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The Rudolf Steiner Archive

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322. The Boundaries of Natural Science: Lecture II 28 Sep 1920, Dornach
Translated by Frederick Amrine, Konrad Oberhuber

It becomes useless the moment we try to proceed toward the kind of phenomenalism that Goethe the scientist cultivated, the moment we want something more than natural science, namely Goetheanism.
And conversely, if I place light behind dark, there appear the colors which lie toward the red end of the spectrum. What was it that Goethe was actually seeking to do? Goethe wanted to find simple phenomena within the complex but above all such phenomena as allowed him to remain within this limit [see illustration], by means of which he did not roll on into a realm that one reaches only through a certain mental inertia. Goethe wanted to adhere to a strict phenomenalism. If we remain within phenomena and if we strive with our thinking to come to a halt there rather than allow ourselves to be carried onward by inertia, the old question arises in a new way.
82. So That Man may Become Fully Human: Anthroposophy and Agnosticism 12 Apr 1922, The Hague

If the smallest event were missing, there would be a slight change, but a change nonetheless. Just think what, say, the sixty-year-old Goethe would have been if he had not experienced Italy. With Goethe, it is almost tangible. He did not go to Italy on a whim, but because there was a deep yearning within him.
Now, anyone who sees more deeply into these matters must ask themselves the following: We once had to advance to that in the development of humanity, which I strictly defended on one of the last lecture evenings for the external natural sciences, especially the inorganic natural sciences; we had to advance to pure phenomenalism, as Goethe also demanded. To that pure phenomenalism, which no longer uses thinking to construct all kinds of atomic worlds behind sense perceptions that can no longer be perceived; which uses thinking merely to read sense perceptions, to remain within the phenomenal world, to arrange the phenomena in such a way that they appear to us as archetypal phenomena in the Goethean sense.
One such negative instance is, for example, agnosticism, when it represents the other side of phenomenalism and one only wants to stop at this phenomenalism. The other, the positive, is part of it. This positive seeks to reach anthroposophy on the spiritual path of knowledge.
76. The Stimulating Effect of Anthroposophy on the Individual Sciences: Philosophy 04 Apr 1921, Dornach

And in the most stringent and admirable way, Goethe repeatedly demands this pure phenomenalism. But the more one strives towards this pure phenomenalism, the more one must strive for a special peculiarity of the conceptual world.
And if one is at all to arrive at a philosophical understanding in our age, one must reach the soil in which this pure thinking is found. Goethe sensed what lies in this pure thinking. Others can only feel it with him. That is why they always quote a Goethe saying incorrectly, which says something like that the kind God has saved him from “thinking about thinking”. As Goethe meant it, it is already correct. Goethe never “thought about thinking” because, admittedly, one cannot achieve this pure thinking with the thinking that one has become accustomed to.
35. Collected Essays on Philosophy and Anthroposophy 1904–1923: Spiritual Science and Contemporary Epistemology 01 Jan 1917,

Anyone who is willing to consider my earlier writings impartially, including the introductory essay I wrote in the 1880s about Goethe's scientific writings in Kürschner's German National Literature, will feel the weight of the sentence I wrote in 1897 in my book 'Goethe's World View'.
Eduard von Hartmann wrote: “In this book, Hume's phenomenalism, absolute in itself, is not reconciled with Berkeley's phenomenalism, based on God; nor is this immanent or subjective phenomenalism reconciled at all with Hegel's transcendental panlogism, nor is Hegel's panlogism reconciled with Goethe's individualism.
Absolute phenomenalism, as it was realized in Hume's philosophy, appears to have been overcome by the attempt to characterize thinking in such a way that, through this, the phenomenal character of the sensory world view is lost and it is made into an appearance of an objective world; Berkeley's subjective phenomenalism loses its justification in the face of this view , in that it is shown that in thinking man grows together with the objective world and that therefore the assertion loses all meaning that world phenomena do not exist outside of being perceived; in contrast to Hegel's Panlogism, thinking is seen as the initial link for purely spiritual human cognitive abilities, not as the final link of ordinary consciousness, which only reflects the sensory world in shadowy ideas; Goethe's individualism is developed by showing how the understanding of human freedom is only possible through a world view that is based on the epistemological foundations of the “Philosophy of Freedom”.
324. Anthroposophy and Science: Lecture VI 22 Mar 1921, Stuttgart
Translated by Walter Stuber, Mark Gardner

