has his own body, but his mind is the same as B has and C has. We might say: Averroës sees mankind as with a single intellect, a single mind; all individuals are merged in it. There they live, as it were, with the head. When they die, the body is withdrawn from this universal mind. There is no immortality in the sense of individual continuation after death. What continues, is the universal mind, that which is common to all men.

For Thomas the problem was that he had to reckon with the universality of mind, but he had to take the point of view that the universal mind is not so closely united with the universal memory in separate beings, but rather during life with the active forces of the bodily organization; and so united, forming such a unity, that everything working in man as the formative vegetable, and animal powers, as the power of memory, is attracted, as it were, during life by the universal mind and disposition. Thus Thomas imagines it, that man attracts the individual through the universal, and then draws into the spiritual world what his universal had attracted; so that he takes it there with him. You perceive, there can be no pre-existence for Albertus Magnus and Thomas, though there can be an after-existence. This was, after all, the same for Aristotle, and in this respect Aristotelianism is also continued in these thinkers.

In this way the great logical questions of the universals join up with the questions which concern the world-destiny of each individual. And even if I were to describe to you the Cosmology of Thomas Aquinas and the natural history of Albertus, which is extraordinarily wide-reaching, over almost all provinces and in countless volumes, you would see everywhere the influence of what I called the general logical nature of Albertinism and Thomism. And this logical nature consisted in this: with our reason—what was then called the Intellect—we cannot attain all heights; up to a certain point we can reach everything through logical acumen and dialectic, but then we have to enter into the region of faith. Thus as I have described it, these two things stand face to face, without contradicting each other: What we understand with our reason, and what is revealed through faith can exist side by side.

What does this really entail? I believe we can tackle this question from very different sides. What have we here before us historically as the essence of Albertinism and of Thomism? It is really characteristic of Thomas, and important, that while he is straining reason to prove the existence of God, he has to add at the same time that one arrives at a picture of God as it was rightly represented in the Old Testament as Jahve. That is, when Thomas departs from the paths of reason open to the individual human soul, he arrives at that unified God whom the Old Testament calls the Jahve-God. If one wants to arrive at the Christ, one has to pass over to faith; the individual spiritual experience of the human soul is not sufficient to attain to Him.

Now in the arguments which Scholasticism had to face (the spirit of the age demanded it), in these theories of the double truth—that a thing could be theologically true and philosophically false—there still lay something deeper; something which perhaps could not be seen in an age in which everywhere rationalism and logic were the pursuit of mankind. And it was the following: that those who spoke of this double truth were not of the opinion that what is theologically revealed and what is to be reached by reason are ultimately two things, but for the time being they are two truths, and that man arrives at these two truths because he has to the innermost part of his soul, shared in the faith. In the background of the soul up to the time of Albertus and Thomas flows, as it were, this question: Have we not assumed original sin in our thought, in what we see as reason in ourselves? Is it not just because reason has fallen from its spirituality that it deceives us with counterfeit truth for the real truth? If Christ enters our reason, or something else which it transforms and develops further, then only is it brought into harmony with that truth which is the content of faith.

The sinfulness of the reason was, in a way, responsible for the thinkers before Albertus and Thomas speaking of two truths. They wanted to take the doctrine of original sin and redemption through Christ seriously. But they had not the thinking power and the logic for it, though they were serious about it. They put the question to themselves: How does Christ redeem in us the truth of the reason which contradicts revealed spiritual truth? How do we become Christians through and through? For our reason is already vitiated through original sin, and therefore it contradicts the pure truth of faith.

And now appeared Albertus and Thomas, and to them it appeared first of all wrong that if we steep ourselves purely logically in the universalia in rebus, and if we take to ourselves the reality in things, we should launch forth in sinfulness over the world. It is impossible that the ordinary reason should be sinful. In this scholastic question lies really the question of Christology. And the question Scholasticism could not answer was: How does Christ enter into human thought? How is human thought permeated with Christ? How does Christ lead human thought up into those spheres where it can coalesce with spiritual faith-content? These things were the real driving force in the souls of the Schoolmen. Therefore, it is before all things important, although Scholasticism possessed the most perfect logical technique not to take the results, but to look through the answer to the question; that we ignore the achievements of the men of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and look at the large problems which were then propounded. They were not yet far enough to be able to apply the redemption of man from original sin to human thought. Therefore, Albertus and Thomas had to deny reason the right to mount the steps which would have enabled them to enter into the spiritual world itself. And Scholasticism left behind it the question: How can human thought develop itself upward to a view of the spiritual world? The most important outcome of Scholasticism is even a question, and is not its existing content. It is the question: How does one carry Christology into thought? How is thought made Christ-like? At the moment when Thomas Aquinas died in 1274 this question, historically speaking, confronted the world. Up to that moment he had been able to get only as far as this question. What is to become of it, one can for the time being only indicate by saying: man penetrates up to a certain point into the spiritual nature of things, but after that point comes faith. And the two must not contradict each other; they must be in harmony. But the ordinary reason cannot of its own accord comprehend the content of the highest things, as, for example, the Trinity, the incarnation of the Christ in the man Jesus, etc. Reason can comprehend only as much as to say: the world could have been created in Time, but it could also have existed from eternity. But revelation says it has been created in Time, and if you ask Reason again you find the grounds for thinking that the creation in Time is the rational and the wiser answer.

Thus the Scholiast takes his place for all the ages. More than one thinks, there survives to-day in Science, in the whole public life of the present what Scholasticism has left to us, although it is in a particular form. How alive Scholasticism really is still in our souls, and what attitude man to-day must adopt towards it, of this we shall speak tomorrow.

2. Das Wesen Des Thomismus

Was ich mich gestern besonders hervorzuheben bemühte, das war, daß in jener geistigen Entwickelung des Abendlandes, die dann ihren Ausdruck in der Scholastik gefunden hat, nicht bloß dasjenige spielt, was man in abstrakten Begriffen erfassen kann und was sich etwa in abstrakten Begriffen, in einer Entwickelung abstrakter Begriffe vollzogen hat, sondern daß dahinter eine reale Entwickelung der Impulse der abendländischen Menschheit steht. Ich meine das so: Man kann zunächst, wie man ja das zumeist in der Philosophiegeschichte macht, den Blick auf dasjenige richten, was man bei den einzelnen Philosophenpersönlichkeiten findet. Man kann verfolgen, wie gewissermaßen die Ideen, die man bei einer Persönlichkeit des 6., 7., 8., 9. Jahrhunderts findet, dann fortgesponnen werden von Persönlichkeiten des io0., I1., 12., 13. Jahrhunderts, und man kann durch eine solche Betrachtung den Eindruck gewinnen, ein Denker habe von dem anderen gewisse Ideen übernommen und es liege eine gewisse Evolution von Ideen vor.

Das ist eine geschichtliche Betrachtung des geistigen Lebens, die allmählich verlassen werden müßte. Denn dasjenige, was sich so abspielt, was sich offenbart aus den einzelnen menschlichen Seelen heraus, das sind doch eigentlich nur Symptome für ein tieferes Geschehen, das gewissermaßen hinter der Szene der äußeren Vorgänge liegt. Und dieses Geschehen, das sich abspielte von etwa ein paar Jahrhunderten an schon bevor das Christentum begründet worden ist, dann in den ersten nachchristlichen Jahrhunderten bis in die Zeit der Scholastik hinein, ist ein ganz organischer Vorgang im Werden der abendländischen Menschheit. Ohne den Blick hinzurichten auf diesen organischen Vorgang, ist es ebenso unmöglich, darüber Aufschluß zu bekommen, wie über dasjenige, was Entwickelung, sagen wir vom zwölften bis zum zwanzigsten menschlichen Lebensjahre ist, wenn man nicht den wichtigen Einschlag in diesem Lebensalter ins Auge fassen würde, der mit der Geschlechtsreife und all den Kräften, die sich da aus den Untergründen der menschlichen Wesenheit heraufarbeiten, verbunden ist. So wühlt sich herauf aus den Tiefen dieses ganzen großen Organismus europäischer Menschheit etwas, was man eben dadurch charakterisieren kann - man könnte auch andere Charakteristiken erfinden —, daß man sagt: Sehr ehrlich und aufrichtig haben jene alten Dichter gesprochen, die etwa wie Homer begannen ihre epischen Gedichte: Singe mir, Göttin, den Zorn des Peleiden Achilleus —, oder: Singe mir, Muse, die Taten des vielgewanderten Mannes. - Diese Leute haben nicht eine Phrase sagen wollen, diese Leute haben empfunden als inneren Tatbestand ihres Bewußtseins, daß nicht ein einzelnes individuelles Ich sich da aussprechen will, sondern daß sich aussprechen will, was in der Tat empfunden wurde als ein höheres Geistig-Seelisches, das hereinspielt in den gewöhnlichen Bewußtseinszustand des Menschen.

Und wiederum - ich sagte es schon gestern — war Klopstock aufrichtig und durchschaute in einer gewissen Beziehung diesen Tatbestand, wenn auch vielleicht nur instinktiv, als er seine «Messias»-Dichtung begann; jetzt nicht: Singe, o Muse -, oder: Singe, o Göttin, von der Erlösung der Menschen —, sondern als er sagte: Singe, unsterbliche Seele -, also: Singe, individuelles Wesen, das in dem einzelnen Menschen als einer Individualität wohnt. - Als Klopstock seinen «Messias» schrieb, war allerdings dieses individuelle Fühlen in der einzelnen Seele schon weit vorgeschritten. Aber dieser innere Trieb, die Individualität herauszukehren, individuell das Leben zu gestalten, bildete sich im eminentesten Sinne in dem Zeitalter aus, das etwa von der Begründung des Christentums bis zu der Hochscholastik verläuft. In dem, was die Philosophen gedacht haben, kann man nur das Oberste sehen, dasjenige, was an die alleräußerste Oberfläche hinaufgeht von dem, was in den Tiefen der ganzen Menschheit sich vollzieht: das Individuellwerden des Bewußtseins europäischer Menschen. Und ein wesentliches Moment in der Verbreitung des Christentums durch diese Jahrhunderte ist die Tatsache, daß diejenigen, welche die Träger dieser Verbreitung waren, hineinsprechen mußten in eine Menschheit, die aus den Tiefen ihres Wesens heraus den Menschen immer mehr und mehr zu einem innerlichen Individuell-Erfühlen hindrängte.

Nur unter diesem Gesichtspunkte lassen sich die einzelnen Ereignisse verstehen, die sich in diesem Zeitalter vollziehen. Und auch nur mit dem Blick auf diese Tatsachen läßt sich verstehen, was an Seelenkämpfen in solchen Persönlichkeiten stattgefunden hat, die dann eben in den tiefsten Tiefen der Menschenseele sich auseinandersetzen wollten mit dem Christentum auf der einen Seite und mit der Philosophie auf der andern Seite, wie Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquino. Heute liegt den gebräuchlichen Philosophiegeschichtsschreibern viel zu wenig von den wahren Gestalten der Seelenkämpfe vor, die ihren letzten Abschluß gewissermaßen in Albert und Thomas gefunden haben, als daß dieses Zeitalter in den gebräuchlichen Philosophiegeschichten auch nur annähernd deutlich genug geschildert würde. Da spielt vieles herein in das Seelenleben des Albert und des Thomas.

Äußerlich sieht es so aus, als ob Albertus Magnus, der vom 12. ins 13. Jahrhundert hinüber lebte, und Thomas, der im 13. Jahrhundert lebte, nur gewissermaßen dialektisch hätten vereinigen wollen auf der einen Seite Augustinismus, von dem wir gestern gesprochen haben, und Aristotelismus. Der eine war der 'Träger der kirchlichen Ideen, der andere der Träger der ausgebildeten philosophischen Ideen. Den Einklang zwischen beiden zu suchen zieht sich allerdings wie ein Duktus hindurch durch all dasjenige, was die beiden geschrieben haben. Aber in alldem, was da in Gedanken fixiert wird wie in einer Blüte des abendländischen Fühlens und Wollens, lebt doch unendlich viel darinnen von dem, was dann nicht auf jenes Zeitalter übergegangen ist, das sich etwa von der Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts bis in unsere Tage erstreckt, und aus dem wir unsere gebräuchlichen Ideen für alle Wissenschaften und auch für das gesamte öffentliche Leben entnehmen.

Dem heutigen Menschen erscheint es eigentlich nur wie etwas Paradoxes, wenn er hört, was wir gestern hören mußten von der Lebensanschauung des Augustinus: daß Augustinus tatsächlich der Anschauung war, daß ein Teil der Menschen von vornherein dazu bestimmt sei, die göttliche Gnade ohne Verdienst zu empfangen - denn eigentlich müßten sie nach der Erbsünde alle zugrunde gehen -, die göttliche Gnade zu empfangen und gerettet zu werden, seelisch-geistig gerettet zu werden; ein anderer Teil der Menschheit müsse seelisch-geistig zugrunde gehen, gleichgültig was er auch unternimmt. — Für den heutigen Menschen erscheint das paradox, vielleicht sogar sinnlos. Wer sich hineinfühlen kann in das Zeitalter, in dem Augustinus gelebt hat, in dem Augustinus all diejenigen Ideen und Empfindungen empfangen hat, die ich gestern charakterisierte, der wird anders fühlen. Der wird fühlen, daß man - noch dazu als ein Mensch wie Augustinus, der mittendrinnen stand in dem Kampfe zwischen dem Gedanken, der die ganze Menschheit als eine Einheit umfaßte, und jenem Gedanken, der die Individualität des Menschen herauskristallisieren wollte aus dieser einheitlichen Menschheit —, daß man es begreiflich finden kann, daß Augustinus auf diese Weise noch festhalten wollte an den Gedanken, die noch nicht als die altertümlichen Gedanken Rücksicht nahmen auf den einzelnen Menschen, die noch unter dem Einflusse solcher Ideen wie die des Plotinismus, den ich gestern charakterisiert habe, eben einzig und allein das Allgemeinmenschliche im Sinne hatten. Aber auf der anderen Seite wühlte auch in der Seele des Augustinus der Drang nach Individualität. Daher bekommen dieseIdeen eine so prägnante, seelen- und herzensmäßig prägnante Fassung, daher sind sie so erfüllt von menschlichem Erleben, und dadurch wird gerade Augustinus jene unendlich sympathische Gestalt, welche so tiefen Eindruck macht, wenn wir den Blick zurückwenden auf die Jahrhunderte, die der Scholastik vorangegangen sind.

