The Rudolf Steiner Archive

1. Preliminary Remarks

[ 1 ] Epistemology is meant to be a scientific investigation of what all other sciences presuppose without examination: cognitive activity itself. Thus, from the very start, it is granted its character as the philosophical fundamental science. For only through it can we experience the value and significance of the insights the other sciences have attained. It forms in this regard the basis for all scientific striving. But clearly it can do justice to its task only if it is itself free of presuppositions, to the extent that this is possible, given the nature of the human ability to know. This is generally well recognized. Nevertheless, on closer examination of the better-known epistemological systems, one finds that a whole series of presuppositions are made at the very start of their investigations that seriously detract from the persuasive power of their further arguments. One notices in particular that certain hidden assumptions are usually made already in the statement of the basic epistemological problems. But if the questions a science asks are wrong, then from the very start one must seriously doubt that a correct solution will ensue. The history of the sciences teaches us after all that countless errors, from which entire ages have suffered, can be traced back purely and simply to the fact that certain problems were wrongly stated. We do not need to go all the way back to the physics of Aristotle or to the Ars Magna of Raymond Lully in order to confirm this statement, but can find examples enough in recent times. The numerous questions about the significance of rudimentary organs in certain organisms could only be asked in the right way after the necessary context had been established through the discovery of the biogenetic law. As long as biology stood under the influence of teleological views, it was impossible to formulate the relevant problems m such a way that a satisfying answer would have been possible. What fantastic pictures one had, for example, about the task of the so-called pineal gland in the human brain, for as long as anyone was asking about some such task! Only when one sought clarity in this matter on the path of comparative anatomy and asked oneself whether this organ were not merely a vestige in man of lower evolutionary forms, did one reach a goal. Another example: What modifications took place in the way one asked certain questions in physics after the discovery of the laws of the mechanical equivalent of heat and of the conservation of energy! In short, the success of scientific investigation is essentially dependent upon whether one is in a position to formulate the problems correctly. And even though epistemology, as a precondition for all the other sciences, occupies an altogether special place, one can nevertheless foresee that the successful progress of its investigations will also be possible only if the basic questions are presented in a correct form.

[ 2 ] The following expositions strive, first and foremost, after a formulation of the problem of knowledge that will do strict justice to the character of epistemology as the science that is totally free of presuppositions. A further aim of this book is to shed light on the relation of J.G. Fichte's theory of science to such a philosophical basic science. Our reason for bringing precisely Fichte's attempt to create an absolutely certain foundation for the sciences into closer connection with our task will become clear of itself in the course of our investigations.