No doubt you have had some dealings with what could be called phenomenalism in the sense of a Goethean world view. In arranging experiments and observations, Goethe used the intellect differently from the way it is used in recent phases of modern thought. Goethe used the intellect as we use it in reading. When we read, we form a whole out of the individual letters.
And so Goethe comes to a true understanding of phenomena—of what might be called the “letters” in the mineral-physical world.
75. The Relationship between Anthroposophy and the Natural Sciences: Agnosticism in Science and Anthroposophy 11 May 1922, Leipzig

By visualizing the mathematical relationship to the external world, one gradually comes to realize that in inorganic sciences, thinking can only have a serving character at first, that nowhere are we entitled to bring anything of our own thoughts into the world if we want to have pure science. But this leads to what is called phenomenalism, and which, though it may be criticized in many details, has, in its purest form, been followed by Goethe.
How do we found moral science in an age in which we must justifiably recognize phenomenalism for external nature? That was the big question for me at the time I wrote my “Philosophy of Freedom.”
on the ground of modern natural science, yes, on the ground of a phenomenalism regarding what can be fathomed by the process of knowledge from the external world of the senses.
322. The Boundaries of Natural Science: Lecture III 29 Sep 1920, Dornach
Translated by Frederick Amrine, Konrad Oberhuber

If one can raise to vivid inner life that which works unconsciously in mathematics and the mathematical sciences and can carry it over into another realm, one discovers the same mathematical element that Goethe viewed. Goethe modestly confessed that he did not have proficiency in mathematics in any conventional sense.
Extraordinarily interesting! For despite Goethe's modest confession that he had not acquired a proficiency in the handling of actual mathematical concepts and theories, he does require one thing: he calls for a phenomenalism such as he employed in his own scientific studies.
Goethe was able, therefore, to suffuse with light the one pole that otherwise remains so dark if we postulate only the concept of matter.
251. The History of the Anthroposophical Society 1913–1922: Report on the Lecture Tour in Holland and England in 1922 30 Apr 1922, Dornach

But by being driven in a justified way through phenomenalism to agnosticism, one is precisely compelled to seek paths to the archetypes of existence in another field.
Linnaeus, despite having such a great influence on Goethe, actually only had the influence that Goethe opposed him, that he developed the opposite view. Spinoza only influenced Goethe to arrive at a certain mode of expression, but he never appropriated Spinoza's inner life.
With this emotional thing that Goethe said about Shakespeare, the power with which Shakespeare worked in an educational way in Goethe is actually meant.
Reincarnation and Immortality: The Mystery of the Human Being 09 Oct 1916, Zurich
Translated by Michael Tapp, Elizabeth Tapp, Adam Bittleston

But the time will come when Goethe's Theory of Color will be vindicated by a more advanced kind of physics. I can refer to what I have said about the artistic side of this in my book Goethe's Conception of the World, and in my introduction to Goethe's scientific writings.
—Or let us take what Goethe says about the experience of the color red. Red, says Goethe, produces an experience purely according to its own nature.
Eduard von Hartmann therefore says: “In this book neither Hume's absolute phenomenalism nor Berkeley's phenomenalism based on God are reconciled, nor this more immanent or subjective, phenomenalism and the transcendental panlogism of Hegel, nor Hegel's panlogism and Goethean individualism.
37. Writings on the History of the Anthroposophical Movement and Society 1902–1925: My Dutch and English Journey 07 May 1922,

The first lecture was held by Dr. W. Stein on “Goethe's significance in the development of humanity as a whole”, after a warm welcome by G. Schubert Knobel, for which we all had to be grateful.
He spoke in The Hague about biological and chemical problems and also about “Free spiritual life through Anthroposophy”. In Kolisko, scientific phenomenalism has a champion who develops this side of Anthroposophical thinking objectively and from unbiased factual knowledge.
Theory is of no use in and of itself, except insofar as it allows us to believe in the coherence of phenomena. This can be learned from Goethe. I have described the individual voices that came together in a chorus in The Hague to form a whole.

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