Über Augustinus hinaus hat sich dann für viele dasjenige, was den einzelnen Menschen des Abendlandes als Christ zusammenhielt mit seiner Kirche — aber nur in den Ideen des Augustinus -—, erhalten. Nur waren diese Ideen, so wie ich sie Ihnen gestern gezeigt habe, eben nicht annehmbar für diese abendländische Menschheit, die den Gedanken nicht ertrug, die Gesamtmenschheit, das Einheitliche, als ein Ganzes zu nehmen und sich darinnen nur etwa zu fühlen wie ein Glied, noch dazu wie ein Glied, das zu dem Teil der Menschheit gehört, der dem Untergang, der Vernichtung verfallen ist. Und so sah sich die Kirche gedrängt, zu einem Ausweg zu greifen.

Augustinus führte noch seinen gewaltigen Kampf gegen den Pelagius, jenen Mann, der schon ganz erfüllt war von dem Individualimpuls des Abendlandes. Es war dies jene Persönlichkeit, bei der wir als einem Zeitgenossen des Augustinus sehen können, wie voraus erscheint das Sich-als-Individualität-Fühlen, wie es sonst erst die Menschen der späteren Jahrhunderte gehabt haben. Daher kann er nicht anders als sagen: Es kann keine Rede davon sein, daß der Mensch ganz unbeteiligt bleiben müsse an seinem Schicksal in der sinnlichen Welt; es muß aus der Menschenindividualität selbst herausgeboren werden können die Kraft, durch welche die Seele den Anschluß findet an das, was sie aus der Umstrickung der Sinnlichkeit erhebt in die reinen geistigen Regionen, wo sie ihre Erlösung und Rückkehr zur Freiheit und Unsterblichkeit finden kann. — Das war dasjenige, was Augustinus’ Gegner geltend machten: daß der einzelne Mensch die Kraft finden müsse, die Erbsünde zu überwinden.

Die Kirche stand mittendrinnen zwischen den beiden Gegnern, und sie suchte nach einem Ausweg. Dieser Ausweg wurde vielfach besprochen. Es wurde gewissermaßen hin und her geredet, und man ergriff dann die Mitte, und ich kann es jedem einzelnen von Ihnen überlassen, ob er diese Mitte in diesem Falle als die goldene Mitte oder als die kupferne Mitte ansieht. Man ergriff die Mitte: den Semipelagianismus. Man fand eine Formel, die eigentlich nicht recht Schwarz und nicht recht Weiß sagte, die verkündete: Es ist zwar so, wie Augustinus gesagt hat, aber es ist doch nicht ganz so, wie Augustinus gesagt hat; es ist auch nicht ganz so, wie Pelagius gesagt hat, aber es ist in einem gewissen Sinne auch so, wie er gesagt hat. Und so könne man sagen, daß zwar nicht durch einen weisheitsvollen ewigen Ratschluß der Gottheit die einen zur Sünde, die anderen zur Gnade verurteilt sind, daß die Menschen Anteil haben an ihrem Sündhaftwerden oder an ihrem Erfülltsein mit Gnade; aber die Sache sei denn doch so, daß zwar nicht eine göttliche Vorherbestimmung vorliege, aber ein göttliches Vorherwissen. Die Gottheit weiß vorher, ob der eine ein Sünder sein werde oder der andere ein Gnadenerfüllter sein werde.

Dabei wurde nicht weiter darauf Rücksicht genommen, als dieses Dogma verbreitet wurde, daß es sich im Grunde gar nicht um ein Vorherwissen handelte, sondern daß es sich darum handelte, klipp und klar Stellung zu nehmen zu dem, ob nun der einzelne individuelle Mensch sich verbinden kann mit den Kräften in seinem individuellen Seelenleben, die ihn herausheben aus seiner Trennung von dem göttlich-geistigen Wesen der Welt und ihn wieder zurückführen können zu dem göttlich-geistigen Wesen der Welt. So bleibt für das Dogmenwesen im Grunde genommen die Frage ungelöst, und ich möchte sagen: Auf der einen Seite genötigt, den Blick nach dem Dogmengehalt der Kirche zu richten, auf der anderen Seite aber aus innerster Empfindung heraus mit tiefster Verehrung für die Größe des Augustinus erfüllt, standen in der Hochscholastik Albertus und Thomas dem gegenüber, was sich als abendländische Geistesentwickelung innerhalb der christlichen Strömung ausbildete. Und hinein spielte doch noch manches aus früheren Zeiten. Es lebte fort so, daß man es sieht, wenn man genau hinblickt auf die Seele des Albertus, des Thomas, daß man es sieht auf dem Grunde ihrer Seele tätig sein, aber daß man auch einsieht, daß es ihnen selber nicht ganz vollbewußt ist, daß es in ihre Gedanken hineinspielt, daß sie es aber nicht zu einer präzisen Fassung bringen können.

Das muß man bedenken, mehr bedenken für diese Zeit der Hochscholastik des Albert und des Thomas, als man eine ähnliche Erscheinung zum Beispiel in unserer Zeit bedenken müßte. Das Warum habe ich mir schon erlaubt hervorzuheben in meinen «Welt- und Lebensanschauungen im neunzehnten Jahrhundert», die dann erweitert wurden zu meinem Buche «Die Rätsel der Philosophie», wo dann die Aufgabe anders gestellt war und daher die betreffende Stelle nicht wiederkehren konnte, wie ich mir noch erlauben will zu bemerken. Das gilt durchaus — und das wird uns morgen noch eingehend zu beschäftigen haben, jetzt will ich es nur erwähnen -, daß wir aus diesem Emporringen der Individualität bei den Denkern, die nun philosophisch ausbildeten dieses Emporringen der Individualität, dasjenige er-leben, was höchste Blüte logischer Urteilskraft ist, man könnte sagen höchste Blüte logischer Technik.

Man kann schimpfen wie man will von diesem oder jenem Parteistandpunkte über die Scholastik — all dieses Schimpfen ist in der Regel wenig von einer wirklichen Sachkenntnis erfüllt. Denn wer Sinn hat für die Art und Weise, wie sich, ganz abgesehen jetzt von.dem sachlichen Inhalt, der Scharfsinn der Gedanken abspielt bei irgend etwas, was wissenschaftlich oder sonst erklärt wird, wer Sinn dafür hat zu erkennen, wie Zusammenhänge zusammengedacht werden, die zusammengedacht werden müssen, wenn das Leben Sinn bekommen soll -, wer für alles das und für manches andere Sinn hat, für den geht es schon auf, daß so präzis, so innerlich logisch gewissenhaft niemals gedacht worden ist vorher, und nachher niemals gedacht worden ist als in der Zeit der Hochscholastik. Gerade das ist das Wesentliche, daß da das reine Denken mit mathematischer Sicherheit von Idee zu Idee, von Urteil zu Urteil, von Schlußfolgerung zu Schlußfolgerung so verläuft, daß über den kleinsten Schritt und über das kleinste Schrittchen diese Denker sich immer Rechenschaft geben.

Man muß nur bedenken, in welchem Milieu sich dieses Denken abspielte. Das war nicht ein Denken, das sich etwa so abspielte wie jetzt sich das Denken abspielt in der geräuschvollen Welt. Das war ein Denken, das sich abspielte in der stillen Klosterzelle oder sonst fern von dem Weltengetriebe. Das war ein Denken, das ganz aufging in dem Gedankenleben, und das war ein Denken, das auch noch durch andere Umstände die reine Denktechnik ausbilden konnte. Es ist heute tatsächlich schwer, diese reine Denktätigkeit auszubilden, denn kaum wird es irgendwie versucht, solche Denktätigkeit vor die Öffentlichkeit hinzustellen, die nichts anderes möchte als, durch ihren Inhalt bedingt, Gedanken an Gedanken reihen, dann kommen die unsachlichen Leute, die unlogischen Leute, greifen alles mögliche auf, werfen ihre brutalen Parteimeinungen entgegen. Und da man schon einmal ein Mensch unter Menschen ist, muß man sich auseinandersetzen mit diesen Dingen, die eigentlich nichts anderes sind als hineingeworfene Brutalitäten, die gar nichts zu tun haben oftmals mit demjenigen, um was es sich eigentlich handelt. Da ist sehr bald jene innere Ruhe verloren, der sich Denker des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts hingeben konnten, die nicht auf den Widerspruch der Unvorbereiteten in ihrem sozialen Leben so außerordentlich viel zu geben brauchten.

Dieses und noch manches andere hat gerade in diesem Zeitalter jene auf der einen Seite wunderbare plastische, aber auch in feinen Konturen verlaufende Denktätigkeit hervorgerufen, welche die Scholastik kennzeichnet und welche namentlich bewußt angestrebt worden ist von Leuten wie Albertus und Thomas.

Aber nun bedenke man dieses: Auf der einen Seite sind Forderungen des Lebens da, die sich so ausnehmen, daß man es zu tun hat mit nicht ins Klaregebrachten Dogmen, was in zahlreichen Fällen ähnlich war dem charakterisierten Semipelagianismus, und daß man kämpfte, um aufrechtzuerhalten dasjenige, von dem man glaubte, daß es aufrechterhalten werden müsse, weil es die dazu berechtigte Kirche aufgestellt hat, daß man das aufrechterhalten wollte mit dem scharfsinnigsten Denken. Man stelle sich nur vor, was es heißt, gerade mit dem scharfsinnigsten Denken hineinzuleuchten in das, was so geartet war, wie ich es Ihnen nach dem Augustinismus charakterisieren mußte. Man muß schon in dieses Innere des scholastischen Strebens hineinschauen und nicht bloß am Faden der Begriffe, die man aufgelesen hat, diesen Hergang von der Parristik bis zu der Scholastik charakterisieren wollen.

Es spielte eben vieles halb Unbewußte in diese Geister der Hochscholastik hinein, und man kommt eigentlich nur zurecht, wenn man über das, was ich schon gestern charakterisiert habe, hinausblickend, noch etwa eine solche Gestalt ins Auge faßt wie die, die halb mysteriös vom sechsten Jahrhundert an in das europäische Geistesleben eintrat, die bekannt geworden ist unter dem Namen des Dionysius des Areopagiten. Ich kann heute, weil die Zeit dazu nicht ausreichen würde, nicht eingehen auf all die Streitigkeiten darüber, ob nun irgend etwas daran ist, daß diese Schriften erst im sechsten Jahrhundert verfaßt worden sind oder ob die andere Anschauung die richtige ist, die wenigstens das Traditionelle dieser Schriften in viel frühere Zeiträume zurückführt. Auf all das kommt es ja nicht an, sondern darauf kommt es an, daß vorlagen die Anschauungen des Dionysius des Areopagiten für die Denker des siebenten, achten Jahrhunderts bis noch in die Zeiten des Thomas von Aquino, und daß diese Schriften durchaus mit christlicher Nuance dasjenige in einer besonderen Gestalt enthielten, was ich Ihnen gestern als den Plotinismus, als den Neuplatonismus des Plotin charakterisiert habe, aber eben in einer besonderen Gestalt, durchaus mit christlicher Nuance. Und ganz besonders bedeutsam ist es geworden für die christlichen Denker des ausgehenden Altertums und des Beginnes des Mittelalters bis in die Mitte des Mittelalters, eben bis zur Hochscholastik, wie sich der Schreiber der Dionysiusschen Schriften verhalten hat zu dem Aufsteigen der menschlichen Seele bis zu einer Anschauung über das Göttliche.

Dieser Dionysius wird ja gewöhnlich so geschildert, als ob er zwei Wege zum Göttlichen hätte. Die hat er auch. Der eine Weg ist der, daß er verlangt: Wenn der Mensch aufsteigen will von den Außendingen, die uns umgeben in der Welt, zu dem Göttlichen, so muß er versuchen herauszufinden aus all den Dingen, die da sind, ihre Vollkommenbheiten, ihr Wesentliches, muß versuchen zurückzugehen zu dem Allervollkommensten, muß die. Möglichkeit haben, das Allervollkommenste so mit Namen zu benennen, daß er einen Inhalt hat für dieses Göttlich-Vollkommenste, der nun wiederum sich gleichsam ausgießen und durch Individualisierung und Differenzierung die einzelnen Dinge der Welt aus sich hervorbringen kann. — So, möchte man sagen, ist für diesen Dionysius die Gottheit diejenige Wesenheit, die mit den Namen im reichlichsten Umfange versehen werden muß, die belegt werden muß mit den Prädikaten, die man als auszeichnendste Prädikate nur herausfinden kann aus allen Vollkommenheiten der Welt, die man zusammenfinden kann: Nimm all das, was dir auffällt in den Dingen der Welt an Vollkommenbheit, benenne es und benenne dann damit die Gottheit, dann kommst du zu einer Vorstellung über die Gottheit. — Das ist der eine Weg, den Dionysius vorschlägt.

Der andere Weg ist, daß er sagt: Du erreichst die Gottheit nie, wenn du ihr auch nur einen einzigen Namen gibst, denn der ganze Seelenprozeß, der darauf hinausgeht, Vollkommenheiten in den Dingen zu finden, der darauf hinausläuft, das Wesenhafte der Dinge zu suchen, es zusammenzufassen, um es dann in dieser Zusammenfassung der Gottheit anzuheften, das führt niemals zu dem, was man Erkennen der Gottheit nennen kann. Du mußt so werden, daß du dich frei machst von alledem, was du in den Dingen erkannt hast. Du mußt dein Bewußtsein vollständig reinigen von alldem, was du an den Dingen erfahren hast. Du mußt nichts mehr wissen von demjenigen, was dir die Welt sagt. Du mußt alle Namen, die du gewohnt bist, den Dingen zu geben, vergessen und dich in einen Seelenzustand versetzen, wo du von der ganzen Welt nichts weißt. Wenn du das in deinem Seelenzustand erleben kannst, dann erlebst du den Namenlosen, der sofort verkannt wird, wenn man ihm irgendeinen Namen beilegt; dann erkennst du den Gott, den Übergott in seiner Überschönheit. Aber schon die Namen Übergott und Überschönheit würden störend sein. Sie können nur dazu dienen, dich hinzuweisen auf dasjenige, was du als Namenloses erleben mußt.

Wie kommt man zurecht mit einer Persönlichkeit, die einem nicht eine Theologie gibt, die einem zwei Theologien gibt, eine positive und eine negative, eine rationalistische und eine mystische Theologie? Wer sich eben hineinversetzen kann in die Geistigkeit der Zeitalter, aus denen heraus das Christentum geboren ist, der kommt ganz gut damit zurecht. Wenn man allerdings den Verlauf der Menschheitsentwickelung auch für die ersten christlichen Jahrhunderte so schildert, wie die heutigen Materialisten das tun, dann erscheint einem so etwas wie die Schriften des Areopagiten mehr oder weniger als Narretei, als Hirnverbranntheit. Dann weist man sie in der Regel aber auch einfach zurück. Wenn man aber sich hineinversetzen kann in das, was damals erlebt und erfühlt worden ist, dann sieht man ein, was ein Mensch wie der Areopagite eigentlich wollte: im Grunde genommen nur ausdrücken, was Unzählige anstrebten. Für sie war nämlich die Gottheit ein Wesen, das man überhaupt nicht erkennen konnte, wenn man nur einen Weg zu ihr einschlug. Für ihn war die Gottheit ein Wesen, dem man sich nähern mußte auf rationellem Wege durch Namengebung und Namenfindung. Aber geht man nur diesen einen Weg, dann verliert man den Pfad, dann verliert man sich in dasjenige, was gewissermaßen der gottentleerte Weltenraum ist. Dann gelangt man nicht zu Gott. Aber man muß ihn gehen, diesen Weg, denn ohne ihn zu gehen, kommt man auch nicht zu dem Gotte. Aber man muß noch einen anderen Weg gehen. Das ist eben der, der das Namenlose anstrebt. Geht man jeden allein, dann findet man ebensowenig die Gottheit; aber geht man beide, so kreuzen sie sich, und man findet in dem Durchkreuzungspunkte die Gottheit. Es genügt nicht, zu streiten darüber, ob der eine Weg oder der andere Weg richtig sei. Beide sind sie richtig; aber jeder einzelne, für sich gegangen, führt zu nichts. Beide gegangen führen, wenn die Menschenseele sich im Kreuzungspunkte findet, zu dem, was angestrebt wird.

Ich kann begreifen, wie manche Menschen der Gegenwart, die gewöhnt sind an das, was als Polemik gilt, zurückschrecken vor dem, was hier von dem Areopagiten gefordert wird. Aber dasjenige, was hier gefordert wird, das lebte bei den Menschen, die in den ersten christlichen Jahrhunderten die führenden geistigen Persönlichkeiten waren, und es lebte dann traditionell noch weiter fort in der christlich-philosophischen Strömung des Abendlandes, und es lebte bis auf Albertus Magnus und bis auf Thomas von Aquino. Es lebte zum Beispiel durch jene Persönlichkeit, deren Namen ich schon gestern genannt habe, durch den am Hofe Karls des Kahlen lebenden Scotus Erigena. Dieser Scotus Erigena erinnert einen lebhaft an dasjenige, was ich Ihnen gestern sagte: Ich habe nie einen so sanften Menschen gekannt wie Vincenz Knauer, den Philosophiegeschichtsschreiber. Vincenz Knauer war immer sanft, aber er fing an wie ein Rohrspatz zu schimpfen, wenn die Rede kam auf Plotin oder das, was Plotin ähnlich war. Und Franz Brentano, der geistreiche Philosoph, der immer feierlich war, er wurde ganz unfeierlich und schimpfte in seinem Buch «Was für ein Philosoph manchmal Epoche macht» -, er meint «Plotin».

Diejenigen, die mehr oder weniger, wenn auch mit Scharfsinn und Geistreichigkeit, dem Rationalismus zugeneigt sind, die werden schon schimpfen, wenn sie das zu Gesicht, zum geistigen Gesichte bekommen, was etwa da ausströmte von dem Areopagiten, und was dann eine letzte bedeutende Offenbarung fand in diesem Erigena. Er war in den letzten Lebensjahren noch Benediktinerprior. Aber seine eigenen Mönche haben ihn, wie die Sage sagt — die Sage; ich sage ja nicht, daß das wörtlich wahr ist, aber wenn es nicht ganz wahr ist, so ist es annähernd wahr —, die haben ihn so lange mit Stecknadeln bearbeitet, bis er tot war, weil er noch den Plotinismus hereinbrachte in das neunte Jahrhundert. Aber über ihn hinaus lebten seine Ideen, die zugleich die weitere Fortbildung der Ideen des Areopagiten waren. Seine Schriften sind mehr oder weniger bis in späte Zeiten hinein verschwunden gewesen; sie sind dann ja doch auf die Nachwelt gekommen. Im 12. Jahrhundert ist Scotus Erigena als Ketzer erklärt worden. Aber das hat ja noch nicht eine solche Bedeutung gehabt wie später und wie heute. Trotzdem sind Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquino tief beeinflußt auch von den Ideen des Scotus Erigena.

Das ist das eine, was wir gewissermaßen als eine Erbschaft aus früheren Zeiten auf dem Grunde der Seelen erblicken müssen, wenn wir vom Wesen des Thomismus sprechen wollen. Noch ein anderes aber kommt in Betracht. Im Plotinismus, den ich Ihnen gestern in bezug auf seine Kosmologie zu charakterisieren versuchte, findet sich eine sehr bedeutsame, aus einer sinnlich-übersinnlichen Schauung hervorgegangene Charakteristik des menschlichen Wesens. Man bekommt vor diesen Dingen eigentlich erst wiederum Respekt, wenn man sie aus geisteswissenschaftlichen Untergründen heraus wieder findet. Da macht man auch ohne weiteres gern das folgende Geständnis. Da sagt man: Wenn man so unvorbereitet liest etwas wie den Plotin oder das, was von ihm überliefert ist, dann sieht es auch ziemlich chaotisch und kraus aus. Wenn man aber die entsprechenden Wahrheiten selber wieder entdeckt, dann gewinnen Ansichten, wenn sie auch anders ausgesprochen waren in der damaligen Zeit, als sie heute ausgesprochen werden müssen, doch ein ganz besonderes Antlitz. Und so ist denn bei Plotin eine Anschauung zu finden, die ich etwa in der folgenden Weise charakterisieren möchte.

Plotin betrachtet die menschliche Wesenheit mit ihren leiblich-seelisch-geistigen Eigentümlichkeiten. Er betrachtet sie zunächst von zwei Gesichtspunkten aus. Er betrachtet sie zuerst von dem Gesichtspunkte der Arbeit der Seele am Leib. Wollte ich in der heutigen Charakteristik sprechen, so müßte ich folgendes sagen. Plotin sagt sich zunächst: Wenn man ein Kind betrachtet, das hereinwächst in die Welt, dann sieht man, wie gewissermaßen noch fertig entwickelt wird dasjenige, was aus Geistig-Seelischem heraus sich als menschlicher Leib gestaltet. Für Plotin ist alles das, was materiell auftritt namentlich am Menschen — wenn ich den Ausdruck, bitte stoßen Sie sich nicht daran, gebrauchen darf - eine Ausschwitzung des Geistig-Seelischen, eine Krustation gewissermaßen des Geistig-Seelischen. Wir können alles das, was leiblich auftritt, als eine Krustation des GeistigSeelischen auffassen. Dann aber, wenn der Mensch herangewachsen ist bis zu einem gewissen Grade, dann hören die geistig-seelischen Kräfte auf, ins Leibliche hineinzuarbeiten. |

Man könnte also sagen (es wird gezeichnet): Zunächst haben wir es zu tun mit einer solchen Betätigung des GeistigSeelischen am Leiblichen, daß dieses Leibliche herausgestaltet, herausorganisiert wird aus dem Geistig-Seelischen. Die Menschheitsorganisation ist aus dem Geistig-Seelischen heraus gearbeitet. Wenn ein gewisser Reifezustand eingetreten ist für irgend etwas in der organischen Tätigkeit, sagen wir zum Beispiel für diejenige Tätigkeit, auf welche die Kräfte verwendet werden, die später als die Kräfte des Gedächtnisses erscheinen, so treten eben diese Kräfte, die früher in den Leib hineingearbeitet haben, in einer geistig-seelischen Metamorphose auf. Was also zuerst materiell gearbeitet hat vom Geistig-Seelischen, das befreit sich, wenn es fertig ist mit seiner Arbeit, und tritt auf als selbständige Wesenheit: Seelenspiegel müßte man etwa sagen, wenn man im Sinne des Plotin sprechen wollte.

Es ist außerordentlich schwierig, mit unseren heutigen Begriffen diese Dinge zu charakterisieren. Man kommt ihnen nahe, wenn man etwa das Folgende denkt: Man sehe, wie der Mensch von einem gewissen Reifezustand seines Gedächtnisses an sich erinnern kann. Das kann er nicht als kleines Kind. Wo sind die Kräfte, mit denen er sich erinnert? Sie arbeiten zunächst am Organismus, sie gestalten den Organismus. Haben sie am Organismus gearbeitet, dann emanzipieren sie sich rein geistig-seelisch und bearbeiten jetzt, aber noch immer als Geistig-Seelisches, den Organismus. Dann erst wohnt wiederum in diesem Seelenspiegel drinnen der eigentliche Kern, das Ich. In Charakteristiken, in einem Ideengehalt, der außerordentlich bildhaft ist, arbeiten diese Anschauungen von dem, was Seelisches tätig arbeitet, und von dem, was dann bleibt, was gewissermaßen passiv wird gegenüber der Außenwelt, so daß es wie das Gedächtnis aufnimmt die Eindrücke der Außenwelt, sie dann behält -, in einer außerordentlich bildhaften Weise wird diese zweifache Arbeit der Seele, diese Gliederung der Seele in einen aktiven Teil, der eigentlich den Leib aufbaut, und in einen passiven Teil, von jener älteren Schichte menschlichen Empfindens und menschlicher Weltanschauung geschildert, die in Plotin ihren letzten Ausdruck gefunden hat und die dann über‚gegangen ist auf Augustinus und seine Nachfolger.

Rationalisiert, in mehr physische Begriffe umgesetzt, finden wir diese Anschauung im Aristotelismus. Aristoteles hatte auch wiederum von Plato her und auch von dem, worauf wiederum Plato fußte, dieses Schauen vorliegend. Aber wenn man Aristoteles liest, ist es so, als ob man sagen müßte: Aristoteles selber bestrebt sich, alles in abstrakte Begriffe zu fassen, was er an alten Anschauungen vor sich hatte. Und so sehen wir in dem aristotelischen System, das sich nun auch fortpflanzte, das gewissermaßen die rationalistische Gestalt desjenigen war, was Plotin gegeben hat in der anderen Gestalt, wir sehen in dem, was sich als Aristotelismus fortpflanzt bis zu Albertus und bis zu Thomas dem Aquinaten, eine gewissermaßen rationalisierte Mystik, eine rationalistische Beschreibung des geistigen Geheimnisses der menschlichen Wesenheit.

Daß Aristoteles gewissermaßen heruntergeholt hat durch abstrakte Begriffe dasjenige, was die anderen in Schauungen gehabt haben, davon haben ein Bewußtsein Albertus und Thomas. Deshalb stehen sie auch dem Aristoteles wahrhaftig nicht so gegenüber wie die jetzigen Philosophiephilologen, die kuriose Streite entfaltet haben über zwei Begriffe, die von Aristoteles herrühren. Aber da die Aristotelischen Schriften nicht vollständig auf die Nachwelt gekommen sind, so findet man diese beiden Begriffe, ohne daß man sie bei Aristoteles im Zusammenhang hat — was ja immer eine Tatsache ist, die für viele gelehrte Streitigkeiten den Unterschied bieten kann -, man findet zwei Ideen bei Aristoteles. Aristoteles sieht ja in der menschlichen Wesenheit das, was zu einer Einheit zusammenfaßt das vegetative Prinzip des Menschen, das animalische Prinzip des Menschen, das niedere menschliche Prinzip, und dann das höhere menschliche Prinzip, dasjenige, was Aristoteles den Nous, was die Scholastik dann den Intellekt nennt. Aber Aristoteles unterscheidet zwischen dem Nous poietikos und dem Nous pathetikos, zwischen dem tätigen und leidenden Geiste des Menschen. Die Ausdrücke sind nicht mehr so bezeichnend, wie die griechischen waren, aber man kann doch sagen, Aristoteles unterscheidet zwischen dem aktiven Verstand, dem tätigen Geist des Menschen und dem passiven Verstand des Menschen. Was ist damit gemeint?

Man begreift nicht, was damit gemeint ist, wenn man nicht auf den Ursprung dieser Begriffe zurückgeht. Geradeso wie die anderen Seelenkräfte sind in einer anderen Metamorphose die beiden Arten des Verstandes an dem Aufbau der menschlichen Seele betätigt: der Verstand, insofern er wirkt als tätiger, noch im Aufbau des Menschen wirksam, aber als Verstand, nicht wie das Gedächtnis einmal aufhörend und dann als Gedächtnis sich emanzipierend, sondern als Verstand das ganze Leben hindurch wirkend, das ist der Nous poietikos, das ist dasjenige, was aus dem Weltenall heraus sich individualisierend den Leib aufbaut im Sinne des Aristoteles. Es ist nichts anderes als das, was die den menschlichen Leib aufbauende tätige Seele des Plotin auch ist. Und dasjenige, was dann sich emanzipiert, was nur noch dazu da ist, um die äußere Welt aufzunehmen und die Eindrücke der äußeren Welt dialektisch zu verarbeiten, das ist der Nous pathetikos, das ist der leidende Intellekt, der intellectus possibilis. Es geht zurück, was in scharfer Dialektik, in präziser Logik in der Scholastik uns entgegentritt, auf diese alten Überlieferungen. Und man kommt nicht zurecht mit dem, was in den Seelen der Scholastiker sich abspielte, wenn man nicht dieses Hereinspielen uralter Traditionen berücksichtigt.

Dadurch, daß das alles, was ich Ihnen geschildert habe, in die Seele der Scholastiker hineinspielte, entstand für sie die große Frage, die man so gewöhnlich als das eigentliche Problem der Scholastik empfindet. In der Zeit, in der es für die Menschheit ein Schauen gab, das solche Dinge hervorbrachte wie den Platonismus oder seine rationalistische Filtrierung, den Aristotelismus, in der aber auch noch nicht das individuelle Fühlen bis zu seinem Höhepunkt gekommen war, in dieser Zeit konnte es die Scholastikprobleme noch nicht geben. Denn dasjenige, was wir heute Verstand nennen, was wir heute Intellekt nennen, und was nach der einen Seite hin seinen Ursprung in der Scholastikterminologie hat, das ist gerade ein Ausfluß des individuellen Menschen. Wenn wir alle gleich denken, so kommt es nur davon, daß wir alle gleich individuell organisiert sind und daß der Verstand geknüpft ist an dies in allen Menschen gleich organisierte Individuelle. Sie denken schon, insoferne Sie differenziert sind, auch verschieden. Das sind aber Nuancen, die mit der eigentlichen Logik nichts zu tun haben. Das eigentliche logische und dialektische Denken ist aber ein Ausfluß der allgemeinen menschheitlichen, aber individuell differenzierten Organisation. |

So steht dann der Mensch, wenn er fühlt, er ist eine Individualität, da und sagt sich: Da steigen im Menschen auf die Gedanken, durch die die Außenwelt innerlich repräsentiert wird; da werden gewissermaßen von innen heraus die Gedanken zusammengestellt, die in ihrer Zusammenstellung wiederum ein Bild der Welt geben sollen. Da arbeiten im Innern des Menschen auf der einen Seite Vorstellungen, die sich knüpfen an einzelne individuelle Dinge, wie an einen einzelnen Stier oder an einen einzelnen Menschen, sagen wir wie Augustinus. Dann aber kommt der Mensch zu anderen inneren Erlebnissen, wie zu seinen Träumen, für die er einen solchen äußeren Repräsentanten zunächst nicht findet. Da kommt er zu denjenigen Erlebnissen, die er sich bildet, die rein Schimäre sind, wie hier auch schon für die Scholastik der Kentaur oder dergleichen Schimäre waren.

Dann sind aber auf der anderen Seite diejenigen Begriffe und Ideen, die eigentlich nach beiden Seiten hin schillern: die Menschheit, der Typus Löwe, der Typus Wolf, und so weiter. Das sind die allgemeinen Begriffe, welche die Scholastiker nach altem Gebrauch die Universalien nannten. Als die Sache für die Menschen so lag, wie ich sie Ihnen gestern geschildert habe, als man herauf sich erhob gewissermaßen zu diesen Universalien und sie empfand als die unterste Grenze der sich dem Menschen durch Schauen offenbarenden Geistwelt, da waren eben einfach diese Universalien — Menschheit, Tierheit, Löwenheit und so weiter — dasjenige, durch das sich die Geistwelt, die intelligible Welt offenbarte, dasjenige, was die Seele als einen Ausfluß der übersinnlichen Welt erlebte. Um so zu erleben, war es nötig, jenes individuelle Gefühl noch nicht in sich zu haben, das sich dann in den charakterisierten Jahrhunderten auslebte. Jenes individualisierte Gefühl brachte es dahin, daß man sich sagte: Man steigt von den Sinnendingen auf bis zu jener Grenze, wo die mehr oder weniger abstrakten, aber doch erlebten Dinge sind, die Universalien Menschheit, Löwenheit, und so weiter.

Das sah die Scholastik sehr gut ein, daß man nicht ohne weiteres sagen kann: Das sind bloße Konzeptionen, bloße Zusammenfassungen der äußeren Welt —, sondern für die Scholastik wurde das ein Problem, mit dem sie rang. Wir müssen uns aus unserer Individualität heraus solche allgemeinen Begriffe bilden, solche Universalbegriffe. Wenn wir aber auf die Welt hinausschauen, so haben wir nicht die Menschheit, sondern einzelne Menschen, nicht die Wolfheit, sondern einzelne Wölfe. Aber auf der andern Seite: Wir können nicht dasjenige, was wir uns als die Wolfheit ausbilden oder als die Lammbheit ausbilden, nur sehen gewissermaßen so, daß wir einmal die Materie in einer Weise lammhaft gebildet haben, ein anderes Mal sie wolfhaft gebildet haben und die Wolfheit und die Lammheit nur so Zusammenstellungen wären, und das Materielle, das in diesen Zusammenfassungen drinnen ist, nur das einzig Wirkliche sei. Das können wir auch nicht ohne weiteres annehmen, denn wenn wir das annehmen, dann müßten wir ja annehmen: Sperren wir einen Wolf ein und schauen wir darauf, daß er durch eine gewisse Zeit hindurch, bis sein Stoffwechsel vollständig umgesetzt ist, nur Lämmer frißt, da erfüllt er sich dann ganz mit Lammesmaterie; aber er wird kein Lamm. Die Materie macht es nicht, er bleibt Wolf. Die Wolfheit ist also doch etwas, was nicht so ohne weiteres bloß mit dem Materiellen in einen Zusammenhang gebracht wird, denn materiell ist der ganze Wolf Lamm, aber er bleibt Wolf.

Es ist heute vielfach ein Problem, das die Menschen gar nicht ernst nehmen. Es ist ein Problem gewesen, mit dem man mit allen Fasern der Seele gerungen hat in der Scholastik, gerade in ihrer Blütezeit. Und dieses Problem, das war in unmittelbarem Zusammenhang stehend mit den kirchlichen Interessen. Wie es mit den Kircheninteressen im Zusammenhang steht, davon können wir uns eine Vorstellung machen, wenn wir das Folgende berücksichtigen.

Bevor Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquino mit ihrer besonderen Ausgestaltung der Philosophie auftraten, war es so, daß allerdings Leute schon aufgetreten waren wie Roscellin zum Beispiel, die die Behauptung aufgestellt haben und auch durchaus der Meinung waren: Diese allgemeinen Begriffe, diese Universalien sind eigentlich nichts anderes als dasjenige, was wir zusammenfassen von den äußeren individuellen Dingen; sie sind eigentlich bloße Worte, bloße Namen. — Und es hatte sich ausgebildet ein gewisser Nominalismus, der in den allgemeinen Dingen, in den Universalien, nur Worte sah. Aber Roscellin, der hat dogmatisch Ernst gemacht mit dem Nominaliismus und hat ihn auf die Trinität angewendet und hat gesagt: Wenn — was er als Richtiges ansah — dasjenige, was Zusammenfassung ist, nur ein Wort ist, dann ist die Dreieinigkeit nur ein Wort, und die Individuen sind das einzig Wirkliche: der Vater, der Sohn, der Heilige Geist. Dann fasse nur der menschliche Verstand durch einen Namen diese drei: Vater, Sohn und Heiliger Geist. - Mittelalterliche Geister haben bis in die letzten Konsequenzen hin solche Dinge ausgedehnt. Die Kirche war genötigt, auf der Synode zu Soissons diese Anschauung des Roscellin für einen partiellen Polytheismus und die Lehre für häretisch zu erklären. Also man war in einer gewissen Kalamität gegenüber dem Nominalismus. Es war also ein dogmatisches Interesse, das sich mit einem philosophischen zusammenschloß.

Heute empfindet man selbstverständlich eine solcheSituation nicht mehr als etwas Reales. In der damaligen Zeit hat man es allerdings als etwas sehr Reales empfunden, und gerade mit dem Verhältnis der Universalien zu den individuellen Dingen ringen die beiden geistig, Thomas und Albertus, und das ist für sie das wichtigste Problem. Im Grunde genommen ist alles andere nur eine Folge, das heißt insofern eine Folge, als alles andere eine gewisse Schattierung bekommen hat durch die Art und Weise, wie sie sich zu diesem Problem gestellt haben. Aber gerade in die Art und Weise, wie sich Albertus und Thomas zu diesem Problem gestellt haben, spielen hinein alle die Kräfte, die ich Ihnen bis jetzt geschildert habe, alle die Kräfte, die noch als Tradition geblieben waren von dem Areopagiten, die geblieben waren von Plotin, die durchgegangen waren durch die Seele des Augustinus, durch Erigena und durch viele andere, — all das spielt herein in die besondere Art der Gedankenformung, welche nun zutage trat zunächst durch Albertus und dann in einer weitläufigen philosophischen Begründung durch Thomas. Und man wußte ja noch: Da hat es Menschen gegeben, die über die Begriffe hinaufsahen in die geistige Welt, in die intellektuelle Welt, in diejenige Welt, von der auch der Thomismus als von einer Wirklichkeit spricht, in der er die materiefreien intellektuellen Wesen erblickt, die er die Engel nennt. Das sind nicht bloße Abstraktionen, das sind reale Wesenheiten, die nur keine Leiber haben. Es sind jene Wesenheiten, die Thomas versetzt in die zehnte Sphäre. Indem er sich umkreist denkt die Erde von der Sphäre des Mondes, des Merkur, der Venus, der Sonne und so weiter, kommt er dann über die achte zur neunten Sphäre und zu dem, was das Empyreum war, also zur zehnten Sphäre. Er denkt sich das alles durchaus durchsetzt von Intelligenzen, und die Intelligenzen, auf die er zunächst rekurriert, es sind diejenigen, welche das, was sie zu ihrer untersten Grenze haben, gewissermaßen hinunterscheinen lassen so, daß die menschliche Seele es erleben kann.

Aber so, wie ich es jetzt ausgesprochen habe, in dieser Form, in der es mehr angelehnt ist an den Plotinismus, kommt es nicht heraus aus dem bloßen individuellen Fühlen, zu dem sich gerade die Scholastik durchgerungen hatte, sondern es blieb für Albertus und für Thomas ein Glaube, daß es über den abstrakten Begriffen oben die Offenbarung dieser abstrakten Begriffe gebe. Und für sie entstand die Frage: Welche Realität haben denn diese abstrakten Begriffe?

Nun hatten sowohl Albertus wie Thomas noch eine Vorstellung von dem Tatbestand des Arbeitens des SeelischGeistigen an dem Leiblichen und des nachherigen Sichspiegelns des Seelisch-Geistigen, wenn genügend am Leiblichen gearbeitet ist. Von alldem hatten sie Vorstellungen. Sie hatten nun Vorstellungen auch von dem, was der Mensch in seinem einzelnen individuellen Leben wird, wie er von Jahr zu Jahr, von Jahrzehnt zu Jahrzehnt sich weiterentwickelt gerade durch dasjenige, was er an Eindrücken der Außenwelt aufnimmt und durch Eindrücke der Außenwelt verarbeitet. Und so bildete sich aus der Gedanke, daß wir allerdings die Welt um uns herum haben, aber diese Welt ist eine Offenbarung dessen, was überweltlich ist, was geistig ist. Indem wir die Welt betrachten, indem wir uns zu den einzelnen Mineralien, Pflanzen und Tieren hinwenden, ahnen wir gewissermaßen, daß dahintersteckt dasjenige, was sich offenbart aus höheren geistigen Welten.

Betrachten wir dann mit logischer Zergliederung, mit alldem, wozu uns unsere Seele fähig macht, mit alldem, was an Denkkraft in uns ist, die Welt der Naturreiche, so kommen wir zu dem, was von der geistigen Welt in die Naturreiche hineingelegt ist. Dann aber müssen wir uns klarwerden darüber: Wir wenden unseren Blick, unsere übrigen Sinnesorgane hin auf diese Welt. Da stehen wir mit der Welt in Verkehr. Wir gehen dann weg von der Welt. Wir bewahren gewissermaßen als Erinnerung dasjenige auf, was wir aus der Welt aufgenommen haben. Wir blicken in der Erinnerung wiederum zurück. Da erscheint uns eigentlich erst das Universelle, das Allgemeine, so etwas wie «Menschheit» und dergleichen, das erscheint uns erst in der inneren begrifflichen Gestalt. So daß Albertus und Thomas sagen: Blickst du zurück, wenn dir deine Seele reflektiert dasjenige, was ssiean der Außenwelt erlebt hat, dann hast du in deiner Seele lebend die Universalia. Du hast dann Universalia. Du bildest dir aus all den Menschen heraus, die dir begegnet sind, den Begriff der Menschheit. Du könntest ja überhaupt, wenn du nur individuelle Dinge erinnertest, bloß in irdischen Namen leben. Indem du überhaupt nicht bloß in irdischen Namen lebst, mußt du Universalia erleben. Da hast du die universalia post res, diejenigen, die nach den Dingen in der Seele leben. Während der Mensch seine Seele hinwendet zu den Dingen, hat er nicht dasselbe in seiner Seele, was er nachher hat, wenn er sich daran erinnert, wenn es ihm gewissermaßen vom Innern reflektiert wird, sondern er steht in einer realen Beziehung zu den Dingen. Er erlebt an den Dingen ihr Geistiges; er übersetzt es sich nur in die Form der Universalien post rem.

Indem Albertus und Thomas annehmen, daß der Mensch in dem Augenblicke, wo er durch sein Denkvermögen in Beziehung steht zu seiner Umgebung, zu einem Realen in Beziehung steht, also nicht bloß zu dem, was der Wolf ist dadurch, daß das Auge ihn sieht, das Ohr ihn hört und so weiter, sondern dadurch, daß der Mensch über ihn denken kann, sich den Typus «Wolf» herausbildet, erlebt er etwas, was in den Dingen unanschaulich gedanklich erfaßt wird, was auch nicht in den Sinnenentitäten aufgeht. Er erlebt die universalia in rebus, in den Dingen.

Nun ist die Unterscheidung nicht ganz leicht zu machen, weil man gewöhnlich denkt, dasjenige, was man im Innern seiner Seele hat zuletzt als Reflexion, das sei auch in den Dingen dasselbe. Nein, es ist nicht dasselbe im Sinne des Thomas von Aquino. Was der Mensch als Idee in seiner Seele erlebt, mit seinem Verstande sich erklärt, das ist dasjenige, wodurch er das Reale, das Universelle erlebt. So daß der Form nach die Universalien iz den Dingen verschieden sind von den Universalten nach den Dingen, die in der Seele dann bleiben; aber innerlich sind sie dasselbe. Da haben Sie einen der scholastischen Begriffe, die man sich gewöhnlich nach ihrer ganzen Schärfe nicht vor die Seele führt. Die Universalien in den Dingen und die Universalien nach den Dingen in der Seele sind inhaltlich dasselbe, nur der Form nach verschieden.

Dann aber kommt noch dazu, daß nun das, was in den Dingen ausgebreitet, individualisiert lebt, wiederum hinweist auf dasjenige, was ich gestern als im Plotinismus liegend, als die eigentlich intelligible Welt charakterisierte. Da sind wiederum dieselben Inhalte, die in den Dingen, nach den Dingen in der Menschenseele sind, inhaltlich gleich, formell verschieden, sind wiederum in anderer Form enthalten, aber wiederum von gleichem Inhalt: das sind die universalia ante res, vor den Dingen. Das sind die Universalien, wie sie in dem göttlichen Verstande und in dem Verstande der Diener des Göttlichen, der englischen Wesenheiten, enthalten sind.

So wird dasjenige, was einer älteren Zeit unmittelbar geistig-sinnlich-übersinnliches Anschauen war, zu Anschauungen, die nur eben in sinnlichen Bildern abgebildet wurden, weil man das, was man übersinnlich schaut, selbst nach dem Areopagiten nicht einmal mit einem Namen benennen kann, wenn man es in seiner wahren Gestalt behandeln will. Man kann nur hinweisen und sagen: Es ist das alles nicht, was die äußeren Dinge sind. — So wird dasjenige, was für die Alten Schauung war, was für die Alten sich als eine Realität in der geistigen Welt darstellte, für dieScholastik etwas, worüber zu entscheiden hat eben all jener Scharfsinn des Denkens, all jene Plastizität und feine Logik, von der ich Ihnen heute gesprochen habe. Es ist heruntergeholt das Problem, das früher durch Schauen abgemacht wurde, in die Sphäre des Denkens, in die Sphäre der Ratio. Das ist das Wesen des Thomismus, das Wesen des Albertinismus, das Wesen der Hochscholastik. Sie sieht vor allen Dingen, daß in ihrer Zeit das Erfühlen der menschlichen Individualität in der Kulmination angelangt ist. Sie sieht vor allen Dingen alle Probleme vor sich in der rationellen Gestalt, in der logischen Gestalt, in der Gestalt, wie sie der Denker auffassen muß.

Mit dieser Gestalt der Weltenprobleme in der Form des Denkens ringt wesenhaft die Scholastik. Und mit diesem Ringen und Denken steht die Scholastik mitten im kirchlichen Leben drinnen, das ich Ihnen nach den verschiedensten Seiten gestern und heute, wenn auch nur mit einzelnen Lichtern, beleuchtet habe. Da steht dasjenige, wovon man im 13., im 12. Jahrhundert glauben konnte, es ist zu erringen mit dem Denken, mit der scharfsinnigen Logik; da steht auf der anderen Seite dasjenige, was als kirchliche Dogmen überliefert ist, da steht der Glaubensinhalt.

Nehmen wir ein Beispiel, wie ein solcher Denker wie Thomas von Aquino zu den beiden Dingen steht. Da sagt Thomas von Aquino: Kann man das Dasein Gottes beweisen durch Logik? Ja, man kann es. - Thomas von Aquino gibt eine ganze Reihe von Beweisen. Einer derselben ist zum Beispiel der, daß er sagt: Erkenntnisse können wir zunächst nur gewinnen, indem wir an die universalia in rebus herangehen, in die Dinge hineinblicken. Wir können nicht durch Schauen — das ist einfach persönliches Erlebnis dieses Zeitalters - in die geistige Welt eindringen. Wir können nur dadurch mit menschlichen Kräften in die geistige Welt eindringen, daß wir uns in die Dinge vertiefen, aus den Dingen dasjenige herausholen, was wir universalia in rebus nennen können. Dann kann man zurückschließen, wie das mit diesen universalia ante res ist vorher —, so sagt er. Die Welt sehen wir bewegt; ein Ding bewegt immer das andere, weil es selbst bewegt ist. So kommen wir von einem bewegten Ding zu einem anderen bewegten Ding, von dem anderen bewegten Ding zu einem weiteren bewegten Ding. Das kann nicht so fortgehen, sondern wir müssen zu einem ersten Beweger kommen. Wäre der aber wieder bewegt, so würde es sich darum handeln, daß wir zu einem anderen Beweger übergehen. Wir müssen also zu einem unbewegten Beweger kommen. — Damit ist Thomas gerade angelangt - und auch Albertus macht ja denselben Schluß - bei dem aristotelischen unbewegten Beweger, bei der ersten Ursache. Den Gott als eine notwendig erste Wesenheit, als einen notwendig unbewegten ersten Beweger anzuerkennen, das ist dem logischen Denken gegeben.

Für die Trinität gibt es keinen solchen Gedankengang, der zu ihr hinführt. Sie ist aber überliefert. Man kann mit dem menschlichen Denken nur so weit kommen, daß man probiert, ob die Trinität widersinnig ist. Da findet man: Sie ist nicht widersinnig, aber man kann sie nicht beweisen, man muß sie glauben, man muß sie hinnehmen als einen Inhalt, bis zu dem sich die auf sich selbst gestellte menschliche Intellektualität nicht erheben kann.

So steht die Scholastik vor der damals so bedeutungsvollen Frage: Wie weit kommt man mit dem sich selbst überlassenen menschlichen Verstande? Aber durch die Zeitentwickelung war sie noch in ganz besonderer Weise hineingestellt in die Tiefen dieses Problems, denn andere Denker gingen voran. Die hatten etwas scheinbar ganz Absurdes angenommen. Die hatten gesagt, es könne etwas theologisch wahr und philosophisch falsch sein. Man könne rundweg sagen: Es kann durchaus sein, daß Dinge dogmatisch überliefert sind, wie zum Beispiel die Trinität; wenn man dann nachdenkt über dieselbe Frage, so kommt man zum entgegengesetzten Resultat. Es ist durchaus möglich, daß die Vernunft zu anderen Ergebnissen führt als der Glaubensinhalt. — Und das ist wichtig, das war das andere, wovor die Scholastiker standen: die Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit. Das ist dasjenige, worauf die beiden Denker Albertus und Thomas ganz besonderen Wert legten: den Glaubensinhalt in Einklang zu bringen mit dem Vernunftinhalt, keinen Widerspruch zu suchen zwischen dem, was die Vernunft denken kann, allerdings nur bis zu einer gewissen Grenze, und dem Glaubensinhalt. Aber was die Vernunft denken kann, darf nicht widersprechen dem Glaubensinhalt, der Glaubensinhalt darf nicht widersprechen der Vernunft.

Das war dazumal ein Radikalismus, denn die Mehrzahl der tonangebenden Kirchenautoritäten hielt fest an der Lehre der doppelten Wahrheit: daß einfach der Mensch müsse auf der einen Seite etwas Vernünftiges denken, inhaltlich in einer Gestalt, und der Glaubensinhalt könne es ihm in einer anderen Gestalt geben, und er müsse mit diesen zweiGestalten der Wahrheit leben.-Ich glaube, man könnte ein Gefühl bekommen für das geschichtliche Werden, wenn man bedenken würde, daß die Menschen mit ihren ganzen Seelenkräften vor so wenigen Jahrhunderten in solchen Problemen drinnensteckten. Denn diese Dinge tönen noch fort in unsere Zeiten. Wir leben auch noch in diesen Problemen. Wie wir darinnen leben, das wollen wir dann morgen besprechen. Heute wollte ich das Wesen des Thomismus im allgemeinen so charakterisieren, wie er in der damaligen Zeit gelebt hat.

Nun, sehen Sie, so war es, daß das Hauptproblem, das sich vor Albertus und Thomas hinstellte, das war: Wie verhält sich der Vernunftinhalt des Menschen zu dem Glaubensinhalt? Wie kann dasjenige, was die Kirche zu glauben vorgibt, erstens verstanden werden, zweitens verteidigt werden gegen das, was ihm entgegengesetzt ist? Darinnen hatten ja auch Leute wie Albertus und Thomas viel zu tun. Denn in Europa lebte nun nicht eben ausschließlich das, was ich charakterisiert habe, sondern es lebten noch allerlei andere Ansichten. Mit der Ausbreitung des Islam, mit der Ausbreitung der Araber haben sich noch andere Anschauungen in Europa geltend gemacht. Und etwas von jenen Anschauungen, die ich gestern als die manichäischen charakterisiert habe, war über ganz Europa hin geblieben.

Aber auch so etwas lebte wie dasjenige, was man als Repräsentation kennt durch die Lehre des Averroës aus dem 12. Jahrhundert, der da sagte: Was der Mensch denkt mit seinem reinen Intellekt, das gehört ihm nicht besonders, das gehört der ganzen Menschheit an. — Averroes sagt: Wir haben nicht etwa einen Verstand für uns; wir haben jeder einen Leib für uns, aber nicht jeder hat einen Verstand für sich. Der A hat einen eigenen Leib, aber der Verstand, der ist derselbe, den auch der B und wieder der C hat. - Man könnte sagen, für Averroes ist die Menschheit so, daß eine einheitliche Intelligenz, Verstand, da ist; in den tauchen alle Individuen unter. Da leben sie mit ihrem Kopf gewissermaßen. Wenn sie sterben, zieht sich der Leib zurück aus diesem universellen Verstande. Eine Unsterblichkeit gibt es nicht in dem Sinne eines individuellen Weiterdauerns nach dem Tode. Was da dauert, ist nur der universelle Verstand, ist nur das, was allen Menschen gemeinsam ist. .

Für Thomas lag die Sache so, daß er zu rechnen hatte mit dieser Universalität des Verstandes, daß er aber sich stellen mußte auf den Standpunkt, daß dasjenige, was universeller Verstand ist, sich nicht nur so innig vereinigt mit dem, was oben nun individuelles Gedächtnis ist im einzelnen Menschen, sondern was während des Lebens sich so vereinigt auch mit dem, was die tätigen Kräfte der Organisation, der leiblichen Organisation sind, so vereinigt, so eine Einheit bildet, daß all das, was im Menschen wirkt als die gestaltenden, vegetativen Kräfte, animalen Kräfte, als die Kräfte des Gedächtnisses, daß all das gewissermaßen während des Lebens angezogen wird von dem universellen Verstande und der Gesinnung. So daß sich Thomas das so vorstellt, daß der Mensch das Individuelle durch das Universelle anzieht und dann in die geistige Welt hineinzieht dasjenige, was sein Universelles angezogen hat, so daß er es da hineinträgt. Es kann also für Albertus und Thomas keine Präexistenz geben, wohl aber eine Postexistenz. Das ist ja dasjenige, was auch für Aristoteles da war. In dieser Beziehung wird auch der Aristotelismus fortgesetzt von diesen Denkern.

So schließen sich zusammen die großen logischen Fragen der Universalien mit den Fragen, die das Weltenschicksal der einzelnen Menschen betreffen. In alles spielt schließlich — auch wenn ich Ihnen die Kosmologie des Thomas von Aquino, wenn ich Ihnen die außerordentlich weite, über fast alle Gebiete sich erstreckende, zahlreiche Bände umfassende Naturgeschichte des Albertus charakterisieren würde -, in all die Einzelheiten spielt hinein dasjenige, was ich Ihnen als das allgemeine logische Wesen des Albertinismus und des Thomismus charakterisieren mußte. Diese logische Wesenheit bestand darinnen: Wir können mit unserer Vernunft, was man dazumal eben den Intellekt nannte, nicht hinaufreichen; bis zu einer gewissen Grenze können wir alles in scharfsinniger Logik und Dialektik durchdringen, dann müssen wir eindringen in den Glaubensinhalt. Und so, wie ich es charakterisiert habe, standen beide diesen zwei Dingen gegenüber, ohne daß sie sich widersprechen: Was wir mit unserer Vernunft erfassen und was durch den Glaubensinhalt geoffenbart ist, beides kann nebeneinandergehen.

Was lag denn nun aber eigentlich vor? Ich glaube, man kann diese Frage von den verschiedensten Seiten anfassen. Was lag da eigentlich welthistorisch vor als Wesen des Albertinismus und als Wesen des Thomismus? Sehen Sie, für Thomas ist eigentlich charakteristisch und wichtig, daß er, indem er die Vernunft anstrengt, den Gott zu beweisen, zu gleicher Zeit zusetzen muß: Man kommt zu einer Gottesvorstellung, wie sie mit Recht im Alten Testament als Jahve bezeichnet worden ist. — Das heißt, indem Thomas ausgeht von den vernünftigen Wegen, welche die einzelne Menschenseele machen kann, kommt er zu jenem einheitlichen Gotte, den auch das Alte Testament als den Jahve-Gott bezeichnet hat. Will man zu dem Christus kommen, muß man zu dem Glaubensinhalt übergehen; zu ihm kann man nicht durch das kommen, was die menschliche Seele an eigenem Geistigen erlebt.

Nun steckt in den Auseinandersetzungen, gegen die sich die Hochscholastik einfach aus dem Zeitgeiste heraus wenden mußte, in diesen Anschauungen von der doppelten Wahrheit — daß etwas theologisch wahr und philosophisch falsch sein könne -, in ihnen steckt doch noch etwas Tieferes darinnen, was man allerdings in dem Zeitalter nicht überschauen konnte, in dem man überall umgeben war von dem Streben der Menschheit nach Rationalismus, nach Logik; es steckte doch etwas Tiefes dahinter. Es steckte nämlich das Folgende dahinter: daß diejenigen, die von der doppelten Wahrheit sprachen, allerdings nicht der Ansicht waren, daß theologisch Geoffenbartes und durch die Vernunft zu Erreichendes letzten Endes zweierlei ist, sondern vorläufig zweierlei Wahrheiten sind, und daß der Mensch deshalb zu zweierlei Wahrheiten kommt, weil er bis in das Innerste der Seele hinein den Sündenfall mitgemacht hat.

Diese Frage glimmt gewissermaßen in den Untergründen der Seele bis zu Albertus und 'Thomas hin. In den Untergründen der Seele glimmt die Frage: Ja, haben wir nicht auch in unserem Denken, in dem, was wir als Vernunft in uns sehen, die Erbsünde aufgenommen? Ist es nicht gerade, weil die Vernunft abgefallen ist von der Geistigkeit, daß uns die Vernunft andere Wahrheitsgehalte vorgaukelt als die wirkliche Wahrheit? -— Nehmen wir in unsere Vernunft den Christus auf, nehmen wir in unsere Vernunft etwas auf, was diese Vernunft also umwandelt, was diese Vernunft weiterentwickelt, dann erst stellt sie sich in Einklang mit der Wahrheit, die der Glaubensinhalt ist. Die Sündhaftigkeit der Vernunft lag in einer gewissen Weise zugrunde, indem die Denker der voralbertinischen und vorthomistischen Zeit von zwei Wahrheiten sprachen. Mit der Lehre von der Erbsünde und der Lehre von der Erlösung durch Christus wollten sie Ernst machen. Sie hatten noch nicht die Gedankenkraft, die Logizität dazu, aber sie wollten das ernsthaft machen. Sie legten sich die Frage vor: Wie erlöst der Christus in uns die Wahrheit der Vernunft, die der geistig geoffenbarten Wahrheit widerspricht? Wie werden wir bis in das Innerste hinein Christen? Denn unsere Vernunft ist schon verderbt; in ihr lebt die Erbsünde, daher widerspricht sie der reinen Glaubenswahrheit.

Und nun traten Albertus und Thomas auf, und für sie schien es zunächst, daß es unrichtig ist, daß, wenn wir uns rein logisch in die universalia in rebus vertiefen, wenn wir in uns aufnehmen dasjenige, was in den Dingen Wirklichkeit ist, daß wir uns dann in Sündhaftigkeit über die Welt ergehen. Es darf. nicht die gewöhnliche Vernunft sündhaft sein. Im Grunde lebt die Frage der Christologie in dieser Frage der Hochscholastik. Und was nicht gelöst werden konnte für die Hochscholastik, das war die Frage: Wie tritt der Christus in das menschliche Denken ein? Wie wird das menschliche Denken durchchristet? Wie führt der Christus das eigene menschliche Denken hinauf in die Sphäre, wo es zusammenwachsen kann mit dem, was nur der geistige Glaubensinhalt ist?

Das steckte noch als das eigentlich Bewegende in den Seelen der Scholastiker drinnen. Daher ist es, trotzdem die vollkommenste logische Technik in der Scholastik lebt, vor allen Dingen wichtig, daß man nicht die Resultate der Scholastik nimmt, sondern daß man durch die Antwort hinschaut auf die Fragestellungen; daß man absieht von dem, wozu sich im i12., im 13. Jahrhundert die Menschen hindurchringen können; daß man sieht auf die großen Probleme, die damals aufgestellt worden sind. Man war noch nicht mit der Christologie so weit gekommen, daß man die Erlösung der Menschen von der Erbsünde bis in das menschliche Denken hinein hat verfolgen können. Daher mußten Albertus und Thomas der Vernunft das Recht absprechen, die Stufen zu überschreiten, über die hinaufschreitend sie in die geistige Welt selbst eintreten könne. Und es blieb von der Hochscholastik die Frage zurück: Wie entwickelt sich das menschliche Denken hinauf zu einer Anschauung der geistigen Welt?

Selbst das wichtigste Ergebnis der Hochscholastik ist eine Frage, ist nicht dasjenige, was als Inhalt von der Hochscholastik existiert. Es ist die Frage: Wie trägt man die Christologie in das Denken hinein? Wie wird das Denken christlich gemacht? — Diese Frage steht welthistorisch da in dem Augenblicke, als Thomas von Aquino 1274 stirbt. Bis zu diesem Momente konnte er sich nur durchringen zu der Frage. Die Frage steht mit aller Herzinnigkeit da in der europäischen Geisteskultur. Was aus ihr werden soll, das konnte nur zunächst so angedeutet werden, daß man sagte: Der Mensch dringt bis zu einem gewissen Grade in das Wesen, in das geistige Wesen der Dinge ein. Aber dann muß der Glaubensinhalt kommen. Und die beiden dürfen einander nur nicht widersprechen, sie müssen in Konkordanz miteinander sein. Aber die gewöhnliche Vernunft kann den Inhalt der höchsten Dinge, wie zum Beispiel die Trinität, die Inkarnation des Christus in dem Menschen Jesus und so weiter, nicht von sich aus begreifen. Die Vernunft kann begreifen nur so weit, daß sie sagen kann: Die Welt könnte in der Zeit entstanden sein, könnte aber auch von Ewigkeit her sein. Aber die Offenbarung sagt, sie ist in der Zeit entstanden. Wenn Sie die Vernunft noch einmal fragen, so finden Sie die Gründe, warum das In-der-Zeit-Entstehen das Vernünftigere, das Weisere ist.

So ist der Scholastiker hineingestellt in die ganze Zeit. Mehr als man denkt, lebt in aller heutigen Wissenschaft, in dem ganzen öffentlichen Leben der Gegenwart noch dasjenige fort, aber allerdings in einer besonderen Gestalt, was von der Scholastik übriggeblieben ist. Wie lebendig im Grunde genommen die Scholastik noch in unseren Seelen ist und welche Stellung zu dem, was noch lebt von der Scholastik, der gegenwärtige Mensch eigentlich einnehmen muß, davon wollen wir dann morgen sprechen.

2. The Essence of Thomism

What I particularly tried to emphasize yesterday was that in the intellectual development of the West, which then found expression in scholasticism, it is not only what can be grasped in abstract terms and what has taken place in abstract terms, in the development of abstract terms, that plays a role, but that behind this there is a real development of the impulses of Western humanity. What I mean is this: one can begin, as is usually done in the history of philosophy, by focusing on what one finds in the individual philosophers. One can trace how, in a sense, the ideas found in a personality of the 6th, 7th, 8th, or 9th century are then spun out by personalities of the 10th, 11th, 12th, or 13th century, and through such observation one can gain the impression that one thinker has taken over certain ideas from another and that there has been a certain evolution of ideas.

This is a historical view of intellectual life that should gradually be abandoned. For what takes place in this way, what is revealed from individual human souls, is actually only a symptom of a deeper process that lies, as it were, behind the scene of external events. And this event, which took place from a few centuries before Christianity was founded, then in the first centuries after Christ until the time of scholasticism, is a completely organic process in the development of Western humanity. Without looking at this organic process, it is just as impossible to gain insight into it as it is into what development let us say from the twelfth to the twentieth year of human life, if one does not consider the important impact at this age associated with sexual maturity and all the forces that work their way up from the depths of the human being. Thus, something emerges from the depths of this great organism of European humanity that can be characterized — one could also invent other characteristics — by saying: Those ancient poets who began their epic poems like Homer spoke very honestly and sincerely: Sing to me, goddess, of the wrath of Achilles, son of Peleus — or: Sing to me, Muse, of the deeds of the man who journeyed far. These people did not want to say a mere phrase; these people felt as an inner fact of their consciousness that it was not a single individual ego that wanted to express itself, but rather what was in fact felt as a higher spiritual-soul force that plays into the ordinary state of human consciousness.

And again — as I said yesterday — Klopstock was sincere and, in a certain sense, understood this fact, even if only instinctively, when he began his poem “Messiah”; not: Sing, O Muse — or: Sing, O Goddess, of the redemption of mankind — but when he said: Sing, immortal soul — that is: Sing, individual being that dwells in the individual human being as an individuality. When Klopstock wrote his Messiah, this individual feeling in the individual soul was already well advanced. But this inner urge to bring out individuality, to shape life individually, developed in the most eminent sense in the age that runs from the founding of Christianity to high scholasticism. In what the philosophers thought, one can only see the highest, that which rises to the very surface of what is taking place in the depths of all humanity: the individualization of the consciousness of European people. And an essential moment in the spread of Christianity through these centuries is the fact that those who were the bearers of this spread had to speak to a humanity that, from the depths of its being, was pushing people more and more toward an inner sense of individuality.

Only from this perspective can the individual events that took place in this era be understood. And only by looking at these facts can we understand the inner struggles that took place in personalities such as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, who wanted to grapple with Christianity on the one hand and philosophy on the other in the deepest depths of the human soul. Today, the usual writers of the history of philosophy have far too little information about the true nature of the inner struggles that found their final conclusion, so to speak, in Albert and Thomas, for this age to be described with even approximate clarity in the usual histories of philosophy. Many factors played a role in the inner lives of Albert and Thomas.

Outwardly, it appears as if Albertus Magnus, who lived from the 12th to the 13th century, and Thomas, who lived in the 13th century, only wanted to dialectically unite, on the one hand, Augustinianism, which we discussed yesterday, and Aristotelianism, on the other. One was the bearer of ecclesiastical ideas, the other the bearer of developed philosophical ideas. The search for harmony between the two runs like a thread through everything they wrote. But in all that is fixed in thought, as in a blossoming of Western feeling and will, there lives on infinitely much of what did not pass into that age which extends from about the middle of the 15th century to our own day, and from which we derive our common ideas for all the sciences and also for the whole of public life.

To people today, it seems paradoxical when they hear what we heard yesterday about Augustine's view of life: that Augustine actually believed that some people were predestined to receive divine grace without merit — for according to original sin, they should all perish — to receive divine grace and be saved, to be saved spiritually and mentally; that another part of humanity must perish spiritually and mentally, no matter what they do. — To people today, this seems paradoxical, perhaps even senseless. Anyone who can empathize with the age in which Augustine lived, in which Augustine received all those ideas and feelings that I characterized yesterday, will feel differently. They will feel that — especially as a person like Augustine, who stood in the midst of the struggle between the idea that embraced all humanity as a unity and the idea that wanted to crystallize the individuality of the human being out of this unified humanity — that one can understand why Augustine wanted to hold on to the ideas that did not yet take the individual human being into account as ancient ideas, which, still under the influence of ideas such as those of Plotinus, which I characterized yesterday, had only the general human in mind. But on the other hand, the urge for individuality also stirred in Augustine's soul. That is why these ideas are so concise, so concise in terms of the soul and the heart, why they are so full of human experience, and why Augustine becomes that infinitely sympathetic figure who makes such a deep impression when we look back on the centuries that preceded scholasticism.

Beyond Augustine, what held the individual people of the West together as Christians with their church — but only in the ideas of Augustine — was preserved for many. However, as I showed you yesterday, these ideas were simply unacceptable to Western humanity, which could not bear the thought of taking humanity as a whole, as a unified entity, and feeling itself to be only a part of it, and moreover a part that belonged to the section of humanity that was doomed to destruction. And so the Church felt compelled to resort to a way out.

Augustine continued his formidable struggle against Pelagius, the man who was already completely imbued with the individualistic impulse of the West. It was in this personality, a contemporary of Augustine, that we can see how advanced the feeling of individuality was, something that people of later centuries would not have had until much later. Therefore, he cannot help but say: There can be no question that man must remain completely uninvolved in his fate in the sensual world; the power through which the soul finds connection to that which lifts it from the entanglement of sensuality into the pure spiritual regions, where it can find its salvation and return to freedom and immortality, must be able to be born out of human individuality itself. This was what Augustine's opponents asserted: that the individual human being must find the strength to overcome original sin.

The Church stood in the middle between the two opponents and sought a way out. This way out was discussed many times. There was a lot of back and forth, and then a middle ground was reached, and I can leave it up to each of you to decide whether you consider this middle ground to be the golden mean or the copper mean in this case. The middle ground was taken: semi-Pelagianism. A formula was found that did not really say black or white, but proclaimed: It is true, as Augustine said, but it is not quite as Augustine said; nor is it quite as Pelagius said, but in a certain sense it is also as he said. And so one could say that although it is not by a wise eternal decree of the Godhead that some are condemned to sin and others to grace, that human beings have a share in their becoming sinful or in their being filled with grace, the fact is that although there is no divine predestination, there is divine foreknowledge. The deity knows in advance whether one will be a sinner or the other will be filled with grace.

When this dogma was spread, no further consideration was given to the fact that it was not really a matter of foreknowledge, but rather a matter of taking a clear-cut position on whether the individual human being can connect with the forces in his individual soul life that can lift him out of his separation from the divine-spiritual essence of the world and lead him back to the divine-spiritual essence of the world. So, for the dogmatic system, the question remains unresolved, and I would like to say: On the one hand compelled to focus on the dogmatic content of the Church, but on the other hand filled with the deepest reverence for the greatness of Augustine from their innermost feelings, Albertus and Thomas stood in high scholasticism in opposition to what developed as Western spiritual development within the Christian movement. And yet many things from earlier times still played a role. It lived on in such a way that, if one looks closely at the soul of Albertus and Thomas, one can see it at work in the depths of their souls, but one also realizes that they themselves are not fully aware of it, that it plays into their thoughts, but that they cannot put it into precise terms.

This must be taken into account, more so for the time of Albert and Thomas's high scholasticism than one would have to consider a similar phenomenon in our time, for example. I have already taken the liberty of emphasizing the reason for this in my “World and Life Views in the Nineteenth Century,” which was then expanded into my book “The Riddles of Philosophy,” where the task was different and therefore the relevant passage could not be repeated, as I will take the liberty of noting. It is certainly true—and we will deal with this in detail tomorrow, but for now I will only mention it—that from this rise of individuality among thinkers, who now philosophically developed this rise of individuality, we experience what is the highest flowering of logical judgment, one might say the highest flowering of logical technique.

One can rant and rave as one likes from this or that party standpoint about scholasticism — all this ranting and raving is usually not based on any real expertise. For anyone who has a sense of the way in which, quite apart from the factual content, the acuity of thought plays out in anything that is explained scientifically or otherwise, who has a sense of how connections are thought together that must be thought together if life is to have meaning — for those who have a sense of all this and much else, it becomes clear that never before has thought been so precise, so internally logical and conscientious, and never since has thought been as it was in the age of high scholasticism. That is precisely the essential point, that pure thinking proceeds with mathematical certainty from idea to idea, from judgment to judgment, from conclusion to conclusion, in such a way that these thinkers always give account of themselves for the smallest step and the smallest little step.

One need only consider the milieu in which this thinking took place. It was not a form of thinking that took place in the same way as thinking takes place now in our noisy world. It was a form of thinking that took place in the quiet cell of a monastery or elsewhere far away from the hustle and bustle of the world. It was a form of thinking that was completely absorbed in the life of ideas, and it was a form of thinking that, due to other circumstances, was also able to develop pure thinking techniques. Today, it is indeed difficult to develop this pure thinking activity, because as soon as one attempts to present such thinking activity to the public, which wants nothing more than to string thoughts together based on their content, then the unobjective people, the illogical people, come along, pick up on everything possible, and throw their brutal partisan opinions at it. And since one is already a human being among other human beings, one has to deal with these things, which are actually nothing more than brutalities thrown in, often having nothing to do with what is actually at stake. Very soon, the inner peace that thinkers of the 12th and 13th centuries were able to enjoy, who did not have to pay so much attention to the contradictions of the unprepared in their social lives, is lost.

This and many other factors gave rise, particularly in this era, to the wonderfully vivid but also finely contoured intellectual activity that characterizes scholasticism and which was consciously pursued by people such as Albertus and Thomas.

But now consider this: on the one hand, there are demands of life that appear to be dealing with dogmas that have not been clarified, which in numerous cases was similar to the characterized semi-Pelagianism, and that people fought to uphold what they believed had to be upheld because it had been established by the Church, which was entitled to do so, and that they wanted to uphold it with the most astute thinking. Just imagine what it means to use the most astute thinking to shed light on what was of such a nature, as I had to characterize it for you according to Augustinianism. One must look into the inner workings of scholastic endeavour and not merely attempt to characterise this development from parristics to scholasticism on the basis of the concepts one has picked up.

There was a great deal of semi-unconsciousness at play in these minds of high scholasticism, and one can really only come to terms with it by looking beyond what I characterized yesterday and considering a figure such as the one who entered European intellectual life in a semi-mysterious way from the sixth century onwards, who became known under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite. Today, because there is not enough time, I cannot go into all the disputes about whether there is any truth in the fact that these writings were first composed in the sixth century, or whether the other view is correct, which traces the tradition of these writings back to much earlier periods. None of that matters, however. What matters is that the views of Dionysius the Areopagite were available to thinkers of the seventh and eighth centuries and even into the time of Thomas Aquinas, and that these writings contained, with a distinctly Christian nuance, what I characterized yesterday as Plotinianism, as the Neoplatonism of Plotinus, but in a special form, with a distinctly Christian nuance. And it became particularly significant for Christian thinkers of late antiquity and the beginning of the Middle Ages until the middle of the Middle Ages, right up to high scholasticism, how the writer of the Dionysian writings related to the ascent of the human soul to a view of the divine.

This Dionysius is usually described as having two paths to the divine. And indeed he does. One path is that he demands: if man wants to ascend from the external things that surround us in the world to the divine, he must try to find out from all the things that are there their perfections, their essence, he must try to go back to the most perfect, he must have the — So, one might say, for this Dionysius, the deity is the entity that must be provided with the most abundant range of names, that must be endowed with the predicates that can now, in turn, pour forth, as it were, and bring forth the individual things of the world through individualization and differentiation. — So, one might say, for this Dionysius, the deity is the entity that must be given the most abundant names, that must be endowed with the predicates that can be found as the most distinctive predicates from all the perfections of the world that can be brought together: Take everything that strikes you as perfect in the things of the world, name it, and then use that name to name the deity, and you will arrive at a conception of the deity. — That is the one way Dionysius proposes.

The other way is that he says: You will never reach the deity if you give it even a single name, because the whole process of the soul, which aims to find perfections in things, which aims to seek the essence of things, to summarize it, and then to attach it to the deity in this summary, never leads to what can be called recognition of the deity. You must become free from all that you have recognized in things. You must completely purify your consciousness of all that you have experienced in things. You must no longer know anything about what the world tells you. You must forget all the names you are accustomed to giving to things and put yourself in a state of mind where you know nothing of the whole world. If you can experience this in your state of mind, then you will experience the Nameless One, who is immediately misunderstood when any name is attached to him; then you will recognize God, the Super-God in his super-beauty. But even the names super-God and super-beauty would be disturbing. They can only serve to point you to that which you must experience as the nameless.

Those who can empathize with the spirituality of the ages from which Christianity was born can cope with it quite well. However, if one describes the course of human development, even for the first Christian centuries, as today's materialists do, then something like the writings of the Areopagite appear more or less as folly, as brainlessness. Then, as a rule, one simply rejects them. But if one can empathize with what was experienced and felt at that time, then one understands what a person like the Areopagite actually wanted: basically, only to express what countless others were striving for. For them, the deity was a being that could not be recognized at all if one took only one path to it. For him, the deity was a being that had to be approached rationally, by naming and finding names. But if you only follow this one path, you lose your way, you lose yourself in what is, in a sense, a godless universe. Then you will not reach God. But you have to follow this path, because without following it, you will not reach God either. But one must also follow another path. This is the path that strives for the nameless. If one follows each path alone, one will find the deity just as little; but if one follows both, they intersect, and one finds the deity at the point of intersection. It is not enough to argue about whether one path or the other is correct. Both are right; but each one, taken separately, leads to nothing. Both taken together, when the human soul finds itself at the point of intersection, lead to what is sought.

I can understand how some people today, who are accustomed to what is considered polemic, recoil from what is demanded here by the Areopagite. But what is demanded here was lived by the people who were the leading spiritual personalities in the first Christian centuries, and it then lived on traditionally in the Christian-philosophical current of the West, and it lived on until Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. It lived on, for example, through that personality whose name I mentioned yesterday, through Scotus Erigena, who lived at the court of Charles the Bald. This Scotus Erigena vividly reminds one of what I told you yesterday: I have never known a man as gentle as Vincenz Knauer, the historian of philosophy. Vincenz Knauer was always gentle, but he began to rant like a madman when the conversation turned to Plotinus or anything similar to Plotinus. And Franz Brentano, the witty philosopher who was always solemn, became quite unserious and ranted in his book “What kind of philosopher sometimes makes an epoch” – he means “Plotinus”.

Those who are more or less inclined toward rationalism, albeit with acumen and wit, will already rant when they see, in their mind's eye, what emanated from the Areopagite and then found its final significant revelation in this Erigena. In the last years of his life, he was still a Benedictine prior. But his own monks, as the legend says—the legend; I am not saying that this is literally true, but if it is not entirely true, it is approximately true—they tormented him with pins until he was dead because he still brought Plotinus's ideas into the ninth century. But beyond him, his ideas lived on, which were at the same time the further development of the ideas of the Areopagite. His writings disappeared more or less until late times; they then came down to posterity after all. In the 12th century, Scotus Erigena was declared a heretic. But that did not have the same significance as it did later and as it does today. Nevertheless, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas were also deeply influenced by the ideas of Scotus Erigena.

That is one thing we must regard as a legacy from earlier times, so to speak, when we speak of the essence of Thomism. But there is something else to consider. In Plotinus' philosophy, which I tried to characterize yesterday in relation to his cosmology, there is a very significant characteristic of human nature that has emerged from a sensual-supersensual vision. One only really regains respect for these things when one rediscovers them from a spiritual-scientific perspective. Then one readily makes the following confession. One says: if one reads something like Plotinus or what has been handed down from him without any preparation, it looks rather chaotic and convoluted. But when you rediscover the corresponding truths yourself, then these views, even if they were expressed differently in those days than they have to be expressed today, take on a very special character. And so we find in Plotinus a view that I would like to characterize in the following way.

Plotinus considers the human being with its physical, soul, and spiritual characteristics. He considers it initially from two points of view. He considers it first from the point of view of the soul's work on the body. If I were to speak in today's terms, I would have to say the following. Plotinus first says to himself: When one considers a child growing up in the world, one sees how, in a sense, what is formed from the spiritual-soul as the human body is still being developed. For Plotinus, everything that appears materially, especially in human beings — if I may use the expression, please don't take offense — is an exudation of the spiritual-soul, a crustation, so to speak, of the spiritual-soul. We can understand everything that appears physically as a crustation of the spiritual-soul. But then, when the human being has grown to a certain degree, the spiritual-soul forces cease to work into the physical. |

One could therefore say (it is drawn): First of all, we are dealing with such an activity of the spiritual-soul in the physical that this physical is formed and organized out of the spiritual-soul. The human organism is worked out from the spiritual-soul. When a certain state of maturity has been reached for something in organic activity, for example, for the activity to which the forces are applied that later appear as the forces of memory, then these very forces, which previously worked into the body, appear in a spiritual-soul metamorphosis. What first worked materially from the spiritual-soul realm frees itself when it has finished its work and appears as an independent entity: one might call it a soul mirror, if one wanted to speak in the sense of Plotinus.

It is extremely difficult to characterize these things with our present-day concepts. One comes close to them when one thinks, for example, of the following: Consider how human beings can remember things once their memory has reached a certain stage of maturity. They cannot do this as small children. Where are the forces that enable them to remember? They first work on the organism, shaping it. Once they have worked on the organism, they emancipate themselves purely spiritually and soulfully and continue to work on the organism, but now as spiritual and soulful beings. Only then does the actual core, the I, reside in this mirror of the soul. In characteristics, in a content of ideas that is extraordinarily pictorial, these views of what is actively working in the soul and of what then remains, what becomes, as it were, passive towards the outside world, so that it, like memory, takes in the impressions of the outside world and and then retains them. This dual work of the soul, this division of the soul into an active part, which actually builds up the body, and a passive part, is described in an extremely vivid way by that older layer of human feeling and human worldview which found its ultimate expression in Plotinus and then passed on to Augustine and his successors.

Rationalized and translated into more physical terms, we find this view in Aristotelianism. Aristotle, in turn, had this view from Plato and also from what Plato based his work on. But when one reads Aristotle, it is as if one had to say: Aristotle himself strives to grasp everything in abstract terms that he had before him in ancient views. And so we see in the Aristotelian system, which now also propagated itself, which was, in a sense, the rationalistic form of what Plotinus had given in the other form, we see in what propagated itself as Aristotelianism up to Albertus and up to Thomas Aquinas, a kind of rationalized mysticism, a rationalistic description of the spiritual mystery of human existence.

Albertus and Thomas are aware that Aristotle, in a sense, brought down through abstract concepts what others had seen in visions. That is why they do not really view Aristotle in the same way as today's philosophy philologists, who have developed curious disputes about two concepts that originate from Aristotle. But since Aristotle's writings have not been passed down to posterity in their entirety, these two concepts are found without any context in Aristotle's work — which is always a fact that can give rise to many scholarly disputes — and two ideas are found in Aristotle. Aristotle sees in human nature that which unites the vegetative principle of man, the animal principle of man, the lower human principle, and then the higher human principle, that which Aristotle calls the nous, which scholasticism then calls the intellect. But Aristotle distinguishes between the nous poietikos and the nous pathetikos, between the active and passive spirit of man. The terms are no longer as distinctive as the Greek ones were, but one can still say that Aristotle distinguishes between the active mind, the active spirit of man, and the passive mind of man. What is meant by this?

It is impossible to understand what is meant by this without going back to the origin of these terms. Just as the other powers of the soul are involved in a different metamorphosis, the two types of intellect are involved in the structure of the human soul: the intellect, insofar as it acts as an active force, is still effective in the structure of the human being, but as intellect, not like memory, which ceases once and then emancipates itself as memory, but as intellect, acting throughout life, that is the Nous poietikos, that is what, individualizing itself out of the universe, builds up the body in the sense of Aristotle. It is nothing other than what Plotinus' active soul, which builds the human body, also is. And that which then emancipates itself, which is only there to take in the external world and to process the impressions of the external world dialectically, that is the Nous pathetikos, that is the suffering intellect, the intellectus possibilis. What confronts us in sharp dialectic and precise logic in scholasticism goes back to these ancient traditions. And one cannot come to terms with what was going on in the souls of the scholastics without taking into account the influence of these ancient traditions.

Because everything I have described to you played into the souls of the scholastics, the great question arose for them, which is usually perceived as the real problem of scholasticism. At a time when humanity had a vision that produced such things as Platonism or its rationalistic filtration, Aristotelianism, but when individual feeling had not yet reached its peak, scholastic problems could not yet exist. For what we today call understanding, what we today call intellect, and which on the one hand has its origin in scholastic terminology, is precisely an outflow of the individual human being. If we all think alike, it is only because we are all organized individually in the same way and because the mind is linked to this individuality that is organized in the same way in all human beings. You already think differently insofar as you are differentiated. But these are nuances that have nothing to do with actual logic. Actual logical and dialectical thinking, however, is an outflow of the general human, but individually differentiated, organization.

So when a person feels that they are an individual, they stand there and say to themselves: Thoughts arise in people through which the outside world is represented internally; in a sense, thoughts are compiled from within, which in turn are supposed to give a picture of the world. On the one hand, ideas are at work within the human being that are linked to individual things, such as a single bull or a single human being, as Augustine says. But then the human being has other inner experiences, such as dreams, for which he cannot initially find such an external representative. They come to experiences that they form themselves, which are pure chimeras, as was the case with the centaur or similar chimeras in scholasticism.

Then, on the other hand, there are those concepts and ideas that actually shimmer in both directions: humanity, the lion type, the wolf type, and so on. These are the general concepts which the scholastics, according to ancient usage, called universals. When things were as I described to you yesterday, when people rose up, as it were, to these universals and perceived them as the lowest limit of the spirit world revealed to man through contemplation, there were simply these universals — humanity, animality, lionhood, and so on — were precisely what revealed the spiritual world, the intelligible world, what the soul experienced as an outflow of the supersensible world. In order to experience this, it was necessary not yet to have within oneself that individual feeling which then lived itself out in the centuries described. That individualized feeling led people to say to themselves: One ascends from the things of the senses to that boundary where the more or less abstract, but nevertheless experienced things are, the universals of humanity, lionhood, and so on.

Scholasticism understood very well that one cannot simply say: These are mere concepts, mere summaries of the external world — but for scholasticism this became a problem with which it struggled. We must form such general concepts, such universal concepts, out of our individuality. But when we look out into the world, we do not have humanity, but individual human beings; we do not have wolfhood, but individual wolves. But on the other hand: We cannot see what we conceive as wolfhood or lambhood in such a way that we have once formed matter in a lamb-like way and another time in a wolf-like way, and that wolfhood and lambhood are only combinations, and that the material contained in these summaries is the only reality. We cannot simply accept this, because if we do, then we would have to assume that if we lock up a wolf and make sure that it only eats lambs for a certain period of time, until its metabolism is completely transformed, it will then be completely filled with lamb matter; but it will not become a lamb. Matter does not make it so; it remains a wolf. So wolfhood is something that cannot be easily linked to the material, because materially the whole wolf is lamb, but it remains a wolf.

Today, this is often a problem that people do not take seriously. It was a problem that people wrestled with with every fiber of their soul in scholasticism, especially in its heyday. And this problem was directly related to the interests of the church. We can get an idea of how it relates to the interests of the church if we consider the following.

Before Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas appeared with their special interpretation of philosophy, there had already been people such as Roscellin, for example, who made the claim and were also of the opinion that these general concepts, these universals, are actually nothing more than what we summarize from external individual things; they are actually mere words, mere names. — And a certain nominalism had developed that saw only words in general things, in universals. But Roscellin took nominalism dogmatically seriously and applied it to the Trinity, saying: If — as he believed to be correct — what is summarized is only a word, then the Trinity is only a word, and the individuals are the only reality: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Then only the human mind can grasp these three through a name: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Medieval minds extended such things to their ultimate consequences. The Church was compelled at the Synod of Soissons to declare Roscellin's view to be partial polytheism and the doctrine to be heretical. So there was a certain calamity in relation to nominalism. It was therefore a dogmatic interest that merged with a philosophical one.

Today, of course, such a situation is no longer perceived as something real. At that time, however, it was perceived as something very real, and it is precisely the relationship between universals and individual things that Thomas and Albertus struggle with intellectually, and this is the most important problem for them. Basically, everything else is just a consequence, in the sense that everything else has been colored by the way they approached this problem. But it is precisely in the way Albertus and Thomas approached this problem that all the forces I have described to you so far come into play, all the forces that had remained as tradition from the Areopagite, that had remained from Plotinus, that had passed through the soul of Augustine, through Erigena and through many others, — all of this plays into the particular way of forming thoughts that now came to light, first through Albertus and then in a broad philosophical justification by Thomas. And one still knew: There have been people who looked beyond concepts into the spiritual world, into the intellectual world, into the world of which Thomism also speaks as a reality, in which it sees the immaterial intellectual beings it calls angels. These are not mere abstractions, they are real beings, only without bodies. They are the beings that Thomas places in the tenth sphere. Thinking of the Earth orbiting the sphere of the Moon, Mercury, Venus, the Sun, and so on, he then comes to the eighth, the ninth sphere, and what was the Empyrean, that is, the tenth sphere. He imagines all of this to be thoroughly permeated with intelligences, and the intelligences to which he initially refers are those which, in a sense, allow what they have at their lowest limit to shine down so that the human soul can experience it.

But as I have now expressed it, in this form, which is more closely based on Plotinianism, it does not arise from mere individual feeling, which scholasticism had just brought itself to accept, but for Albertus and Thomas it remained a belief that above the abstract concepts there was the revelation of these abstract concepts. And for them the question arose: What reality do these abstract concepts have?

Now, both Albertus and Thomas still had an idea of the fact that the soul-spiritual works on the physical and that the soul-spiritual is subsequently reflected when enough work has been done on the physical. They had ideas about all of this. They now also had ideas about what a person becomes in their individual life, how they develop from year to year, from decade to decade, precisely through what they take in from the outside world and process through impressions of the outside world. And so the idea arose that we do indeed have the world around us, but this world is a revelation of what is supermundane, what is spiritual. By observing the world, by turning our attention to individual minerals, plants, and animals, we sense, as it were, that behind them lies that which is revealed from higher spiritual worlds.

If we then observe the world of the natural kingdoms with logical analysis, with everything our soul enables us to do, with all the power of thought within us, we come to what has been placed in the natural kingdoms by the spiritual world. But then we must realize that we turn our gaze and our other sense organs toward this world. There we are in communication with the world. Then we walk away from the world. We preserve, as it were, as a memory, what we have taken in from the world. We look back in our memory. Only then does the universal, the general, something like “humanity” and the like, appear to us, only then does it appear to us in its inner conceptual form. So that Albertus and Thomas say: if you look back when your soul reflects what it has experienced in the outside world, then you have the universals alive in your soul. You then have universals. You form the concept of humanity from all the people you have encountered. If you only remembered individual things, you could only live in earthly names. By not living solely in earthly names, you must experience universals. Then you have the universalia post res, those that live in the soul after things. While man turns his soul to things, he does not have the same thing in his soul as he has afterwards when he remembers it, when it is reflected to him, as it were, from within, but he stands in a real relationship to things. He experiences their spiritual aspect; he only translates it into the form of universalia post rem.

By assuming that at the moment when man relates to his surroundings through his thinking faculty, he relates to something real, i.e., not merely to what the wolf is insofar as the eye sees it, the ear hears it, and so on, but insofar as man can think about it, forming the type “wolf,” he experiences something that is grasped conceptually in things, something that is not absorbed into the entities of the senses. He experiences the universalia in rebus, in things.

Now, the distinction is not entirely easy to make, because one usually thinks that what one has inside one's soul as a final reflection is also the same in things. No, it is not the same in the sense of Thomas Aquinas. What man experiences as an idea in his soul, explains to himself with his intellect, is that through which he experiences the real, the universal. So that, in form, the universals in things are different from the universals according to things, which then remain in the soul; but inwardly they are the same. Here you have one of the scholastic concepts that one does not usually bring to mind in all its sharpness. The universals in things and the universals according to things in the soul are the same in content, only different in form.

But then there is the fact that what is spread out in things, lives individualized, again points to what I characterized yesterday as lying in Plotinianism, as the actually intelligible world. Here again are the same contents that are in things, according to things in the human soul, identical in content, different in form, contained again in a different form, but again with the same content: these are the universalia ante res, before things. These are the universals as they are contained in the divine mind and in the minds of the servants of the divine, the angelic beings.

Thus, what in earlier times was immediate spiritual-sensory-supersensory perception becomes perceptions that are merely depicted in sensory images, because, even according to the Areopagite, one cannot even name what one perceives supersensorily if one wants to treat it in its true form. One can only point and say: it is not all that which external things are. — Thus, what was vision for the ancients, what presented itself to the ancients as a reality in the spiritual world, becomes for scholasticism something to be decided by all that acuity of thought, all that plasticity and fine logic of which I have spoken to you today. The problem that was previously solved through vision has been brought down into the sphere of thought, into the sphere of reason. That is the essence of Thomism, the essence of Albertinism, the essence of high scholasticism. Above all, it sees that in its time the feeling of human individuality has reached its culmination. Above all, it sees all problems before it in rational form, in logical form, in the form in which the thinker must grasp them.

Scholasticism essentially grapples with this form of world problems in the form of thought. And with this struggle and thinking, scholasticism stands at the center of church life, which I illuminated for you yesterday and today from various angles, albeit only with individual highlights. On the one hand, there is what one could believe in the 13th and 12th centuries could be achieved through thinking, through astute logic; on the other hand, there is what has been handed down as ecclesiastical dogma, there is the content of faith.

Let us take an example of how a thinker such as Thomas Aquinas views these two things. Thomas Aquinas says: Can the existence of God be proven by logic? Yes, it can. Thomas Aquinas gives a whole series of proofs. One of them, for example, is that he says: We can only gain knowledge by approaching the universalia in rebus, by looking into things. We cannot penetrate the spiritual world by looking — that is simply the personal experience of this age. We can only penetrate the spiritual world with human powers by delving into things, by extracting from them what we can call universalia in rebus. Then we can infer what these universalia ante res are beforehand, he says. We see the world in motion; one thing always moves another because it is itself in motion. Thus we move from one moving thing to another moving thing, from the other moving thing to yet another moving thing. This cannot go on indefinitely; we must arrive at a first mover. But if this were also in motion, we would have to move on to another mover. We must therefore arrive at an unmoved mover. — Thomas has thus arrived — and Albertus also comes to the same conclusion — at the Aristotelian unmoved mover, at the first cause. Recognizing God as a necessary first being, as a necessary unmoved first mover, is a matter of logical thinking.

There is no such train of thought that leads to the Trinity. However, it has been handed down. Human thinking can only go so far as to try to determine whether the Trinity is absurd. One finds that it is not absurd, but one cannot prove it; one must believe it, one must accept it as a concept that human intellect, left to its own devices, cannot rise to.

Scholasticism thus faces the question that was so significant at the time: How far can one get with the human mind left to its own devices? But through the development of time, it was placed in a very special way in the depths of this problem, because other thinkers had gone before. They had accepted something that seemed completely absurd. They had said that something could be theologically true and philosophically false. One could say outright: it may well be that things are handed down dogmatically, such as the Trinity; but when one thinks about the same question, one comes to the opposite conclusion. It is quite possible that reason leads to different conclusions than the content of faith. — And that is important, that was the other thing the scholastics were faced with: the doctrine of double truth. That is what the two thinkers Albertus and Thomas placed particular emphasis on: reconciling the content of faith with the content of reason, not seeking contradiction between what reason can think, albeit only up to a certain limit, and the content of faith. But what reason can conceive must not contradict the content of faith, and the content of faith must not contradict reason.

This was radical at the time, because the majority of influential church authorities adhered firmly to the doctrine of double truth: that, on the one hand, humans simply had to think something reasonable, in terms of content, in one form, and that the content of faith could give it to them in another form, and that they had to live with these two forms of truth. I believe one could get a sense of historical development by considering that, just a few centuries ago, people were grappling with such problems with all their soul. For these things still resonate in our times. We still live with these problems. How we live with them is what we will discuss tomorrow. Today I wanted to characterize the essence of Thomism in general as it was lived at that time.

Now, you see, the main problem facing Albertus and Thomas was this: How does the content of human reason relate to the content of faith? How can what the Church prescribes as belief be, first, understood and, second, defended against what is opposed to it? People like Albertus and Thomas had a lot to do in this regard. For in Europe, it was not only what I have characterized that existed, but all kinds of other views as well. With the spread of Islam and the spread of the Arabs, other views also gained ground in Europe. And some of those views, which I characterized yesterday as Manichean, remained throughout Europe.

But something like what is known as representation also existed through the teachings of Averroes in the 12th century, who said: What man thinks with his pure intellect does not belong to him in particular, but to all of humanity. — Averroes says: We do not have a mind for ourselves; we each have a body for ourselves, but not everyone has a mind for themselves. A has his own body, but the mind is the same as that of B and C. One could say that for Averroes, humanity is such that there is a unified intelligence, a unified mind, into which all individuals are submerged. There they live with their heads, so to speak. When they die, the body withdraws from this universal mind. There is no immortality in the sense of an individual continuing after death. What lasts is only the universal mind, only that which is common to all human beings.

For Thomas, the situation was such that he had to reckon with this universality of the mind, but he had to take the position that what is universal mind is not only so intimately united with what is now individual memory in the individual human being, but also, during life, is united with what are the active forces of the organization, the physical organization, unites in such a way, forms such a unity, that everything that works in the human being as the formative, vegetative forces, animal forces, as the forces of memory, that all of this is, in a sense, attracted during life by the universal intellect and disposition. So Thomas imagines that the individual is attracted by the universal and then draws into the spiritual world that which has attracted his universal, so that he carries it there. For Albertus and Thomas, therefore, there can be no pre-existence, but there can be a post-existence. This is also what Aristotle believed. In this respect, Aristotelianism is continued by these thinkers.

Thus, the great logical questions of universals are linked to the questions concerning the fate of individual human beings in the world. Ultimately, everything—even if I were to characterize for you the cosmology of Thomas Aquinas, even if I were to characterize for you the extraordinarily broad natural history of Albertus, which covers almost all areas and comprises numerous volumes—everything, in all its details, is influenced by what I had to characterize for you as the general logical essence of Albertinism and Thomism. This logical essence consisted in the following: we cannot reach up with our reason, what was then called the intellect; up to a certain limit, we can penetrate everything with astute logic and dialectics, but then we must penetrate the content of faith. And so, as I have characterized it, these two things stood opposite each other without contradicting each other: what we grasp with our reason and what is revealed through the content of faith can both coexist.

But what was actually at stake? I believe this question can be approached from many different angles. What was actually at stake in world history as the essence of Albertinism and the essence of Thomism? You see, what is actually characteristic and important for Thomas is that, by straining his reason to prove God, he must at the same time add: one arrives at a conception of God that is rightly referred to as Yahweh in the Old Testament. — That is, by starting from the rational paths that the individual human soul can take, Thomas arrives at that unified God whom the Old Testament also referred to as Yahweh. If one wants to arrive at Christ, one must move on to the content of faith; one cannot arrive at him through what the human soul experiences in its own spirit.

Now, in the debates against which high scholasticism simply had to turn out of the spirit of the times, in these views of the double truth — that something could be theologically true and philosophically false — there is something even deeper in them, something that could not be grasped in an age when people were surrounded by humanity's striving for rationalism and logic; there was something profound behind it. Namely, that those who spoke of double truth did not believe that what is revealed theologically and what can be attained through reason are ultimately two different things, but rather that they are two truths for the time being, and that human beings arrive at two truths because they have experienced the Fall of Man in the depths of their souls.

This question smolders, as it were, in the depths of the soul until Albertus and Thomas. In the depths of the soul, the question smolders: Yes, have we not also accepted original sin in our thinking, in what we see as reason within ourselves? Is it not precisely because reason has fallen away from spirituality that reason deceives us with truths other than the real truth? — If we accept Christ into our reason, if we accept into our reason something that transforms this reason, that develops this reason further, only then does it come into harmony with the truth that is the content of faith. The sinfulness of reason was in a certain way fundamental, in that the thinkers of the pre-Albertine and pre-Thomistic period spoke of two truths. They wanted to take the doctrine of original sin and the doctrine of redemption through Christ seriously. They did not yet have the power of thought, the logic for this, but they wanted to take it seriously. They asked themselves the question: How does Christ redeem in us the truth of reason, which contradicts the spiritually revealed truth? How do we become Christians to the core? For our reason is already corrupt; original sin lives in it, and therefore it contradicts the pure truth of faith.

And now Albertus and Thomas appeared, and at first it seemed to them that it was incorrect that, if we immerse ourselves purely logically in the universalia in rebus, if we take in what is real in things, we then indulge in sinfulness over the world. Ordinary reason must not be sinful. Basically, the question of Christology lives on in this question of high scholasticism. And what could not be solved for high scholasticism was the question: How does Christ enter into human thinking? How is human thinking permeated by Christ? How does Christ lead human thinking up into the sphere where it can grow together with what is only the spiritual content of faith?

This was still the real driving force in the souls of the scholastics. Therefore, even though the most perfect logical technique lives in scholasticism, it is important above all not to take the results of scholasticism, but to look through the answers to the questions; to disregard what people in the 12th century and 13th centuries; that one looks at the great problems that were raised at that time. Christology had not yet progressed to the point where it was possible to trace the redemption of human beings from original sin into human thinking. Therefore, Albertus and Thomas had to deny reason the right to transcend the stages beyond which it could ascend into the spiritual world itself. And the question remained from high scholasticism: How does human thinking develop up to a perception of the spiritual world?

Even the most important result of high scholasticism is a question, not what exists as the content of high scholasticism. It is the question: How does one bring Christology into thinking? How is thinking made Christian? — This question stands in world history at the moment when Thomas Aquinas dies in 1274. Up to this moment, he could only bring himself to ask the question. The question stands with all sincerity in European intellectual culture. What was to become of it could only be hinted at by saying that man penetrates to a certain degree into the essence, into the spiritual essence of things. But then the content of faith must come. And the two must not contradict each other; they must be in concord with each other. But ordinary reason cannot comprehend the content of the highest things, such as the Trinity, the incarnation of Christ in the man Jesus, and so on, on its own. Reason can only comprehend to the extent that it can say: The world could have come into being in time, but it could also be eternal. But revelation says that it came into being in time. If you ask reason again, you will find the reasons why coming into being in time is the more reasonable, the wiser option.

Thus, the scholastic is placed within the whole of time. More than one might think, what remains of scholasticism still lives on in all of today's science and in the whole of contemporary public life, albeit in a special form. Tomorrow we will talk about how alive scholasticism still is in our souls and what position contemporary man must actually take towards what still lives on from scholasticism.